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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-01-15 06:36:33 +0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-01-15 06:36:33 +0400
commitc49c41a4134679cecb77362e7f6b59acb6320aa7 (patch)
tree45e690c036ca5846a48c8be67945d1d841b2d96d /kernel/capability.c
parent892d208bcf79e4e1058707786a7b6d486697cd78 (diff)
parentf423e5ba76e7e4a6fcb4836b4f072d1fdebba8b5 (diff)
downloadlinux-c49c41a4134679cecb77362e7f6b59acb6320aa7.tar.xz
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable() ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert() Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv(): - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()") - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add userspace configuration API") causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the issue.
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/capability.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c80
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index b463871a4e69..0fcf1c14a297 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -287,74 +287,84 @@ error:
}
/**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
+ * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
* @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
*
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
-bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
- int ret = security_real_capable(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+ int ret;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return (ret == 0);
}
/**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
* @t: The task in question
- * @ns: target user namespace
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
*
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
-bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
{
- int ret = security_real_capable(t, ns, cap);
-
- return (ret == 0);
+ return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
}
/**
- * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * in a specific user ns.
* @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an
- * audit message for the check.
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * Do not write an audit message for the check.
*
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
-bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
- int ret = security_real_capable_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+ int ret;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return (ret == 0);
}
/**
- * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the
+ * initial user ns
+ * @t: The task in question
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
- * available for use, false if not.
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an
+ * audit message for the check.
*
- * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
- * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
-bool capable(int cap)
+bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
{
- return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
+ return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
/**
* ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
@@ -374,7 +384,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
BUG();
}
- if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
+ if (has_ns_capability(current, ns, cap)) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return true;
}
@@ -383,18 +393,20 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
/**
- * task_ns_capable - Determine whether current task has a superior
- * capability targeted at a specific task's user namespace.
- * @t: The task whose user namespace is targeted.
- * @cap: The capability in question.
+ * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
*
- * Return true if it does, false otherwise.
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
*/
-bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool capable(int cap)
{
- return ns_capable(task_cred_xxx(t, user)->user_ns, cap);
+ return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_ns_capable);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
/**
* nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns