diff options
| author | Patrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz> | 2022-04-21 22:30:30 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Patrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz> | 2022-04-21 22:32:13 +0300 |
| commit | ab475af3890f35980cd224ec8da7143c68834989 (patch) | |
| tree | 17e7111d61ee585f26e344679909fd07c5193d10 | |
| parent | e093d3473a724f8f7cbb318d2a632518655e7304 (diff) | |
| download | openbmc-ab475af3890f35980cd224ec8da7143c68834989.tar.xz | |
subtree updates
meta-openembedded: ab9fca485e..fdd1dfe6b4:
Akash Hadke (1):
tcpreplay: Add fix for CVE-2020-24265 and CVE-2020-24266
Andre Carvalho (1):
netcat: Set CVE_PRODUCT
Armin Kuster (7):
wireshark: Update to 3.2.18
c-ares: bump PV in recipe to 1.16.1
pw-am.sh: update to new patcwork system
p7zip: refresh patches
breakpad: Update SRC_URI for protobuf and lss
spirv-tools: update SRC_URI for googletest to main
Mariadb: update to 10.4.24
Christian Ege (1):
cli11: switch from default master branch to main to fix do_fetch failure
Christian Eggers (1):
graphviz: native: create /usr/lib/graphviz/config6 in populate_sysroot
Daniel Stadelmann (1):
imagemagick: update SRC_URI branch from master to main
Jeremy Puhlman (1):
CVE-2021-4034: polkit Local privilege escalation in pkexec due to incorrect handling of argument vector
Khem Raj (1):
mongodb: Pass OBJCOPY to scons so it does not use it from host
Kristian Klausen (1):
cryptsetup: Add runtime dependency on lvm2-udevrules for udev
Leif Middelschulte (1):
dbus-daemon-proxy: add missing `return` statement
Mingli Yu (2):
polkit: fix CVE-2021-3560
geoip: Switch to use the main branch
Minjae Kim (1):
multipath-tools: update SRC_URI
Nisha Parrakat (2):
p7zip: build and package lib7z.so needed for fastboot
nodejs: upgrade to 12.22.2
Peter Kjellerstedt (1):
googletest: Switch branch from master to main
Ralph Siemsen (2):
nginx: backport fix for CVE-2019-20372
polkit: fix overlapping changes in recent CVE patches
Ranjitsinh Rathod (4):
strongswan: Add fix of CVE-2021-45079
nss: Add fix for CVE-2022-22747
polkit: Fix for CVE-2021-4115
python3-urllib3: Fix CVE-2020-26137 and CVE-2021-33503
Robert Joslyn (1):
linuxptp: Update to 2.0.1
Ross Burton (1):
protobuf: fix patch fuzz
Sana Kazi (2):
protobuf: Fix CVE-2021-22570
openjpeg: Fix multiple CVE
Thomas Perrot (1):
breakpad: fix branch for gtest in SRC_URI
Virendra Thakur (5):
strongswan: Fix for CVE-2021-41990 and CVE-2021-41991
udisks2: Fix for CVE-2021-3802
p7zip: fix for CVE-2018-5996
nodejs: Fix for CVE-2021-44532
p7zip: Fix for CVE-2016-9296
Yi Zhao (1):
apache2: upgrade 2.4.52 -> 2.4.53
wangmy (1):
apache2: upgrade 2.4.51 -> 2.4.52
meta-security: b76698c788..c62970fda8:
Armin Kuster (3):
clamav: disable DB creation.
clamav: drop creating cvd package
chkrootkit: update SRC_URI
Jeremy A. Puhlman (1):
sssd: re-package to fix QA issues
Ralph Siemsen (2):
tpm2-tools: backport fix for CVE-2021-3565
tpm2-tools: update to 4.1.3
poky: bba3233897..b6ce93d565:
Alexander Kanavin (4):
libusb1: correct SRC_URI
ruby: correctly set native/target dependencies
vim: do not report upstream version check as broken
mobile-broadband-provider-info: upgrade 20201225 -> 20210805
Bruce Ashfield (4):
linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.173
linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.176
linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.178
perf-tests: add bash into RDEPENDS (v5.12-rc5+)
Changhyeok Bae (1):
mobile-broadband-provider-info: upgrade 20210805 -> 20220315
Chee Yang Lee (1):
ruby: 2.7.4 -> 2.7.5
Christian Eggers (1):
sdk: fix search for dynamic loader
Davide Gardenal (6):
re2c: backport fix for CVE-2018-21232
qemu: backport fix for CVE-2020-13253
qemu: backport patch fix for CVE-2020-13791
apt: backport patch fix for CVE-2020-3810
ghostscript: backport patch fix for CVE-2021-3781
go: backport patch fix for CVE-2021-38297
Florian Amstutz (1):
devtool: deploy-target: Remove stripped binaries in pseudo context
Jose Quaresma (2):
buildhistory.bbclass: create the buildhistory directory when needed
sstate: inside the threadedpool don't write to the shared localdata
Joshua Watt (5):
tzdata: Remove BSD License specifier
e2fsprogs: Use specific BSD license variant
glib-2.0: Use specific BSD license variant
shadow: Use specific BSD license variant
libcap: Use specific BSD license variant
Kartikey Rameshbhai Parmar (1):
puzzles: Upstream changed to main branch for development
Konrad Weihmann (1):
ruby: fix DEPENDS append
Lee Chee Yang (1):
poky.conf: update tested distros
Marek Vasut (2):
binutils: Backport Include members in the variable table used when resolving DW_AT_specification tags.
