reset upstream subtrees to yocto 2.6

Reset the following subtrees on thud HEAD:

  poky: 87e3a9739d
  meta-openembedded: 6094ae18c8
  meta-security: 31dc4e7532
  meta-raspberrypi: a48743dc36
  meta-xilinx: c42016e2e6

Also re-apply backports that didn't make it into thud:
  poky:
    17726d0 systemd-systemctl-native: handle Install wildcards

  meta-openembedded:
    4321a5d libtinyxml2: update to 7.0.1
    042f0a3 libcereal: Add native and nativesdk classes
    e23284f libcereal: Allow empty package
    030e8d4 rsyslog: curl-less build with fmhttp PACKAGECONFIG
    179a1b9 gtest: update to 1.8.1

Squashed OpenBMC subtree compatibility updates:
  meta-aspeed:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          aspeed: add yocto 2.6 compatibility

  meta-ibm:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          ibm: prepare for yocto 2.6

  meta-ingrasys:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          ingrasys: set layer compatibility to yocto 2.6

  meta-openpower:
    Brad Bishop (1):
          openpower: set layer compatibility to yocto 2.6

  meta-phosphor:
    Brad Bishop (3):
          phosphor: set layer compatibility to thud
          phosphor: libgpg-error: drop patches
          phosphor: react to fitimage artifact rename

    Ed Tanous (4):
          Dropbear: upgrade options for latest upgrade
          yocto2.6: update openssl options
          busybox: remove upstream watchdog patch
          systemd: Rebase CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF patch

Change-Id: I7b1fe71cca880d0372a82d94b5fd785323e3a9e7
Signed-off-by: Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 48 deletions

diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 104aa171b..000000000
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-From 5018a0c016495155ee598b7e0167b43d5d902414 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
-Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2018 03:47:50 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] fusermount: refuse unknown options
-
-Blacklists are notoriously fragile; especially if the kernel wishes to add
-some security-critical mount option at a later date, all existing systems
-with older versions of fusermount installed will suddenly have a security
-problem.
-Additionally, if the kernel's option parsing became a tiny bit laxer, the
-blacklist could probably be bypassed.
-
-Whitelist known-harmless flags instead, even if it's slightly more
-inconvenient.
-
-CVE: CVE-2018-10906
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/commit/5018a0c016495155ee598b7e0167b43d5d902414]
-
-Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
----
- util/fusermount.c | 8 +++++++-
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/util/fusermount.c b/util/fusermount.c
-index 4e0f51a..2792407 100644
---- a/util/fusermount.c
-+++ b/util/fusermount.c
-@@ -819,10 +819,16 @@ static int do_mount(const char *mnt, char **typep, mode_t rootmode,
- 						flags |= flag;
- 					else
- 						flags  &= ~flag;
--				} else {
-+				} else if (opt_eq(s, len, "default_permissions") ||
-+					   opt_eq(s, len, "allow_other") ||
-+					   begins_with(s, "max_read=") ||
-+					   begins_with(s, "blksize=")) {
- 					memcpy(d, s, len);
- 					d += len;
- 					*d++ = ',';
-+				} else {
-+					fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown option '%.*s'\n", progname, len, s);
-+					exit(1);
- 				}
- 			}
- 		}
--- 
-2.13.3
-