diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 68 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/apic/bigsmp_32.c | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/apic/probe_32.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 66 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 107 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 44 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c | 39 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/sysfb_efi.c | 46 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 17 |
16 files changed, 364 insertions, 90 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c index f5291362da1a..aa5495d0f478 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c @@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ static __initdata unsigned long lapic_cal_pm1, lapic_cal_pm2; static __initdata unsigned long lapic_cal_j1, lapic_cal_j2; /* - * Temporary interrupt handler. + * Temporary interrupt handler and polled calibration function. */ static void __init lapic_cal_handler(struct clock_event_device *dev) { @@ -851,7 +851,8 @@ bool __init apic_needs_pit(void) static int __init calibrate_APIC_clock(void) { struct clock_event_device *levt = this_cpu_ptr(&lapic_events); - void (*real_handler)(struct clock_event_device *dev); + u64 tsc_perj = 0, tsc_start = 0; + unsigned long jif_start; unsigned long deltaj; long delta, deltatsc; int pm_referenced = 0; @@ -878,28 +879,64 @@ static int __init calibrate_APIC_clock(void) apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, "Using local APIC timer interrupts.\n" "calibrating APIC timer ...\n"); + /* + * There are platforms w/o global clockevent devices. Instead of + * making the calibration conditional on that, use a polling based + * approach everywhere. + */ local_irq_disable(); - /* Replace the global interrupt handler */ - real_handler = global_clock_event->event_handler; - global_clock_event->event_handler = lapic_cal_handler; - /* * Setup the APIC counter to maximum. There is no way the lapic * can underflow in the 100ms detection time frame */ __setup_APIC_LVTT(0xffffffff, 0, 0); - /* Let the interrupts run */ + /* + * Methods to terminate the calibration loop: + * 1) Global clockevent if available (jiffies) + * 2) TSC if available and frequency is known + */ + jif_start = READ_ONCE(jiffies); + + if (tsc_khz) { + tsc_start = rdtsc(); + tsc_perj = div_u64((u64)tsc_khz * 1000, HZ); + } + + /* + * Enable interrupts so the tick can fire, if a global + * clockevent device is available + */ local_irq_enable(); - while (lapic_cal_loops <= LAPIC_CAL_LOOPS) - cpu_relax(); + while (lapic_cal_loops <= LAPIC_CAL_LOOPS) { + /* Wait for a tick to elapse */ + while (1) { + if (tsc_khz) { + u64 tsc_now = rdtsc(); + if ((tsc_now - tsc_start) >= tsc_perj) { + tsc_start += tsc_perj; + break; + } + } else { + unsigned long jif_now = READ_ONCE(jiffies); - local_irq_disable(); + if (time_after(jif_now, jif_start)) { + jif_start = jif_now; + break; + } + } + cpu_relax(); + } - /* Restore the real event handler */ - global_clock_event->event_handler = real_handler; + /* Invoke the calibration routine */ + local_irq_disable(); + lapic_cal_handler(NULL); + local_irq_enable(); + } + + local_irq_disable(); /* Build delta t1-t2 as apic timer counts down */ delta = lapic_cal_t1 - lapic_cal_t2; @@ -943,10 +980,11 @@ static int __init calibrate_APIC_clock(void) levt->features &= ~CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_DUMMY; /* - * PM timer calibration failed or not turned on - * so lets try APIC timer based calibration + * PM timer calibration failed or not turned on so lets try APIC + * timer based calibration, if a global clockevent device is + * available. */ - if (!pm_referenced) { + if (!pm_referenced && global_clock_event) { apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, "... verify APIC timer\n"); /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/bigsmp_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/bigsmp_32.c index afee386ff711..caedd8d60d36 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/bigsmp_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/bigsmp_32.c @@ -38,32 +38,12 @@ static int bigsmp_early_logical_apicid(int cpu) return early_per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_apicid, cpu); } -static inline unsigned long calculate_ldr(int cpu) -{ - unsigned long val, id; - - val = apic_read(APIC_LDR) & ~APIC_LDR_MASK; - id = per_cpu(x86_bios_cpu_apicid, cpu); - val |= SET_APIC_LOGICAL_ID(id); - - return val; -} - /* - * Set up the logical destination ID. - * - * Intel recommends to set DFR, LDR and TPR before enabling - * an APIC. See e.g. "AP-388 82489DX User's Manual" (Intel - * document number 292116). So here it goes... + * bigsmp enables physical destination mode + * and doesn't use LDR and DFR */ static void bigsmp_init_apic_ldr(void) { - unsigned long val; - int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - - apic_write(APIC_DFR, APIC_DFR_FLAT); - val = calculate_ldr(cpu); - apic_write(APIC_LDR, val); } static void bigsmp_setup_apic_routing(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c index c7bb6c69f21c..d6af97fd170a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c @@ -2438,7 +2438,13 @@ unsigned int arch_dynirq_lower_bound(unsigned int from) * dmar_alloc_hwirq() may be called before setup_IO_APIC(), so use * gsi_top if ioapic_dynirq_base hasn't been initialized yet. */ - return ioapic_initialized ? ioapic_dynirq_base : gsi_top; + if (!ioapic_initialized) + return gsi_top; + /* + * For DT enabled machines ioapic_dynirq_base is irrelevant and not + * updated. So simply return @from if ioapic_dynirq_base == 0. + */ + return ioapic_dynirq_base ? : from; } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/probe_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/probe_32.c index 1492799b8f43..ee2d91e382f1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/probe_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/probe_32.c @@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ void __init default_setup_apic_routing(void) def_to_bigsmp = 0; break; } - /* If P4 and above fall through */ + /* P4 and above */ + /* fall through */ case X86_VENDOR_HYGON: case X86_VENDOR_AMD: def_to_bigsmp = 1; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 8d4e50428b68..68c363c341bf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -804,6 +804,64 @@ static void init_amd_ln(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, 31); } +static bool rdrand_force; + +static int __init rdrand_cmdline(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(str, "force")) + rdrand_force = true; + else + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} +early_param("rdrand", rdrand_cmdline); + +static void clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + /* + * Saving of the MSR used to hide the RDRAND support during + * suspend/resume is done by arch/x86/power/cpu.c, which is + * dependent on CONFIG_PM_SLEEP. + */ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PM_SLEEP)) + return; + + /* + * The nordrand option can clear X86_FEATURE_RDRAND, so check for + * RDRAND support using the CPUID function directly. + */ + if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(30)) || rdrand_force) + return; + + msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_CPUID_FN_1, 62); + + /* + * Verify that the CPUID change has occurred in case the kernel is + * running virtualized and the hypervisor doesn't support the MSR. + */ + if (cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(30)) { + pr_info_once("BIOS may not properly restore RDRAND after suspend, but hypervisor does not support hiding RDRAND via CPUID.\n"); + return; + } + + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND); + pr_info_once("BIOS may not properly restore RDRAND after suspend, hiding RDRAND via CPUID. Use rdrand=force to reenable.\n"); +} + +static void init_amd_jg(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + /* + * Some BIOS implementations do not restore proper RDRAND support + * across suspend and resume. Check on whether to hide the RDRAND + * instruction support via CPUID. + */ + clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c); +} + static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 value; @@ -818,6 +876,13 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) wrmsrl_safe(MSR_F15H_IC_CFG, value); } } + + /* + * Some BIOS implementations do not restore proper RDRAND support + * across suspend and resume. Check on whether to hide the RDRAND + * instruction support via CPUID. + */ + clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c); } static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -860,6 +925,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) case 0x10: init_amd_gh(c); break; case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break; case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break; + case 0x16: init_amd_jg(c); break; case 0x17: init_amd_zn(c); break; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 66ca906aa790..c6fa3ef10b4e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include "cpu.h" +static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); @@ -98,17 +99,11 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */ + /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ + spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); - - /* - * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store - * Bypass vulnerability. - */ ssb_select_mitigation(); - l1tf_select_mitigation(); - mds_select_mitigation(); arch_smt_update(); @@ -274,6 +269,98 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str) early_param("mds", mds_cmdline); #undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt + +enum spectre_v1_mitigation { + SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE, + SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO, +}; + +static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init = + SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO; + +static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = { + [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers", + [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization", +}; + +/* + * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to + * userspace? + */ +static bool smap_works_speculatively(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP)) + return false; + + /* + * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not + * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache. + * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these + * CPUs. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) { + spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE; + return; + } + + if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) { + /* + * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either + * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS + * value. The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths. + * + * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in + * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection. + * + * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the + * FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ] + * + * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space + * address in GS. That makes an attack harder, but still + * possible if there's no SMAP protection. + */ + if (!smap_works_speculatively()) { + /* + * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or + * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation + * is serializing. + * + * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to + * stop speculation through swapgs. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER); + + /* + * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs) + * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively + * skipping swapgs. + */ + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL); + } + } + + pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]); +} + +static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) +{ + spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE; + return 0; +} +early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); + +#undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = @@ -1226,7 +1313,7 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf) { - if (!hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_NATIVE)) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]); } @@ -1290,7 +1377,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr break; case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1: - return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]); case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2: return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 11472178e17f..f125bf7ecb6f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1022,6 +1022,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #define NO_L1TF BIT(3) #define NO_MDS BIT(4) #define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5) +#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6) #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \ { X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist } @@ -1048,30 +1049,38 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = { VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION), VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), - VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), - VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF), - VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS), + + /* + * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously + * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is + * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory + * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is + * good enough for our purposes. + */ /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */ - VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), - VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), - VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), - VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), + VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */ - VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), - VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS), + VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), + VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS), {} }; @@ -1108,6 +1117,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY); } + if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS); + if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN)) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c index 4296c702a3f7..72182809b333 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ cyrix_get_free_region(unsigned long base, unsigned long size, int replace_reg) case 7: if (size < 0x40) break; + /* Else, fall through */ case 6: case 5: case 4: diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c index 6a204e7336c1..32b4dc9030aa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c @@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ static u32 umwait_control_cached = UMWAIT_CTRL_VAL(100000, UMWAIT_C02_ENABLE); /* + * Cache the original IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR value which is configured by + * hardware or BIOS before kernel boot. + */ +static u32 orig_umwait_control_cached __ro_after_init; + +/* * Serialize access to umwait_control_cached and IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR in * the sysfs write functions. */ @@ -53,6 +59,23 @@ static int umwait_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu) } /* + * The CPU hotplug callback sets the control MSR to the original control + * value. + */ +static int umwait_cpu_offline(unsigned int cpu) +{ + /* + * This code is protected by the CPU hotplug already and + * orig_umwait_control_cached is never changed after it caches + * the original control MSR value in umwait_init(). So there + * is no race condition here. + */ + wrmsr(MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL, orig_umwait_control_cached, 0); + + return 0; +} + +/* * On resume, restore IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR on the boot processor which * is the only active CPU at this time. The MSR is set up on the APs via the * CPU hotplug callback. @@ -185,8 +208,22 @@ static int __init umwait_init(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG)) return -ENODEV; + /* + * Cache the original control MSR value before the control MSR is + * changed. This is the only place where orig_umwait_control_cached + * is modified. + */ + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL, orig_umwait_control_cached); + ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "umwait:online", - umwait_cpu_online, NULL); + umwait_cpu_online, umwait_cpu_offline); + if (ret < 0) { + /* + * On failure, the control MSR on all CPUs has the + * original control value. + */ + return ret; + } register_syscore_ops(&umwait_syscore_ops); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S index a6342c899be5..f3d3e9646a99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S @@ -193,10 +193,10 @@ ENTRY(secondary_startup_64) /* Set up %gs. * - * The base of %gs always points to the bottom of the irqstack - * union. If the stack protector canary is enabled, it is - * located at %gs:40. Note that, on SMP, the boot cpu uses - * init data section till per cpu areas are set up. + * The base of %gs always points to fixed_percpu_data. If the + * stack protector canary is enabled, it is located at %gs:40. + * Note that, on SMP, the boot cpu uses init data section until + * the per cpu areas are set up. */ movl $MSR_GS_BASE,%ecx movl initial_gs(%rip),%eax diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c index c43e96a938d0..c6f791bc481e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c @@ -827,10 +827,6 @@ int __init hpet_enable(void) if (!hpet_cfg_working()) goto out_nohpet; - /* Validate that the counter is counting */ - if (!hpet_counting()) - goto out_nohpet; - /* * Read the period and check for a sane value: */ @@ -896,6 +892,14 @@ int __init hpet_enable(void) } hpet_print_config(); + /* + * Validate that the counter is counting. This needs to be done + * after sanitizing the config registers to properly deal with + * force enabled HPETs. + */ + if (!hpet_counting()) + goto