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2014-12-17Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+12
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace related fixes from Eric Biederman: "As these are bug fixes almost all of thes changes are marked for backporting to stable. The first change (implicitly adding MNT_NODEV on remount) addresses a regression that was created when security issues with unprivileged remount were closed. I go on to update the remount test to make it easy to detect if this issue reoccurs. Then there are a handful of mount and umount related fixes. Then half of the changes deal with the a recently discovered design bug in the permission checks of gid_map. Unix since the beginning has allowed setting group permissions on files to less than the user and other permissions (aka ---rwx---rwx). As the unix permission checks stop as soon as a group matches, and setgroups allows setting groups that can not later be dropped, results in a situtation where it is possible to legitimately use a group to assign fewer privileges to a process. Which means dropping a group can increase a processes privileges. The fix I have adopted is that gid_map is now no longer writable without privilege unless the new file /proc/self/setgroups has been set to permanently disable setgroups. The bulk of user namespace using applications even the applications using applications using user namespaces without privilege remain unaffected by this change. Unfortunately this ix breaks a couple user space applications, that were relying on the problematic behavior (one of which was tools/selftests/mount/unprivileged-remount-test.c). To hopefully prevent needing a regression fix on top of my security fix I rounded folks who work with the container implementations mostly like to be affected and encouraged them to test the changes. > So far nothing broke on my libvirt-lxc test bed. :-) > Tested with openSUSE 13.2 and libvirt 1.2.9. > Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> > Tested on Fedora20 with libvirt 1.2.11, works fine. > Tested-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com> > Ok, thanks - yes, unprivileged lxc is working fine with your kernels. > Just to be sure I was testing the right thing I also tested using > my unprivileged nsexec testcases, and they failed on setgroup/setgid > as now expected, and succeeded there without your patches. > Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> > I tested this with Sandstorm. It breaks as is and it works if I add > the setgroups thing. > Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> # breaks things as designed :(" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Unbreak the unprivileged remount tests userns; Correct the comment in map_write userns: Allow setting gid_maps without privilege when setgroups is disabled userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis userns: Rename id_map_mutex to userns_state_mutex userns: Only allow the creator of the userns unprivileged mappings userns: Check euid no fsuid when establishing an unprivileged uid mapping userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablished userns: Document what the invariant required for safe unprivileged mappings. groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks mnt: Clear mnt_expire during pivot_root mnt: Carefully set CL_UNPRIVILEGED in clone_mnt mnt: Move the clear of MNT_LOCKED from copy_tree to it's callers. umount: Do not allow unmounting rootfs. umount: Disallow unprivileged mount force mnt: Update unprivileged remount test mnt: Implicitly add MNT_NODEV on remount when it was implicitly added by mount
2014-12-12userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basisEric W. Biederman1-0/+7
- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the future in this user namespace. A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled. - Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from their parents. - A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do not allow checking the permissions at open time. - Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map for the user namespace is set. This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace level will never remove the ability to call setgroups from a process that already has that ability. A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled. Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-10userns: Don't allow setgroups until a gid mapping has been setablishedEric W. Biederman1-0/+5
setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called, in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups. The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually be used until a gid mapping is established. Therefore add a helper function to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call that function in the setgroups permission check. This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups without privilege using user namespaces. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2014-12-04common object embedded into various struct ....nsAl Viro1-1/+2
for now - just move corresponding ->proc_inum instances over there Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-08-09proc: constify seq_operationsFabian Frederick1-3/+3
proc_uid_seq_operations, proc_gid_seq_operations and proc_projid_seq_operations are only called in proc_id_map_open with seq_open as const struct seq_operations so we can constify the 3 structures and update proc_id_map_open prototype. text data bss dec hex filename 6817 404 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-before 6913 308 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-after Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-09-24KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos cachesDavid Howells1-0/+6
