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author | Jason M. Bills <jason.m.bills@linux.intel.com> | 2020-12-08 00:38:17 +0300 |
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committer | Jason M. Bills <jason.m.bills@linux.intel.com> | 2020-12-08 00:38:17 +0300 |
commit | 8d6ae7f2a817751fad151168fa10ce28ee0869d8 (patch) | |
tree | 281032f7ec07c41589aa094bd165cc2a98f2d3a7 /poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2020-24977.patch | |
parent | c16fb8893b19075db4bcf3b5bf33c1db8c3ca2bd (diff) | |
parent | 5da3c2284560a7e08ffafd03c5b5ba44a3242228 (diff) | |
download | openbmc-8d6ae7f2a817751fad151168fa10ce28ee0869d8.tar.xz |
Merge tag '0.26' of ssh://git-amr-1.devtools.intel.com:29418/openbmc-openbmc into update
Diffstat (limited to 'poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2020-24977.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2020-24977.patch | 41 |
1 files changed, 41 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2020-24977.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2020-24977.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..822434666 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2020-24977.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 50f06b3efb638efb0abd95dc62dca05ae67882c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de> +Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2020 21:54:27 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix out-of-bounds read with 'xmllint --htmlout' + +Make sure that truncated UTF-8 sequences don't cause an out-of-bounds +array access. + +Thanks to @SuhwanSong and the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) for +the report. + +Fixes #178. + +CVE: CVE-2020-24977 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/50f06b3efb638efb0abd95dc62dca05ae67882c2] + +Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com> +--- + xmllint.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xmllint.c b/xmllint.c +index f6a8e463..c647486f 100644 +--- a/xmllint.c ++++ b/xmllint.c +@@ -528,6 +528,12 @@ static void + xmlHTMLEncodeSend(void) { + char *result; + ++ /* ++ * xmlEncodeEntitiesReentrant assumes valid UTF-8, but the buffer might ++ * end with a truncated UTF-8 sequence. This is a hack to at least avoid ++ * an out-of-bounds read. ++ */ ++ memset(&buffer[sizeof(buffer)-4], 0, 4); + result = (char *) xmlEncodeEntitiesReentrant(NULL, BAD_CAST buffer); + if (result) { + xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "%s", result); +-- +2.17.1 + |