diff options
| author | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2021-12-07 15:51:56 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2021-12-22 11:32:35 +0300 |
| commit | 423628125a484538111c2c6d9bb1588eb086053b (patch) | |
| tree | 0c7260befcd2fe2e4f11b30a7bd247995fe283c0 /kernel/bpf | |
| parent | 976389cbb16cee46847e5d06250a3a0b5506781e (diff) | |
| download | linux-423628125a484538111c2c6d9bb1588eb086053b.tar.xz | |
bpf: Fix kernel address leakage in atomic fetch
commit 7d3baf0afa3aa9102d6a521a8e4c41888bb79882 upstream.
The change in commit 37086bfdc737 ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers
in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH") around check_mem_access() handling is buggy since
this would allow for unprivileged users to leak kernel pointers. For example,
an atomic fetch/and with -1 on a stack destination which holds a spilled
pointer will migrate the spilled register type into a scalar, which can then
be exported out of the program (since scalar != pointer) by dumping it into
a map value.
The original implementation of XADD was preventing this situation by using
a double call to check_mem_access() one with BPF_READ and a subsequent one
with BPF_WRITE, in both cases passing -1 as a placeholder value instead of
register as per XADD semantics since it didn't contain a value fetch. The
BPF_READ also included a check in check_stack_read_fixed_off() which rejects
the program if the stack slot is of __is_pointer_value() if dst_regno < 0.
The latter is to distinguish whether we're dealing with a regular stack spill/
fill or some arithmetical operation which is disallowed on non-scalars, see
also 6e7e63cbb023 ("bpf: Forbid XADD on spilled pointers for unprivileged
users") for more context on check_mem_access() and its handling of placeholder
value -1.
One minimally intrusive option to fix the leak is for the BPF_FETCH case to
initially check the BPF_READ case via check_mem_access() with -1 as register,
followed by the actual load case with non-negative load_reg to propagate
stack bounds to registers.
Fixes: 37086bfdc737 ("bpf: Propagate stack bounds to registers in atomics w/ BPF_FETCH")
Reported-by: <n4ke4mry@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 8a0b4879790e..f417af7407ad 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4417,13 +4417,19 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_i load_reg = -1; } - /* check whether we can read the memory */ + /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch + * case to simulate the register fill. + */ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, - BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, true); + BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true); + if (!err && load_reg >= 0) + err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, + BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, + true); if (err) return err; - /* check whether we can write into the same memory */ + /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true); if (err) |