diff options
author | Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> | 2019-10-17 16:10:37 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> | 2019-11-06 08:14:33 +0300 |
commit | f9fab3d9860050ed69b7cee348a449a7853a3259 (patch) | |
tree | 1abdd095c00f84eb72c60b1dd5257b220ae7e745 | |
parent | 19f5f88ed779180f16e236949e18389a0dca4aae (diff) | |
download | linux-f9fab3d9860050ed69b7cee348a449a7853a3259.tar.xz |
scsi: target: iscsi: rename some variables to avoid confusion.
This patch renames some variables in chap_server_compute_hash() to make it
harder to confuse the initiator's challenge with the target's challenge
when the mutual chap authentication is used.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017131037.9903-4-mlombard@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 40 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c index f3973ab19da2..0e54627d9aa8 100644 --- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c +++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c @@ -215,8 +215,8 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( unsigned long id; unsigned char id_as_uchar; unsigned char type; - unsigned char identifier[10], *challenge = NULL; - unsigned char *challenge_binhex = NULL; + unsigned char identifier[10], *initiatorchg = NULL; + unsigned char *initiatorchg_binhex = NULL; unsigned char *digest = NULL; unsigned char *response = NULL; unsigned char *client_digest = NULL; @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol; struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL; struct shash_desc *desc = NULL; - int auth_ret = -1, ret, challenge_len; + int auth_ret = -1, ret, initiatorchg_len; digest = kzalloc(chap->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!digest) { @@ -256,15 +256,15 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( memset(chap_n, 0, MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE); memset(chap_r, 0, MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH); - challenge = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge) { + initiatorchg = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!initiatorchg) { pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge buffer\n"); goto out; } - challenge_binhex = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge_binhex) { - pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge_binhex buffer\n"); + initiatorchg_binhex = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!initiatorchg_binhex) { + pr_err("Unable to allocate initiatorchg_binhex buffer\n"); goto out; } /* @@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( * Get CHAP_C. */ if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_C", CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, - challenge, &type) < 0) { + initiatorchg, &type) < 0) { pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n"); goto out; } @@ -408,28 +408,28 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n"); goto out; } - challenge_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(challenge), 2); - if (!challenge_len) { + initiatorchg_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(initiatorchg), 2); + if (!initiatorchg_len) { pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n"); goto out; } - if (challenge_len > 1024) { + if (initiatorchg_len > 1024) { pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n"); goto out; } - if (hex2bin(challenge_binhex, challenge, challenge_len) < 0) { + if (hex2bin(initiatorchg_binhex, initiatorchg, initiatorchg_len) < 0) { pr_err("Malformed CHAP_C\n"); goto out; } - pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge); + pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", initiatorchg); /* * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by * the target. */ - if (challenge_len == chap->challenge_len && - !memcmp(challenge_binhex, chap->challenge, - challenge_len)) { + if (initiatorchg_len == chap->challenge_len && + !memcmp(initiatorchg_binhex, chap->challenge, + initiatorchg_len)) { pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing" " login attempt\n"); goto out; @@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( /* * Convert received challenge to binary hex. */ - ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, challenge_binhex, challenge_len, + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, initiatorchg_binhex, initiatorchg_len, digest); if (ret < 0) { pr_err("crypto_shash_finup() failed for ma challenge\n"); @@ -487,8 +487,8 @@ out: kzfree(desc); if (tfm) crypto_free_shash(tfm); - kfree(challenge); - kfree(challenge_binhex); + kfree(initiatorchg); + kfree(initiatorchg_binhex); kfree(digest); kfree(response); kfree(server_digest); |