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Diffstat (limited to 'meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/0109-signal-Extend-exec_id-to-64bits.patch')
-rw-r--r--meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/0109-signal-Extend-exec_id-to-64bits.patch88
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 88 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/0109-signal-Extend-exec_id-to-64bits.patch b/meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/0109-signal-Extend-exec_id-to-64bits.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7d879ab82..000000000
--- a/meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/0109-signal-Extend-exec_id-to-64bits.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-From 5f2d04139aa5ed04eab54b84e8a25bab87a2449c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 19:01:04 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits
-
-commit d1e7fd6462ca9fc76650fbe6ca800e35b24267da upstream.
-
-Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible
-to wrap the exec_id counter. With care an attacker can cause exec_id
-wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent. This
-bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their
-credentials during exec.
-
-The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing
-of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times.
-Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit
-exec_id. Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7
-days. Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server.
-Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec
-gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump.
-
-Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit
-architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can
-take two read instructions. Which means that is is possible to hit
-a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written
-value. So with very lucky timing after this change this still
-remains expoiltable.
-
-I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE
-and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE
-to make it clear that there is no locking between these two
-locations.
-
-Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl
-Fixes: 2.3.23pre2
-Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
-Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
----
- fs/exec.c | 2 +-
- include/linux/sched.h | 4 ++--
- kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
-index c27231234764..fc2870f2aca9 100644
---- a/fs/exec.c
-+++ b/fs/exec.c
-@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
-
- /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
- group */
-- current->self_exec_id++;
-+ WRITE_ONCE(current->self_exec_id, current->self_exec_id + 1);
- flush_signal_handlers(current, 0);
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec);
-diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
-index b968d736833b..5710b80f8050 100644
---- a/include/linux/sched.h
-+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
-@@ -934,8 +934,8 @@ struct task_struct {
- struct seccomp seccomp;
-
- /* Thread group tracking: */
-- u32 parent_exec_id;
-- u32 self_exec_id;
-+ u64 parent_exec_id;
-+ u64 self_exec_id;
-
- /* Protection against (de-)allocation: mm, files, fs, tty, keyrings, mems_allowed, mempolicy: */
- spinlock_t alloc_lock;
-diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
-index eea748174ade..7d3d35eb7a0b 100644
---- a/kernel/signal.c
-+++ b/kernel/signal.c
-@@ -1931,7 +1931,7 @@ bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig)
- * This is only possible if parent == real_parent.
- * Check if it has changed security domain.
- */
-- if (tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->parent->self_exec_id)
-+ if (tsk->parent_exec_id != READ_ONCE(tsk->parent->self_exec_id))
- sig = SIGCHLD;
- }
-
---
-2.7.4
-