bootchart2: Add missing python3-math dependency
Marta Rybczynska (48):
grub: add a fix for CVE-2020-25632
grub: add a fix for CVE-2020-25647
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: add a fix for a possible NULL dereference
grub: fix a dangling memory pointer
grub: fix wrong handling of argc == 0
grub: add a fix for malformed device path handling
grub: fix memory leak at error in grub_efi_get_filename()
grub: add a fix for a possible NULL pointer dereference
grub: add a fix for unused variable in gnulib
grub: fix an unitialized token in gnulib
grub: add a fix a NULL pointer dereference in gnulib
grub: add a fix for NULL pointer dereference
grub: fix an unitialized re_token in gnulib
grub: add a fix for unnecessary assignements
grub: add structure initialization in zstd
grub: add a missing NULL check
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: fix an integer overflow
grub: add a fix for a length check
grub: add a fix for a possible negative shift
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: add a fix for possible integer overflows
grub: fix an error check
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: add a fix for a possible unintended sign extension
grub: add a fix for a possible NULL dereference
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: remove unneeded return value
grub: fix an integer overflow
grub: fix multiple integer overflows
grub: fix a possible integer overflow
grub: test for malformed jpeg files
grub: remove dead code
grub: fix checking for NULL
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: avoid a memory leak
grub: add a check for a NULL pointer
grub: add a fix for NULL pointer dereference
grub: add a fix for an incorrect cast
grub: fix incorrect use of a negative value
grub: add a fix for a NULL pointer dereference
grub: avoid a NULL pointer dereference
grub: add a fix for a crash in scripts
Martin Beeger (1):
cmake: remove bogus CMAKE_LDFLAGS_FLAGS definition from toolchain file
Martin Jansa (1):
boost: fix native build with glibc-2.34
Michael Halstead (2):
releases: update to include 3.1.14
uninative: Upgrade to 3.5
Michael Opdenacker (1):
docs: fix hardcoded link warning messages
Minjae Kim (6):
ghostscript: fix CVE-2021-45949
go: fix CVE-2022-23806
go: fix CVE-2022-23772
bluez5: fix CVE-2021-3658
gnu-config: update SRC_URI
virglrenderer: update SRC_URI
Nathan Rossi (1):
cml1.bbclass: Handle ncurses-native being available via pkg-config
Oleksandr Kravchuk (1):
tzdata: update to 2022a
Ovidiu Panait (1):
openssl: upgrade 1.1.1l -> 1.1.1n
Peter Kjellerstedt (2):
sstate: A third fix for for touching files inside pseudo
python3-jinja2: Correct HOMEPAGE
Purushottam Choudhary (3):
systemd: Fix CVE-2021-3997
freetype: add missing CVE tag CVE-2020-15999
tiff: fix for CVE-2022-22844
Ralph Siemsen (6):
bind: update to 9.11.36
libxml2: backport fix for CVE-2022-23308
libxml2: move to gitlab.gnome.org
libxml2: fix CVE-2022-23308 regression
bluez5: fix CVE-2022-0204
bind: update to 9.11.37
Ranjitsinh Rathod (2):
util-linux: Fix for CVE-2021-3995 and CVE-2021-3996
openssl: Add fix for CVE-2021-4160
Richard Purdie (19):
bitbake: tests/fetch: Handle upstream master -> main branch change
default-distrovars.inc: Switch connectivity check to a yoctoproject.org page
vim: Upgrade 4269 -> 4134
vim: Upgrade 8.2.4314 -> 8.2.4424
libxml-parser-perl: Add missing RDEPENDS
uninative: Add version to uninative tarball name
systemd: Ensure uid/gid ranges are set deterministically
vim: Update to 8.2.4524 for further CVE fixes
build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision
python3targetconfig: Use for nativesdk too
oeqa/runtime/ping: Improve failure message to include more detail
oeqa/selftest/tinfoil: Improve tinfoil event test debugging
bitbake: server/process: Note when commands complete in logs
bitbake: tinfoil: Allow run_command not to wait on events
poky: Drop PREMIRRORS entries for scms
oeqa/selftest/tinfoil: Fix intermittent event loss issue in test
mirrors: Add missing gitsm entries for yocto/oe mirrors
bitbake: server/process: Disable gc around critical section
conf.py/poky.yaml: Move version information to poky.yaml and read in conf.py
Ross Burton (13):
lsof: correct LICENSE
shadow-sysroot: sync license with shadow
lighttpd: backport a fix for CVE-2022-22707
vim: set PACKAGECONFIG idiomatically
vim: upgrade to 8.2 patch 3752
vim: update to include latest CVE fixes
vim: upgrade to patch 4269
coreutils: remove obsolete ignored CVE list
cve-check: get_cve_info should open the database read-only
Revert "cve-check: add lockfile to task"
asciidoc: update git repository
python3: ignore CVE-2022-26488
grub: ignore CVE-2021-46705
Rudolf J Streif (1):
linux-firmware: Add CLM blob to linux-firmware-bcm4373 package
Saul Wold (1):
recipetool: Fix circular reference in SRC_URI
Scott Weaver (1):
bitbake: fetch2: add check for empty SRC_URI hash string
Stefan Herbrechtsmeier (1):
cve-check: create directory of CVE_CHECK_MANIFEST before copy
Steve Sakoman (29):
glibc: update to lastest 2.31 release HEAD
expat: fix CVE-2022-23852
expat: add missing Upstream-status, CVE tag and sign-off to CVE-2021-46143.patch
common-licenses: add Spencer-94
documentation: update for 3.1.14 release
expat: fix CVE-2022-23990
connman: fix CVE-2022-23096-7
connman: fix CVE-2022-23098
connman: fix CVE-2021-33833
wpa-supplicant: fix CVE-2022-23303-4
Revert "vim: fix CVE-2021-4069"
expat: fix CVE-2022-25235
expat: fix CVE-2022-25236
expat: fix CVE-2022-25313
expat: fix CVE-2022-25314
expat: fix CVE-2022-25315
ref-system-requirements.rst: update list of supported distros
linux-yocto: update genericx86* to v5.4.178
poky.conf: Bump version for 3.1.15 release
documentation: update for 3.1.15 release
libsolv: fix CVE: CVE-2021-44568-71 and CVE-2021-44573-77
ghostscript: fix CVE-2020-15900 and CVE-2021-45949 for -native
util-linux: fix CVE-2022-0563
xserver-xorg: update to 1.20.9
xserver-xorg: update to 1.20.10
xserver-xorg: update to 1.20.11
xserver-xorg: update to 1.20.12
xserver-xorg: update to 1.20.13
xserver-xorg: update to 1.20.14
Sundeep KOKKONDA (1):
binutils: Fix CVE-2021-45078
Tim Orling (1):
python3: upgrade 3.8.12 -> 3.8.13
Virendra Thakur (1):
libarchive: Fix for CVE-2021-36976
bkylerussell@gmail.com (1):
rpm: fix intermittent compression failure in do_package_write_rpm
sana kazi (1):
tiff: Add backports for two CVEs from upstream
wangmy (3):
linux-firmware: upgrade 20211216 -> 20220209
wireless-regdb: upgrade 2021.08.28 -> 2022.02.18
linux-firmware: upgrade 20220209 -> 20220310
Signed-off-by: Patrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz>
Change-Id: Ib8eac0ed434df84b23bf80c52a2b3c4be9beff38
297 files changed, 15833 insertions, 1918 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/contrib/pw-am.sh b/meta-openembedded/contrib/pw-am.sh index 8987eee8eb..d9d1187b0b 100755 --- a/meta-openembedded/contrib/pw-am.sh +++ b/meta-openembedded/contrib/pw-am.sh @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ for patchnumber in $@; do - wget -nv http://patches.openembedded.org/patch/$patchnumber/mbox/ -O pw-am-$patchnumber.patch + wget -nv http://patchwork.yoctoproject.org/patch/$patchnumber/mbox/ -O pw-am-$patchnumber.patch git am -s pw-am-$patchnumber.patch rm pw-am-$patchnumber.patch done diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/geoip/geoip_1.6.12.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/geoip/geoip_1.6.12.bb index 3be1313d38..0efcbec1fc 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/geoip/geoip_1.6.12.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/geoip/geoip_1.6.12.bb @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ SECTION = "libdevel" GEOIP_DATABASE_VERSION = "20181205" -SRC_URI = "git://github.com/maxmind/geoip-api-c.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ +SRC_URI = "git://github.com/maxmind/geoip-api-c.git;branch=main;protocol=https \ http://sources.openembedded.org/GeoIP.dat.${GEOIP_DATABASE_VERSION}.gz;apply=no;name=GeoIP-dat; \ http://sources.openembedded.org/GeoIPv6.dat.${GEOIP_DATABASE_VERSION}.gz;apply=no;name=GeoIPv6-dat; \ http://sources.openembedded.org/GeoLiteCity.dat.${GEOIP_DATABASE_VERSION}.gz;apply=no;name=GeoLiteCity-dat; \ diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/netcat/netcat_0.7.1.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/netcat/netcat_0.7.1.bb index 14d743f820..1e113de519 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/netcat/netcat_0.7.1.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/netcat/netcat_0.7.1.bb @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b55af0bbdf5acc02d1eb6ab18da2acd77a400bafd074489003f3df0967 inherit autotools +CVE_PRODUCT = "netcat_project:netcat" + do_install_append() { install -d ${D}${bindir} mv ${D}${bindir}/nc ${D}${bindir}/nc.