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[ Upstream commit cf4f5530bb55ef7d5a91036b26676643b80b1616 ]
The link_id is supposed to be unique, but smcr_next_link_id() doesn't
skip the used link_id as expected. So the patch fixes this.
Fixes: 026c381fb477 ("net/smc: introduce link_idx for link group array")
Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 938cca9e4109b30ee1d476904538225a825e54eb ]
sk_clone_lock() needs to call sock_inuse_add(1) before entering the
sk_free_unlock_clone() error path, for __sk_free() from sk_free() from
sk_free_unlock_clone() calls sock_inuse_add(-1).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: 648845ab7e200993 ("sock: Move the socket inuse to namespace.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 271351d255b09e39c7f6437738cba595f9b235be ]
The MSG_CRYPTO msgs are always encrypted and sent to other nodes
for keys' deployment. But when receiving in peers, if those nodes
do not validate it and make sure it's encrypted, one could craft
a malicious MSG_CRYPTO msg to deploy its key with no need to know
other nodes' keys.
This patch is to do that by checking TIPC_SKB_CB(skb)->decrypted
and discard it if this packet never got decrypted.
Note that this is also a supplementary fix to CVE-2021-43267 that
can be triggered by an unencrypted malicious MSG_CRYPTO msg.
Fixes: 1ef6f7c9390f ("tipc: add automatic session key exchange")
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6dd2360334f3cb3b45fc1b8194c670090474b87c ]
Since commit a05829a7222e ("cfg80211: avoid holding the RTNL when
calling the driver") we've not only been protecting the pointer
to monitor_sdata with the RTNL, but also with the wiphy->mtx. This
is relevant in a number of lockdep assertions, e.g. the one we hit
in ieee80211_set_monitor_channel(). However, we're now protecting
all the assignments/dereferences, even the one in interface iter,
with the wiphy->mtx, so switch over the lockdep assertions to that
lock.
Fixes: a05829a7222e ("cfg80211: avoid holding the RTNL when calling the driver")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112135143.cb8e8ceffef3.Iaa210f16f6904c8a7a24954fb3396da0ef86ec08@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ce6b69749961426c6d822215ded9e67154e1ad4f ]
Even if userspace specifies the NL80211_ATTR_SURVEY_RADIO_STATS
attribute, we cannot get the statistics because we're not really
parsing the incoming attributes properly any more.
Fix this by passing the attrbuf to nl80211_prepare_wdev_dump()
and filling it there, if given, and using a local version only
if no output is desired.
Since I'm touching it anyway, make nl80211_prepare_wdev_dump()
static.
Fixes: 50508d941c18 ("cfg80211: use parallel_ops for genl")
Reported-by: Jan Fuchs <jf@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211029092539.2851b4799386.If9736d4575ee79420cbec1bd930181e1d53c7317@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 70701b83e208767f2720d8cd3e6a62cddafb3a30 ]
TCP Receive zerocopy iterates through the SKB queue via
tcp_recv_skb(), acquiring a pointer to an SKB and an offset within
that SKB to read from. From there, it iterates the SKB frags array to
determine which offset to start remapping pages from.
However, this is built on the assumption that the offset read so far
within the SKB is smaller than the SKB length. If this assumption is
violated, we can attempt to read an invalid frags array element, which
would cause a fault.
tcp_recv_skb() can cause such an SKB to be returned when the TCP FIN
flag is set. Therefore, we must guard against this occurrence inside
skb_advance_frag().
One way that we can reproduce this error follows:
1) In a receiver program, call getsockopt(TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE) with:
char some_array[32 * 1024];
struct tcp_zerocopy_receive zc = {
.copybuf_address = (__u64) &some_array[0],
.copybuf_len = 32 * 1024,
};
2) In a sender program, after a TCP handshake, send the following
sequence of packets:
i) Seq = [X, X+4000]
ii) Seq = [X+4000, X+5000]
iii) Seq = [X+4000, X+5000], Flags = FIN | URG, urgptr=1000
(This can happen without URG, if we have a signal pending, but URG is
a convenient way to reproduce the behaviour).
In this case, the following event sequence will occur on the receiver:
tcp_zerocopy_receive():
-> receive_fallback_to_copy() // copybuf_len >= inq
-> tcp_recvmsg_locked() // reads 5000 bytes, then breaks due to URG
-> tcp_recv_skb() // yields skb with skb->len == offset
-> tcp_zerocopy_set_hint_for_skb()
-> skb_advance_to_frag() // will returns a frags ptr. >= nr_frags
-> find_next_mappable_frag() // will dereference this bad frags ptr.
With this patch, skb_advance_to_frag() will no longer return an
invalid frags pointer, and will return NULL instead, fixing the issue.
Signed-off-by: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 05255b823a61 ("tcp: add TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE support for zerocopy receive")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211111235215.2605384-1-arjunroy.kdev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit ea7a1019d8baf8503ecd6e3ec8436dec283569e6 upstream.
The premise of commit 6f9f17287e78 ("SUNRPC: Mitigate cond_resched() in
xprt_transmit()") was that cond_resched() is expensive and unnecessary
when there has been just a single send.
The point of cond_resched() is to ensure that tasks that should pre-empt
this one get a chance to do so when it is safe to do so. The code prior
to commit 6f9f17287e78 failed to take into account that it was keeping a
rpc_task pinned for longer than it needed to, and so rather than doing a
full revert, let's just move the cond_resched.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 27eb4c3144f7a5ebef3c9a261d80cb3e1fa784dc upstream.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/99338965-d36c-886e-cd0e-1d8fff2b4746@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+06472778c97ed94af66d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3dc20f4762c62d3b3f0940644881ed818aa7b2f5 ]
Currently, it is not possible to migrate a neighbor entry between NUD_PERMANENT
state and NTF_USE flag with a dynamic NUD state from a user space control plane.
Similarly, it is not possible to add/remove NTF_EXT_LEARNED flag from an existing
neighbor entry in combination with NTF_USE flag.
This is due to the latter directly calling into neigh_event_send() without any
meta data updates as happening in __neigh_update(). Thus, to enable this use
case, extend the latter with a NEIGH_UPDATE_F_USE flag where we break the
NUD_PERMANENT state in particular so that a latter neigh_event_send() is able
to re-resolve a neighbor entry.
Before fix, NUD_PERMANENT -> NUD_* & NTF_USE:
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT
[...]
