summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/include/linux/syslog.h
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2019-05-21treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 18Thomas Gleixner1-14/+1
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 or at your option any later version this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program see the file copying if not write to the free software foundation 675 mass ave cambridge ma 02139 usa extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 52 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Jilayne Lovejoy <opensource@jilayne.com> Reviewed-by: Steve Winslow <swinslow@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190519154042.342335923@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-08-18Revert "pstore: Honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on dmesg dumps"Kees Cook1-9/+0
This reverts commit 68c4a4f8abc60c9440ede9cd123d48b78325f7a3, with various conflict clean-ups. The capability check required too much privilege compared to simple DAC controls. A system builder was forced to have crash handler processes run with CAP_SYSLOG which would give it the ability to read (and wipe) the _current_ dmesg, which is much more access than being given access only to the historical log stored in pstorefs. With the prior commit to make the root directory 0750, the files are protected by default but a system builder can now opt to give access to a specific group (via chgrp on the pstorefs root directory) without being forced to also give away CAP_SYSLOG. Suggested-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
2015-06-26check_syslog_permissions() cleanupVasily Averin1-3/+3
Patch fixes drawbacks in heck_syslog_permissions() noticed by AKPM: "from_file handling makes me cry. That's not a boolean - it's an enumerated value with two values currently defined. But the code in check_syslog_permissions() treats it as a boolean and also hardwires the knowledge that SYSLOG_FROM_PROC == 1 (or == `true`). And the name is wrong: it should be called from_proc to match SYSLOG_FROM_PROC." Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-11-17syslog: Provide stub check_syslog_permissionsSebastian Schmidt1-0/+8
When building without CONFIG_PRINTK, we need to provide a stub check_syslog_permissions. As there is no way to turn on the dmesg_restrict sysctl without CONFIG_PRINTK, return success. Reported-by: Jim Davis <jim.epost@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Schmidt <yath@yath.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
2014-11-05pstore: Honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on dmesg dumpsSebastian Schmidt1-0/+1
When the kernel.dmesg_restrict restriction is in place, only users with CAP_SYSLOG should be able to access crash dumps (like: attacker is trying to exploit a bug, watchdog reboots, attacker can happily read crash dumps and logs). This puts the restriction on console-* types as well as sensitive information could have been leaked there. Other log types are unaffected. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Schmidt <yath@yath.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
2013-06-13kmsg: honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsgKees Cook1-2/+2
The dmesg_restrict sysctl currently covers the syslog method for access dmesg, however /dev/kmsg isn't covered by the same protections. Most people haven't noticed because util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to using the syslog method for access in older versions. With util-linux dmesg(1) defaults to reading directly from /dev/kmsg. To fix /dev/kmsg, let's compare the existing interfaces and what they allow: - /proc/kmsg allows: - open (SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) if CAP_SYSLOG since it uses a destructive single-reader interface (SYSLOG_ACTION_READ). - everything, after an open. - syslog syscall allows: - anything, if CAP_SYSLOG. - SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER, if dmesg_restrict==0. - nothing else (EPERM). The use-cases were: - dmesg(1) needs to do non-destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALLs. - sysklog(1) needs to open /proc/kmsg, drop privs, and still issue the destructive SYSLOG_ACTION_READs. AIUI, dmesg(1) is moving to /dev/kmsg, and systemd-journald doesn't clear the ring buffer. Based on the comments in devkmsg_llseek, it sounds like actions besides reading aren't going to be supported by /dev/kmsg (i.e. SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), so we have a strict subset of the non-destructive syslog syscall actions. To this end, move the check as Josh had done, but also rename the constants to reflect their new uses (SYSLOG_FROM_CALL becomes SYSLOG_FROM_READER, and SYSLOG_FROM_FILE becomes SYSLOG_FROM_PROC). SYSLOG_FROM_READER allows non-destructive actions, and SYSLOG_FROM_PROC allows destructive actions after a capabilities-constrained SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN check. - /dev/kmsg allows: - open if CAP_SYSLOG or dmesg_restrict==0 - reading/polling, after open Addresses https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=903192 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: use pr_warn_once()] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Christian Kujau <lists@nerdbynature.de> Tested-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-02-04syslog: use defined constants instead of raw numbersKees Cook1-0/+23
Right now the syslog "type" action are just raw numbers which makes the source difficult to follow. This patch replaces the raw numbers with defined constants for some level of sanity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-02-04syslog: distinguish between /proc/kmsg and syscallsKees Cook1-0/+29
This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls. By default, the commoncaps will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg file descriptor. For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>