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Replace all the occurrences of FIELD_SIZEOF() with sizeof_field() except
at places where these are defined. Later patches will remove the unused
definition of FIELD_SIZEOF().
This patch is generated using following script:
EXCLUDE_FILES="include/linux/stddef.h|include/linux/kernel.h"
git grep -l -e "\bFIELD_SIZEOF\b" | while read file;
do
if [[ "$file" =~ $EXCLUDE_FILES ]]; then
continue
fi
sed -i -e 's/\bFIELD_SIZEOF\b/sizeof_field/g' $file;
done
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Bharadiya <pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190924105839.110713-3-pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com
Co-developed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> # for net
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Asymmetric private keys are used to sign multiple files. The kernel
currently supports checking against blacklisted keys. However, if the
public key is blacklisted, any file signed by the blacklisted key will
automatically fail signature verification. Blacklisting the public key
is not fine enough granularity, as we might want to only blacklist a
particular file.
This patch adds support for checking against the blacklisted hash of
the file, without the appended signature, based on the IMA policy. It
defines a new policy option "appraise_flag=check_blacklist".
In addition to the blacklisted binary hashes stored in the firmware
"dbx" variable, the Linux kernel may be configured to load blacklisted
binary hashes onto the .blacklist keyring as well. The following
example shows how to blacklist a specific kernel module hash.
$ sha256sum kernel/kheaders.ko
77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
kernel/kheaders.ko
$ grep BLACKLIST .config
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="blacklist-hash-list"
$ cat certs/blacklist-hash-list
"bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3"
Update the IMA custom measurement and appraisal policy
rules (/etc/ima-policy):
measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
appraise_type=imasig|modsig
After building, installing, and rebooting the kernel:
545660333 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist:
bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
appraise_type=imasig|modsig
modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'kheaders': Permission denied
10 0c9834db5a0182c1fb0cdc5d3adcf11a11fd83dd ima-sig
sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko
10 82aad2bcc3fa8ed94762356b5c14838f3bcfa6a0 ima-modsig
sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko sha256:77fa889b3
5a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
3082029a06092a864886f70d010702a082028b30820287020101310d300b0609608648
016503040201300b06092a864886f70d01070131820264....
10 25b72217cc1152b44b134ce2cd68f12dfb71acb3 ima-buf
sha256:8b58427fedcf8f4b20bc8dc007f2e232bf7285d7b93a66476321f9c2a3aa132
b blacklisted-hash
77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-8-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
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process_buffer_measurement() is limited to measuring the kexec boot
command line. This patch makes process_buffer_measurement() more
generic, allowing it to measure other types of buffer data (e.g.
blacklisted binary hashes or key hashes).
process_buffer_measurement() may be called directly from an IMA hook
or as an auxiliary measurement record. In both cases the buffer
measurement is based on policy. This patch modifies the function to
conditionally retrieve the policy defined PCR and template for the IMA
hook case.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: added comment in process_buffer_measurement()]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
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One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:
struct ima_template_entry {
...
struct ima_field_data template_data[0]; /* template related data */
};
instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ima_template_entry) + count * sizeof(struct ima_field_data), GFP_NOFS);
Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:
instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_NOFS);
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:
struct foo {
int stuff;
struct boo entry[];
};
instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct foo) + count * sizeof(struct boo), GFP_KERNEL);
Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:
instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_KERNEL);
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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If we can't parse the PKCS7 in the appended modsig, we will free the modsig
structure and then access one of its members to determine the error value.
Fixes: 39b07096364a ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels.
For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating
a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those
platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to
determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type,
and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down.
This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set
in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.
This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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integrity_kernel_read() can fail in which case we forward to call
ahash_request_free() on a currently running request. We have to wait
for its completion before we can free the request.
This was observed by interrupting a "find / -type f -xdev -print0 | xargs -0
cat 1>/dev/null" with ctrl-c on an IMA enabled filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is
a short read then this positive value is returned from
ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from
ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value
being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value.
Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error,
so translate a short read into -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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If the IMA template contains the "modsig" or "d-modsig" field, then the
modsig should be added to the measurement list when the file is appraised.
And that is what normally happens, but if a measurement rule caused a file
containing a modsig to be measured before a different rule causes it to be
appraised, the resulting measurement entry will not contain the modsig
because it is only fetched during appraisal. When the appraisal rule
triggers, it won't store a new measurement containing the modsig because
the file was already measured.
