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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2019-06-26 23:02:32 +0300
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2019-06-26 23:02:32 +0300
commit3b6e4de05e9ee2e2f94e4a3fe14d945e2418d9a8 (patch)
treec31a08de17f1607b40358d4351b1f97d78520164 /security/keys
parent0f44e4d976f96c6439da0d6717238efa4b91196e (diff)
downloadlinux-3b6e4de05e9ee2e2f94e4a3fe14d945e2418d9a8.tar.xz
keys: Include target namespace in match criteria
Currently a key has a standard matching criteria of { type, description } and this is used to only allow keys with unique criteria in a keyring. This means, however, that you cannot have keys with the same type and description but a different target namespace in the same keyring. This is a potential problem for a containerised environment where, say, a container is made up of some parts of its mount space involving netfs superblocks from two different network namespaces. This is also a problem for shared system management keyrings such as the DNS records keyring or the NFS idmapper keyring that might contain keys from different network namespaces. Fix this by including a namespace component in a key's matching criteria. Keyring types are marked to indicate which, if any, namespace is relevant to keys of that type, and that namespace is set when the key is created from the current task's namespace set. The capability bit KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG is set if the kernel is employing this feature. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/gc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c36
-rw-r--r--security/keys/persistent.c1
5 files changed, 39 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 634e96b380e8..83d279fb7793 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
key_user_put(key->user);
-
+ key_put_tag(key->domain_tag);
kfree(key->description);
memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(*key));
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 9d52f2472a09..85fdc2ea6c14 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
goto security_error;
/* publish the key by giving it a serial number */
+ refcount_inc(&key->domain_tag->usage);
atomic_inc(&user->nkeys);
key_alloc_serial(key);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 8a813220f269..4bb5781d3ddf 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ static const unsigned char keyrings_capabilities[2] = {
KEYCTL_CAPS0_RESTRICT_KEYRING |
KEYCTL_CAPS0_MOVE
),
- [1] = (KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME),
+ [1] = (KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME |
+ KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG),
};
static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 3663e5168583..0da8fa282d56 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ static void hash_key_type_and_desc(struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
type = (unsigned long)index_key->type;
acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(type, desc_len + 13);
acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
+ piece = (unsigned long)index_key->domain_tag;
+ acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, piece);
+ acc = mult_64x32_and_fold(acc, 9207);
for (;;) {
n = desc_len;
@@ -208,16 +211,36 @@ static void hash_key_type_and_desc(struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
/*
* Finalise an index key to include a part of the description actually in the
- * index key and to add in the hash too.
+ * index key, to set the domain tag and to calculate the hash.
*/
void key_set_index_key(struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
{
+ static struct key_tag default_domain_tag = { .usage = REFCOUNT_INIT(1), };
size_t n = min_t(size_t, index_key->desc_len, sizeof(index_key->desc));
+
memcpy(index_key->desc, index_key->description, n);
+ index_key->domain_tag = &default_domain_tag;
hash_key_type_and_desc(index_key);
}
+/**
+ * key_put_tag - Release a ref on a tag.
+ * @tag: The tag to release.
+ *
+ * This releases a reference the given tag and returns true if that ref was the
+ * last one.
+ */
+bool key_put_tag(struct key_tag *tag)
+{
+ if (refcount_dec_and_test(&tag->usage)) {
+ kfree_rcu(tag, rcu);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* Build the next index key chunk.
*
@@ -238,8 +261,10 @@ static unsigned long keyring_get_key_chunk(const void *data, int level)
return index_key->x;
case 2:
return (unsigned long)index_key->type;
+ case 3:
+ return (unsigned long)index_key->domain_tag;
default:
- level -= 3;
+ level -= 4;
if (desc_len <= sizeof(index_key->desc))
return 0;
@@ -268,6 +293,7 @@ static bool keyring_compare_object(const void *object, const void *data)
const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
return key->index_key.type == index_key->type &&
+ key->index_key.domain_tag == index_key->domain_tag &&
key->index_key.desc_len == index_key->desc_len &&
memcmp(key->index_key.description, index_key->description,
index_key->desc_len) == 0;
@@ -309,6 +335,12 @@ static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *object, const void *data)
goto differ;
level += sizeof(unsigned long);
+ seg_a = (unsigned long)a->domain_tag;
+ seg_b = (unsigned long)b->domain_tag;
+ if ((seg_a ^ seg_b) != 0)
+ goto differ;
+ level += sizeof(unsigned long);
+
i = sizeof(a->desc);
if (a->desc_len <= i)
goto same;
diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c
index 90303fe4a394..9944d855a28d 100644
--- a/security/keys/persistent.c
+++ b/security/keys/persistent.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static long key_get_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
long ret;
/* Look in the register if it exists */
+ memset(&index_key, 0, sizeof(index_key));
index_key.type = &key_type_keyring;
index_key.description = buf;
index_key.desc_len = sprintf(buf, "_persistent.%u", from_kuid(ns, uid));