Add support for per-user_namespace registers of persistent per-UID kerberos caches held within the kernel. This allows the kerberos cache to be retained beyond the life of all a user's processes so that the user's cron jobs can work. The kerberos cache is envisioned as a keyring/key tree looking something like: struct user_namespace \___ .krb_cache keyring - The register \___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache \___ tkt785 big_key - A ccache blob \___ tkt12345 big_key - Another ccache blob Or possibly: struct user_namespace \___ .krb_cache keyring - The register \___ _krb.0 keyring - Root's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5000 keyring - User 5000's Kerberos cache \___ _krb.5001 keyring - User 5001's Kerberos cache \___ tkt785 keyring - A ccache \___ krbtgt/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM big_key \___ http/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ afs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ nfs/REDHAT.COM@REDHAT.COM user \___ krbtgt/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key \___ http/KERNEL.ORG@KERNEL.ORG big_key What goes into a particular Kerberos cache is entirely up to userspace. Kernel support is limited to giving you the Kerberos cache keyring that you want. The user asks for their Kerberos cache by: krb_cache = keyctl_get_krbcache(uid, dest_keyring); The uid is -1 or the user's own UID for the user's own cache or the uid of some other user's cache (requires CAP_SETUID). This permits rpc.gssd or whatever to mess with the cache. The cache returned is a keyring named "_krb.<uid>" that the possessor can read, search, clear, invalidate, unlink from and add links to. Active LSMs get a chance to rule on whether the caller is permitted to make a link. Each uid's cache keyring is created when it first accessed and is given a timeout that is extended each time this function is called so that the keyring goes away after a while. The timeout is configurable by sysctl but defaults to three days. Each user_namespace struct gets a lazily-created keyring that serves as the register. The cache keyrings are added to it. This means that standard key search and garbage collection facilities are available. The user_namespace struct's register goes away when it does and anything left in it is then automatically gc'd. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-09-08Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-4/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman: "This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug fixes. The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace infrastructure. Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace. namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on. pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc/<pid>/ns/mnt between namespaces kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code. proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users
2013-08-27userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mountedEric W. Biederman1-4/+0
Rely on the fact that another flavor of the filesystem is already mounted and do not rely on state in the user namespace. Verify that the mounted filesystem is not covered in any significant way. I would love to verify that the previously mounted filesystem has no mounts on top but there are at least the directories /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc and /sys/fs/cgroup/ that exist explicitly for other filesystems to mount on top of. Refactor the test into a function named fs_fully_visible and call that function from the mount routines of proc and sysfs. This makes this test local to the filesystems involved and the results current of when the mounts take place, removing a weird threading of the user namespace, the mount namespace and the filesystems themselves. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-08-09userns: limit the maximum depth of user_namespace->parent chainOleg Nesterov1-0/+1
Ensure that user_namespace->parent chain can't grow too much. Currently we use the hardroded 32 as limit. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-03-27userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mountedEric W. Biederman1-0/+4
Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already mounted when the user namespace is created. proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that is shared between every instance. Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time the user namespace was created. In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all (some form of mount namespace jail). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-01-27userns: Avoid recursion in put_user_nsEric W. Biederman1-5/+5
When freeing a deeply nested user namespace free_user_ns calls put_user_ns on it's parent which may in turn call free_user_ns again. When -fno-optimize-sibling-calls is passed to gcc one stack frame per user namespace is left on the stack, potentially overflowing the kernel stack. CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER forces -fno-optimize-sibling-calls so we can't count on gcc to optimize this code. Remove struct kref and use a plain atomic_t. Making the code more flexible and easier to comprehend. Make the loop in free_user_ns explict to guarantee that the stack does not overflow with CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER enabled. I have tested this fix with a simple program that uses unshare to create a deeply nested user namespace structure and then calls exit. With 1000 nesteuser namespaces before this change running my test program causes the kernel to die a horrible death. With 10,000,000 nested user namespaces after this change my test program runs to completion and causes no harm. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Pointed-out-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-11-20proc: Usable inode numbers for the namespace file descriptors.Eric W. Biederman1-0/+1
Assign a unique proc inode to each namespace, and use that inode number to ensure we only allocate at most one proc inode for every namespace in proc. A single proc inode per namespace allows userspace to test to see if two processes are in the same namespace. This has been a long requested feature and only blocked because a naive implementation would put the id in a global space and would ultimately require having a namespace for the names of namespaces, making migration and certain virtualization tricks impossible. We still don't have per superblock inode numbers for proc, which appears necessary for application unaware checkpoint/restart and migrations (if the application is using namespace file descriptors) but that is now allowd by the design if it becomes important. I have preallocated the ipc and uts initial proc inode numbers so their structures can be statically initialized. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-11-20userns: Implement unshare of the user namespaceEric W. Biederman1-0/+9