${BPN} diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7118ba1fb --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41990.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From 423a5d56274a1d343e0d2107dfc4fbf0df2dcca5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> +Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 17:52:08 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Reject RSASSA-PSS params with negative salt length + +The `salt_len` member in the struct is of type `ssize_t` because we use +negative values for special automatic salt lengths when generating +signatures. + +Not checking this could lead to an integer overflow. The value is assigned +to the `len` field of a chunk (`size_t`), which is further used in +calculations to check the padding structure and (if that is passed by a +matching crafted signature value) eventually a memcpy() that will result +in a segmentation fault. + +Fixes: a22316520b91 ("signature-params: Add functions to parse/build ASN.1 RSASSA-PSS params") +Fixes: 7d6b81648b2d ("gmp: Add support for RSASSA-PSS signature verification") +Fixes: CVE-2021-41990 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2021-41990] +CVE: CVE-2021-41990 + +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> + +--- + src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c | 6 +++++- + src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c +index d89bd2c96bb5..837de8443d43 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/keys/signature_params.c +@@ -322,7 +322,11 @@ bool rsa_pss_params_parse(chunk_t asn1, int level0, rsa_pss_params_t *params) + case RSASSA_PSS_PARAMS_SALT_LEN: + if (object.len) + { +- params->salt_len = (size_t)asn1_parse_integer_uint64(object); ++ params->salt_len = (ssize_t)asn1_parse_integer_uint64(object); ++ if (params->salt_len < 0) ++ { ++ goto end; ++ } + } + break; + case RSASSA_PSS_PARAMS_TRAILER: +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c +index f9bd1d314dec..3a775090883e 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/gmp/gmp_rsa_public_key.c +@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static bool verify_emsa_pss_signature(private_gmp_rsa_public_key_t *this, + int i; + bool success = FALSE; + +- if (!params) ++ if (!params || params->salt_len < 0) + { + return FALSE; + } +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2d898fa5cf --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-41991.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From b667237b3a84f601ef5a707ce8eb861c3a5002d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> +Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:38:22 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cert-cache: Prevent crash due to integer overflow/sign change + +random() allocates values in the range [0, RAND_MAX], with RAND_MAX usually +equaling INT_MAX = 2^31-1. Previously, values between 0 and 31 were added +directly to that offset before applying`% CACHE_SIZE` to get an index into +the cache array. If the random value was very high, this resulted in an +integer overflow and a negative index value and, therefore, an out-of-bounds +access of the array and in turn dereferencing invalid pointers when trying +to acquire the read lock. This most likely results in a segmentation fault. + +Fixes: 764e8b2211ce ("reimplemented certificate cache") +Fixes: CVE-2021-41991 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2021-41991] +CVE: CVE-2021-41991 + +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> + +--- + src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c +index f1579c60a9bc..ceebb3843725 100644 +--- a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c ++++ b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/sets/cert_cache.c +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void cache(private_cert_cache_t *this, + for (try = 0; try < REPLACE_TRIES; try++) + { + /* replace a random relation */ +- offset = random(); ++ offset = random() % CACHE_SIZE; + for (i = 0; i < CACHE_SIZE; i++) + { + rel = &this->relations[(i + offset) % CACHE_SIZE]; +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-45079.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-45079.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..97aa6a0efc --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2021-45079.patch @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +From 76968cdd6b79f6ae40d674554e902ced192fd33e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> +Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 10:51:35 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] eap-authenticator: Enforce failure if MSK generation fails + +Without this, the authentication succeeded if the server sent an early +EAP-Success message for mutual, key-generating EAP methods like EAP-TLS, +which may be used in EAP-only scenarios but would complete without server +or client authentication. For clients configured for such EAP-only +scenarios, a rogue server could capture traffic after the tunnel is +established or even access hosts behind the client. For non-mutual EAP +methods, public key server authentication has been enforced for a while. + +A server previously could also crash a client by sending an EAP-Success +immediately without initiating an actual EAP method. + +Fixes: 0706c39cda52 ("added support for EAP methods not establishing an MSK") +Fixes: CVE-2021-45079 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2021-45079/strongswan-5.5.0-5.9.4_eap_success.patch] +CVE: CVE-2021-45079 +Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com> + +--- + src/libcharon/plugins/eap_gtc/eap_gtc.c | 2 +- + src/libcharon/plugins/eap_md5/eap_md5.c | 2 +- + src/libcharon/plugins/eap_radius/eap_radius.c | 4 ++- + src/libcharon/sa/eap/eap_method.h | 8 ++++- + .../ikev2/authenticators/eap_authenticator.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++--- + 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_gtc/eap_gtc.c b/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_gtc/eap_gtc.c +index 95ba090b79ce..cffb6222c2f8 100644 +--- a/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_gtc/eap_gtc.c ++++ b/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_gtc/eap_gtc.c +@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ METHOD(eap_method_t, get_type, eap_type_t, + METHOD(eap_method_t, get_msk, status_t, + private_eap_gtc_t *this, chunk_t *msk) + { +- return FAILED; ++ return NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + METHOD(eap_method_t, get_identifier, uint8_t, +diff --git a/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_md5/eap_md5.c b/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_md5/eap_md5.c +index ab5f7ff6a823..3a92ad7c0a04 100644 +--- a/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_md5/eap_md5.c ++++ b/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_md5/eap_md5.c +@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ METHOD(eap_method_t, get_type, eap_type_t, + METHOD(eap_method_t, get_msk, status_t, + private_eap_md5_t *this, chunk_t *msk) + { +- return FAILED; ++ return NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + METHOD(eap_method_t, is_mutual, bool, +diff --git a/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_radius/eap_radius.c b/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_radius/eap_radius.c +index 2dc7a423e702..5336dead13d9 100644 +--- a/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_radius/eap_radius.c ++++ b/src/libcharon/plugins/eap_radius/eap_radius.c +@@ -733,7 +733,9 @@ METHOD(eap_method_t, get_msk, status_t, + *out = msk; + return SUCCESS; + } +- return FAILED; ++ /* we assume the selected method did not establish an MSK, if it failed ++ * to establish one, process() would have failed */ ++ return NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + METHOD(eap_method_t, get_identifier, uint8_t, +diff --git a/src/libcharon/sa/eap/eap_method.h b/src/libcharon/sa/eap/eap_method.h +index 0b5218dfec15..33564831f86e 100644 +--- a/src/libcharon/sa/eap/eap_method.h ++++ b/src/libcharon/sa/eap/eap_method.h +@@ -114,10 +114,16 @@ struct eap_method_t { + * Not all EAP methods establish a shared secret. For implementations of + * the EAP-Identity method, get_msk() returns the received identity. + * ++ * @note Returning NOT_SUPPORTED is important for implementations of EAP ++ * methods that don't establish an MSK. In particular as client because ++ * key-generating EAP methods MUST fail to process EAP-Success messages if ++ * no MSK is established. ++ * + * @param msk chunk receiving internal stored MSK + * @return +- * - SUCCESS, or ++ * - SUCCESS, if MSK is established + * - FAILED, if MSK not established (yet) ++ * - NOT_SUPPORTED, for non-MSK-establishing methods + */ + status_t (*get_msk) (eap_method_t *this, chunk_t *msk); + +diff --git a/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/authenticators/eap_authenticator.c b/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/authenticators/eap_authenticator.c +index e1e6cd7ee6f3..87548fc471a6 100644 +--- a/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/authenticators/eap_authenticator.c ++++ b/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/authenticators/eap_authenticator.c +@@ -305,9 +305,17 @@ static eap_payload_t* server_process_eap(private_eap_authenticator_t *this, + this->method->destroy(this->method); + return server_initiate_eap(this, FALSE); + } +- if (this->method->get_msk(this->method, &this->msk) == SUCCESS) ++ switch (this->method->get_msk(this->method, &this->msk)) + { +- this->msk = chunk_clone(this->msk); ++ case SUCCESS: ++ this->msk = chunk_clone(this->msk); ++ break; ++ case NOT_SUPPORTED: ++ break; ++ case FAILED: ++ default: ++ DBG1(DBG_IKE, "failed to establish MSK"); ++ goto failure; + } + if (vendor) + { +@@ -326,6 +334,7 @@ static eap_payload_t* server_process_eap(private_eap_authenticator_t *this, + return eap_payload_create_code(EAP_SUCCESS, in->get_identifier(in)); + case FAILED: + default: ++failure: + /* type might have changed for virtual methods */ + type = this->method->get_type(this->method, &vendor); + if (vendor) +@@ -661,9 +670,24 @@ METHOD(authenticator_t, process_client, status_t, + uint32_t vendor; + auth_cfg_t *cfg; + +- if (this->method->get_msk(this->method, &this->msk) == SUCCESS) ++ if (!this->method) + { +- this->msk = chunk_clone(this->msk); ++ DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received unexpected %N", ++ eap_code_names, eap_payload->get_code(eap_payload)); ++ return FAILED; ++ } ++ switch (this->method->get_msk(this->method, &this->msk)) ++ { ++ case SUCCESS: ++ this->msk = chunk_clone(this->msk); ++ break; ++ case NOT_SUPPORTED: ++ break; ++ case FAILED: ++ default: ++ DBG1(DBG_IKE, "received %N but failed to establish MSK", ++ eap_code_names, eap_payload->get_code(eap_payload)); ++ return FAILED; + } + type = this->method->get_type(this->method, &vendor); + if (vendor) +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb index 8a8809243a..8a5855fb87 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://fix-funtion-parameter.patch \ file://0001-memory.h-Include-stdint.h-for-uintptr_t.patch \ file://0001-Remove-obsolete-setting-regarding-the-Standard-Outpu.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-41990.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-41991.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-45079.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "0634e7f40591bd3f6770e583c3f27d29" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/tcpreplay/files/CVE-2020-24265-and-CVE-2020-24266.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/tcpreplay/files/CVE-2020-24265-and-CVE-2020-24266.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3ca9a831f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/tcpreplay/files/CVE-2020-24265-and-CVE-2020-24266.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From d3110859064b15408dbca1294dc7e31c2208504d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gabriel Ganne <gabriel.ganne@gmail.com> +Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2020 08:26:38 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fix heap-buffer-overflow when DLT_JUNIPER_ETHER + +The test logic on datalen was inverted. + +Processing truncated packats should now raise a warning like the +following: + Warning: <pcap> was captured using a snaplen of 4 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets. + +Fixes #616 #617 + +CVE: CVE-2020-24265 +CVE: CVE-2020-24266 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/appneta/tcpreplay/commit/d3110859064b15408dbca1294dc7e31c2208504d] + +Signed-off-by: Gabriel Ganne <gabriel.ganne@gmail.com> +Signed-off-by: Akash Hadke <akash.hadke@kpit.com> +Signed-off-by: Akash Hadke <hadkeakash4@gmail.com> +--- + src/common/get.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/common/get.c b/src/common/get.c +index f9ee92d3..0517bf0a 100644 +--- a/src/common/get.c ++++ b/src/common/get.c +@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ get_l2len(const u_char *pktdata, const int datalen, const int datalink) + break; + + case DLT_JUNIPER_ETHER: +- if (datalen >= 5) { ++ if (datalen < 5) { + l2_len = -1; + break; + } diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/tcpreplay/tcpreplay_4.3.3.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/tcpreplay/tcpreplay_4.3.3.bb index 39be950ad4..557d323311 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/tcpreplay/tcpreplay_4.3.3.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/tcpreplay/tcpreplay_4.3.3.bb @@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ SECTION = "net" LICENSE = "GPLv3" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://docs/LICENSE;md5=890b830b22fd632e9ffd996df20338f8" -SRC_URI = "https://github.com/appneta/tcpreplay/releases/download/v${PV}/tcpreplay-${PV}.tar.gz" +SRC_URI = "https://github.com/appneta/tcpreplay/releases/download/v${PV}/tcpreplay-${PV}.tar.gz \ + file://CVE-2020-24265-and-CVE-2020-24266.patch" SRC_URI[md5sum] = "53b52bf64f0b6b9443428e657b37bc6b" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ed2402caa9434ff5c74b2e7b31178c73e7c7c5c4ea1e1d0e2e39a7dc46958fde" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/fix_lemon_path.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/fix_lemon_path.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..54438dd870 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/fix_lemon_path.patch @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +Fix update to build for alt arch machine. + +Commit 9ca6e39c7ee26570e29dc87332ffb0f6c1d0e4a4 changed the UseLemon to use +the target lemon built by the target wireshark. Revert to use the one built by +wireshark-native. + +Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [configuration] +Signed-off: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> + +Index: wireshark-3.2.18/cmake/modules/UseLemon.cmake +=================================================================== +--- wireshark-3.2.18.orig/cmake/modules/UseLemon.cmake ++++ wireshark-3.2.18/cmake/modules/UseLemon.cmake +@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ MACRO(ADD_LEMON_FILES _source _generated + # These files are generated as side-effect + ${_out}.h + ${_out}.out +- COMMAND $<TARGET_FILE:lemon> ++ COMMAND lemon + -T${_lemonpardir}/lempar.c + -d. + ${_in} diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.2.15.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.2.18.bb index 36e84d0ccd..f9e22141c4 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.2.15.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.2.18.bb @@ -8,11 +8,12 @@ DEPENDS = "pcre expat glib-2.0 glib-2.0-native libgcrypt libgpg-error libxml2 bi DEPENDS_append_class-target = " wireshark-native chrpath-replacement-native " -SRC_URI = "https://1.eu.dl.wireshark.org/src/all-versions/wireshark-${PV}.tar.xz" +SRC_URI = "https://1.eu.dl.wireshark.org/src/all-versions/wireshark-${PV}.tar.xz \ + file://fix_lemon_path.patch " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://1.as.dl.wireshark.org/src" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "32f6cfd67b00903a1bfca02ecc4ccf72db6b70d4fda33e4a099fefb03e849bdb" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bbe75d909b052fcd67a850f149f0d5b1e2531026fc2413946b48570293306887" PE = "1" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/dynamic-layers/meta-python/recipes-dbs/mongodb/mongodb_git.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/dynamic-layers/meta-python/recipes-dbs/mongodb/mongodb_git.bb index 7ef8f69827..cc15a8de31 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/dynamic-layers/meta-python/recipes-dbs/mongodb/mongodb_git.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/dynamic-layers/meta-python/recipes-dbs/mongodb/mongodb_git.bb @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ EXTRA_OESCONS = "--prefix=${D}${prefix} \ LINKFLAGS='${LDFLAGS}' \ CXXFLAGS='${CXXFLAGS}' \ TARGET_ARCH=${TARGET_ARCH} \ + MONGO_VERSION=${PV} \ + OBJCOPY=${OBJCOPY} \ --ssl \ --disable-warnings-as-errors \ --use-system-zlib \ diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/linuxptp/linuxptp_2.0.