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT
[...]
As can be seen, despite the admin-triggered replace, the entry remains in the
NUD_PERMANENT state.
After fix, NUD_PERMANENT -> NUD_* & NTF_USE:
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT
[...]
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a extern_learn REACHABLE
[...]
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a extern_learn STALE
[...]
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a PERMANENT
[...]
After the fix, the admin-triggered replace switches to a dynamic state from
the NTF_USE flag which triggered a new neighbor resolution. Likewise, we can
transition back from there, if needed, into NUD_PERMANENT.
Similar before/after behavior can be observed for below transitions:
Before fix, NTF_USE -> NTF_USE | NTF_EXT_LEARNED -> NTF_USE:
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE
[...]
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE
[...]
After fix, NTF_USE -> NTF_USE | NTF_EXT_LEARNED -> NTF_USE:
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE
[...]
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a extern_learn REACHABLE
[...]
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE
[..]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e5d5aadcf3cd59949316df49c27cb21788d7efe4 ]
We got the following WARNING when running ab/nginx
test with RDMA link flapping (up-down-up).
The reason is when smc_sock fallback and at linkdown
happens simultaneously, we may got the following situation:
__smc_lgr_terminate()
--> smc_conn_kill()
--> smc_close_active_abort()
smc_sock->sk_state = SMC_CLOSED
sock_put(smc_sock)
smc_sock was set to SMC_CLOSED and sock_put() been called
when terminate the link group. But later application call
close() on the socket, then we got:
__smc_release():
if (smc_sock->fallback)
smc_sock->sk_state = SMC_CLOSED
sock_put(smc_sock)
Again we set the smc_sock to CLOSED through it's already
in CLOSED state, and double put the refcnt, so the following
warning happens:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 860 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x8d/0xf0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 5 PID: 860 Comm: nginx Not tainted 5.10.46+ #403
Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 8c24b4c 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x8d/0xf0
Code: 05 5c 1e b5 01 01 e8 52 25 bc ff 0f 0b c3 80 3d 4f 1e b5 01 00 75 ad 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000527e50 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: ffff8881300df2c0 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88813bd58040 RDI: ffff88813bd58048
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffff8881300df2c0 R11: ffffc90000527c78 R12: ffff8881300df340
R13: ffff8881300df930 R14: ffff88810b3dad80 R15: ffff8881300df4f8
FS: 00007f739de8fb80(0000) GS:ffff88813bd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000a01b008 CR3: 0000000111b64003 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
smc_release+0x353/0x3f0
__sock_release+0x3d/0xb0
sock_close+0x11/0x20
__fput+0x93/0x230
task_work_run+0x65/0xa0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xf9/0x100
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x190
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
This patch adds check in __smc_release() to make
sure we won't do an extra sock_put() and set the
socket to CLOSED when its already in CLOSED state.
Fixes: 51f1de79ad8e (net/smc: replace sock_put worker by socket refcounting)
Signed-off-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c7cd82b90599fa10915f41e3dd9098a77d0aa7b6 ]
Currently vosck_connect() increments sock refcount for nonblocking
socket each time it's called, which can lead to memory leak if
it's called multiple times because connect timeout function decrements
sock refcount only once.
Fixes it by making vsock_connect() return -EALREADY immediately when
sock state is already SS_CONNECTING.
Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <eiichi.tsukata@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6dc25401cba4d428328eade8ceae717633fdd702 ]
1) if q->tk_offset == TK_OFFS_MAX, then get_tcp_tstamp() calls
ktime_mono_to_any() with out-of-bound value.
2) if q->tk_offset is changed in taprio_parse_clockid(),
taprio_get_time() might also call ktime_mono_to_any()
with out-of-bound value as sysbot found:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in kernel/time/timekeeping.c:908:27
index 3 is out of range for type 'ktime_t *[3]'
CPU: 1 PID: 25668 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.15.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: bat_events batadv_iv_send_outstanding_bat_ogm_packet
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:151
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x62/0x6c lib/ubsan.c:291
ktime_mono_to_any+0x1d4/0x1e0 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:908
get_tcp_tstamp net/sched/sch_taprio.c:322 [inline]
get_packet_txtime net/sched/sch_taprio.c:353 [inline]
taprio_enqueue_one+0x5b0/0x1460 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:420
taprio_enqueue+0x3b1/0x730 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:485
dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x40/0x300 net/core/dev.c:3785
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3869 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1f6e/0x3630 net/core/dev.c:4194
batadv_send_skb_packet+0x4a9/0x5f0 net/batman-adv/send.c:108
batadv_iv_ogm_send_to_if net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:393 [inline]
batadv_iv_ogm_emit net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:421 [inline]
batadv_iv_send_outstanding_bat_ogm_packet+0x6d7/0x8e0 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:1701
process_one_work+0x9b2/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2298
worker_thread+0x658/0x11f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2445
kthread+0x405/0x4f0 kernel/kthread.c:327
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295
Fixes: 7ede7b03484b ("taprio: make clock reference conversions easier")
Fixes: 54002066100b ("taprio: Adjust timestamps for TCP packets")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Vedang Patel <vedang.patel@intel.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211108180815.1822479-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b2c4618162ec615a15883a804cce7e27afecfa58 ]
The current conversion of skb->data_end reads like this:
; data_end = (void*)(long)skb->data_end;
559: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r2 +200) ; r1 = skb->data
560: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r2 +112) ; r11 = skb->len
561: (0f) r1 += r11
562: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r2 +116)
563: (1f) r1 -= r11
But similar to the case in 84f44df664e9 ("bpf: sock_ops sk access may stomp
registers when dst_reg = src_reg"), the code will read an incorrect skb->len
when src == dst. In this case we end up generating this xlated code:
; data_end = (void*)(long)skb->data_end;
559: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +200) ; r1 = skb->data
560: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r1 +112) ; r11 = (skb->data)->len
561: (0f) r1 += r11
562: (61) r11 = *(u32 *)(r1 +116)
563: (1f) r1 -= r11
... where line 560 is the reading 4B of (skb->data + 112) instead of the
intended skb->len Here the skb pointer in r1 gets set to skb->data and the
later deref for skb->len ends up following skb->data instead of skb.
This fixes the issue similarly to the patch mentioned above by creating an
additional temporary variable and using to store the register when dst_reg =
src_reg. We name the variable bpf_temp_reg and place it in the cb context for
sk_skb. Then we restore from the temp to ensure nothing is lost.