- Add CLONE_THREAD to the unshare flags if CLONE_NEWUSER is selected As changing user namespaces is only valid if all there is only a single thread. - Restore the code to add CLONE_VM if CLONE_THREAD is selected and the code to addCLONE_SIGHAND if CLONE_VM is selected. Making the constraints in the code clear. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-09-18userns: Add kprojid_t and associated infrastructure in projid.hEric W. Biederman1-0/+3
Implement kprojid_t a cousin of the kuid_t and kgid_t. The per user namespace mapping of project id values can be set with /proc/<pid>/projid_map. A full compliment of helpers is provided: make_kprojid, from_kprojid, from_kprojid_munged, kporjid_has_mapping, projid_valid, projid_eq, projid_eq, projid_lt. Project identifiers are part of the generic disk quota interface, although it appears only xfs implements project identifiers currently. The xfs code allows anyone who has permission to set the project identifier on a file to use any project identifier so when setting up the user namespace project identifier mappings I do not require a capability. Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-05-03userns: Replace user_ns_map_uid and user_ns_map_gid with from_kuid and from_kgidEric W. Biederman1-12/+0
These function are no longer needed replace them with their more useful equivalents. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-05-03userns: Store uid and gid values in struct cred with kuid_t and kgid_t typesEric W. Biederman1-4/+4
cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile and behave correctly. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-04-26userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid mapping supportEric W. Biederman1-7/+23
- Convert the old uid mapping functions into compatibility wrappers - Add a uid/gid mapping layer from user space uid and gids to kernel internal uids and gids that is extent based for simplicty and speed. * Working with number space after mapping uids/gids into their kernel internal version adds only mapping complexity over what we have today, leaving the kernel code easy to understand and test. - Add proc files /proc/self/uid_map /proc/self/gid_map These files display the mapping and allow a mapping to be added if a mapping does not exist. - Allow entering the user namespace without a uid or gid mapping. Since we are starting with an existing user our uids and gids still have global mappings so are still valid and useful they just don't have local mappings. The requirement for things to work are global uid and gid so it is odd but perfectly fine not to have a local uid and gid mapping. Not requiring global uid and gid mappings greatly simplifies the logic of setting up the uid and gid mappings by allowing the mappings to be set after the namespace is created which makes the slight weirdness worth it. - Make the mappings in the initial user namespace to the global uid/gid space explicit. Today it is an identity mapping but in the future we may want to twist this for debugging, similar to what we do with jiffies. - Document the memory ordering requirements of setting the uid and gid mappings. We only allow the mappings to be set once and there are no pointers involved so the requirments are trivial but a little atypical. Performance: In this scheme for the permission checks the performance is expected to stay the same as the actuall machine instructions should remain the same. The worst case I could think of is ls -l on a large directory where all of the stat results need to be translated with from kuids and kgids to uids and gids. So I benchmarked that case on my laptop with a dual core hyperthread Intel i5-2520M cpu with 3M of cpu cache. My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results: v3.4-rc1: ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled) v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled) All of the configurations ran in roughly 120ns when I performed tests that ran in the cpu cache. So in summary the performance impact is: 1ns improvement in the worst case with user namespace support compiled out. 8ns aka 5% slowdown in the worst case with user namespace support compiled in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-04-26userns: Simplify the user_namespace by making userns->creator a kuid.Eric W. Biederman1-2/+2
- Transform userns->creator from a user_struct reference to a simple kuid_t, kgid_t pair. In cap_capable this allows the check to see if we are the creator of a namespace to become the classic suser style euid permission check. This allows us to remove the need for a struct cred in the mapping functions and still be able to dispaly the user namespace creators uid and gid as 0. - Remove the now unnecessary delayed_work in free_user_ns. All that is left for free_user_ns to do is to call kmem_cache_free and put_user_ns. Those functions can be called in any context so call them directly from free_user_ns removing the need for delayed work. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-04-08userns: Disassociate user_struct from the user_namespace.Eric W. Biederman1-4/+0
Modify alloc_uid to take a kuid and make the user hash table global. Stop holding a reference to the user namespace in struct user_struct. This simplifies the code and makes the per user accounting not care about which user namespace a uid happens to appear in. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-04-08userns: Add an explicit reference to the parent user namespaceEric W. Biederman1-0/+1
I am about to remove the struct user_namespace reference from struct user_struct. So keep an explicit track of the parent user namespace. Take advantage of this new reference and replace instances of user_ns->creator->user_ns with user_ns->parent. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2011-01-13user_ns: improve the user_ns on-the-slab packagingPavel Emelyanov1-1/+1
