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-rw-r--r--meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/0109-signal-Extend-exec_id-to-64bits.patch88
1 files changed, 88 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/0109-signal-Extend-exec_id-to-64bits.patch b/meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/0109-signal-Extend-exec_id-to-64bits.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7d879ab82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/0109-signal-Extend-exec_id-to-64bits.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+From 5f2d04139aa5ed04eab54b84e8a25bab87a2449c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 19:01:04 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits
+
+commit d1e7fd6462ca9fc76650fbe6ca800e35b24267da upstream.
+
+Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible
+to wrap the exec_id counter. With care an attacker can cause exec_id
+wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent. This
+bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their
+credentials during exec.
+
+The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing
+of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times.
+Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit
+exec_id. Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7
+days. Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server.
+Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec
+gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump.
+
+Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit
+architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can
+take two read instructions. Which means that is is possible to hit
+a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written
+value. So with very lucky timing after this change this still
+remains expoiltable.
+
+I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE
+and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE
+to make it clear that there is no locking between these two
+locations.
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl
+Fixes: 2.3.23pre2
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/exec.c | 2 +-
+ include/linux/sched.h | 4 ++--
+ kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
+ 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
+index c27231234764..fc2870f2aca9 100644
+--- a/fs/exec.c
++++ b/fs/exec.c
+@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
+
+ /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
+ group */
+- current->self_exec_id++;
++ WRITE_ONCE(current->self_exec_id, current->self_exec_id + 1);
+ flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
+diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
+index b968d736833b..5710b80f8050 100644
+--- a/include/linux/sched.h
++++ b/include/linux/sched.h
+@@ -934,8 +934,8 @@ struct task_struct {
+ struct seccomp seccomp;
+
+ /* Thread group tracking: */
+- u32 parent_exec_id;
+- u32 self_exec_id;
++ u64 parent_exec_id;
++ u64 self_exec_id;
+
+ /* Protection against (de-)allocation: mm, files, fs, tty, keyrings, mems_allowed, mempolicy: */
+ spinlock_t alloc_lock;
+diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
+index eea748174ade..7d3d35eb7a0b 100644
+--- a/kernel/signal.c
++++ b/kernel/signal.c
+@@ -1931,7 +1931,7 @@ bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig)
+ * This is only possible if parent == real_parent.
+ * Check if it has changed security domain.
+ */
+- if (tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->parent->self_exec_id)
++ if (tsk->parent_exec_id != READ_ONCE(tsk->parent->self_exec_id))
+ sig = SIGCHLD;
+ }
+
+--
+2.7.4
+