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/linuxptp/linuxptp_2.0.1.bb index c989767790..79e59a8fea 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/linuxptp/linuxptp_2.0.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/linuxptp/linuxptp_2.0.1.bb @@ -2,14 +2,13 @@ DESCRIPTION = "Precision Time Protocol (PTP) according to IEEE standard 1588 for LICENSE = "GPLv2" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263" -SRC_URI = "http://sourceforge.net/projects/linuxptp/files/v${PV}/linuxptp-${PV}.tgz \ +SRC_URI = "http://sourceforge.net/projects/linuxptp/files/v2.0/linuxptp-${PV}.tgz \ file://build-Allow-CC-and-prefix-to-be-overriden.patch \ file://Use-cross-cpp-in-incdefs.patch \ file://time_t_maybe_long_long.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d8bb7374943bb747db7786ac26f17f11" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0a24d9401e87d4af023d201e234d91127d82c350daad93432106284aa9459c7d" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6f4669db1733747427217a9e74c8b5ca25c4245947463e9cdb860ec8f5ec797a" EXTRA_OEMAKE = "ARCH=${TARGET_ARCH} EXTRA_CFLAGS='${CFLAGS}'" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-core/dbus/dbus-daemon-proxy/0001-dbus-daemon-proxy-Return-DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-core/dbus/dbus-daemon-proxy/0001-dbus-daemon-proxy-Return-DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET.patch index 2c4ca057f2..1c2fc3813f 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-core/dbus/dbus-daemon-proxy/0001-dbus-daemon-proxy-Return-DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-core/dbus/dbus-daemon-proxy/0001-dbus-daemon-proxy-Return-DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET.patch @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ index 009e4fd..f3f0d80 100644 if (!dbus_conn) - return; -+ DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED; ++ return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED; if (verbose) g_print ("New message from server: type='%d' path='%s' iface='%s'" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-crypto/cryptsetup/cryptsetup_2.3.2.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-crypto/cryptsetup/cryptsetup_2.3.2.bb index b9668eb099..3c1c8b0beb 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-crypto/cryptsetup/cryptsetup_2.3.2.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-crypto/cryptsetup/cryptsetup_2.3.2.bb @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[veritysetup] = "--enable-veritysetup,--disable-veritysetup" PACKAGECONFIG[cryptsetup-reencrypt] = "--enable-cryptsetup-reencrypt,--disable-cryptsetup-reencrypt" PACKAGECONFIG[integritysetup] = "--enable-integritysetup,--disable-integritysetup" PACKAGECONFIG[selinux] = "--enable-selinux,--disable-selinux" -PACKAGECONFIG[udev] = "--enable-udev,--disable-udev,,udev" +PACKAGECONFIG[udev] = "--enable-udev,--disable-udev,,udev lvm2-udevrules" PACKAGECONFIG[kernel_crypto] = "--enable-kernel_crypto,--disable-kernel_crypto" # gcrypt-pkbdf2 requries --with-crypto_backend=gcrypt or the flag isn't # recognized. diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb-native_10.4.20.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb-native_10.4.24.bb index e1a038dfa3..e1a038dfa3 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb-native_10.4.20.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb-native_10.4.24.bb diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb.inc b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb.inc index 0fb0c95ec3..9aca7371af 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb.inc +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb.inc @@ -15,12 +15,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://downloads.mariadb.org/interstitial/${BP}/source/${BP}.tar.gz file://support-files-CMakeLists.txt-fix-do_populate_sysroot.patch \ file://sql-CMakeLists.txt-fix-gen_lex_hash-not-found.patch \ file://0001-disable-ucontext-on-musl.patch \ - file://c11_atomics.patch \ - file://clang_version_header_conflict.patch \ file://fix-arm-atomic.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "c3bc7a3eca3b0bbae5748f7b22a55c0c" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "87d5e29ee1f18de153266ec658138607703ed2a05b3ffb1f89091d33f4abf545" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "af39316a6803d13f84fb586635598036" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fe975551b37f095640ea5e380eb896a37e331caf113dbe5d05564714338df846" UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/MariaDB/server/releases" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb/c11_atomics.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb/c11_atomics.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b1ce963602..0000000000 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb/c11_atomics.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ -Author: Vicențiu Ciorbaru <vicentiu@mariadb.org> -Date: Fri Dec 21 19:14:04 2018 +0200 - - Link with libatomic to enable C11 atomics support - - Some architectures (mips) require libatomic to support proper - atomic operations. Check first if support is available without - linking, otherwise use the library. - -Upstream-Status: Pending -Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> - -Index: mariadb-10.4.17/configure.cmake -=================================================================== ---- mariadb-10.4.17.orig/configure.cmake -+++ mariadb-10.4.17/configure.cmake -@@ -863,7 +863,25 @@ int main() - long long int *ptr= &var; - return (int)__atomic_load_n(ptr, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); - }" --HAVE_GCC_C11_ATOMICS) -+HAVE_GCC_C11_ATOMICS_WITHOUT_LIBATOMIC) -+IF (HAVE_GCC_C11_ATOMICS_WITHOUT_LIBATOMIC) -+ SET(HAVE_GCC_C11_ATOMICS True) -+ELSE() -+ SET(OLD_CMAKE_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES ${CMAKE_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES}) -+ LIST(APPEND CMAKE_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES "atomic") -+ CHECK_CXX_SOURCE_COMPILES(" -+ int main() -+ { -+ long long int var= 1; -+ long long int *ptr= &var; -+ return (int)__atomic_load_n(ptr, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); -+ }" -+ HAVE_GCC_C11_ATOMICS_WITH_LIBATOMIC) -+ IF(HAVE_GCC_C11_ATOMICS_WITH_LIBATOMIC) -+ SET(HAVE_GCC_C11_ATOMICS True) -+ ENDIF() -+ SET(CMAKE_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES ${OLD_CMAKE_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES}) -+ENDIF() - - IF(WITH_VALGRIND) - SET(HAVE_valgrind 1) -Index: mariadb-10.4.17/mysys/CMakeLists.txt -=================================================================== ---- mariadb-10.4.17.orig/mysys/CMakeLists.txt -+++ mariadb-10.4.17/mysys/CMakeLists.txt -@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(mysys dbug strings - ${LIBNSL} ${LIBM} ${LIBRT} ${CMAKE_DL_LIBS} ${LIBSOCKET} ${LIBEXECINFO} ${CRC32_LIBRARY}) - DTRACE_INSTRUMENT(mysys) - -+IF (HAVE_GCC_C11_ATOMICS_WITH_LIBATOMIC) -+ TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(mysys atomic) -+ENDIF() -+ - IF(HAVE_BFD_H) - TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(mysys bfd) - ENDIF(HAVE_BFD_H) -Index: mariadb-10.4.17/sql/CMakeLists.txt -=================================================================== ---- mariadb-10.4.17.orig/sql/CMakeLists.txt -+++ mariadb-10.4.17/sql/CMakeLists.txt -@@ -196,6 +196,10 @@ ELSE() - SET(MYSQLD_SOURCE main.cc ${DTRACE_PROBES_ALL}) - ENDIF() - -+IF (HAVE_GCC_C11_ATOMICS_WITH_LIBATOMIC) -+ TARGET_LINK_LIBRARIES(sql atomic) -+ENDIF() -+ - - IF(MSVC AND NOT WITHOUT_DYNAMIC_PLUGINS) - diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb/clang_version_header_conflict.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb/clang_version_header_conflict.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c77a869441..0000000000 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb/clang_version_header_conflict.