We need to detect that situation and store an additional measurement with
the modsig. This is done by adding an IMA_MEASURE action flag if we read a
modsig and the IMA template contains a modsig field.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Define new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is
expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig"
template field which holds the appended file signature.
Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as
well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.
Change ima_store_measurement() to accept a struct modsig * argument so that
it can be passed along to the templates via struct ima_event_data.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Obtain the modsig and calculate its corresponding hash in
ima_collect_measurement().
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Implement the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and
verify modsig signatures.
In case a file has both an xattr signature and an appended modsig, IMA will
only use the appended signature if the key used by the xattr signature
isn't present in the IMA or platform keyring.
Because modsig verification needs to convert from an integrity keyring id
to the keyring itself, add an integrity_keyring_from_id() function in
digsig.c so that integrity_modsig_verify() can use it.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Verify xattr signature in a separate function so that the logic in
ima_appraise_measurement() remains clear when it gains the ability to also
verify an appended module signature.
The code in the switch statement is unchanged except for having to
dereference the status and cause variables (since they're now pointers),
and fixing the style of a block comment to appease checkpatch.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Introduce the modsig keyword to the IMA policy syntax to specify that
a given hook should expect the file to have the IMA signature appended
to it. Here is how it can be used in a rule:
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
With this rule, IMA will accept either a signature stored in the extended
attribute or an appended signature.
For now, the rule above will behave exactly the same as if
appraise_type=imasig was specified. The actual modsig implementation
will be introduced separately.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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IMA policy rules are walked sequentially. Depending on the ordering of
the policy rules, the "template" field might be defined in one rule, but
will be replaced by subsequent, applicable rules, even if the rule does
not explicitly define the "template" field.
This patch initializes the "template" once and only replaces the
"template", when explicitly defined.
Fixes: 19453ce0bcfb ("IMA: support for per policy rule template formats")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs"
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus
effectively commits
7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")
that the merge brought in).
It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].
The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features:
- IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the
IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM
label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is
being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label
deletions.
- Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being
mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar
changes at the VFS layer would be preferable.
- The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a
couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line
measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes).
- Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent
list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and
storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is
the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement
list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition
KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args
IMA: Define a new template field buf
IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
IMA: support for per policy rule template formats
integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch
ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers
x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY
ima: Make arch_policy_entry static
ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute
x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
"This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
based on an internal ACL by the following means:
- Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.
ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
tags/namespaces.
Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
acquiring use of possessor permits.
- Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"
* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
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Even though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a
SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean
"type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real
size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable.
The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the
definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data.
So make this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from
the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. Also, change the name of the
element from digest to data since in most places the array doesn't hold a
digest.
A separate struct evm_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of
evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that
definition, specifically the EVM HMAC code.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN is used when restoring measurements carried over from
a kexec. It should be set to the length of a template containing all fields
except for 'd' and 'n', which don't need to be accounted for since they
shouldn't be defined in the same template description as 'd-ng' and 'n-ng'.
That length is greater than the current 15, so update using a sizeof() to
show where the number comes from and also can be visually shown to be
correct. The sizeof() is calculated at compile time.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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A buffer(kexec boot command line arguments) measured into IMA
measuremnt list cannot be appraised, without already being
aware of the buffer contents. Since hashes are non-reversible,
raw buffer is needed for validation or regenerating hash for
appraisal/attestation.
Add support to store/read the buffer contents in HEX.
The kexec cmdline hash is stored in the "d-ng" field of the
template data. It can be verified using
sudo cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements |
grep kexec-cmdline | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum
- Add two new fields to ima_event_data to hold the buf and
buf_len
- Add a new template field 'buf' to be used to store/read
the buffer data.
- Updated process_buffer_meaurement to add the buffer to
ima_event_data. process_buffer_measurement added in
"Define a new IMA hook to measure the boot command line
arguments"
- Add a new template policy name ima-buf to represent
'd-ng|n-ng|buf'
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
|
Currently during soft reboot(kexec_file_load) boot command line
arguments are not measured. Define hooks needed to measure kexec
command line arguments during soft reboot(kexec_file_load).
- A new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline is defined to be called by the
kexec code.
- A new function process_buffer_measurement is defined to measure
the buffer hash into the IMA measurement list.