Fixes: 16137b09a66f2 ("bpf: Compute data_end dynamically with JIT code")
Signed-off-by: Jussi Maki <joamaki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211103204736.248403-6-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e0dc3b93bd7bcff8c3813d1df43e0908499c7cf0 ]
Strparser is reusing the qdisc_skb_cb struct to stash the skb message handling
progress, e.g. offset and length of the skb. First this is poorly named and
inherits a struct from qdisc that doesn't reflect the actual usage of cb[] at
this layer.
But, more importantly strparser is using the following to access its metadata.
(struct _strp_msg *)((void *)skb->cb + offsetof(struct qdisc_skb_cb, data))
Where _strp_msg is defined as:
struct _strp_msg {
struct strp_msg strp; /* 0 8 */
int accum_len; /* 8 4 */
/* size: 12, cachelines: 1, members: 2 */
/* last cacheline: 12 bytes */
};
So we use 12 bytes of ->data[] in struct. However in BPF code running parser
and verdict the user has read capabilities into the data[] array as well. Its
not too problematic, but we should not be exposing internal state to BPF
program. If its really needed then we can use the probe_read() APIs which allow
reading kernel memory. And I don't believe cb[] layer poses any API breakage by
moving this around because programs can't depend on cb[] across layers.
In order to fix another issue with a ctx rewrite we need to stash a temp
variable somewhere. To make this work cleanly this patch builds a cb struct
for sk_skb types called sk_skb_cb struct. Then we can use this consistently
in the strparser, sockmap space. Additionally we can start allowing ->cb[]
write access after this.
Fixes: 604326b41a6fb ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Jussi Maki <joamaki@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211103204736.248403-5-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c5d2177a72a1659554922728fc407f59950aa929 ]
A socket in a sockmap may have different combinations of programs attached
depending on configuration. There can be no programs in which case the socket
acts as a sink only. There can be a TX program in this case a BPF program is
attached to sending side, but no RX program is attached. There can be an RX
program only where sends have no BPF program attached, but receives are hooked
with BPF. And finally, both TX and RX programs may be attached. Giving us the
permutations:
None, Tx, Rx, and TxRx
To date most of our use cases have been TX case being used as a fast datapath
to directly copy between local application and a userspace proxy. Or Rx cases
and TxRX applications that are operating an in kernel based proxy. The traffic
in the first case where we hook applications into a userspace application looks
like this:
AppA redirect AppB
Tx <-----------> Rx
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+ +
TCP <--> lo <--> TCP
In this case all traffic from AppA (after 3whs) is copied into the AppB
ingress queue and no traffic is ever on the TCP recieive_queue.
In the second case the application never receives, except in some rare error
cases, traffic on the actual user space socket. Instead the send happens in
the kernel.
AppProxy socket pool
sk0 ------------->{sk1,sk2, skn}
^ |
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| v
ingress lb egress
TCP TCP
Here because traffic is never read off the socket with userspace recv() APIs
there is only ever one reader on the sk receive_queue. Namely the BPF programs.
However, we've started to introduce a third configuration where the BPF program
on receive should process the data, but then the normal case is to push the
data into the receive queue of AppB.
AppB
recv() (userspace)
-----------------------
tcp_bpf_recvmsg() (kernel)
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ingress_msgQ |
| |
RX_BPF |
| |
v v
sk->receive_queue
This is different from the App{A,B} redirect because traffic is first received
on the sk->receive_queue.
Now for the issue. The tcp_bpf_recvmsg() handler first checks the ingress_msg
queue for any data handled by the BPF rx program and returned with PASS code
so that it was enqueued on the ingress msg queue. Then if no data exists on
that queue it checks the socket receive queue. Unfortunately, this is the same
receive_queue the BPF program is reading data off of. So we get a race. Its
possible for the recvmsg() hook to pull data off the receive_queue before the
BPF hook has a chance to read it. It typically happens when an application is
banging on recv() and getting EAGAINs. Until they manage to race with the RX
BPF program.
To fix this we note that before this patch at attach time when the socket is
loaded into the map we check if it needs a TX program or just the base set of
proto bpf hooks. Then it uses the above general RX hook regardless of if we
have a BPF program attached at rx or not. This patch now extends this check to
handle all cases enumerated above, TX, RX, TXRX, and none. And to fix above
race when an RX program is attached we use a new hook that is nearly identical
to the old one except now we do not let the recv() call skip the RX BPF program.
Now only the BPF program pulls data from sk->receive_queue and recv() only
pulls data from the ingress msgQ post BPF program handling.
With this resolved our AppB from above has been up and running for many hours
without detecting any errors. We do this by correlating counters in RX BPF
events and the AppB to ensure data is never skipping the BPF program. Selftests,
was not able to detect this because we only run them for a short period of time
on well ordered send/recvs so we don't get any of the noise we see in real
application environments.
Fixes: 51199405f9672 ("bpf: skb_verdict, support SK_PASS on RX BPF path")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Jussi Maki <joamaki@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211103204736.248403-4-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b8b8315e39ffaca82e79d86dde26e9144addf66b ]
We do not need to handle unhash from BPF side we can simply wait for the
close to happen. The original concern was a socket could transition from
ESTABLISHED state to a new state while the BPF hook was still attached.
But, we convinced ourself this is no longer possible and we also improved
BPF sockmap to handle listen sockets so this is no longer a problem.
More importantly though there are cases where unhash is called when data is
in the receive queue. The BPF unhash logic will flush this data which is
wrong. To be correct it should keep the data in the receive queue and allow
a receiving application to continue reading the data. This may happen when
tcp_abort() is received for example. Instead of complicating the logic in
unhash simply moving all this to tcp_close() hook solves this.
Fixes: 51199405f9672 ("bpf: skb_verdict, support SK_PASS on RX BPF path")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Jussi Maki <joamaki@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211103204736.248403-3-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 92f62485b3715882cd397b0cbd80a96d179b86d6 ]
Normally it is expected that the dsa_device_ops :: rcv() method finishes
parsing the DSA tag and consumes it, then never looks at it again.
