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authorStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>2017-04-20 18:31:30 +0300
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2017-05-23 17:23:22 +0300
commitdb59000ab760f8d77b07b7f2898ff61110f88607 (patch)
treedf6808b9f383cc449bff7630f8448319acaa475c /security/selinux
parent46be14d2b6fbc20c9e7008ec8c28b40609ef6f22 (diff)
downloadlinux-db59000ab760f8d77b07b7f2898ff61110f88607.tar.xz
selinux: only invoke capabilities and selinux for CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks
SELinux uses CAP_MAC_ADMIN to control the ability to get or set a raw, uninterpreted security context unknown to the currently loaded security policy. When performing these checks, we only want to perform a base capabilities check and a SELinux permission check. If any other modules that implement a capable hook are stacked with SELinux, we do not want to require them to also have to authorize CAP_MAC_ADMIN, since it may have different implications for their security model. Rework the CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks within SELinux to only invoke the capabilities module and the SELinux permission checking. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c23
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 735609b19e76..dddb81e06d2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3107,6 +3107,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
}
+static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
+
+ if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit))
+ return false;
+ if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
@@ -3138,7 +3150,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (rc == -EINVAL) {
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
size_t audit_size;
const char *str;
@@ -3264,13 +3276,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
- if (!error)
- error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
isec = inode_security(inode);
- if (!error)
+ if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);
else
@@ -5919,7 +5926,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
}
error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
size_t audit_size;