From 79c92ca42b5a3e0ea172ea2ce8df8e125af237da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yu Wang Date: Fri, 10 May 2019 17:04:52 +0800 Subject: mac80211: handle deauthentication/disassociation from TDLS peer When receiving a deauthentication/disassociation frame from a TDLS peer, a station should not disconnect the current AP, but only disable the current TDLS link if it's enabled. Without this change, a TDLS issue can be reproduced by following the steps as below: 1. STA-1 and STA-2 are connected to AP, bidirection traffic is running between STA-1 and STA-2. 2. Set up TDLS link between STA-1 and STA-2, stay for a while, then teardown TDLS link. 3. Repeat step #2 and monitor the connection between STA and AP. During the test, one STA may send a deauthentication/disassociation frame to another, after TDLS teardown, with reason code 6/7, which means: Class 2/3 frame received from nonassociated STA. On receive this frame, the receiver STA will disconnect the current AP and then reconnect. It's not a expected behavior, purpose of this frame should be disabling the TDLS link, not the link with AP. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yu Wang Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 3 +++ net/mac80211/mlme.c | 12 +++++++++++- net/mac80211/tdls.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index 073a8235ae1b..a8af4aafa117 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -2225,6 +2225,9 @@ void ieee80211_tdls_cancel_channel_switch(struct wiphy *wiphy, const u8 *addr); void ieee80211_teardown_tdls_peers(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata); void ieee80211_tdls_chsw_work(struct work_struct *wk); +void ieee80211_tdls_handle_disconnect(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, + const u8 *peer, u16 reason); +const char *ieee80211_get_reason_code_string(u16 reason_code); extern const struct ethtool_ops ieee80211_ethtool_ops; diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c index b7a9fe3d5fcb..383b0df100e4 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c @@ -2963,7 +2963,7 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_auth(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, #define case_WLAN(type) \ case WLAN_REASON_##type: return #type -static const char *ieee80211_get_reason_code_string(u16 reason_code) +const char *ieee80211_get_reason_code_string(u16 reason_code) { switch (reason_code) { case_WLAN(UNSPECIFIED); @@ -3028,6 +3028,11 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_deauth(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (len < 24 + 2) return; + if (!ether_addr_equal(mgmt->bssid, mgmt->sa)) { + ieee80211_tdls_handle_disconnect(sdata, mgmt->sa, reason_code); + return; + } + if (ifmgd->associated && ether_addr_equal(mgmt->bssid, ifmgd->associated->bssid)) { const u8 *bssid = ifmgd->associated->bssid; @@ -3077,6 +3082,11 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_mgmt_disassoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, reason_code = le16_to_cpu(mgmt->u.disassoc.reason_code); + if (!ether_addr_equal(mgmt->bssid, mgmt->sa)) { + ieee80211_tdls_handle_disconnect(sdata, mgmt->sa, reason_code); + return; + } + sdata_info(sdata, "disassociated from %pM (Reason: %u=%s)\n", mgmt->sa, reason_code, ieee80211_get_reason_code_string(reason_code)); diff --git a/net/mac80211/tdls.c b/net/mac80211/tdls.c index 24c37f91ca46..ba8fe48952d9 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tdls.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tdls.c @@ -1994,3 +1994,26 @@ void ieee80211_tdls_chsw_work(struct work_struct *wk) } rtnl_unlock(); } + +void ieee80211_tdls_handle_disconnect(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, + const u8 *peer, u16 reason) +{ + struct ieee80211_sta *sta; + + rcu_read_lock(); + sta = ieee80211_find_sta(&sdata->vif, peer); + if (!sta || !sta->tdls) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + tdls_dbg(sdata, "disconnected from TDLS peer %pM (Reason: %u=%s)\n", + peer, reason, + ieee80211_get_reason_code_string(reason)); + + ieee80211_tdls_oper_request(&sdata->vif, peer, + NL80211_TDLS_TEARDOWN, + WLAN_REASON_TDLS_TEARDOWN_UNREACHABLE, + GFP_ATOMIC); +} -- cgit v1.2.3 From 818e9dfa2c145c7b0d241c5c419f4b897a1af564 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YueHaibing Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 14:07:54 +0000 Subject: mac80211: remove set but not used variable 'old' Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning: net/mac80211/key.c: In function 'ieee80211_set_tx_key': net/mac80211/key.c:271:24: warning: variable 'old' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] It is not used since introduction in commit 96fc6efb9ad9 ("mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/key.