But commit c0bcf537667c ("net: dsa: ocelot: add hardware timestamping
support for Felix") added support for RX timestamping in a very
unconventional way. On this switch, a partial timestamp is available in
the DSA header, but the driver got away with not parsing that timestamp
right away, but instead delayed that parsing for a little longer:
dsa_switch_rcv():
nskb = cpu_dp->rcv(skb, dev); <------------- not here
-> ocelot_rcv()
...
skb = nskb;
skb_push(skb, ETH_HLEN);
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_HOST;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, skb->dev);
...
if (dsa_skb_defer_rx_timestamp(p, skb)) <--- but here
-> felix_rxtstamp()
return 0;
When in felix_rxtstamp(), this driver accounted for the fact that
eth_type_trans() happened in the meanwhile, so it got a hold of the
extraction header again by subtracting (ETH_HLEN + OCELOT_TAG_LEN) bytes
from the current skb->data.
This worked for quite some time but was quite fragile from the very
beginning. Not to mention that having DSA tag parsing split in two
different files, under different folders (net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c vs
drivers/net/dsa/ocelot/felix.c) made it quite non-obvious for patches to
come that they might break this.
Finally, the blamed commit does the following: at the end of
ocelot_rcv(), it checks whether the skb payload contains a VLAN header.
If it does, and this port is under a VLAN-aware bridge, that VLAN ID
might not be correct in the sense that the packet might have suffered
VLAN rewriting due to TCAM rules (VCAP IS1). So we consume the VLAN ID
from the skb payload using __skb_vlan_pop(), and take the classified
VLAN ID from the DSA tag, and construct a hwaccel VLAN tag with the
classified VLAN, and the skb payload is VLAN-untagged.
The big problem is that __skb_vlan_pop() does:
memmove(skb->data + VLAN_HLEN, skb->data, 2 * ETH_ALEN);
__skb_pull(skb, VLAN_HLEN);
aka it moves the Ethernet header 4 bytes to the right, and pulls 4 bytes
from the skb headroom (effectively also moving skb->data, by definition).
So for felix_rxtstamp()'s fragile logic, all bets are off now.
Instead of having the "extraction" pointer point to the DSA header,
it actually points to 4 bytes _inside_ the extraction header.
Corollary, the last 4 bytes of the "extraction" header are in fact 4
stale bytes of the destination MAC address from the Ethernet header,
from prior to the __skb_vlan_pop() movement.
So of course, RX timestamps are completely bogus when the system is
configured in this way.
The fix is actually very simple: just don't structure the code like that.
For better or worse, the DSA PTP timestamping API does not offer a
straightforward way for drivers to present their RX timestamps, but
other drivers (sja1105) have established a simple mechanism to carry
their RX timestamp from dsa_device_ops :: rcv() all the way to
dsa_switch_ops :: port_rxtstamp() and even later. That mechanism is to
simply save the partial timestamp to the skb->cb, and complete it later.
Question: why don't we simply populate the skb's struct
skb_shared_hwtstamps from ocelot_rcv(), and bother with this
complication of propagating the timestamp to felix_rxtstamp()?
Answer: dsa_switch_ops :: port_rxtstamp() answers the question whether
PTP packets need sleepable context to retrieve the full RX timestamp.
Currently felix_rxtstamp() answers "no, thanks" to that question, and
calls ocelot_ptp_gettime64() from softirq atomic context. This is
understandable, since Felix VSC9959 is a PCIe memory-mapped switch, so
hardware access does not require sleeping. But the felix driver is
preparing for the introduction of other switches where hardware access
is over a slow bus like SPI or MDIO:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210814025003.2449143-1-colin.foster@in-advantage.com/
So I would like to keep this code structure, so the rework needed when
that driver will need PTP support will be minimal (answer "yes, I need
deferred context for this skb's RX timestamp", then the partial
timestamp will still be found in the skb->cb.
Fixes: ea440cd2d9b2 ("net: dsa: tag_ocelot: use VLAN information from tagging header when available")
Reported-by: Po Liu <po.liu@nxp.com>
Cc: Yangbo Lu <yangbo.lu@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 563bcbae3ba233c275c244bfce2efe12938f5363 ]
The real_dev of a vlan net_device may be freed after
unregister_vlan_dev(). Access the real_dev continually by
vlan_dev_real_dev() will trigger the UAF problem for the
real_dev like following:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vlan_dev_real_dev+0xf9/0x120
Call Trace:
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
vlan_dev_real_dev+0xf9/0x120
is_eth_port_of_netdev_filter.part.0+0xb1/0x2c0
is_eth_port_of_netdev_filter+0x28/0x40
ib_enum_roce_netdev+0x1a3/0x300
ib_enum_all_roce_netdevs+0xc7/0x140
netdevice_event_work_handler+0x9d/0x210
...
Freed by task 9288:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
__kasan_slab_free+0xfc/0x130
slab_free_freelist_hook+0xdd/0x240
kfree+0xe4/0x690
kvfree+0x42/0x50
device_release+0x9f/0x240
kobject_put+0x1c8/0x530
put_device+0x1b/0x30
free_netdev+0x370/0x540
ppp_destroy_interface+0x313/0x3d0
...
Move the put_device(real_dev) to vlan_dev_free(). Ensure
real_dev not be freed before vlan_dev unregistered.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+e4df4e1389e28972e955@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1aabe578dd86e9f2867c4db4fba9a15f4ba1825d ]
ETHTOOL_A_PAUSE_STAT_MAX is the MAX attribute id,
so we need to subtract non-stats and add one to
get a count (IOW -2+1 == -1).
Otherwise we'll see:
ethnl cmd 21: calculated reply length 40, but consumed 52
Fixes: 9a27a33027f2 ("ethtool: add standard pause stats")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5648b5e1169ff1d6d6a46c35c0b5fbebd2a5cbb2 ]
On 64bit platforms the MAC header is set to 0xffff on allocation and
also when a helper like skb_unset_mac_header() is called.
dev_parse_header may call skb_mac_header() which assumes valid mac offset:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in eth_header_parse+0x75/0x90
Read of size 6 at addr ffff8881075a5c05 by task nf-queue/1364
Call Trace:
memcpy+0x20/0x60
eth_header_parse+0x75/0x90
__nfqnl_enqueue_packet+0x1a61/0x3380
__nf_queue+0x597/0x1300
nf_queue+0xf/0x40
nf_hook_slow+0xed/0x190
nf_hook+0x184/0x440
ip_output+0x1c0/0x2a0
nf_reinject+0x26f/0x700
nfqnl_recv_verdict+0xa16/0x18b0
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x506/0xe70
The existing code only works if the skb has a mac header.
