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authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2018-06-18 20:22:39 +0300
committerHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2018-07-01 16:00:43 +0300
commited331adab35bcddc595dae066522ca6336ee9210 (patch)
tree7d9daa5ac6b7d61166803e51458e8f512ae88013 /crypto/vmac.c
parentbb29648102335586e9a66289a1d98a0cb392b6e5 (diff)
downloadlinux-ed331adab35bcddc595dae066522ca6336ee9210.tar.xz
crypto: vmac - add nonced version with big endian digest
Currently the VMAC template uses a "nonce" hardcoded to 0, which makes it insecure unless a unique key is set for every message. Also, the endianness of the final digest is wrong: the implementation uses little endian, but the VMAC specification has it as big endian, as do other VMAC implementations such as the one in Crypto++. Add a new VMAC template where the nonce is passed as the first 16 bytes of data (similar to what is done for Poly1305's nonce), and the digest is big endian. Call it "vmac64", since the old name of simply "vmac" didn't clarify whether the implementation is of VMAC-64 or of VMAC-128 (which produce 64-bit and 128-bit digests respectively); so we fix the naming ambiguity too. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/vmac.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/vmac.c130
1 files changed, 112 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/vmac.c b/crypto/vmac.c
index bb2fc787d615..bf1e385bc684 100644
--- a/crypto/vmac.c
+++ b/crypto/vmac.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#define VMAC_KEY_SIZE 128/* Must be 128, 192 or 256 */
#define VMAC_KEY_LEN (VMAC_KEY_SIZE/8)
#define VMAC_NHBYTES 128/* Must 2^i for any 3 < i < 13 Standard = 128*/
+#define VMAC_NONCEBYTES 16
/* per-transform (per-key) context */
struct vmac_tfm_ctx {
@@ -63,6 +64,11 @@ struct vmac_desc_ctx {
unsigned int partial_size; /* size of the partial block */
bool first_block_processed;
u64 polytmp[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64]; /* running total of L2-hash */
+ union {
+ u8 bytes[VMAC_NONCEBYTES];
+ __be64 pads[VMAC_NONCEBYTES / 8];
+ } nonce;
+ unsigned int nonce_size; /* nonce bytes filled so far */
};
/*
@@ -480,6 +486,17 @@ static int vmac_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
dctx->partial_size = 0;
dctx->first_block_processed = false;
memcpy(dctx->polytmp, tctx->polykey, sizeof(dctx->polytmp));
+ dctx->nonce_size = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmac_init_with_hardcoded_nonce(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ vmac_init(desc);
+ memset(&dctx->nonce, 0, VMAC_NONCEBYTES);
+ dctx->nonce_size = VMAC_NONCEBYTES;
return 0;
}
@@ -489,6 +506,15 @@ static int vmac_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *p, unsigned int len)
struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int n;
+ /* Nonce is passed as first VMAC_NONCEBYTES bytes of data */
+ if (dctx->nonce_size < VMAC_NONCEBYTES) {
+ n = min(len, VMAC_NONCEBYTES - dctx->nonce_size);
+ memcpy(&dctx->nonce.bytes[dctx->nonce_size], p, n);
+ dctx->nonce_size += n;
+ p += n;
+ len -= n;
+ }
+
if (dctx->partial_size) {
n = min(len, VMAC_NHBYTES - dctx->partial_size);
memcpy(&dctx->partial[dctx->partial_size], p, n);
@@ -544,30 +570,62 @@ static u64 vhash_final(const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx,
return l3hash(ch, cl, tctx->l3key[0], tctx->l3key[1], partial * 8);
}
-static int vmac_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+static int __vmac_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u64 *mac)
{
const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- static const u8 nonce[16] = {}; /* TODO: this is insecure */
- union {
- u8 bytes[16];
- __be64 pads[2];
- } block;
int index;
u64 hash, pad;
+ if (dctx->nonce_size != VMAC_NONCEBYTES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * The VMAC specification requires a nonce at least 1 bit shorter than
+ * the block cipher's block length, so we actually only accept a 127-bit
+ * nonce. We define the unused bit to be the first one and require that
+ * it be 0, so the needed prepending of a 0 bit is implicit.