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c index 20bf9db7a388..89f09a09efdb 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.c +++ b/net/mac80211/key.c @@ -268,11 +268,9 @@ int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key) { struct sta_info *sta = key->sta; struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local; - struct ieee80211_key *old; assert_key_lock(local); - old = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[sta->ptk_idx]); sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx; ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 33d915d9e8ce811d8958915ccd18d71a66c7c495 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Manikanta Pubbisetty Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 14:55:33 +0530 Subject: {nl,mac}80211: allow 4addr AP operation on crypto controlled devices As per the current design, in the case of sw crypto controlled devices, it is the device which advertises the support for AP/VLAN iftype based on it's ability to tranmsit packets encrypted in software (In VLAN functionality, group traffic generated for a specific VLAN group is always encrypted in software). Commit db3bdcb9c3ff ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices") has introduced this change. Since 4addr AP operation also uses AP/VLAN iftype, this conditional way of advertising AP/VLAN support has broken 4addr AP mode operation on crypto controlled devices which do not support VLAN functionality. In the case of ath10k driver, not all firmwares have support for VLAN functionality but all can support 4addr AP operation. Because AP/VLAN support is not advertised for these devices, 4addr AP operations are also blocked. Fix this by allowing 4addr operation on devices which do not support AP/VLAN iftype but can support 4addr AP operation (decision is based on the wiphy flag WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: db3bdcb9c3ff ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices") Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- include/net/cfg80211.h | 3 ++- net/mac80211/util.c | 4 +++- net/wireless/core.c | 6 +++++- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 8 ++++++-- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/include/net/cfg80211.h b/include/net/cfg80211.h index 87dae868707e..948139690a58 100644 --- a/include/net/cfg80211.h +++ b/include/net/cfg80211.h @@ -3839,7 +3839,8 @@ struct cfg80211_ops { * on wiphy_new(), but can be changed by the driver if it has a good * reason to override the default * @WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP: supports 4addr mode even on AP (with a single station - * on a VLAN interface) + * on a VLAN interface). This flag also serves an extra purpose of + * supporting 4ADDR AP mode on devices which do not support AP/VLAN iftype. * @WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_STATION: supports 4addr mode even as a station * @WIPHY_FLAG_CONTROL_PORT_PROTOCOL: This device supports setting the * control port protocol ethertype. The device also honours the diff --git a/net/mac80211/util.c b/net/mac80211/util.c index cba4633cd6cf..1c8384f81526 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/util.c +++ b/net/mac80211/util.c @@ -3795,7 +3795,9 @@ int ieee80211_check_combinations(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, } /* Always allow software iftypes */ - if (local->hw.wiphy->software_iftypes & BIT(iftype)) { + if (local->hw.wiphy->software_iftypes & BIT(iftype) || + (iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN && + local->hw.wiphy->flags & WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP)) { if (radar_detect) return -EINVAL; return 0; diff --git a/net/wireless/core.c b/net/wireless/core.c index b36ad8efb5e5..4e83892f1ac2 100644 --- a/net/wireless/core.c +++ b/net/wireless/core.c @@ -1396,8 +1396,12 @@ static int cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call(struct notifier_block *nb, } break; case NETDEV_PRE_UP: - if (!(wdev->wiphy->interface_modes & BIT(wdev->iftype))) + if (!(wdev->wiphy->interface_modes & BIT(wdev->iftype)) && + !(wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN && + rdev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP && + wdev->use_4addr)) return notifier_from_errno(-EOPNOTSUPP); + if (rfkill_blocked(rdev->rfkill)) return notifier_from_errno(-ERFKILL); break; diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index fffe4b371e23..4b3c5281ca14 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -3419,8 +3419,7 @@ static int nl80211_new_interface(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IFTYPE]) type = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IFTYPE]); - if (!rdev->ops->add_virtual_intf || - !(rdev->wiphy.interface_modes & (1 << type))) + if (!rdev->ops->add_virtual_intf) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if ((type == NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_DEVICE || type == NL80211_IFTYPE_NAN || @@ -3439,6 +3438,11 @@ static int nl80211_new_interface(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) return err; } + if (!(rdev->wiphy.interface_modes & (1 << type)) && + !(type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN && params.use_4addr && + rdev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + err = nl80211_parse_mon_options(rdev, type, info, ¶ms); if (err < 0) return err; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a71fd9dac23613d96ba3c05619a8ef4fd6cdf9b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jouni Malinen Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 01:46:43 +0300 Subject: mac80211: Do not use stack memory with scatterlist for GMAC ieee80211_aes_gmac() uses the mic argument directly in sg_set_buf() and that does not allow use of stack memory (e.g., BUG_ON() is hit in sg_set_buf() with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG). BIP GMAC TX side is fine for this since it can use the skb data buffer, but the RX side was using a stack variable for deriving the local MIC value to compare against the received one. Fix this by allocating heap memory for the mic buffer. This was found with hwsim test case ap_cipher_bip_gmac_128 hitting that BUG_ON() and kernel panic. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/wpa.