Fixes: 2c38de4c1f8da7 ("netfilter: fix looped (broad|multi)cast's MAC handling")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9b6e27d01adcec58e046c624874f8a124e8b07ec ]
Dan Carpenter says:
The patch d20c11d86d8f: "nfsd: Protect session creation and client
confirm using client_lock" from Jul 30, 2014, leads to the following
Smatch static checker warning:
net/sunrpc/addr.c:178 rpc_parse_scope_id()
warn: sleeping in atomic context
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: d20c11d86d8f ("nfsd: Protect session creation and client...")
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7303524e04af49a47991e19f895c3b8cdc3796c7 ]
If sockmap enable strparser, there are lose offset info in
sk_psock_skb_ingress(). If the length determined by parse_msg function is not
skb->len, the skb will be converted to sk_msg multiple times, and userspace
app will get the data multiple times.
Fix this by get the offset and length from strp_msg. And as Cong suggested,
add one bit in skb->_sk_redir to distinguish enable or disable strparser.
Fixes: 604326b41a6fb ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211029141216.211899-1-liujian56@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 42dcfd850e514b229d616a53dec06d0f2533217c ]
Commit c6af0c227a22 ("ip: support SO_MARK cmsg")
added propagation of SO_MARK from cmsg to skb->mark.
For IPv4 and raw sockets the mark also affects route
lookup, but in case of IPv6 the flow info is
initialized before cmsg is parsed.
Fixes: c6af0c227a22 ("ip: support SO_MARK cmsg")
Reported-and-tested-by: Xintong Hu <huxintong@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 829e050eea69c7442441b714b6f5b339b5b8c367 ]
Function br_get_link_af_size_filtered() calls br_cfm_{,peer}_mep_count()
that return a count. When BRIDGE_CFM is not enabled these functions
simply return -EOPNOTSUPP but do not modify count parameter and
calling function then works with uninitialized variables.
Modify these inline functions to return zero in count parameter.
Fixes: b6d0425b816e ("bridge: cfm: Netlink Notifications.")
Cc: Henrik Bjoernlund <henrik.bjoernlund@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 75cf662c64dd8543f56c329c69eba18141c8fd9f ]
sctp_transport_pl_toobig() supposes to return true only if there's
pathmtu update, so that in sctp_icmp_frag_needed() it would call
sctp_assoc_sync_pmtu() and sctp_retransmit(). This patch is to fix
these return places in sctp_transport_pl_toobig().
Fixes: 836964083177 ("sctp: do state transition when receiving an icmp TOOBIG packet")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 40171248bb8934537fec8fbaf718e57c8add187c ]
Currently when PLPMTUD enters Error state, transport pathmtu will be set
to MIN_PLPMTU(512) while probe is continuing with BASE_PLPMTU(1200). It
will cause pathmtu to stay in a very small value, even if the real pmtu
is some value like 1000.
RFC8899 doesn't clearly say how to set the value in Error state. But one
possibility could be keep using BASE_PLPMTU for the real pmtu, but allow
to do IP fragmentation when it's in Error state.
As it says in rfc8899#section-5.4:
Some paths could be unable to sustain packets of the BASE_PLPMTU
size. The Error State could be implemented to provide robustness to
such paths. This allows fallback to a smaller than desired PLPMTU
rather than suffer connectivity failure. This could utilize methods
such as endpoint IP fragmentation to enable the PL sender to
communicate using packets smaller than the BASE_PLPMTU.
This patch is to set pmtu to BASE_PLPMTU instead of MIN_PLPMTU for Error
state in sctp_transport_pl_send/toobig(), and set packet ipfragok for
non-probe packets when it's in Error state.
Fixes: 1dc68c194571 ("sctp: do state transition when PROBE_COUNT == MAX_PROBES on HB send path")
Reported-by: Ying Xu <yinxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit cf12e6f9124629b18a6182deefc0315f0a73a199 ]
v1: Implement a more general statement as recommended by Eric Dumazet. The
sequence number will be advanced, so this check will fix the FIN case and
other cases.
A customer reported sockets stuck in the CLOSING state. A Vmcore revealed that
the write_queue was not empty as determined by tcp_write_queue_empty() but the
sk_buff containing the FIN flag had been freed and the socket was zombied in
that state. Corresponding pcaps show no FIN from the Linux kernel on the wire.
Some instrumentation was added to the kernel and it was found that there is a
timing window where tcp_sendmsg() can run after tcp_send_fin().
tcp_sendmsg() will hit an error, for example:
1269 ▹ if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN))↩
1270 ▹ ▹ goto do_error;↩
tcp_remove_empty_skb() will then free the FIN sk_buff as "skb->len == 0". The
TCP socket is now wedged in the FIN-WAIT-1 state because the FIN is never sent.
If the other side sends a FIN packet the socket will transition to CLOSING and
remain that way until the system is rebooted.
Fix this by checking for the FIN flag in the sk_buff and don't free it if that
is the case. Testing confirmed that fixed the issue.
Fixes: fdfc5c8594c2 ("tcp: remove empty skb from write queue in error cases")
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Monir Zouaoui <Monir.Zouaoui@mail.schwarz>
Reported-by: Simon Stier <simon.stier@mail.schwarz>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 232deb3f9567ce37d99b8616a6c07c1fc0436abf ]
At present, when either of ds->ops->port_fdb_del() or ds->ops->port_mdb_del()
return a non-zero error code, we attempt to save the day and keep the
data structure associated with that switchdev object, as the deletion
procedure did not complete.
However, the way in which we do this is suspicious to the checker in
lib/refcount.c, who thinks it is buggy to increment a refcount that
became zero, and that this is indicative of a use-after-free.
Fixes: 161ca59d39e9 ("net: dsa: reference count the MDB entries at the cross-chip notifier level")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 24bcbe1cc69fa52dc4f7b5b2456678ed464724d8 ]
sk_stream_kill_queues() can be called on close when there are
still outstanding skbs to transmit. Those skbs may try to queue
notifications to the error queue (e.g. timestamps).
If sk_stream_kill_queues() purges the queue without taking
its lock the queue may get corrupted, and skbs leaked.
This shows up as a warning about an rmem leak:
WARNING: CPU: 24 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/af_inet.c:154 inet_sock_destruct+0x...
