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2021-08-30Merge tag 'efi-core-2021-08-30' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar: "A handful of EFI changes for this cycle: - EFI CPER parsing improvements - Don't take the address of efi_guid_t internal fields" * tag 'efi-core-2021-08-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: efi: cper: check section header more appropriately efi: Don't use knowledge about efi_guid_t internals efi: cper: fix scnprintf() use in cper_mem_err_location()
2021-08-27efi: Don't use knowledge about efi_guid_t internalsAndy Shevchenko1-1/+1
When print GUIDs supply pointer to the efi_guid_t (guid_t) type rather its internal members. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
2021-08-10bpf: Add lockdown check for probe_write_user helperDaniel Borkmann1-0/+1
Back then, commit 96ae52279594 ("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper to be called in tracers") added the bpf_probe_write_user() helper in order to allow to override user space memory. Its original goal was to have a facility to "debug, divert, and manipulate execution of semi-cooperative processes" under CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Write to kernel was explicitly disallowed since it would otherwise tamper with its integrity. One use case was shown in cf9b1199de27 ("samples/bpf: Add test/example of using bpf_probe_write_user bpf helper") where the program DNATs traffic at the time of connect(2) syscall, meaning, it rewrites the arguments to a syscall while they're still in userspace, and before the syscall has a chance to copy the argument into kernel space. These days we have better mechanisms in BPF for achieving the same (e.g. for load-balancers), but without having to write to userspace memory. Of course the bpf_probe_write_user() helper can also be used to abuse many other things for both good or bad purpose. Outside of BPF, there is a similar mechanism for ptrace(2) such as PTRACE_PEEK{TEXT,DATA} and PTRACE_POKE{TEXT,DATA}, but would likely require some more effort. Commit 96ae52279594 explicitly dedicated the helper for experimentation purpose only. Thus, move the helper's availability behind a newly added LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER lockdown knob so that the helper is disabled under the "integrity" mode. More fine-grained control can be implemented also from LSM side with this change. Fixes: 96ae52279594 ("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper to be called in tracers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
2021-08-09bpf: Add _kernel suffix to internal lockdown_bpf_readDaniel Borkmann1-1/+1
Rename LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ into LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL so we have naming more consistent with a LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER option that we are adding. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
2021-08-05Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210805' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-6/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore: "One small SELinux fix for a problem where an error code was not being propagated back up to userspace when a bogus SELinux policy is loaded into the kernel" * tag 'selinux-pr-20210805' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: correct the return value when loads initial sids
2021-08-02selinux: correct the return value when loads initial sidsXiu Jianfeng1-6/+4
It should not return 0 when SID 0 is assigned to isids. This patch fixes it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e3e0b582c321a ("selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling") Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> [PM: remove changelog from description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-07-02Merge tag 'asm-generic-unaligned-5.14' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic Pull asm/unaligned.h unification from Arnd Bergmann: "Unify asm/unaligned.h around struct helper The get_unaligned()/put_unaligned() helpers are traditionally architecture specific, with the two main variants being the "access-ok.h" version that assumes unaligned pointer accesses always work on a particular architecture, and the "le-struct.h" version that casts the data to a byte aligned type before dereferencing, for architectures that cannot always do unaligned accesses in hardware. Based on the discussion linked below, it appears that the access-ok version is not realiable on any architecture, but the struct version probably has no downsides. This series changes the code to use the same implementation on all architectures, addressing the few exceptions separately" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75d07691-1e4f-741f-9852-38c0b4f520bc@synopsys.com/ Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=100363 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210507220813.365382-14-arnd@kernel.org/ Link: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic.git unaligned-rework-v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=whGObOKruA_bU3aPGZfoDqZM1_9wBkwREp0H0FgR-90uQ@mail.gmail.com/ * tag 'asm-generic-unaligned-5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic: asm-generic: simplify asm/unaligned.h asm-generic: uaccess: 1-byte access is always aligned netpoll: avoid put_unaligned() on single character mwifiex: re-fix for unaligned accesses apparmor: use get_unaligned() only for multi-byte words partitions: msdos: fix one-byte get_unaligned() asm-generic: unaligned always use struct helpers asm-generic: unaligned: remove byteshift helpers powerpc: use linux/unaligned/le_struct.h on LE power7 m68k: select CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS sh: remove unaligned access for sh4a openrisc: always use unaligned-struct header asm-generic: use asm-generic/unaligned.h for most architectures