- A new func policy KEXEC_CMDLINE is defined to control the
measurement.
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
Admins may wish to log different measurements using different IMA
templates. Add support for overriding the default template on a per-rule
basis.
Inspired-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
Designated initializers allow specifying only the members of the struct
that need initialization. Non-mentioned members are initialized to zero.
This makes the code a bit clearer (particularly in ima_add_boot_aggregate)
and also allows adding a new member to the struct without having to update
all struct initializations.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
Don't do lazy policy updates while running the rule matching,
run the updates as they happen.
Depends on commit f242064c5df3 ("LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers")
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
If enabled, ima arch specific policies always adds the measurements rules,
this makes it dependent on CONFIG_IMA. CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE implicitly takes
care of this, however it is needed explicitly for CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.
This patch adds the CONFIG_IMA dependency in combination with
CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG for CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY
Fixes: d958083a8f640 (x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86)
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
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Fix sparse warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:202:23: warning:
symbol 'arch_policy_entry' was not declared. Should it be static?
Fixes: 6191706246de ("ima: add support for arch specific policies")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-5.0)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2 of the license
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
The kernel calls deny_write_access() to prevent a file already opened
for write from being executed and also prevents files being executed
from being opened for write. For some reason this does not extend to
files being mmap'ed execute.
From an IMA perspective, measuring/appraising the integrity of a file
being mmap'ed shared execute, without first making sure the file cannot
be modified, makes no sense. This patch prevents files, in policy,
already mmap'ed shared write, from being mmap'ed execute.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"Four bug fixes, none 5.2-specific, all marked for stable.
The first two are related to the architecture specific IMA policy
support. The other two patches, one is related to EVM signatures,
based on additional hash algorithms, and the other is related to
displaying the IMA policy"
* 'next-fixes-for-5.2-rc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly
evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()
ima: fix wrong signed policy requirement when not appraising
x86/ima: Check EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES before using
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|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Show the '^' character when a policy rule has flag IMA_INMASK.
Fixes: 80eae209d63ac ("IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:
- Have no license information of any form
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Kernel booted just with ima_policy=tcb (not with
ima_policy=appraise_tcb) shouldn't require signed policy.
Regression found with LTP test ima_policy.sh.
Fixes: c52657d93b05 ("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-5.0)
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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|
The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything.
The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op.
With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly
pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm
actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions,
which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP
from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are
called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep.
Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while
hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function
crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks
and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's
not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary
to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all.
Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the
crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:
- Clean up the transmission flow
Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now
done in the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead
taking the chip lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside
tpm_transmit(), used with the resource manager, have been refactored
out.
Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel
patches by James Bottomley).
- PPI 1.3 support
TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that
may be needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command
requires such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.
The PPI request file will show output like this then:
# echo "23 16" > request
# cat request
23 16
# echo "5" > request
# cat request
5
- Extend all PCR banks in IMA
Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks
is now allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined
dynamically using a probe PCR read without relying crypto's static
list of hash algorithms.
This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and
secure.
- TPM 2.0 selftests
Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside
of the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
tpm/ppi: Enable submission of optional command parameter for PPI 1.3
tpm/ppi: Possibly show command parameter if TPM PPI 1.3 is used
tpm/ppi: Display up to 101 operations as define for version 1.3
tpm/ppi: rename TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID to TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID_1
tpm/ppi: pass function revision ID to tpm_eval_dsm()
tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()
KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()
tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h
tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read
tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms
tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array
tpm: remove @flags from tpm_transmit()
tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit()
tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop()
tpm: remove TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED flag
tpm: use tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm-sysfs.c.
tpm: remove @space from tpm_transmit()
tpm: move TPM space code out of tpm_transmit()
tpm: move tpm_validate_commmand() to tpm2-space.c
tpm: clean up tpm_try_transmit() error handling flow
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"Mimi Zohar says:
'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.
Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup'"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.
Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.
Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.
All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1"
* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: mark expected switch fall-through
audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
audit: join tty records to their syscall
audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
audit: ignore fcaps on umount
audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
audit: add support for fcaps v3
audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
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In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch fixes the following warnings:
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
Also, add a missing break statement to fix the following warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Currently, tpm_pcr_extend() accepts as an input only a SHA1 digest.