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -libc++ also has a file called version and this file and how cflags are specified -it ends up including this file and resulting in compile errors - -fixes errors like -storage/mroonga/version:1:1: error: expected unqualified-id -7.07 -^ - -Upstream-Status: Pending -Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> - ---- a/storage/mroonga/CMakeLists.txt -+++ b/storage/mroonga/CMakeLists.txt -@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ else() - set(MRN_SOURCE_DIR ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}) - endif() - --file(READ ${MRN_SOURCE_DIR}/version MRN_VERSION) -+file(READ ${MRN_SOURCE_DIR}/ver MRN_VERSION) - file(READ ${MRN_SOURCE_DIR}/version_major MRN_VERSION_MAJOR) - file(READ ${MRN_SOURCE_DIR}/version_minor MRN_VERSION_MINOR) - file(READ ${MRN_SOURCE_DIR}/version_micro MRN_VERSION_MICRO) ---- /dev/null -+++ b/storage/mroonga/ver -@@ -0,0 +1 @@ -+7.07 -\ No newline at end of file ---- a/storage/mroonga/version -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1 +0,0 @@ --7.07 -\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb_10.4.20.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb_10.4.24.bb index c0b53379d9..c0b53379d9 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb_10.4.20.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb_10.4.24.bb diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/breakpad/breakpad_git.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/breakpad/breakpad_git.bb index cbeb99316e..1e474225a2 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/breakpad/breakpad_git.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/breakpad/breakpad_git.bb @@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ SRCREV_protobuf = "cb6dd4ef5f82e41e06179dcd57d3b1d9246ad6ac" SRCREV_lss = "8048ece6c16c91acfe0d36d1d3cc0890ab6e945c" SRCREV_gyp = "324dd166b7c0b39d513026fa52d6280ac6d56770" -SRC_URI = "git://github.com/google/breakpad;name=breakpad;branch=master;protocol=https \ - git://github.com/google/googletest.git;destsuffix=git/src/testing/gtest;name=gtest;branch=master;protocol=https \ - git://github.com/google/protobuf.git;destsuffix=git/src/third_party/protobuf/protobuf;name=protobuf;branch=master;protocol=https \ - git://chromium.googlesource.com/linux-syscall-support;protocol=https;destsuffix=git/src/third_party/lss;name=lss;branch=master \ +SRC_URI = "git://github.com/google/breakpad;name=breakpad;branch=main;protocol=https \ + git://github.com/google/googletest.git;destsuffix=git/src/testing/gtest;name=gtest;branch=main;protocol=https \ + git://github.com/google/protobuf.git;destsuffix=git/src/third_party/protobuf/protobuf;name=protobuf;branch=main;protocol=https \ + git://chromium.googlesource.com/linux-syscall-support;protocol=https;destsuffix=git/src/third_party/lss;name=lss;branch=main \ git://chromium.googlesource.com/external/gyp;protocol=https;destsuffix=git/src/tools/gyp;name=gyp;branch=master \ file://0001-include-sys-reg.h-to-get-__WORDSIZE-on-musl-libc.patch \ file://0003-Fix-conflict-between-musl-libc-dirent.h-and-lss.patch \ diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2021-44532.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2021-44532.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dff7fe23a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2021-44532.patch @@ -0,0 +1,3090 @@ +From 19873abfb24dce75ffff042efe76dc5633052677 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Tobias=20Nie=C3=9Fen?= <tniessen@tnie.de> +Date: Wed, 29 Dec 2021 19:30:57 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] crypto,tls: implement safe x509 GeneralName format + +This change introduces JSON-compatible escaping rules for strings that +include X.509 GeneralName components (see RFC 5280). This non-standard +format avoids ambiguities and prevents injection attacks that could +previously lead to X.509 certificates being accepted even though they +were not valid for the target hostname. + +These changes affect the format of subject alternative names and the +format of authority information access. The checkServerIdentity function +has been modified to safely handle the new format, eliminating the +possibility of injecting subject alternative names into the verification +logic. + +Because each subject alternative name is only encoded as a JSON string +literal if necessary for security purposes, this change will only be +visible in rare cases. + +This addresses CVE-2021-44532. + +Co-authored-by: Akshay K <iit.akshay@gmail.com> +CVE-ID: CVE-2021-44532 +Backport-PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/306 +PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/300 +Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com> +Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/19873abfb24dce75ffff042efe76dc5633052677] + +CVE: CVE-2021-44532 + +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> + +--- + doc/api/errors.md | 8 + + lib/_tls_common.js | 9 + + lib/internal/errors.js | 2 + + lib/tls.js | 52 +- + src/node_crypto_common.cc | 340 ++++++++++-- + test/common/index.js | 7 + + test/fixtures/keys/Makefile | 14 + + .../incorrect_san_correct_subject-cert.pem | 11 + + .../incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem | 5 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/.gitignore | 2 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-0-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-1-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-10-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-11-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-12-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-13-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-14-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-15-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-16-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-17-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-18-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-19-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-2-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-20-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-21-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-22-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-23-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-24-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-25-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-26-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-27-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-28-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-29-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-3-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-30-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-4-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-5-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-6-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-7-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-8-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-9-cert.pem | 28 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/create-certs.js | 502 ++++++++++++++++++ + .../x509-escaping/google/intermediate.pem | 11 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/key.pem | 5 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf0.pem | 10 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf1.pem | 10 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf2.pem | 10 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf3.pem | 10 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf4.pem | 10 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/root.pem | 9 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-0-cert.pem | 30 ++ + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-1-cert.pem | 31 ++ + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-2-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-3-cert.pem | 30 ++ + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-4-cert.pem | 29 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/package.json | 12 + + test/fixtures/x509-escaping/server-key.pem | 52 ++ + test/parallel/test-tls-0-dns-altname.js | 2 +- + test/parallel/test-x509-escaping.js | 349 ++++++++++++ + 59 files changed, 2429 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/keys/incorrect_san_correct_subject-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/keys/incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/.gitignore + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-0-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-1-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-10-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-11-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-12-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-13-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-14-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-15-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-16-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-17-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-18-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-19-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-2-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-20-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-21-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-22-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-23-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-24-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-25-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-26-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-27-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-28-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-29-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-3-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-30-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-4-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-5-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-6-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-7-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-8-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-9-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/create-certs.js + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/intermediate.