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index 58d0b258b684..5dd48f0a4b1b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; - u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], mic[GMAC_MIC_LEN], ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; + u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], *mic, ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) @@ -1206,13 +1206,18 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN); memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6); + mic = kmalloc(GMAC_MIC_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!mic) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce, skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic) < 0 || crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) { key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++; + kfree(mic); return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } + kfree(mic); } memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 551842446ed695641a00782cd118cbb064a416a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Pedersen Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 21:16:24 -0700 Subject: mac80211: mesh: fix RCU warning ifmsh->csa is an RCU-protected pointer. The writer context in ieee80211_mesh_finish_csa() is already mutually exclusive with wdev->sdata.mtx, but the RCU checker did not know this. Use rcu_dereference_protected() to avoid a warning. fixes the following warning: [ 12.519089] ============================= [ 12.520042] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 12.520652] 5.1.0-rc7-wt+ #16 Tainted: G W [ 12.521409] ----------------------------- [ 12.521972] net/mac80211/mesh.c:1223 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 12.522928] other info that might help us debug this: [ 12.523984] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 12.524855] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:2/152: [ 12.525438] #0: 00000000057be08c ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1a2/0x620 [ 12.526607] #1: 0000000059c6b07a ((work_completion)(&sdata->csa_finalize_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1a2/0x620 [ 12.528001] #2: 00000000f184ba7d (&wdev->mtx){+.+.}, at: ieee80211_csa_finalize_work+0x2f/0x90 [ 12.529116] #3: 00000000831a1f54 (&local->mtx){+.+.}, at: ieee80211_csa_finalize_work+0x47/0x90 [ 12.530233] #4: 00000000fd06f988 (&local->chanctx_mtx){+.+.}, at: ieee80211_csa_finalize_work+0x51/0x90 Signed-off-by: Thomas Pedersen Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/mesh.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh.c b/net/mac80211/mesh.c index 766e5e5bab8a..d5aba5029cb0 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c @@ -1220,7 +1220,8 @@ int ieee80211_mesh_finish_csa(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) ifmsh->chsw_ttl = 0; /* Remove the CSA and MCSP elements from the beacon */ - tmp_csa_settings = rcu_dereference(ifmsh->csa); + tmp_csa_settings = rcu_dereference_protected(ifmsh->csa, + lockdep_is_held(&sdata->wdev.mtx)); RCU_INIT_POINTER(ifmsh->csa, NULL); if (tmp_csa_settings) kfree_rcu(tmp_csa_settings, rcu_head); @@ -1242,6 +1243,8 @@ int ieee80211_mesh_csa_beacon(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct mesh_csa_settings *tmp_csa_settings; int ret = 0; + lockdep_assert_held(&sdata->wdev.mtx); + tmp_csa_settings = kmalloc(sizeof(*tmp_csa_settings), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!tmp_csa_settings) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0112fa557c3bb3a002bc85760dc3761d737264d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 16:36:16 -0700 Subject: mac80211: free peer keys before vif down in mesh freeing peer keys after vif down is resulting in peer key uninstall to fail due to interface lookup failure. so fix that. Signed-off-by: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/mesh.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh.c b/net/mac80211/mesh.c index d5aba5029cb0..fe44f0d98de0 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c @@ -929,6 +929,7 @@ void ieee80211_stop_mesh(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) /* flush STAs and mpaths on this iface */ sta_info_flush(sdata); + ieee80211_free_keys(sdata, true); mesh_path_flush_by_iface(sdata); /* stop the beacon */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 28c61a66abd6925b574adfd48811254bb6a211b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sat, 1 Jun 2019 10:08:46 +0200 Subject: treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 432 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this file is gplv2 as found in copying extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Allison Randal Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190114.657082701@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac80211/cfg.c | 3 +-- net/mac80211/ethtool.c | 3 +-- net/mac80211/tdls.c | 3 +-- net/wireless/sysfs.c | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c index 52e6a091b7e4..a1973a26c7fc 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c +++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * mac80211 configuration hooks for cfg80211 * @@ -5,8 +6,6 @@ * Copyright 2013-2015 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH * Copyright (C) 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation - * - * This file is GPLv2 as found in COPYING. */ #include diff --git a/net/mac80211/ethtool.c b/net/mac80211/ethtool.c index 5ac743816b59..99a2e30b3833 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ethtool.c +++ b/net/mac80211/ethtool.