2021-07-01Merge tag 'safesetid-5.14' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linuxLinus Torvalds2-2/+2
Pull SafeSetID update from Micah Morton: "One very minor code cleanup change that marks a variable as __initdata" * tag 'safesetid-5.14' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux: LSM: SafeSetID: Mark safesetid_initialized as __initdata
2021-07-01Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.14' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds2-5/+9
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler: "There is nothing more significant than an improvement to a byte count check in smackfs. All changes have been in next for weeks" * tag 'Smack-for-5.14' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: Smack: fix doc warning Revert "Smack: Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges" smackfs: restrict bytes count in smk_set_cipso() security/smack/: fix misspellings using codespell tool
2021-07-01Merge tag 'audit-pr-20210629' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "Another merge window, another small audit pull request. Four patches in total: one is cosmetic, one removes an unnecessary initialization, one renames some enum values to prevent name collisions, and one converts list_del()/list_add() to list_move(). None of these are earth shattering and all pass the audit-testsuite tests while merging cleanly on top of your tree from earlier today" * tag 'audit-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: remove unnecessary 'ret' initialization audit: remove trailing spaces and tabs audit: Use list_move instead of list_del/list_add audit: Rename enum audit_state constants to avoid AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition audit: add blank line after variable declarations
2021-07-01Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210629' of ↵Linus Torvalds11-109/+81
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore: - The slow_avc_audit() function is now non-blocking so we can remove the AVC_NONBLOCKING tricks; this also includes the 'flags' variant of avc_has_perm(). - Use kmemdup() instead of kcalloc()+copy when copying parts of the SELinux policydb. - The InfiniBand device name is now passed by reference when possible in the SELinux code, removing a strncpy(). - Minor cleanups including: constification of avtab function args, removal of useless LSM/XFRM function args, SELinux kdoc fixes, and removal of redundant assignments. * tag 'selinux-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: kill 'flags' argument in avc_has_perm_flags() and avc_audit() selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking selinux: Fix kernel-doc selinux: use __GFP_NOWARN with GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC lsm_audit,selinux: pass IB device name by reference selinux: Remove redundant assignment to rc selinux: Corrected comment to match kernel-doc comment selinux: delete selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() useless argument selinux: constify some avtab function arguments selinux: simplify duplicate_policydb_cond_list() by using kmemdup()
2021-06-29Merge tag 'integrity-v5.14' of ↵Linus Torvalds18-75/+730
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: "The large majority of the changes are EVM portable & immutable signature related: removing a dependency on loading an HMAC key, safely allowing file metadata included in the EVM portable & immutable signatures to be modified, allowing EVM signatures to fulfill IMA file signature policy requirements, including the EVM file metadata signature in lieu of an IMA file data signature in the measurement list, and adding dynamic debugging of EVM file metadata. In addition, in order to detect critical data or file change reversions, duplicate measurement records are permitted in the IMA measurement list. The remaining patches address compiler, sparse, and doc warnings" * tag 'integrity-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: (31 commits) evm: Check xattr size discrepancy between kernel and user evm: output EVM digest calculation info IMA: support for duplicate measurement records ima: Fix warning: no previous prototype for function 'ima_add_kexec_buffer' ima: differentiate between EVM failures in the audit log ima: Fix fall-through warning for Clang ima: Pass NULL instead of 0 to ima_get_action() in ima_file_mprotect() ima: Include header defining ima_post_key_create_or_update() ima/evm: Fix type mismatch ima: Set correct casting types doc: Fix warning in Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst evm: Don't return an error in evm_write_xattrs() if audit is not enabled ima: Define new template evm-sig ima: Define new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvalues evm: Verify portable signatures against all protected xattrs ima: Define new template field imode ima: Define new template fields iuid and igid ima: Add ima_show_template_uint() template library function ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback ...
