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authorJiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>2019-08-20 03:17:44 +0300
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2019-08-20 07:54:15 +0300
commit99d5cadfde2b1acb7650021df5abaa5ec447dd10 (patch)
tree49af3ab9d60ad3191426f616750002f1720562cc /crypto
parentfef5dad9876034253d59acbf8c0c314f4d94cf87 (diff)
downloadlinux-99d5cadfde2b1acb7650021df5abaa5ec447dd10.tar.xz
kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime. This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE. Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature. Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c4
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 3b303fe2f061..cc9dbcecaaca 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,
if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {
pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n");
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ return -ENODATA;
}
chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address,
@@ -403,6 +403,8 @@ error_no_desc:
* (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
* keyring, or:
*
+ * (*) -ENODATA if there is no signature present.
+ *
* (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
* chain.
*