diff options
author | Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com> | 2018-12-17 04:11:34 +0300 |
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committer | Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com> | 2019-01-09 02:21:44 +0300 |
commit | 1a4b7ee28bf7413af6513fb45ad0d0736048f866 (patch) | |
tree | 79f6d8ea698cab8f2eaf4f54b793d2ca7a1451ce /meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd | |
parent | 5b9ede0403237c7dace972affa65cf64a1aadd0e (diff) | |
download | openbmc-1a4b7ee28bf7413af6513fb45ad0d0736048f866.tar.xz |
reset upstream subtrees to yocto 2.6
Reset the following subtrees on thud HEAD:
poky: 87e3a9739d
meta-openembedded: 6094ae18c8
meta-security: 31dc4e7532
meta-raspberrypi: a48743dc36
meta-xilinx: c42016e2e6
Also re-apply backports that didn't make it into thud:
poky:
17726d0 systemd-systemctl-native: handle Install wildcards
meta-openembedded:
4321a5d libtinyxml2: update to 7.0.1
042f0a3 libcereal: Add native and nativesdk classes
e23284f libcereal: Allow empty package
030e8d4 rsyslog: curl-less build with fmhttp PACKAGECONFIG
179a1b9 gtest: update to 1.8.1
Squashed OpenBMC subtree compatibility updates:
meta-aspeed:
Brad Bishop (1):
aspeed: add yocto 2.6 compatibility
meta-ibm:
Brad Bishop (1):
ibm: prepare for yocto 2.6
meta-ingrasys:
Brad Bishop (1):
ingrasys: set layer compatibility to yocto 2.6
meta-openpower:
Brad Bishop (1):
openpower: set layer compatibility to yocto 2.6
meta-phosphor:
Brad Bishop (3):
phosphor: set layer compatibility to thud
phosphor: libgpg-error: drop patches
phosphor: react to fitimage artifact rename
Ed Tanous (4):
Dropbear: upgrade options for latest upgrade
yocto2.6: update openssl options
busybox: remove upstream watchdog patch
systemd: Rebase CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF patch
Change-Id: I7b1fe71cca880d0372a82d94b5fd785323e3a9e7
Signed-off-by: Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd')
-rw-r--r-- | meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch | 44 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb | 1 |
2 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..522fc394b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +hostapd-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526 + +[No upstream tracking] -- https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt + +wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data + +Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant +processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted +flag set, but not the MIC flag. + +When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but +not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying +the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when +negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that +unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary +could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information +in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key). + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961] +CVE: CVE-2018-14526 +Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, + + if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) && + (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) { ++ /* ++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity ++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not ++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0 ++ * which is the case in this code branch. ++ */ ++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data"); ++ goto out; ++ } + if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data, + &key_data_len)) + goto out; diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb index 250add875..42aae4279 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \ file://0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch \ file://0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch \ file://0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch \ + file://hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7" |