diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch | 70 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch b/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c477c2f93 --- /dev/null +++ b/yocto-poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> + +From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit + and Confirm + +The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not +checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read +overflow when processing an invalid message. + +Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before +processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to +make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm +message before the previous exchanges have been completed. + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644 +--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c ++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c +@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; + EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL; + int res = 0; ++ size_t prime_len, order_len; + + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response"); + ++ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); ++ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); ++ ++ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, ++ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) || + ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) || +@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, + u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; + int offset; + ++ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", ++ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); ++ goto fin; ++ } ++ + /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */ + grp = htons(data->group_num); + ptr = (u8 *) &cs; +-- +1.9.1 + |