The leak is always a multiple of 0x300 bytes (the value is in
%rax on my builds, so RAX: 0000000000000300). 0x300 is truesize of
an empty sk_buff. Indeed if we dump the socket state at the time
of the warning the sk_error_queue is often (but not always)
corrupted. The ->next pointer points back at the list head,
but not the ->prev pointer. Indeed we can find the leaked skb
by scanning the kernel memory for something that looks like
an skb with ->sk = socket in question, and ->truesize = 0x300.
The contents of ->cb[] of the skb confirms the suspicion that
it is indeed a timestamp notification (as generated in
__skb_complete_tx_timestamp()).
Removing purging of sk_error_queue should be okay, since
inet_sock_destruct() does it again once all socket refs
are gone. Eric suggests this may cause sockets that go
thru disconnect() to maintain notifications from the
previous incarnations of the socket, but that should be
okay since the race was there anyway, and disconnect()
is not exactly dependable.
Thanks to Jonathan Lemon and Omar Sandoval for help at various
stages of tracing the issue.
Fixes: cb9eff097831 ("net: new user space API for time stamping of incoming and outgoing packets")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 19757cebf0c5016a1f36f7fe9810a9f0b33c0832 ]
Use of percpu_counter structure to track count of orphaned
sockets is causing problems on modern hosts with 256 cpus
or more.
Stefan Bach reported a serious spinlock contention in real workloads,
that I was able to reproduce with a netfilter rule dropping
incoming FIN packets.
53.56% server [kernel.kallsyms] [k] queued_spin_lock_slowpath
|
---queued_spin_lock_slowpath
|
--53.51%--_raw_spin_lock_irqsave
|
--53.51%--__percpu_counter_sum
tcp_check_oom
|
|--39.03%--__tcp_close
| tcp_close
| inet_release
| inet6_release
| sock_close
| __fput
| ____fput
| task_work_run
| exit_to_usermode_loop
| do_syscall_64
| entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
| __GI___libc_close
|
--14.48%--tcp_out_of_resources
tcp_write_timeout
tcp_retransmit_timer
tcp_write_timer_handler
tcp_write_timer
call_timer_fn
expire_timers
__run_timers
run_timer_softirq
__softirqentry_text_start
As explained in commit cf86a086a180 ("net/dst: use a smaller percpu_counter
batch for dst entries accounting"), default batch size is too big
for the default value of tcp_max_orphans (262144).
But even if we reduce batch sizes, there would still be cases
where the estimated count of orphans is beyond the limit,
and where tcp_too_many_orphans() has to call the expensive
percpu_counter_sum_positive().
One solution is to use plain per-cpu counters, and have
a timer to periodically refresh this cache.
Updating this cache every 100ms seems about right, tcp pressure
state is not radically changing over shorter periods.
percpu_counter was nice 15 years ago while hosts had less
than 16 cpus, not anymore by current standards.
v2: Fix the build issue for CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CHELSIO_TLS=m,
reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Remove unused socket argument from tcp_too_many_orphans()
Fixes: dd24c00191d5 ("net: Use a percpu_counter for orphan_count")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Stefan Bach <sfb@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e4400bbf5b15750e1b59bf4722d18d99be60c69f ]
The NTF_EXT_LEARNED neigh flag is usually propagated back to user space
upon dump of the neighbor table. However, when used in combination with
NTF_USE flag this is not the case despite exempting the entry from the
garbage collector. This results in inconsistent state since entries are
typically marked in neigh->flags with NTF_EXT_LEARNED, but here they are
not. Fix it by propagating the creation flag to ___neigh_create().
Before fix:
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a REACHABLE
[...]
After fix:
# ./ip/ip n replace 192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 use extern_learn
# ./ip/ip n
192.168.178.30 dev enp5s0 lladdr f4:8c:50:5e:71:9a extern_learn REACHABLE
[...]
Fixes: 9ce33e46531d ("neighbour: support for NTF_EXT_LEARNED flag")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7b1394892de8d95748d05e3ee41e85edb4abbfa1 ]
Relax this condition to make add and update commands idempotent for sets
with no timeout. The eval function already checks if the set element
timeout is available and updates it if the update command is used.
Fixes: 22fe54d5fefc ("netfilter: nf_tables: add support for dynamic set updates")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e53e9828a8d2c6545e01ff9711f1221f2fd199ce ]
In the (somewhat unlikely) event that we allocate a wiphy, then
add a regdomain to it, and then fail registration, we leak the
regdomain. Fix this by just always freeing it at the end, in the
normal cases we'll free (and NULL) it during wiphy_unregister().
This happened when the wiphy settings were bad, and since they
can be controlled by userspace with hwsim, syzbot was able to
find this issue.
Reported-by: syzbot+1638e7c770eef6b6c0d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 3e0c3ff36c4c ("cfg80211: allow multiple driver regulatory_hints()")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210927131105.68b70cef4674.I4b9f0aa08c2af28555963b9fe3d34395bb72e0cc@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7ff379ba2d4b7b205240e666601fe302207d73f8 ]
Since we're pointing into a frame, the pointer to the
twt_agrt->req_type struct member is potentially not
aligned properly. Open-code le16p_replace_bits() to
avoid passing an unaligned pointer.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: f5a4c24e689f ("mac80211: introduce individual TWT support in AP mode")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210927115124.e1208694f37b.Ie3de9bcc5dde5a79e3ac81f3185beafe4d214e57@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0d199e4363b482badcedba764e2aceab53a4a10a ]
When recovering after a link failure, snd_nxt should not be set to a
lower value. Else, update of snd_nxt is broken because:
msk->snd_nxt += ret; (where ret is number of bytes sent)
assumes that snd_nxt always moves forward.
After reduction, its possible that snd_nxt update gets out of sync:
dfrag we just sent might have had a data sequence number even past
recovery_snd_nxt.
This change factors the common msk state update to a helper
and updates snd_nxt based on the current dfrag data sequence number.
The conditional is required for the recovery phase where we may
re-transmit old dfrags that are before current snd_nxt.
After this change, snd_nxt only moves forward and covers all in-sequence
data that was transmitted.
recovery_snd_nxt is retained to detect when recovery has completed.
Fixes: 1e1d9d6f119c5 ("mptcp: handle pending data on closed subflow")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit acde891c243c1ed85b19d4d5042bdf00914f5739 ]
Directly using _usecs_to_jiffies() might be unsafe, so it's
better to use usecs_to_jiffies() instead.