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * mac80211 ethtool hooks for cfg80211 * @@ -5,8 +6,6 @@ * Copyright 2006-2010 Johannes Berg * Copyright 2014 Intel Corporation (Author: Johannes Berg) * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation - * - * This file is GPLv2 as found in COPYING. */ #include #include diff --git a/net/mac80211/tdls.c b/net/mac80211/tdls.c index 24c37f91ca46..ca97e1598c28 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tdls.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tdls.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * mac80211 TDLS handling code * @@ -6,8 +7,6 @@ * Copyright 2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH * Copyright 2015 - 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH * Copyright (C) 2019 Intel Corporation - * - * This file is GPLv2 as found in COPYING. */ #include diff --git a/net/wireless/sysfs.c b/net/wireless/sysfs.c index 6ab32f6a1961..3ac1f48195d2 100644 --- a/net/wireless/sysfs.c +++ b/net/wireless/sysfs.c @@ -1,11 +1,10 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * This file provides /sys/class/ieee80211// * and some default attributes. * * Copyright 2005-2006 Jiri Benc * Copyright 2006 Johannes Berg - * - * This file is GPLv2 as found in COPYING. */ #include -- cgit v1.2.3 From 588f7d39b3592a36fb7702ae3b8bdd9be4621e2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 15:13:30 +0100 Subject: mac80211: drop robust management frames from unknown TA When receiving a robust management frame, drop it if we don't have rx->sta since then we don't have a security association and thus couldn't possibly validate the frame. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 25577ede2986..fd3740000e87 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -3831,6 +3831,8 @@ static bool ieee80211_accept_frame(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION: if (!bssid && !sdata->u.mgd.use_4addr) return false; + if (ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb) && !rx->sta) + return false; if (multicast) return true; return ether_addr_equal(sdata->vif.addr, hdr->addr1); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 563572340173865a9a356e6bb02579e6998a876d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yibo Zhao Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 19:01:52 +0800 Subject: mac80211: only warn once on chanctx_conf being NULL In multiple SSID cases, it takes time to prepare every AP interface to be ready in initializing phase. If a sta already knows everything it needs to join one of the APs and sends authentication to the AP which is not fully prepared at this point of time, AP's channel context could be NULL. As a result, warning message occurs. Even worse, if the AP is under attack via tools such as MDK3 and massive authentication requests are received in a very short time, console will be hung due to kernel warning messages. WARN_ON_ONCE() could be a better way for indicating warning messages without duplicate messages to flood the console. Johannes: We still need to address the underlying problem, but we don't really have a good handle on it yet. Suppress the worst side-effects for now. Signed-off-by: Zhi Chen Signed-off-by: Yibo Zhao [johannes: add note, change subject] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index a8af4aafa117..682d0ab1bf89 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@ ieee80211_get_sband(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) rcu_read_lock(); chanctx_conf = rcu_dereference(sdata->vif.chanctx_conf); - if (WARN_ON(!chanctx_conf)) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!chanctx_conf)) { rcu_read_unlock(); return NULL; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From f8891461a277ec0afc493fd30cd975a38048a038 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Naftali Goldstein Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 15:25:30 +0300 Subject: mac80211: do not start any work during reconfigure flow It is not a good idea to try to perform any work (e.g. send an auth frame) during reconfigure flow. Prevent this from happening, and at the end of the reconfigure flow requeue all the works. Signed-off-by: Naftali Goldstein Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 7 +++++++ net/mac80211/util.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index 682d0ab1bf89..a86fcae279a6 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -2037,6 +2037,13 @@ void __ieee80211_flush_queues(struct ieee80211_local *local, static inline bool ieee80211_can_run_worker(struct ieee80211_local *local) { + /* + * It's unsafe to try to do any work during reconfigure flow. + * When the flow ends the work will be requeued. + */ + if (local->in_reconfig) + return false; + /* * If quiescing is set, we are racing with __ieee80211_suspend. * __ieee80211_suspend flushes the workers after setting quiescing, diff --git a/net/mac80211/util.c b/net/mac80211/util.c index 1c8384f81526..e2edc2a3cc8b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/util.c +++ b/net/mac80211/util.c @@ -2480,6 +2480,10 @@ int ieee80211_reconfig(struct ieee80211_local *local) mutex_lock(&local->mtx); ieee80211_start_next_roc(local); mutex_unlock(&local->mtx); + + /* Requeue all works */ + list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list) + ieee80211_queue_work(&local->hw, &sdata->work); } ieee80211_wake_queues_by_reason(hw, IEEE80211_MAX_QUEUE_MAP, -- cgit v1.2.3