diff options
| author | Marcin Kozlowski <marcinguy@gmail.com> | 2022-04-06 11:05:37 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2022-04-20 10:34:16 +0300 |
| commit | b416898442f2b6aa9f1b2f2968ce07e3abaa05f7 (patch) | |
| tree | e8e438398329fb4b83f3850ea3348e3fedb46068 /drivers/net | |
| parent | c3f86aef97cf2671d65ce67f02190efc2adc71ae (diff) | |
| download | linux-b416898442f2b6aa9f1b2f2968ce07e3abaa05f7.tar.xz | |
net: usb: aqc111: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup
[ Upstream commit afb8e246527536848b9b4025b40e613edf776a9d ]
aqc111_rx_fixup() contains several out-of-bounds accesses that can be
triggered by a malicious (or defective) USB device, in particular:
- The metadata array (desc_offset..desc_offset+2*pkt_count) can be out of bounds,
causing OOB reads and (on big-endian systems) OOB endianness flips.
- A packet can overlap the metadata array, causing a later OOB
endianness flip to corrupt data used by a cloned SKB that has already
been handed off into the network stack.
- A packet SKB can be constructed whose tail is far beyond its end,
causing out-of-bounds heap data to be considered part of the SKB's
data.
Found doing variant analysis. Tested it with another driver (ax88179_178a), since
I don't have a aqc111 device to test it, but the code looks very similar.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Kozlowski <marcinguy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c b/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c index 73b97f4cc1ec..e8d49886d695 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c @@ -1102,10 +1102,15 @@ static int aqc111_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) if (start_of_descs != desc_offset) goto err; - /* self check desc_offset from header*/ - if (desc_offset >= skb_len) + /* self check desc_offset from header and make sure that the + * bounds of the metadata array are inside the SKB + */ + if (pkt_count * 2 + desc_offset >= skb_len) goto err; + /* Packets must not overlap the metadata array */ + skb_trim(skb, desc_offset); + if (pkt_count == 0) goto err; |