summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst114
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst b/Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst
index cb85af559dff..0dd3f748239f 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst
@@ -206,7 +206,11 @@ TX
Segments transmitted from an offloaded socket can get out of sync
in similar ways to the receive side-retransmissions - local drops
-are possible, though network reorders are not.
+are possible, though network reorders are not. There are currently
+two mechanisms for dealing with out of order segments.
+
+Crypto state rebuilding
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Whenever an out of order segment is transmitted the driver provides
the device with enough information to perform cryptographic operations.
@@ -225,6 +229,35 @@ was just a retransmission. The former is simpler, and does not require
retransmission detection therefore it is the recommended method until
such time it is proven inefficient.
+Next record sync
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Whenever an out of order segment is detected the driver requests
+that the ``ktls`` software fallback code encrypt it. If the segment's
+sequence number is lower than expected the driver assumes retransmission
+and doesn't change device state. If the segment is in the future, it
+may imply a local drop, the driver asks the stack to sync the device
+to the next record state and falls back to software.
+
+Resync request is indicated with:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ void tls_offload_tx_resync_request(struct sock *sk, u32 got_seq, u32 exp_seq)
+
+Until resync is complete driver should not access its expected TCP
+sequence number (as it will be updated from a different context).
+Following helper should be used to test if resync is complete:
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ bool tls_offload_tx_resync_pending(struct sock *sk)
+
+Next time ``ktls`` pushes a record it will first send its TCP sequence number
+and TLS record number to the driver. Stack will also make sure that
+the new record will start on a segment boundary (like it does when
+the connection is initially added).
+
RX
--
@@ -268,6 +301,9 @@ Device can only detect that segment 4 also contains a TLS header
if it knows the length of the previous record from segment 2. In this case
the device will lose synchronization with the stream.
+Stream scan resynchronization
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
When the device gets out of sync and the stream reaches TCP sequence
numbers more than a max size record past the expected TCP sequence number,
the device starts scanning for a known header pattern. For example
@@ -298,6 +334,22 @@ Special care has to be taken if the confirmation request is passed
asynchronously to the packet stream and record may get processed
by the kernel before the confirmation request.
+Stack-driven resynchronization
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The driver may also request the stack to perform resynchronization
+whenever it sees the records are no longer getting decrypted.
+If the connection is configured in this mode the stack automatically
+schedules resynchronization after it has received two completely encrypted
+records.
+
+The stack waits for the socket to drain and informs the device about
+the next expected record number and its TCP sequence number. If the
+records continue to be received fully encrypted stack retries the
+synchronization with an exponential back off (first after 2 encrypted
+records, then after 4 records, after 8, after 16... up until every
+128 records).
+
Error handling
==============
@@ -372,14 +424,24 @@ Statistics
Following minimum set of TLS-related statistics should be reported
by the driver:
- * ``rx_tls_decrypted`` - number of successfully decrypted TLS segments
- * ``tx_tls_encrypted`` - number of in-order TLS segments passed to device
- for encryption
+ * ``rx_tls_decrypted_packets`` - number of successfully decrypted RX packets
+ which were part of a TLS stream.
+ * ``rx_tls_decrypted_bytes`` - number of TLS payload bytes in RX packets
+ which were successfully decrypted.
+ * ``tx_tls_encrypted_packets`` - number of TX packets passed to the device
+ for encryption of their TLS payload.
+ * ``tx_tls_encrypted_bytes`` - number of TLS payload bytes in TX packets
+ passed to the device for encryption.
+ * ``tx_tls_ctx`` - number of TLS TX HW offload contexts added to device for
+ encryption.
* ``tx_tls_ooo`` - number of TX packets which were part of a TLS stream
- but did not arrive in the expected order
- * ``tx_tls_drop_no_sync_data`` - number of TX packets dropped because
- they arrived out of order and associated record could not be found
- (see also :ref:`pre_tls_data`)
+ but did not arrive in the expected order.
+ * ``tx_tls_drop_no_sync_data`` - number of TX packets which were part of
+ a TLS stream dropped, because they arrived out of order and associated
+ record could not be found.
+ * ``tx_tls_drop_bypass_req`` - number of TX packets which were part of a TLS
+ stream dropped, because they contain both data that has been encrypted by
+ software and data that expects hardware crypto offload.
Notable corner cases, exceptions and additional requirements
============================================================
@@ -444,39 +506,3 @@ Drivers should ignore the changes to TLS the device feature flags.
These flags will be acted upon accordingly by the core ``ktls`` code.
TLS device feature flags only control adding of new TLS connection
offloads, old connections will remain active after flags are cleared.
-
-Known bugs
-==========
-
-skb_orphan() leaks clear text
------------------------------
-
-Currently drivers depend on the :c:member:`sk` member of
-:c:type:`struct sk_buff <sk_buff>` to identify segments requiring
-encryption. Any operation which removes or does not preserve the socket
-association such as :c:func:`skb_orphan` or :c:func:`skb_clone`
-will cause the driver to miss the packets and lead to clear text leaks.
-
-Redirects leak clear text
--------------------------
-
-In the RX direction, if segment has already been decrypted by the device
-and it gets redirected or mirrored - clear text will be transmitted out.
-
-.. _pre_tls_data:
-
-Transmission of pre-TLS data
-----------------------------
-
-User can enqueue some already encrypted and framed records before enabling
-``ktls`` on the socket. Those records have to get sent as they are. This is
-perfectly easy to handle in the software case - such data will be waiting
-in the TCP layer, TLS ULP won't see it. In the offloaded case when pre-queued
-segment reaches transmission point it appears to be out of order (before the
-expected TCP sequence number) and the stack does not have a record information
-associated.
-
-All segments without record information cannot, however, be assumed to be
-pre-queued data, because a race condition exists between TCP stack queuing
-a retransmission, the driver seeing the retransmission and TCP ACK arriving
-for the retransmitted data.