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/key.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf0.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf1.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf2.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf3.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf4.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/root.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-0-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-1-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-2-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-3-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-4-cert.pem + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/package.json + create mode 100644 test/fixtures/x509-escaping/server-key.pem + create mode 100644 test/parallel/test-x509-escaping.js + +diff --git a/doc/api/errors.md b/doc/api/errors.md +index d5d8e1efa7..9d176d9048 100644 +--- a/doc/api/errors.md ++++ b/doc/api/errors.md +@@ -1869,6 +1869,14 @@ An unspecified or non-specific system error has occurred within the Node.js + process. The error object will have an `err.info` object property with + additional details. + ++<a id="ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_FORMAT"></a> ++### `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_FORMAT` ++ ++This error is thrown by `checkServerIdentity` if a user-supplied ++`subjectaltname` property violates encoding rules. Certificate objects produced ++by Node.js itself always comply with encoding rules and will never cause ++this error. ++ + <a id="ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID"></a> + ### `ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID` + +diff --git a/lib/_tls_common.js b/lib/_tls_common.js +index b7a3b70a24..a2a74813f1 100644 +--- a/lib/_tls_common.js ++++ b/lib/_tls_common.js +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + + const { + ArrayIsArray, ++ JSONParse, + ObjectCreate, + } = primordials; + +@@ -323,6 +324,14 @@ exports.translatePeerCertificate = function translatePeerCertificate(c) { + + // XXX: More key validation? + info.replace(/([^\n:]*):([^\n]*)(?:\n|$)/g, (all, key, val) => { ++ if (val.charCodeAt(0) === 0x22) { ++ // The translatePeerCertificate function is only ++ // used on internally created legacy certificate ++ // objects, and any value that contains a quote ++ // will always be a valid JSON string literal, ++ // so this should never throw. ++ val = JSONParse(val); ++ } + if (key in c.infoAccess) + c.infoAccess[key].push(val); + else +diff --git a/lib/internal/errors.js b/lib/internal/errors.js +index 2cf7df436b..cd7153ad1a 100644 +--- a/lib/internal/errors.js ++++ b/lib/internal/errors.js +@@ -1345,6 +1345,8 @@ E('ERR_STREAM_WRAP', 'Stream has StringDecoder set or is in objectMode', Error); + E('ERR_STREAM_WRITE_AFTER_END', 'write after end', Error); + E('ERR_SYNTHETIC', 'JavaScript Callstack', Error); + E('ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR', 'A system error occurred', SystemError); ++E('ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_FORMAT', 'Invalid subject alternative name string', ++ SyntaxError); + E('ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID', function(reason, host, cert) { + this.reason = reason; + this.host = host; +diff --git a/lib/tls.js b/lib/tls.js +index 2ccbe409c9..cefb47d10f 100644 +--- a/lib/tls.js ++++ b/lib/tls.js +@@ -24,11 +24,19 @@ + const { + Array, + ArrayIsArray, ++ ArrayPrototypePush, ++ JSONParse, + ObjectDefineProperty, + ObjectFreeze, ++ RegExpPrototypeExec, ++ StringPrototypeIncludes, ++ StringPrototypeIndexOf, ++ StringPrototypeSplit, ++ StringPrototypeSubstring, + } = primordials; + + const { ++ ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_FORMAT, + ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID, + ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE + } = require('internal/errors').codes; +@@ -207,6 +215,45 @@ function check(hostParts, pattern, wildcards) { + return true; + } + ++// This pattern is used to determine the length of escaped sequences within ++// the subject alt names string. It allows any valid JSON string literal. ++// This MUST match the JSON specification (ECMA-404 / RFC8259) exactly. ++const jsonStringPattern = ++ // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex ++ /^"(?:[^"\\\u0000-\u001f]|\\(?:["\\/bfnrt]|u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}))*"/; ++ ++function splitEscapedAltNames(altNames) { ++ const result = []; ++ let currentToken = ''; ++ let offset = 0; ++ while (offset !== altNames.length) { ++ const nextSep = StringPrototypeIndexOf(altNames, ', ', offset); ++ const nextQuote = StringPrototypeIndexOf(altNames, '"', offset); ++ if (nextQuote !== -1 && (nextSep === -1 || nextQuote < nextSep)) { ++ // There is a quote character and there is no separator before the quote. ++ currentToken += StringPrototypeSubstring(altNames, offset, nextQuote); ++ const match = RegExpPrototypeExec( ++ jsonStringPattern, StringPrototypeSubstring(altNames, nextQuote)); ++ if (!match) { ++ throw new ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_FORMAT(); ++ } ++ currentToken += JSONParse(match[0]); ++ offset = nextQuote + match[0].length; ++ } else if (nextSep !== -1) { ++ // There is a separator and no quote before it. ++ currentToken += StringPrototypeSubstring(altNames, offset, nextSep); ++ ArrayPrototypePush(result, currentToken); ++ currentToken = ''; ++ offset = nextSep + 2; ++ } else { ++ currentToken += StringPrototypeSubstring(altNames, offset); ++ offset = altNames.length; ++ } ++ } ++ ArrayPrototypePush(result, currentToken); ++ return result; ++} ++ + let urlWarningEmitted = false; + exports.checkServerIdentity = function checkServerIdentity(hostname, cert) { + const subject = cert.subject; +@@ -218,7 +265,10 @@ exports.checkServerIdentity = function checkServerIdentity(hostname, cert) { + hostname = '' + hostname; + + if (altNames) { +- for (const name of altNames.split(', ')) { ++ const splitAltNames = StringPrototypeIncludes(altNames, '"') ? ++ splitEscapedAltNames(altNames) : ++ StringPrototypeSplit(altNames, ', '); ++ for (const name of splitAltNames) { + if (name.startsWith('DNS:')) { + dnsNames.push(name.slice(4)); + } else if (name.startsWith('URI:')) { +diff --git a/src/node_crypto_common.cc b/src/node_crypto_common.cc +index 74bc0a9756..53fbc576ef 100644 +--- a/src/node_crypto_common.cc ++++ b/src/node_crypto_common.cc +@@ -480,39 +480,320 @@ void AddFingerprintDigest( + } + } + +-bool SafeX509ExtPrint(const BIOPointer& out, X509_EXTENSION* ext) { +- const X509V3_EXT_METHOD* method = X509V3_EXT_get(ext); ++static inline bool IsSafeAltName(const char* name, size_t length, bool utf8) { ++ for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) { ++ char c = name[i]; ++ switch (c) { ++ case '"': ++ case '\\': ++ // These mess with encoding rules. ++ // Fall through. ++ case ',': ++ // Commas make it impossible to split the list of subject alternative ++ // names unambiguously, which is why we have to escape. ++ // Fall through. ++ case '\'': ++ // Single quotes are unlikely to appear in any legitimate values, but they ++ // could be used to make a value look like it was escaped (i.e., enclosed ++ // in single/double quotes). ++ return false; ++ default: ++ if (utf8) { ++ // In