2021-06-21evm: Check xattr size discrepancy between kernel and userRoberto Sassu1-1/+7
The kernel and the user obtain an xattr value in two different ways: kernel (EVM): uses vfs_getxattr_alloc() which obtains the xattr value from the filesystem handler (raw value); user (ima-evm-utils): uses vfs_getxattr() which obtains the xattr value from the LSMs (normalized value). Normally, this does not have an impact unless security.selinux is set with setfattr, with a value not terminated by '\0' (this is not the recommended way, security.selinux should be set with the appropriate tools such as chcon and restorecon). In this case, the kernel and the user see two different xattr values: the former sees the xattr value without '\0' (raw value), the latter sees the value with '\0' (value normalized by SELinux). This could result in two different verification outcomes from EVM and ima-evm-utils, if a signature was calculated with a security.selinux value terminated by '\0' and the value set in the filesystem is not terminated by '\0'. The former would report verification failure due to the missing '\0', while the latter would report verification success (because it gets the normalized value with '\0'). This patch mitigates this issue by comparing in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash() the size of the xattr returned by the two xattr functions and by warning the user if there is a discrepancy. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-20evm: output EVM digest calculation infoMimi Zohar2-0/+47
Output the data used in calculating the EVM digest and the resulting digest as ascii hexadecimal strings. Suggested-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> (CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG) Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Use %zu for size_t) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-15tomoyo: fix doc warningsChenXiaoSong4-9/+9
Fix gcc W=1 warnings: security/tomoyo/audit.c:331: warning: Function parameter or member 'matched_acl' not described in 'tomoyo_get_audit' security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c:146: warning: Function parameter or member 'inode' not described in 'tomoyo_release' security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:122: warning: Function parameter or member 'path' not described in 'tomoyo_inode_getattr' security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:497: warning: Function parameter or member 'clone_flags' not described in 'tomoyo_task_alloc' security/tomoyo/util.c:92: warning: Function parameter or member 'time64' not described in 'tomoyo_convert_time' Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com> [ penguin-kernel: Also adjust spaces and similar warnings ] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
2021-06-11audit: remove unnecessary 'ret' initializationAustin Kim1-1/+0
The variable 'ret' is set to 0 when declared. The 'ret' is unused until it is set to 0 again. So it had better remove unnecessary initialization. Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-06-11selinux: kill 'flags' argument in avc_has_perm_flags() and avc_audit()Al Viro3-31/+5
... along with avc_has_perm_flags() itself, since now it's identical to avc_has_perm() (as pointed out by Paul Moore) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [PM: add "selinux:" prefix to subj and tweak for length] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-06-11selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blockingAl Viro3-35/+10
dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now; no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-06-11selinux: Fix kernel-docYang Li1-1/+22
Fix function name and add comment for parameter state in ss/services.c kernel-doc to remove some warnings found by running make W=1 LLVM=1. Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-06-11IMA: support for duplicate measurement recordsTushar Sugandhi2-2/+10
IMA measures contents of a given file/buffer/critical-data record, and properly re-measures it on change. However, IMA does not measure the duplicate value for a given record, since TPM extend is a very expensive operation. For example, if the record changes from value 'v#1' to 'v#2', and then back to 'v#1', IMA will not measure and log the last change to 'v#1', since the hash of 'v#1' for that record is already present in the IMA htable. This limits the ability of an external attestation service to accurately determine the current state of the system. The service would incorrectly conclude that the latest value of the given record on the system is 'v#2', and act accordingly. Define and use a new Kconfig option IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE to permit duplicate records in the IMA measurement list. In addition to the duplicate measurement records described above, other duplicate file measurement records may be included in the log, when CONFIG_IMA_DISABLE_HTABLE is enabled. For example, - i_version is not enabled, - i_generation changed, - same file present on different filesystems, - an inode is evicted from dcache Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated list of duplicate measurement records] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-11ima: Fix warning: no previous prototype for function 'ima_add_kexec_buffer'Lakshmi Ramasubramanian1-0/+1
