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authorAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>2021-02-24 23:05:50 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-02-25 00:38:31 +0300
commit611806b4bf8dd97a4f3d73f5cf3c2c7730c51eb2 (patch)
treebc3e29573db25c2b8c21c03f03b5e9544aaa6013 /mm/slab_common.c
parent027b37b552f326aa94ef06c7ea77088b16c41e6e (diff)
downloadlinux-611806b4bf8dd97a4f3d73f5cf3c2c7730c51eb2.tar.xz
kasan: fix bug detection via ksize for HW_TAGS mode
The currently existing kasan_check_read/write() annotations are intended to be used for kernel modules that have KASAN compiler instrumentation disabled. Thus, they are only relevant for the software KASAN modes that rely on compiler instrumentation. However there's another use case for these annotations: ksize() checks that the object passed to it is indeed accessible before unpoisoning the whole object. This is currently done via __kasan_check_read(), which is compiled away for the hardware tag-based mode that doesn't rely on compiler instrumentation. This leads to KASAN missing detecting some memory corruptions. Provide another annotation called kasan_check_byte() that is available for all KASAN modes. As the implementation rename and reuse kasan_check_invalid_free(). Use this new annotation in ksize(). To avoid having ksize() as the top frame in the reported stack trace pass _RET_IP_ to __kasan_check_byte(). Also add a new ksize_uaf() test that checks that a use-after-free is detected via ksize() itself, and via plain accesses that happen later. Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Iaabf771881d0f9ce1b969f2a62938e99d3308ec5 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f32ad74a60b28d8402482a38476f02bb7600f620.1610733117.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/slab_common.c')
-rw-r--r--mm/slab_common.c16
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 5be7825ad3ce..7c8298c17145 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1218,19 +1218,21 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
size_t size;
/*
- * We need to check that the pointed to object is valid, and only then
- * unpoison the shadow memory below. We use __kasan_check_read(), to
- * generate a more useful report at the time ksize() is called (rather
- * than later where behaviour is undefined due to potential
- * use-after-free or double-free).
+ * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid, and
+ * only then unpoison the memory. The report printed from ksize() is
+ * more useful, then when it's printed later when the behaviour could
+ * be undefined due to a potential use-after-free or double-free.
*
- * If the pointed to memory is invalid we return 0, to avoid users of
+ * We use kasan_check_byte(), which is supported for the hardware
+ * tag-based KASAN mode, unlike kasan_check_read/write().
+ *
+ * If the pointed to memory is invalid, we return 0 to avoid users of
* ksize() writing to and potentially corrupting the memory region.
*
* We want to perform the check before __ksize(), to avoid potentially
* crashing in __ksize() due to accessing invalid metadata.
*/
- if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !__kasan_check_read(objp, 1))
+ if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !kasan_check_byte(objp))
return 0;
size = __ksize(objp);