diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant')
-rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch | 44 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb | 1 |
2 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e800a410e --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +wpa_supplicant-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526 + +[No upstream tracking] -- https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt + +wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data + +Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant +processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted +flag set, but not the MIC flag. + +When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but +not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying +the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when +negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that +unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary +could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information +in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key). + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961] +CVE: CVE-2018-14526 +Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com> + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, + + if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) && + (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) { ++ /* ++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity ++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not ++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0 ++ * which is the case in this code branch. ++ */ ++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data"); ++ goto out; ++ } + if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data, + &key_data_len)) + goto out; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb index e68453748..aa4c4c2da 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://key-replay-cve-multiple6.patch \ file://key-replay-cve-multiple7.patch \ file://key-replay-cve-multiple8.patch \ + file://wpa_supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "091569eb4440b7d7f2b4276dbfc03c3c" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450" |