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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-10-20 13:19:38 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-10-20 13:19:38 +0300
commit03b652e5c0cdbdfe31314b644d2b0bc77e736693 (patch)
tree70553e88c3e37271924ca5d34f3813518e15e1b0 /fs
parentce43f4fd6f103681c7485c2b1967179647e73555 (diff)
parent76ba89c76f2c74e208d93a9e7c698e39eeb3b85c (diff)
downloadlinux-03b652e5c0cdbdfe31314b644d2b0bc77e736693.tar.xz
Merge branch 'fixes-v4.14-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull key handling fixes from James Morris: "This includes a fix for the capabilities code from Colin King, and a set of further fixes for the keys subsystem. From David: - Fix a bunch of places where kernel drivers may access revoked user-type keys and don't do it correctly. - Fix some ecryptfs bits. - Fix big_key to require CONFIG_CRYPTO. - Fix a couple of bugs in the asymmetric key type. - Fix a race between updating and finding negative keys. - Prevent add_key() from updating uninstantiated keys. - Make loading of key flags and expiry time atomic when not holding locks" * 'fixes-v4.14-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: commoncap: move assignment of fs_ns to avoid null pointer dereference pkcs7: Prevent NULL pointer dereference, since sinfo is not always set. KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in proc_keys_show() KEYS: Load key expiry time atomically in keyring_search_iterator() KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in key_validate() KEYS: don't let add_key() update an uninstantiated key KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key KEYS: checking the input id parameters before finding asymmetric key KEYS: Fix the wrong index when checking the existence of second id security/keys: BIG_KEY requires CONFIG_CRYPTO ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload fscrypt: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload lib/digsig: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload FS-Cache: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload KEYS: encrypted: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keyinfo.c5
-rw-r--r--fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h24
-rw-r--r--fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c9
-rw-r--r--fs/fscache/object-list.c7
4 files changed, 37 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
index 018c588c7ac3..8e704d12a1cf 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ static int validate_user_key(struct fscrypt_info *crypt_info,
goto out;
}
ukp = user_key_payload_locked(keyring_key);
+ if (!ukp) {
+ /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
+ res = -EKEYREVOKED;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct fscrypt_key)) {
res = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
index 9c351bf757b2..3fbc0ff79699 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
@@ -84,11 +84,16 @@ struct ecryptfs_page_crypt_context {
static inline struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *
ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(struct key *key)
{
- if (key->type == &key_type_encrypted)
- return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)
- (&((struct encrypted_key_payload *)key->payload.data[0])->payload_data);
- else
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *payload;
+
+ if (key->type != &key_type_encrypted)
return NULL;
+
+ payload = key->payload.data[0];
+ if (!payload)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+
+ return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)payload->payload_data;
}
static inline struct key *ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key(char *sig)
@@ -114,12 +119,17 @@ static inline struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *
ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key)
{
struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok;
+ struct user_key_payload *ukp;
auth_tok = ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(key);
- if (!auth_tok)
- return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)user_key_payload_locked(key)->data;
- else
+ if (auth_tok)
return auth_tok;
+
+ ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+ if (!ukp)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+
+ return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)ukp->data;
}
#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEYSET_SIZE 1024
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index 3cf1546dca82..fa218cd64f74 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -459,7 +459,8 @@ out:
* @auth_tok_key: key containing the authentication token
* @auth_tok: authentication token
*
- * Returns zero on valid auth tok; -EINVAL otherwise
+ * Returns zero on valid auth tok; -EINVAL if the payload is invalid; or
+ * -EKEYREVOKED if the key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore.
*/
static int
ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key(struct key *auth_tok_key,
@@ -468,6 +469,12 @@ ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key(struct key *auth_tok_key,
int rc = 0;
(*auth_tok) = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(auth_tok_key);
+ if (IS_ERR(*auth_tok)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(*auth_tok);
+ *auth_tok = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (ecryptfs_verify_version((*auth_tok)->version)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Data structure version mismatch. Userspace "
"tools must match eCryptfs kernel module with major "
diff --git a/fs/fscache/object-list.c b/fs/fscache/object-list.c
index b5ab06fabc60..0438d4cd91ef 100644
--- a/fs/fscache/object-list.c
+++ b/fs/fscache/object-list.c
@@ -331,6 +331,13 @@ static void fscache_objlist_config(struct fscache_objlist_data *data)
rcu_read_lock();
confkey = user_key_payload_rcu(key);
+ if (!confkey) {
+ /* key was revoked */
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ key_put(key);
+ goto no_config;
+ }
+
buf = confkey->data;
for (len = confkey->datalen - 1; len >= 0; len--) {