out_nohpet; + clocksource_register_hz(&clocksource_hpet, (u32)hpet_freq); if (id & HPET_ID_LEGSUP) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c index b7f34fe2171e..4ab377c9fffe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c @@ -308,9 +308,6 @@ static notrace void kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write(u32 reg, u32 val) static void kvm_guest_cpu_init(void) { - if (!kvm_para_available()) - return; - if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF) && kvmapf) { u64 pa = slow_virt_to_phys(this_cpu_ptr(&apf_reason)); @@ -625,9 +622,6 @@ static void __init kvm_guest_init(void) { int i; - if (!kvm_para_available()) - return; - paravirt_ops_setup(); register_reboot_notifier(&kvm_pv_reboot_nb); for (i = 0; i < KVM_TASK_SLEEP_HASHSIZE; i++) @@ -848,8 +842,6 @@ asm( */ void __init kvm_spinlock_init(void) { - if (!kvm_para_available()) - return; /* Does host kernel support KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT? */ if (!kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT)) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c index 0fdbe89d0754..3c5bbe8e4120 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static int set_segment_reg(struct task_struct *task, case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, ss): if (unlikely(value == 0)) return -EIO; + /* Else, fall through */ default: *pt_regs_access(task_pt_regs(task), offset) = value; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c index 4f36d3241faf..2d6898c2cb64 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ copy_stack_frame(const void __user *fp, struct stack_frame_user *frame) { int ret; - if (!access_ok(fp, sizeof(*frame))) + if (__range_not_ok(fp, sizeof(*frame), TASK_SIZE)) return 0; ret = 1; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sysfb_efi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sysfb_efi.c index 8eb67a670b10..653b7f617b61 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sysfb_efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sysfb_efi.c @@ -230,9 +230,55 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id efifb_dmi_system_table[] __initconst = { {}, }; +/* + * Some devices have a portrait LCD but advertise a landscape resolution (and + * pitch). We simply swap width and height for these devices so that we can + * correctly deal with some of them coming with multiple resolutions. + */ +static const struct dmi_system_id efifb_dmi_swap_width_height[] __initconst = { + { + /* + * Lenovo MIIX310-10ICR, only some batches have the troublesome + * 800x1280 portrait screen. Luckily the portrait version has + * its own BIOS version, so we match on that. + */ + .matches = { + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"), + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "MIIX 310-10ICR"), + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "1HCN44WW"), + }, + }, + { + /* Lenovo MIIX 320-10ICR with 800x1280 portrait screen */ + .matches = { + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"), + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, + "Lenovo MIIX 320-10ICR"), + }, + }, + { + /* Lenovo D330 with 800x1280 or 1200x1920 portrait screen */ + .matches = { + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"), + DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, + "Lenovo ideapad D330-10IGM"), + }, + }, + {}, +}; + __init void sysfb_apply_efi_quirks(void) { if (screen_info.orig_video_isVGA != VIDEO_TYPE_EFI || !(screen_info.capabilities & VIDEO_CAPABILITY_SKIP_QUIRKS)) dmi_check_system(efifb_dmi_system_table); + + if (screen_info.orig_video_isVGA == VIDEO_TYPE_EFI && + dmi_check_system(efifb_dmi_swap_width_height)) { + u16 temp = screen_info.lfb_width; + + screen_info.lfb_width = screen_info.lfb_height; + screen_info.lfb_height = temp; + screen_info.lfb_linelength = 4 * screen_info.lfb_width; + } } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c index d8359ebeea70..8cd745ef8c7b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c @@ -508,9 +508,12 @@ struct uprobe_xol_ops { void (*abort)(struct arch_uprobe *, struct pt_regs *); }; -static inline int sizeof_long(void) +static inline int sizeof_long(struct pt_regs *regs) { - return in_ia32_syscall() ? 4 : 8; + /* + * Check registers for mode as in_xxx_syscall() does not apply here. + */ + return user_64bit_mode(regs) ? 8 : 4; } static int default_pre_xol_op(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs) @@ -521,9 +524,9 @@ static int default_pre_xol_op(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs) static int emulate_push_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long val) { - unsigned long new_sp = regs->sp - sizeof_long(); + unsigned long new_sp = regs->sp - sizeof_long(regs); - if (copy_to_user((void __user *)new_sp, &val, sizeof_long())) + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)new_sp, &val, sizeof_long(regs))) return -EFAULT; regs->sp = new_sp; @@ -556,7 +559,7 @@ static int default_post_xol_op(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs long correction = utask->vaddr - utask->xol_vaddr; regs->ip += correction; } else if (auprobe->defparam.fixups & UPROBE_FIX_CALL) { - regs->sp += sizeof_long(); /* Pop incorrect return address */ + regs->sp += sizeof_long(regs); /* Pop incorrect return address */ if (emulate_push_stack(regs, utask->vaddr + auprobe->defparam.ilen)) return -ERESTART; } @@ -675,7 +678,7 @@ static int branch_post_xol_op(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs) * "call" insn was executed out-of-line. Just restore ->sp and restart. * We could also restore ->ip and try to call branch_emulate_op() again. */ - regs->sp += sizeof_long(); + regs->sp += sizeof_long(regs); return -ERESTART; } @@ -1056,7 +1059,7 @@ bool arch_uprobe_skip_sstep(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs) unsigned long arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(unsigned long trampoline_vaddr, struct pt_regs *regs) { - int rasize = sizeof_long(), nleft; + int rasize = sizeof_long(regs), nleft; unsigned long orig_ret_vaddr = 0; /* clear high bits for 32-bit apps */ if (copy_from_user(&orig_ret_vaddr, (void __user *)regs->sp, rasize)) |