Because we can see that the result of _usecs_to_jiffies()
could be larger than MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET values without the
check of the input.
Fixes: c410bf01933e ("Fix the excessive initial retransmission timeout")
Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit aed0826b0cf2e488900ab92193893e803d65c070 ]
The key_domain member in struct net only exists if we define CONFIG_KEYS.
So we should add the define when we used key_domain.
Fixes: 9b242610514f ("keys: Network namespace domain tag")
Signed-off-by: Yajun Deng <yajun.deng@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 49d8a5606428ca0962d09050a5af81461ff90fbb ]
Before freeing struct sco_conn, all delayed timeout work should be
cancelled. Otherwise, sco_sock_timeout could potentially use the
sco_conn after it has been freed.
Additionally, sco_conn.timeout_work should be initialized when the
connection is allocated, not when the channel is added. This is
because an sco_conn can create channels with multiple sockets over its
lifetime, which happens if sockets are released but the connection
isn't deleted.
Fixes: ba316be1b6a0 ("Bluetooth: schedule SCO timeouts with delayed_work")
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b7b1d02fc43925a4d569ec221715db2dfa1ce4f5 ]
The internal stream state sets the timeout to 120 seconds 2 seconds
after the creation of the flow, attach this internal stream state to the
IPS_ASSURED flag for consistent event reporting.
Before this patch:
[NEW] udp 17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 [UNREPLIED] src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282
[UPDATE] udp 17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282
[UPDATE] udp 17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED]
[DESTROY] udp 17 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED]
Note IPS_ASSURED for the flow not yet in the internal stream state.
after this update:
[NEW] udp 17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 [UNREPLIED] src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282
[UPDATE] udp 17 30 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282
[UPDATE] udp 17 120 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED]
[DESTROY] udp 17 src=10.246.11.13 dst=216.239.35.0 sport=37282 dport=123 src=216.239.35.0 dst=10.246.11.13 sport=123 dport=37282 [ASSURED]
Before this patch, short-lived UDP flows never entered IPS_ASSURED, so
they were already candidate flow to be deleted by early_drop under
stress.
Before this patch, IPS_ASSURED is set on regardless the internal stream
state, attach this internal stream state to IPS_ASSURED.
packet #1 (original direction) enters NEW state
packet #2 (reply direction) enters ESTABLISHED state, sets on IPS_SEEN_REPLY
paclet #3 (any direction) sets on IPS_ASSURED (if 2 seconds since the
creation has passed by).
Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <zenczykowski@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9dfc685e0262d4c5e44e13302f89841fa75173ca ]
syzbot reported data-races in inet_getname() multiple times,
it is time we fix this instead of pretending applications
should not trigger them.
getsockname() and getpeername() are not really considered fast path.
v2: added the missing BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG() declaration
needed when CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF=n, as reported by
kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
syzbot typical report:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __inet_hash_connect / inet_getname
write to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14374 on cpu 1:
__inet_hash_connect+0x7ec/0x950 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:831
inet_hash_connect+0x85/0x90 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:853
tcp_v4_connect+0x782/0xbb0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:275
__inet_stream_connect+0x156/0x6e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:664
inet_stream_connect+0x44/0x70 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:728
__sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1896 [inline]
__sys_connect+0x254/0x290 net/socket.c:1913
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1923 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1920 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1920
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14408 on cpu 0:
inet_getname+0x11f/0x170 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:790
__sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1946
__do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1961 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1958 [inline]
__x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1958
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x0000 -> 0xdee0
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 14408 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026213014.3026708-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE
[ Upstream commit 61e18ce7348bfefb5688a8bcd4b4d6b37c0f9b2a ]
When addr_gen_mode is set to IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE, the link-local addr
should not be generated. But it isn't the case for GRE (as well as GRE6)
and SIT tunnels. Make it so that tunnels consider the addr_gen_mode,
especially for IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_NONE.
Do this in add_v4_addrs() to cover both GRE and SIT only if the addr
scope is link.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211020200618.467342-1-ssuryaextr@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 146e5e733310379f51924111068f08a3af0db830 ]
Due to deadlocks in the networking subsystem spotted 12 years ago[1],
a workaround was put in place[2] to avoid taking the rtnl lock when it
was not available and restarting the syscall (back to VFS, letting
userspace spin). The following construction is found a lot in the net
sysfs and sysctl code:
if (!rtnl_trylock())
return restart_syscall();
This can be problematic when multiple userspace threads use such
interfaces in a short period, making them to spin a lot. This happens
for example when adding and moving virtual interfaces: userspace
programs listening on events, such as systemd-udevd and NetworkManager,
do trigger actions reading files in sysfs. It gets worse when a lot of
virtual interfaces are created concurrently, say when creating
containers at boot time.
Returning early without hitting the above pattern when the syscall will
fail eventually does make things better. While it is not a fix for the
issue, it does ease things.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/49A4D5D5.5090602@trash.net/
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/m14oyhis31.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org/
and https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20090226084924.16cb3e08@nehalam/
[2] Rightfully, those deadlocks are *hard* to solve.
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1e080f17750d1083e8a32f7b350584ae1cd7ff20 ]
mq / mqprio make the default child qdiscs visible. They only do
so for the qdiscs which are within real_num_tx_queues when the
device is registered. Depending on order of calls in the driver,
or if user space changes config via ethtool -L the number of
qdiscs visible under tc qdisc show will differ from the number
of queues. This is confusing to users and potentially to system
configuration scripts which try to make sure qdiscs have the
right parameters.
Add a new Qdisc_ops callback and make relevant qdiscs TTRT.
Note that this uncovers the "shortcut" created by
commit 1f27cde313d7 ("net: sched: use pfifo_fast for non real queues")
The default child qdiscs beyond initial real_num_tx are always
pfifo_fast, no matter what the sysfs setting is. Fixing this
gets a little tricky because we'd need to keep a reference
on whatever the default qdisc was at the time of creation.
In practice this is likely an non-issue the qdiscs likely have
to be configured to non-default settings, so whatever user space
is doing such configuration can replace the pfifos... now that
it will see them.
Reported-by: Matthew Massey <matthewmassey@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f4712fa993f688d0a48e0c28728fcdeb88c1ea58 ]
In sco_conn_del, conn->sk is read while holding on to the
sco_conn.lock to avoid races with a socket that could be released
concurrently.