The function prototype for ima_add_kexec_buffer() is present in 'linux/ima.h'. But this header file is not included in ima_kexec.c where the function is implemented. This results in the following compiler warning when "-Wmissing-prototypes" flag is turned on: security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c:81:6: warning: no previous prototype for function 'ima_add_kexec_buffer' [-Wmissing-prototypes] Include the header file 'linux/ima.h' in ima_kexec.c to fix the compiler warning. Fixes: dce92f6b11c3 (arm64: Enable passing IMA log to next kernel on kexec) Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-11selinux: use __GFP_NOWARN with GFP_NOWAIT in the AVCMinchan Kim1-6/+7
In the field, we have seen lots of allocation failure from the call path below. 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Binder : 31542_2: page allocation failure: order:0, mode:0x800(GFP_NOWAIT), nodemask=(null),cpuset=background,mems_allowed=0 ... ... 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Call trace: 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_backtrace.cfi_jt+0x0/0x8 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_stack+0xc8/0x14c 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : warn_alloc+0x158/0x1c8 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x9d8/0xb80 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1c4/0x430 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : allocate_slab+0xb4/0x390 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : ___slab_alloc+0x12c/0x3a4 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : kmem_cache_alloc+0x358/0x5e4 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_alloc_node+0x30/0x184 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_update_node+0x54/0x4f0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_has_extended_perms+0x1a4/0x460 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : selinux_file_ioctl+0x320/0x3d0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xec/0x1fc 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc_common+0xc0/0x24c 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc+0x28/0x88 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync_handler+0x8c/0xf0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync+0x1a4/0x1c0 .. .. 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 Based on [1], selinux is tolerate for failure of memory allocation. Then, use __GFP_NOWARN together. [1] 476accbe2f6e ("selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches") Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> [PM: subj fix, line wraps, normalized commit refs] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2021-06-10ima: differentiate between EVM failures in the audit logMimi Zohar1-1/+2
Differentiate between an invalid EVM portable signature failure from other EVM HMAC/signature failures. Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-10LSM: SafeSetID: Mark safesetid_initialized as __initdataAustin Kim2-2/+2
Mark safesetid_initialized as __initdata since it is only used in initialization routine. Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
2021-06-09ima: Fix fall-through warning for ClangGustavo A. R. Silva1-0/+1
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a fall-through warning by explicitly adding a break statement instead of just letting the code fall through to the next case. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-08ima: Pass NULL instead of 0 to ima_get_action() in ima_file_mprotect()Roberto Sassu1-1/+1
This patch fixes the sparse warning: sparse: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-08ima: Include header defining ima_post_key_create_or_update()Roberto Sassu1-0/+1
This patch fixes the sparse warning for ima_post_key_create_or_update() by adding the header file that defines the prototype (linux/ima.h). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-08ima/evm: Fix type mismatchRoberto Sassu4-11/+12
The endianness of a variable written to the measurement list cannot be determined at compile time, as it depends on the value of the ima_canonical_fmt global variable (set through a kernel option with the same name if the machine is big endian). If ima_canonical_fmt is false, the endianness of a variable is the same as the machine; if ima_canonical_fmt is true, the endianness is little endian. The warning arises due to this type of instruction: var = cpu_to_leXX(var) which tries to assign a value in little endian to a variable with native endianness (little or big endian). Given that the variables set with this instruction are not used in any operation but just written to a buffer, it is safe to force the type of the value being set to be the same of the type of the variable with: var = (__force <var type>)cpu_to_leXX(var) Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-08ima: Set correct casting typesRoberto Sassu2-9/+10
The code expects that the values being parsed from a buffer when the ima_canonical_fmt global variable is true are in little endian. Thus, this patch sets the casting types accordingly. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-08Smack: fix doc warningChenXiaoSong1-1/+4