This patch replaces the hash parameter of tpm_pcr_extend() with an array of
tpm_digest structures, so that the caller can provide a digest for each PCR
bank currently allocated in the TPM.
tpm_pcr_extend() will not extend banks for which no digest was provided,
as it happened before this patch, but instead it requires that callers
provide the full set of digests. Since the number of digests will always be
chip->nr_allocated_banks, the count parameter has been removed.
Due to the API change, ima_pcr_extend() and pcrlock() have been modified.
Since the number of allocated banks is not known in advance, the memory for
the digests must be dynamically allocated. To avoid performance degradation
and to avoid that a PCR extend is not done due to lack of memory, the array
of tpm_digest structures is allocated by the users of the TPM driver at
initialization time.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (on x86 for TPM 1.2 & PTT TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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|
Currently, the TPM driver retrieves the digest size from a table mapping
TPM algorithms identifiers to identifiers defined by the crypto subsystem.
If the algorithm is not defined by the latter, the digest size can be
retrieved from the output of the PCR read command.
The patch modifies the definition of tpm_pcr_read() and tpm2_pcr_read() to
pass the desired hash algorithm and obtain the digest size at TPM startup.
Algorithms and corresponding digest sizes are stored in the new structure
tpm_bank_info, member of tpm_chip, so that the information can be used by
other kernel subsystems.
tpm_bank_info contains: the TPM algorithm identifier, necessary to generate
the event log as defined by Trusted Computing Group (TCG); the digest size,
to pad/truncate a digest calculated with a different algorithm; the crypto
subsystem identifier, to calculate the digest of event data.
This patch also protects against data corruption that could happen in the
bus, by checking that the digest size returned by the TPM during a PCR read
matches the size of the algorithm passed to tpm2_pcr_read().
For the initial PCR read, when digest sizes are not yet available, this
patch ensures that the amount of data copied from the output returned by
the TPM does not exceed the size of the array data are copied to.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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If tmpfiles can be made persistent, then newly created tmpfiles need to
be treated like any other new files in policy.
This patch indicates which newly created tmpfiles are in policy, causing
the file hash to be calculated on __fput().
Reported-by: Ignaz Forster <ignaz.forster@gmx.de>
[rgoldwyn@suse.com: Call ima_post_create_tmpfile() in vfs_tmpfile() as
opposed to do_tmpfile(). This will help the case for overlayfs where
copy_up is denied while overwriting a file.]
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).
The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.
It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.
Remove it.
Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull TPM updates from James Morris:
- Support for partial reads of /dev/tpm0.
- Clean up for TPM 1.x code: move the commands to tpm1-cmd.c and make
everything to use the same data structure for building TPM commands
i.e. struct tpm_buf.
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (25 commits)
tpm: add support for partial reads
tpm: tpm_ibmvtpm: fix kdoc warnings
tpm: fix kdoc for tpm2_flush_context_cmd()
tpm: tpm_try_transmit() refactor error flow.
tpm: use u32 instead of int for PCR index
tpm1: reimplement tpm1_continue_selftest() using tpm_buf
tpm1: reimplement SAVESTATE using tpm_buf
tpm1: rename tpm1_pcr_read_dev to tpm1_pcr_read()
tpm1: implement tpm1_pcr_read_dev() using tpm_buf structure
tpm: tpm1: rewrite tpm1_get_random() using tpm_buf structure
tpm: tpm-space.c remove unneeded semicolon
tpm: tpm-interface.c drop unused macros
tpm: add tpm_auto_startup() into tpm-interface.c
tpm: factor out tpm_startup function
tpm: factor out tpm 1.x pm suspend flow into tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: move tpm 1.x selftest code from tpm-interface.c tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: factor out tpm1_get_random into tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: move tpm_getcap to tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: move tpm1_pcr_extend to tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: factor out tpm_get_timeouts()
...
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.
Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the
kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent
loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall,
independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure
boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.
In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.
(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here)"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
integrity: Remove references to module keyring
ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write
ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
efi: Add EFI signature data types
integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring
integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring
selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test
ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs
x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
ima: add support for arch specific policies
ima: refactor ima_init_policy()
ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot
integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
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totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages are made static inline function.
Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating
things. It was discussed in length here,
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 So it seemes
better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic, with preventing
poteintial store-to-read tearing as a bonus.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-4-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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