However, in between unlocking sco_conn.lock and calling sock_hold,
it's possible for the socket to be freed, which would cause a
use-after-free write when sock_hold is finally called.
To fix this, the reference count of the socket should be increased
while the sco_conn.lock is still held.
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1bff51ea59a9afb67d2dd78518ab0582a54a472c ]
use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested is reported:
[ 179.140137][ T3731] =====================================================
[ 179.142675][ T3731] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0
[ 179.145494][ T3731] CPU: 4 PID: 3731 Comm: kworker/4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #54
[ 179.148432][ T3731] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[ 179.151806][ T3731] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
[ 179.152730][ T3731] Call Trace:
[ 179.153301][ T3731] dump_stack+0x24c/0x2e0
[ 179.154063][ T3731] kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0
[ 179.154855][ T3731] __msan_warning+0x5c/0xa0
[ 179.155579][ T3731] lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0
[ 179.156436][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
[ 179.157257][ T3731] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0xb8/0x890
[ 179.158154][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20
[ 179.159141][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
[ 179.159994][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0
[ 179.160959][ T3731] ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x420/0x420
[ 179.161834][ T3731] l2cap_chan_del+0x3e1/0x1d50
[ 179.162608][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180
[ 179.163435][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0
[ 179.164406][ T3731] l2cap_chan_close+0xeea/0x1050
[ 179.165189][ T3731] ? kmsan_internal_unpoison_shadow+0x42/0x70
[ 179.166180][ T3731] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x1da/0x590
[ 179.167066][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20
[ 179.168023][ T3731] ? l2cap_chan_create+0x560/0x560
[ 179.168818][ T3731] process_one_work+0x121d/0x1ff0
[ 179.169598][ T3731] worker_thread+0x121b/0x2370
[ 179.170346][ T3731] kthread+0x4ef/0x610
[ 179.171010][ T3731] ? process_one_work+0x1ff0/0x1ff0
[ 179.171828][ T3731] ? kthread_blkcg+0x110/0x110
[ 179.172587][ T3731] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 179.173348][ T3731]
[ 179.173752][ T3731] Uninit was created at:
[ 179.174409][ T3731] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0xf0
[ 179.175373][ T3731] kmsan_slab_free+0x76/0xc0
[ 179.176060][ T3731] kfree+0x3a5/0x1180
[ 179.176664][ T3731] __sk_destruct+0x8af/0xb80
[ 179.177375][ T3731] __sk_free+0x812/0x8c0
[ 179.178032][ T3731] sk_free+0x97/0x130
[ 179.178686][ T3731] l2cap_sock_release+0x3d5/0x4d0
[ 179.179457][ T3731] sock_close+0x150/0x450
[ 179.180117][ T3731] __fput+0x6bd/0xf00
[ 179.180787][ T3731] ____fput+0x37/0x40
[ 179.181481][ T3731] task_work_run+0x140/0x280
[ 179.182219][ T3731] do_exit+0xe51/0x3e60
[ 179.182930][ T3731] do_group_exit+0x20e/0x450
[ 179.183656][ T3731] get_signal+0x2dfb/0x38f0
[ 179.184344][ T3731] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xaa/0xe10
[ 179.185266][ T3731] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2d2/0x560
[ 179.186136][ T3731] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x35/0x60
[ 179.186984][ T3731] do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x140
[ 179.187681][ T3731] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 179.188604][ T3731] =====================================================
In our case, there are two Thread A and B:
Context: Thread A: Context: Thread B:
l2cap_chan_timeout() __se_sys_shutdown()
l2cap_chan_close() l2cap_sock_shutdown()
l2cap_chan_del() l2cap_chan_close()
l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()
Once l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() excuted, this sock will be marked as SOCK_ZAPPED,
and can be treated as killable in l2cap_sock_kill() if sock_orphan() has
excuted, at this time we close sock through sock_close() which end to call
l2cap_sock_kill() like Thread C:
Context: Thread C:
sock_close()
l2cap_sock_release()
sock_orphan()
l2cap_sock_kill() #free sock if refcnt is 1
If C completed, Once A or B reaches l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() again,
use-after-free happened.
We should set chan->data to NULL if sock is destructed, for telling teardown
operation is not allowed in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(), and also we should
avoid killing an already killed socket in l2cap_sock_close_cb().
Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 99c23da0eed4fd20cae8243f2b51e10e66aa0951 ]
The sco_send_frame() also takes lock_sock() during memcpy_from_msg()
call that may be endlessly blocked by a task with userfaultd
technique, and this will result in a hung task watchdog trigger.
Just like the similar fix for hci_sock_sendmsg() in commit
92c685dc5de0 ("Bluetooth: reorganize functions..."), this patch moves
the memcpy_from_msg() out of lock_sock() for addressing the hang.
This should be the last piece for fixing CVE-2021-3640 after a few
already queued fixes.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 164051a6ab5445bd97f719f50b16db8b32174269 upstream.
The TP.CM_BAM message must be sent to the global address [1], so add a
check to drop TP.CM_BAM sent to a non-global address.
Without this patch, the receiver will treat the following packets as
normal RTS/CTS transport:
18EC0102#20090002FF002301
18EB0102#0100000000000000
18EB0102#020000FFFFFFFFFF
[1] SAE-J1939-82 2015 A.3.3 Row 1.
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1635431907-15617-4-git-send-email-zhangchangzhong@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a79305e156db3d24fcd8eb649cdb3c3b2350e5c2 upstream.
According to SAE-J1939-82 2015 (A.3.6 Row 2), a receiver should never
send TP.CM_CTS to the global address, so we can add a check in
j1939_can_recv() to drop messages with invalid source address.
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1635431907-15617-3-git-send-email-zhangchangzhong@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c0f49d98006f2db3333b917caac65bce2af9865c upstream.
This patch prevents BAM transport from being closed by receiving abort
message, as specified in SAE-J1939-82 2015 (A.3.3 Row 4).
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1635431907-15617-2-git-send-email-zhangchangzhong@huawei.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1e4b50f06d970d8da3474d2a0354450416710bda upstream.
In order to have the padding fields actually usable in the future,
there have to be checks that user space doesn't supply non-zero garbage
there. It is also worth setting these padding fields to zero, unless
it is known that they have been already zeroed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15
Fixes: 5a20dd46b8b84593 ("mctp: Be explicit about struct sockaddr_mctp padding")
Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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