Fix gcc W=1 warning: security/smack/smack_access.c:342: warning: Function parameter or member 'ad' not described in 'smack_log' security/smack/smack_access.c:403: warning: Function parameter or member 'skp' not described in 'smk_insert_entry' security/smack/smack_access.c:487: warning: Function parameter or member 'level' not described in 'smk_netlbl_mls' security/smack/smack_access.c:487: warning: Function parameter or member 'len' not described in 'smk_netlbl_mls' Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2021-06-03evm: Don't return an error in evm_write_xattrs() if audit is not enabledRoberto Sassu1-1/+1
This patch avoids that evm_write_xattrs() returns an error when audit is not enabled. The ab variable can be NULL and still be passed to the other audit_log_() functions, as those functions do not include any instruction. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-03ima: Define new template evm-sigRoberto Sassu1-1/+4
With the recent introduction of the evmsig template field, remote verifiers can obtain the EVM portable signature instead of the IMA signature, to verify file metadata. After introducing the new fields to include file metadata in the measurement list, this patch finally defines the evm-sig template, whose format is: d-ng|n-ng|evmsig|xattrnames|xattrlengths|xattrvalues|iuid|igid|imode xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvalues are populated only from defined EVM protected xattrs, i.e. the ones that EVM considers to verify the portable signature. xattrnames and xattrlengths are populated only if the xattr is present. xattrnames and xattrlengths are not necessary for verifying the EVM portable signature, but they are included for completeness of information, if a remote verifier wants to infer more from file metadata. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-03ima: Define new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvaluesRoberto Sassu4-0/+148
This patch defines the new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths and xattrvalues, which contain respectively a list of xattr names (strings, separated by |), lengths (u32, hex) and values (hex). If an xattr is not present, the name and length are not displayed in the measurement list. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Missing prototype def) Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-01evm: Verify portable signatures against all protected xattrsRoberto Sassu4-12/+68
Currently, the evm_config_default_xattrnames array contains xattr names only related to LSMs which are enabled in the kernel configuration. However, EVM portable signatures do not depend on local information and a vendor might include in the signature calculation xattrs that are not enabled in the target platform. Just including all xattrs names in evm_config_default_xattrnames is not a safe approach, because a target system might have already calculated signatures or HMACs based only on the enabled xattrs. After applying this patch, EVM would verify those signatures and HMACs with all xattrs instead. The non-enabled ones, which could possibly exist, would cause a verification error. Thus, this patch adds a new field named enabled to the xattr_list structure, which is set to true if the LSM associated to a given xattr name is enabled in the kernel configuration. The non-enabled xattrs are taken into account only in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), if the passed security.evm type is EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG. The new function evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled() has been defined so that IMA can include all protected xattrs and not only the enabled ones in the measurement list, if the new template fields xattrnames, xattrlengths or xattrvalues have been included in the template format. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-01ima: Define new template field imodeRoberto Sassu3-0/+26
This patch defines the new template field imode, which includes the inode mode. It can be used by a remote verifier to verify the EVM portable signature, if it was included with the template fields sig or evmsig. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-01ima: Define new template fields iuid and igidRoberto Sassu3-0/+53
This patch defines the new template fields iuid and igid, which include respectively the inode UID and GID. For idmapped mounts, still the original UID and GID are provided. These fields can be used to verify the EVM portable signature, if it was included with the template fields sig or evmsig. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-01ima: Add ima_show_template_uint() template library functionRoberto Sassu2-1/+39
This patch introduces the new function ima_show_template_uint(). This can be used for showing integers of different sizes in ASCII format. The function ima_show_template_data_ascii() automatically determines how to print a stored integer by checking the integer size. If integers have been written in canonical format, ima_show_template_data_ascii() calls the appropriate leXX_to_cpu() function to correctly display the value. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-01ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraisedRoberto Sassu1-2/+0
