diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files')
-rw-r--r-- | meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch | 52 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch | 48 |
2 files changed, 0 insertions, 100 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 83bef3022..000000000 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -From 28bdae3d113ef479c1660a581ef720cdc33bf466 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> -Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2018 15:15:36 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] fusermount: don't feed "escaped commas" into mount options - -The old code permits the following behavior: - -$ _FUSE_COMMFD=10000 priv_strace -etrace=mount -s200 fusermount -o 'foobar=\,allow_other' mount -mount("/dev/fuse", ".", "fuse", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV, "foobar=\\,allow_other,fd=3,rootmode=40000,user_id=1000,group_id=1000") = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument) - -However, backslashes do not have any special meaning for the kernel here. - -As it happens, you can't abuse this because there is no FUSE mount option -that takes a string value that can contain backslashes; but this is very -brittle. Don't interpret "escape characters" in places where they don't -work. - -CVE: CVE-2018-10906 -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/commit/28bdae3d113ef479c1660a581ef720cdc33bf466] - -Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com> ---- - util/fusermount.c | 5 ++++- - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/util/fusermount.c b/util/fusermount.c -index 0e1d34d..143bd4a 100644 ---- a/util/fusermount.c -+++ b/util/fusermount.c -@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ - #include <sys/socket.h> - #include <sys/utsname.h> - #include <sched.h> -+#include <stdbool.h> - - #define FUSE_COMMFD_ENV "_FUSE_COMMFD" - -@@ -754,8 +755,10 @@ static int do_mount(const char *mnt, char **typep, mode_t rootmode, - unsigned len; - const char *fsname_str = "fsname="; - const char *subtype_str = "subtype="; -+ bool escape_ok = begins_with(s, fsname_str) || -+ begins_with(s, subtype_str); - for (len = 0; s[len]; len++) { -- if (s[len] == '\\' && s[len + 1]) -+ if (escape_ok && s[len] == '\\' && s[len + 1]) - len++; - else if (s[len] == ',') - break; --- -2.13.3 - diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 104aa171b..000000000 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -From 5018a0c016495155ee598b7e0167b43d5d902414 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> -Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2018 03:47:50 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] fusermount: refuse unknown options - -Blacklists are notoriously fragile; especially if the kernel wishes to add -some security-critical mount option at a later date, all existing systems -with older versions of fusermount installed will suddenly have a security -problem. -Additionally, if the kernel's option parsing became a tiny bit laxer, the -blacklist could probably be bypassed. - -Whitelist known-harmless flags instead, even if it's slightly more -inconvenient. - -CVE: CVE-2018-10906 -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/commit/5018a0c016495155ee598b7e0167b43d5d902414] - -Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com> ---- - util/fusermount.c | 8 +++++++- - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/util/fusermount.c b/util/fusermount.c -index 4e0f51a..2792407 100644 ---- a/util/fusermount.c -+++ b/util/fusermount.c -@@ -819,10 +819,16 @@ static int do_mount(const char *mnt, char **typep, mode_t rootmode, - flags |= flag; - else - flags &= ~flag; -- } else { -+ } else if (opt_eq(s, len, "default_permissions") || -+ opt_eq(s, len, "allow_other") || -+ begins_with(s, "max_read=") || -+ begins_with(s, "blksize=")) { - memcpy(d, s, len); - d += len; - *d++ = ','; -+ } else { -+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown option '%.*s'\n", progname, len, s); -+ exit(1); - } - } - } --- -2.13.3 - |