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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2016-04-06 18:14:26 +0300
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2016-04-12 00:43:43 +0300
commita511e1af8b12f44c6e55786c463c9f093c214fb6 (patch)
tree68451cc38ab74ac81f11825a407008c01918147b /certs
parent99716b7cae8263e1c7e7c1987e95d8f67071ab3e (diff)
downloadlinux-a511e1af8b12f44c6e55786c463c9f093c214fb6.tar.xz
KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'certs')
-rw-r--r--certs/system_keyring.c20
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index 417d65882870..4e2fa8ab01d6 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -18,12 +18,26 @@
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
-struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
+static struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted - Restrict keyring addition by system CA
+ *
+ * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
+ * being vouched for by a key in the system keyring.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ unsigned long flags,
+ const union key_payload *payload)
+{
+ return restrict_link_by_signature(system_trusted_keyring,
+ type, payload);
+}
+
/*
* Load the compiled-in keys
*/
@@ -37,7 +51,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
- keyring_restrict_trusted_only, NULL);
+ restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
return 0;