Files might come from a remote source and might have xattrs, including security.ima. It should not be IMA task to decide whether security.ima should be kept or not. This patch removes the removexattr() system call in ima_inode_post_setattr(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-01ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallbackRoberto Sassu3-1/+36
With the patch to accept EVM portable signatures when the appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy, appraisal can be successfully done even if the file does not have an IMA signature. However, remote attestation would not see that a different signature type was used, as only IMA signatures can be included in the measurement list. This patch solves the issue by introducing the new template field 'evmsig' to show EVM portable signatures and by including its value in the existing field 'sig' if the IMA signature is not found. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-01ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signaturesRoberto Sassu1-7/+17
System administrators can require that all accessed files have a signature by specifying appraise_type=imasig in a policy rule. Currently, IMA signatures satisfy this requirement. Appended signatures may also satisfy this requirement, but are not applicable as IMA signatures. IMA/appended signatures ensure data source authentication for file content and prevent any change. EVM signatures instead ensure data source authentication for file metadata. Given that the digest or signature of the file content must be included in the metadata, EVM signatures provide the same file data guarantees of IMA signatures, as well as providing file metadata guarantees. This patch lets systems protected with EVM signatures pass appraisal verification if the appraise_type=imasig requirement is specified in the policy. This facilitates deployment in the scenarios where only EVM signatures are available. The patch makes the following changes: file xattr types: security.ima: IMA_XATTR_DIGEST/IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG security.evm: EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG execve(), mmap(), open() behavior (with appraise_type=imasig): before: denied (file without IMA signature, imasig requirement not met) after: allowed (file with EVM portable signature, imasig requirement met) open(O_WRONLY) behavior (without appraise_type=imasig): before: allowed (file without IMA signature, not immutable) after: denied (file with EVM portable signature, immutable) In addition, similarly to IMA signatures, this patch temporarily allows new files without or with incomplete metadata to be opened so that content can be written. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-06-01evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadataRoberto Sassu1-1/+112
With the patch to allow xattr/attr operations if a portable signature verification fails, cp and tar can copy all xattrs/attrs so that at the end of the process verification succeeds. However, it might happen that the xattrs/attrs are already set to the correct value (taken at signing time) and signature verification succeeds before the copy has completed. For example, an archive might contains files owned by root and the archive is extracted by root. Then, since portable signatures are immutable, all subsequent operations fail (e.g. fchown()), even if the operation is legitimate (does not alter the current value). This patch avoids this problem by reporting successful operation to user space when that operation does not alter the current value of xattrs/attrs. With this patch, the one that introduces evm_hmac_disabled() and the one that allows a metadata operation on the INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE error, EVM portable signatures can be used without disabling metadata verification (by setting EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES). Due to keeping metadata verification enabled, altering immutable metadata protected with a portable signature that was successfully verified will be denied (existing behavior). Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [implicit declaration of function] Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-05-21evm: Pass user namespace to set/remove xattr hooksRoberto Sassu2-8/+13
In preparation for 'evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata', this patch passes mnt_userns to the inode set/remove xattr hooks so that the GID of the inode on an idmapped mount is correctly determined by posix_acl_update_mode(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-05-21evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signaturesRoberto Sassu2-6/+29
If files with portable signatures are copied from one location to another or are extracted from an archive, verification can temporarily fail until all xattrs/attrs are set in the destination. Only portable signatures may be moved or copied from one file to another, as they don't depend on system-specific information such as the inode generation. Instead portable signatures must include security.ima. Unlike other security.evm types, EVM portable signatures are also immutable. Thus, it wouldn't be a problem to allow xattr/attr operations when verification fails, as portable signatures will never be replaced with the HMAC on possibly corrupted xattrs/attrs. This patch first introduces a new integrity status called INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE, that allows callers of evm_verify_current_integrity() to detect that a portable signature didn't pass verification and then adds an exception in evm_protect_xattr() and evm_inode_setattr() for this status and returns 0 instead of -EPERM. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-05-21evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errorsRoberto Sassu1-1/+38