Currently on 64-bit arch the user_namespace is 2096 and when being kmalloc-ed it resides on a 4k slab wasting 2003 bytes. If we allocate a separate cache for it and reduce the hash size from 128 to 64 chains the packaging becomes *much* better - the struct is 1072 bytes and the hole between is 98 bytes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/__initcall/module_init/] Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-06-17user_ns: Introduce user_nsmap_uid and user_ns_map_gid.Eric W. Biederman1-0/+14
Define what happens when a we view a uid from one user_namespace in another user_namepece. - If the user namespaces are the same no mapping is necessary. - For most cases of difference use overflowuid and overflowgid, the uid and gid currently used for 16bit apis when we have a 32bit uid that does fit in 16bits. Effectively the situation is the same, we want to return a uid or gid that is not assigned to any user. - For the case when we happen to be mapping the uid or gid of the creator of the target user namespace use uid 0 and gid as confusing that user with root is not a problem. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-02-28Fix recursive lock in free_uid()/free_user_ns()David Howells1-0/+1
free_uid() and free_user_ns() are corecursive when CONFIG_USER_SCHED=n, but free_user_ns() is called from free_uid() by way of uid_hash_remove(), which requires uidhash_lock to be held. free_user_ns() then calls free_uid() to complete the destruction. Fix this by deferring the destruction of the user_namespace. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-25User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2)Serge Hallyn1-9/+4
The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are here as well. Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply: 1. The task pins the user struct. 2. The user struct pins its user namespace. 3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it. User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user namespaces). When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty keyrings and a clean group_info. This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here is his original patch description: >I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following >changes: > > (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user > namespace. > > (2) Fixes eCryptFS. > > (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent > with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is > superfluous. > > (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the > beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts > at allocation. > > (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds > to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine > the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred > struct. > > This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the > reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be > transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer. > > (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under > preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds(). > >David >Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Changelog: Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments 1. leave thread_keyring alone 2. use current_user_ns() in set_user() Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
2007-09-19Convert uid hash to hlistPavel Emelyanov1-1/+1
Surprisingly, but (spotted by Alexey Dobriyan) the uid hash still uses list_heads, thus occupying twice as much place as it could. Convert it to hlist_heads. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-20user namespace: fix copy_user_ns return valueSerge E. Hallyn1-1/+1
When a CONFIG_USER_NS=n and a user tries to unshare some namespace other than the user namespace, the dummy copy_user_ns returns NULL rather than the old_ns. This value then gets assigned to task->nsproxy->user_ns, so that a subsequent setuid, which uses task->nsproxy->user_ns, causes a NULL pointer deref. Fix this by returning old_ns. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16user namespace: add unshareSerge E. Hallyn1-0/+4
This patch enables the unshare of user namespaces. It adds a new clone flag CLONE_NEWUSER and implements copy_user_ns() which resets the current user_struct and adds a new root user (uid == 0) For now, unsharing the user namespace allows a process to reset its user_struct accounting and uid 0 in the new user namespace should be contained using appropriate means, for instance selinux The plan, when the full support is complete (all uid checks covered), is to keep the original user's rights in the original namespace, and let a process become uid 0 in the new namespace, with full capabilities to the new namespace. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com> Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at> Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <agm@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-16user namespace: add the frameworkCedric Le Goater1-0/+57
Basically, it will allow a process to unshare its user_struct table, resetting at the same time its own user_struct and all the associated accounting. A new root user (uid == 0) is added to the user namespace upon creation. Such root users have full privileges and it seems that theses privileges should be controlled through some means (process capabilities ?) The unshare is not included in this patch. Changes since [try #4]: - Updated get_user_ns and put_user_ns to accept NULL, and get_user_ns to return the namespace. Changes since [try #3]: - moved struct user_namespace to files user_namespace.{c,h} Changes since [try #2]: - removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user() Changes since [try #1]: - removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user() - added a root_user per user namespace Signed-off-by: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at> Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <agm@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>