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author | Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com> | 2018-07-09 00:58:53 +0300 |
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committer | Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com> | 2018-09-06 20:53:59 +0300 |
commit | 066be20a36c3f99cf5f0ba237f4e464b3378148a (patch) | |
tree | b56c6de5993d3f79d1da0f5551cfb173b84e4ecd /meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch | |
parent | 134b6d49de68990ff80b297e3cb627dc168a497e (diff) | |
download | openbmc-066be20a36c3f99cf5f0ba237f4e464b3378148a.tar.xz |
meta-openembedded: sumo refresh b0950aeff5..be79b8b111
Update meta-openembedded to sumo HEAD.
Armin Kuster (2):
wireshark: update to 2.4.7
wireshark: update to 2.4.8
Denys Dmytriyenko (1):
devmem2: ensure word is 32-bit, add support for 64-bit long
Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa (1):
fuse: CVE-2018-10906
Oleksandr Kravchuk (1):
libsodium: update to 1.0.16
changqing.li@windriver.com (1):
php: upgrade 7.2.4 -> 7.2.7 Included:
leimaohui (2):
python-pytest: Fix conflict error as following:
libnih: Fix do_package error when enable mutilib.
Change-Id: I036baed004e407d5e9fde46eba75b6cc7e3479e0
Signed-off-by: Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch | 48 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..104aa171b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 5018a0c016495155ee598b7e0167b43d5d902414 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> +Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2018 03:47:50 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] fusermount: refuse unknown options + +Blacklists are notoriously fragile; especially if the kernel wishes to add +some security-critical mount option at a later date, all existing systems +with older versions of fusermount installed will suddenly have a security +problem. +Additionally, if the kernel's option parsing became a tiny bit laxer, the +blacklist could probably be bypassed. + +Whitelist known-harmless flags instead, even if it's slightly more +inconvenient. + +CVE: CVE-2018-10906 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/commit/5018a0c016495155ee598b7e0167b43d5d902414] + +Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com> +--- + util/fusermount.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/util/fusermount.c b/util/fusermount.c +index 4e0f51a..2792407 100644 +--- a/util/fusermount.c ++++ b/util/fusermount.c +@@ -819,10 +819,16 @@ static int do_mount(const char *mnt, char **typep, mode_t rootmode, + flags |= flag; + else + flags &= ~flag; +- } else { ++ } else if (opt_eq(s, len, "default_permissions") || ++ opt_eq(s, len, "allow_other") || ++ begins_with(s, "max_read=") || ++ begins_with(s, "blksize=")) { + memcpy(d, s, len); + d += len; + *d++ = ','; ++ } else { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown option '%.*s'\n", progname, len, s); ++ exit(1); + } + } + } +-- +2.13.3 + |