When a file is being created, LSMs can set the initial label with the inode_init_security hook. If no HMAC key is loaded, the new file will have LSM xattrs but not the HMAC. It is also possible that the file remains without protected xattrs after creation if no active LSM provided it, or because the filesystem does not support them. Unfortunately, EVM will deny any further metadata operation on new files, as evm_protect_xattr() will return the INTEGRITY_NOLABEL error if protected xattrs exist without security.evm, INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if no protected xattrs exist or INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN if xattrs are not supported. This would limit the usability of EVM when only a public key is loaded, as commands such as cp or tar with the option to preserve xattrs won't work. This patch introduces the evm_hmac_disabled() function to determine whether or not it is safe to ignore verification errors, based on the ability of EVM to calculate HMACs. If the HMAC key is not loaded, and it cannot be loaded in the future due to the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag, allowing an operation despite the attrs/xattrs being found invalid will not make them valid. Since the post hooks can be executed even when the HMAC key is not loaded, this patch also ensures that the EVM_INIT_HMAC initialization flag is set before the post hooks call evm_update_evmxattr(). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (for ensuring EVM_INIT_HMAC is set) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-05-21evm: Introduce evm_revalidate_status()Roberto Sassu2-9/+46
When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set, EVM allows any operation on metadata. Its main purpose is to allow users to freely set metadata when it is protected by a portable signature, until an HMAC key is loaded. However, callers of evm_verifyxattr() are not notified about metadata changes and continue to rely on the last status returned by the function. For example IMA, since it caches the appraisal result, will not call again evm_verifyxattr() until the appraisal flags are cleared, and will grant access to the file even if there was a metadata operation that made the portable signature invalid. This patch introduces evm_revalidate_status(), which callers of evm_verifyxattr() can use in their xattr hooks to determine whether re-validation is necessary and to do the proper actions. IMA calls it in its xattr hooks to reset the appraisal flags, so that the EVM status is re-evaluated after a metadata operation. Lastly, this patch also adds a call to evm_reset_status() in evm_inode_post_setattr() to invalidate the cached EVM status after a setattr operation. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-05-21evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loadedRoberto Sassu1-4/+4
EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs. Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation. Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-05-21evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisalRoberto Sassu2-1/+7
The public builtin keys do not need to be appraised by IMA as the restriction on the IMA/EVM trusted keyrings ensures that a key can be loaded only if it is signed with a key on the builtin or secondary keyrings. However, when evm_load_x509() is called, appraisal is already enabled and a valid IMA signature must be added to the EVM key to pass verification. Since the restriction is applied on both IMA and EVM trusted keyrings, it is safe to disable appraisal also when the EVM key is loaded. This patch calls evm_load_x509() inside ima_load_x509() if CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, which crosses the normal IMA and EVM boundary. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-05-21evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loadedRoberto Sassu1-2/+3
evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC. Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files. More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error when no HMAC key has been loaded. This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized. Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-05-21evm: fix writing <securityfs>/evm overflowMimi Zohar1-2/+3
EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX. The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete. Define and read an unsigned int. Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-05-18Revert "Smack: Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges"Jens Axboe1-3/+2
This reverts commit 942cb357ae7d9249088e3687ee6a00ed2745a0c7. The io_uring PF_IO_WORKER threads no longer have PF_KTHREAD set, so no need to special case them for credential checks. Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>