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authorXin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>2021-10-20 14:42:44 +0300
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2021-10-22 22:36:44 +0300
commita64b341b8695e1c744dd972b39868371b4f68f83 (patch)
tree8a0ff9b2df052f798e5029397836f72a126d4b9b /net/sctp
parent438b95a7c98f77d51cbf4db021f41b602d750a3f (diff)
downloadlinux-a64b341b8695e1c744dd972b39868371b4f68f83.tar.xz
sctp: fix the processing for COOKIE_ECHO chunk
1. In closed state: in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(): When asoc is NULL, making packet for abort will use chunk's vtag in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(). But when asoc exists, vtag from the chunk should be verified before using peer.i.init_tag to make packet for abort in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(), and just discard it if vtag is not correct. 2. In the other states: in sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(): asoc always exists, but duplicate cookie_echo's vtag will be handled by sctp_tietags_compare() and then take actions, so before that we only verify the vtag for the abort sent for invalid chunk length. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sctp')
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c14
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
index 672e5308839b..96a069d725e9 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
@@ -710,6 +710,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
struct sock *sk;
int error = 0;
+ if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
+ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
/* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the
* control endpoint, respond with an ABORT.
*/
@@ -724,7 +727,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
* in sctp_unpack_cookie().
*/
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
- return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+ return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
+ commands);
/* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations
* on the TCP-style socket exceed the max backlog, respond with an
@@ -2204,9 +2208,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(
* enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is
* done later.
*/
- if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)))
- return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
- commands);
+ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) {
+ if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc))
+ asoc = NULL;
+ return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+ }
/* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we
* are in good shape.