+ */
+ if (dctx->nonce.bytes[0] & 0x80)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* Finish calculating the VHASH of the message */
hash = vhash_final(tctx, dctx);
/* Generate pseudorandom pad by encrypting the nonce */
- memcpy(&block, nonce, 16);
- index = block.bytes[15] & 1;
- block.bytes[15] &= ~1;
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, block.bytes, block.bytes);
- pad = be64_to_cpu(block.pads[index]);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(VMAC_NONCEBYTES != 2 * (VMAC_TAG_LEN / 8));
+ index = dctx->nonce.bytes[VMAC_NONCEBYTES - 1] & 1;
+ dctx->nonce.bytes[VMAC_NONCEBYTES - 1] &= ~1;
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, dctx->nonce.bytes,
+ dctx->nonce.bytes);
+ pad = be64_to_cpu(dctx->nonce.pads[index]);
/* The VMAC is the sum of VHASH and the pseudorandom pad */
- put_unaligned_le64(hash + pad, out);
+ *mac = hash + pad;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmac_final_le(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ u64 mac;
+ int err;
+
+ err = __vmac_final(desc, &mac);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ put_unaligned_le64(mac, out);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmac_final_be(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ u64 mac;
+ int err;
+
+ err = __vmac_final(desc, &mac);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ put_unaligned_be64(mac, out);
return 0;
}
@@ -593,7 +651,8 @@ static void vmac_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
crypto_free_cipher(tctx->cipher);
}
-static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+static int vmac_create_common(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
+ bool vmac64)
{
struct shash_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
@@ -609,10 +668,10 @@ static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
return PTR_ERR(alg);
err = -EINVAL;
- if (alg->cra_blocksize != 16)
+ if (alg->cra_blocksize != VMAC_NONCEBYTES)
goto out_put_alg;
- inst = shash_alloc_instance("vmac", alg);
+ inst = shash_alloc_instance(tmpl->name, alg);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
@@ -633,9 +692,15 @@ static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
inst->alg.descsize = sizeof(struct vmac_desc_ctx);
inst->alg.digestsize = VMAC_TAG_LEN / 8;
- inst->alg.init = vmac_init;
+ if (vmac64) {
+ inst->alg.init = vmac_init;
+ inst->alg.final = vmac_final_be;
+ } else {
+ pr_warn("vmac: using insecure hardcoded nonce\n");
+ inst->alg.init = vmac_init_with_hardcoded_nonce;
+ inst->alg.final = vmac_final_le;
+ }
inst->alg.update = vmac_update;
- inst->alg.final = vmac_final;
inst->alg.setkey = vmac_setkey;
err = shash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
@@ -649,6 +714,16 @@ out_put_alg:
return err;
}
+static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+ return vmac_create_common(tmpl, tb, false);
+}
+
+static int vmac64_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+ return vmac_create_common(tmpl, tb, true);
+}
+
static struct crypto_template vmac_tmpl = {
.name = "vmac",
.create = vmac_create,
@@ -656,14 +731,32 @@ static struct crypto_template vmac_tmpl = {
.module = THIS_MODULE,
};
+static struct crypto_template vmac64_tmpl = {
+ .name = "vmac64",
+ .create = vmac64_create,
+ .free = shash_free_instance,
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
static int __init vmac_module_init(void)
{
- return crypto_register_template(&vmac_tmpl);
+ int err;
+
+ err = crypto_register_template(&vmac_tmpl);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = crypto_register_template(&vmac64_tmpl);
+ if (err)
+ crypto_unregister_template(&vmac_tmpl);
+
+ return err;
}
static void __exit vmac_module_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_template(&vmac_tmpl);
+ crypto_unregister_template(&vmac64_tmpl);
}
module_init(vmac_module_init);
@@ -672,3 +765,4 @@ module_exit(vmac_module_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("VMAC hash algorithm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("vmac");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("vmac64");