UTF8 strings, we require escaping for any ASCII control character, ++ // but NOT for non-ASCII characters. Note that all bytes of any code ++ // point that consists of more than a single byte have their MSB set. ++ if (static_cast<unsigned char>(c) < ' ' || c == '\x7f') { ++ return false; ++ } ++ } else { ++ // Check if the char is a control character or non-ASCII character. Note ++ // that char may or may not be a signed type. Regardless, non-ASCII ++ // values will always be outside of this range. ++ if (c < ' ' || c > '~') { ++ return false; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ return true; ++} + +- if (method != X509V3_EXT_get_nid(NID_subject_alt_name)) +- return false; ++static inline void PrintAltName(const BIOPointer& out, const char* name, ++ size_t length, bool utf8, ++ const char* safe_prefix) { ++ if (IsSafeAltName(name, length, utf8)) { ++ // For backward-compatibility, append "safe" names without any ++ // modifications. ++ if (safe_prefix != nullptr) { ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "%s:", safe_prefix); ++ } ++ BIO_write(out.get(), name, length); ++ } else { ++ // If a name is not "safe", we cannot embed it without special ++ // encoding. This does not usually happen, but we don't want to hide ++ // it from the user either. We use JSON compatible escaping here. ++ BIO_write(out.get(), "\"", 1); ++ if (safe_prefix != nullptr) { ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "%s:", safe_prefix); ++ } ++ for (size_t j = 0; j < length; j++) { ++ char c = static_cast<char>(name[j]); ++ if (c == '\\') { ++ BIO_write(out.get(), "\\\\", 2); ++ } else if (c == '"') { ++ BIO_write(out.get(), "\\\"", 2); ++ } else if ((c >= ' ' && c != ',' && c <= '~') || (utf8 && (c & 0x80))) { ++ // Note that the above condition explicitly excludes commas, which means ++ // that those are encoded as Unicode escape sequences in the "else" ++ // block. That is not strictly necessary, and Node.js itself would parse ++ // it correctly either way. We only do this to account for third-party ++ // code that might be splitting the string at commas (as Node.js itself ++ // used to do). ++ BIO_write(out.get(), &c, 1); ++ } else { ++ // Control character or non-ASCII character. We treat everything as ++ // Latin-1, which corresponds to the first 255 Unicode code points. ++ const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef"; ++ char u[] = { '\\', 'u', '0', '0', hex[(c & 0xf0) >> 4], hex[c & 0x0f] }; ++ BIO_write(out.get(), u, sizeof(u)); ++ } ++ } ++ BIO_write(out.get(), "\"", 1); ++ } ++} ++ ++static inline void PrintLatin1AltName(const BIOPointer& out, ++ const ASN1_IA5STRING* name, ++ const char* safe_prefix = nullptr) { ++ PrintAltName(out, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(name->data), name->length, ++ false, safe_prefix); ++} ++ ++static inline void PrintUtf8AltName(const BIOPointer& out, ++ const ASN1_UTF8STRING* name, ++ const char* safe_prefix = nullptr) { ++ PrintAltName(out, reinterpret_cast<const char*>(name->data), name->length, ++ true, safe_prefix); ++} ++ ++// This function currently emulates the behavior of i2v_GENERAL_NAME in a safer ++// and less ambiguous way. ++// TODO(tniessen): gradually improve the format in the next major version(s) ++static bool PrintGeneralName(const BIOPointer& out, const GENERAL_NAME* gen) { ++ if (gen->type == GEN_DNS) { ++ ASN1_IA5STRING* name = gen->d.dNSName; ++ BIO_write(out.get(), "DNS:", 4); ++ // Note that the preferred name syntax (see RFCs 5280 and 1034) with ++ // wildcards is a subset of what we consider "safe", so spec-compliant DNS ++ // names will never need to be escaped. ++ PrintLatin1AltName(out, name); ++ } else if (gen->type == GEN_EMAIL) { ++ ASN1_IA5STRING* name = gen->d.rfc822Name; ++ BIO_write(out.get(), "email:", 6); ++ PrintLatin1AltName(out, name); ++ } else if (gen->type == GEN_URI) { ++ ASN1_IA5STRING* name = gen->d.uniformResourceIdentifier; ++ BIO_write(out.get(), "URI:", 4); ++ // The set of "safe" names was designed to include just about any URI, ++ // with a few exceptions, most notably URIs that contains commas (see ++ // RFC 2396). In other words, most legitimate URIs will not require ++ // escaping. ++ PrintLatin1AltName(out, name); ++ } else if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { ++ // For backward compatibility, use X509_NAME_oneline to print the ++ // X509_NAME object. The format is non standard and should be avoided ++ // elsewhere, but conveniently, the function produces ASCII and the output ++ // is unlikely to contains commas or other characters that would require ++ // escaping. With that in mind, note that it SHOULD NOT produce ASCII ++ // output since an RFC5280 AttributeValue may be a UTF8String. ++ // TODO(tniessen): switch to RFC2253 rules in a major release ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "DirName:"); ++ char oline[256]; ++ if (X509_NAME_oneline(gen->d.dirn, oline, sizeof(oline)) != nullptr) { ++ PrintAltName(out, oline, strlen(oline), false, nullptr); ++ } else { ++ return false; ++ } ++ } else if (gen->type == GEN_IPADD) { ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "IP Address:"); ++ const ASN1_OCTET_STRING* ip = gen->d.ip; ++ const unsigned char* b = ip->data; ++ if (ip->length == 4) { ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "%d.%d.%d.%d", b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3]); ++ } else if (ip->length == 16) { ++ for (unsigned int j = 0; j < 8; j++) { ++ uint16_t pair = (b[2 * j] << 8) | b[2 * j + 1]; ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), (j == 0) ? "%X" : ":%X", pair); ++ } ++ } else { ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "<invalid length=%d>", ip->length); ++#else ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "<invalid>"); ++#endif ++ } ++ } else if (gen->type == GEN_RID) { ++ // TODO(tniessen): unlike OpenSSL's default implementation, never print the ++ // OID as text and instead always print its numeric representation, which is ++ // backward compatible in practice and more future proof (see OBJ_obj2txt). ++ char oline[256]; ++ i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(oline, sizeof(oline), gen->d.rid); ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "Registered ID:%s", oline); ++ } else if (gen->type == GEN_OTHERNAME) { ++ // TODO(tniessen): the format that is used here is based on OpenSSL's ++ // implementation of i2v_GENERAL_NAME (as of OpenSSL 3.0.1), mostly for ++ // backward compatibility. It is somewhat awkward, especially when passed to ++ // translatePeerCertificate, and should be changed in the future, probably ++ // to the format used by GENERAL_NAME_print (in a major release). ++ bool unicode = true; ++ const char* prefix = nullptr; ++ // OpenSSL 1.1.1 does not support othername in i2v_GENERAL_NAME and may not ++ // define these NIDs. ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 ++ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(gen->d.otherName->type_id); ++ switch (nid) { ++ case NID_id_on_SmtpUTF8Mailbox: ++ prefix = " SmtpUTF8Mailbox:"; ++ break; ++ case NID_XmppAddr: ++ prefix = " XmppAddr:"; ++ break; ++ case NID_SRVName: ++ prefix = " SRVName:"; ++ unicode = false; ++ break; ++ case NID_ms_upn: ++ prefix = " UPN:"; ++ break; ++ case NID_NAIRealm: ++ prefix = " NAIRealm:"; ++ break; ++ } ++#endif // OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 ++ int val_type = gen->d.otherName->value->type; ++ if (prefix == nullptr || ++ (unicode && val_type != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) || ++ (!unicode && val_type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)) { ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "othername:<unsupported>"); ++ } else { ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "othername:"); ++ if (unicode) { ++ PrintUtf8AltName(out, gen->d.otherName->value->value.utf8string, ++ prefix); ++ } else { ++ PrintLatin1AltName(out, gen->d.otherName->value->value.ia5string, ++ prefix); ++ } ++ } ++ } else if (gen->type == GEN_X400) { ++ // TODO(tniessen): this is what OpenSSL does, implement properly instead ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "X400Name:<unsupported>"); ++ } else if (gen->type == GEN_EDIPARTY) { ++ // TODO(tniessen): this is what OpenSSL does, implement properly instead ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "EdiPartyName:<unsupported>"); ++ } else { ++ // This is safe because X509V3_EXT_d2i would have returned nullptr in this ++ // case already. ++ UNREACHABLE(); ++ } ++ ++ return true; ++} ++ ++bool SafeX509SubjectAltNamePrint(const BIOPointer& out, X509_EXTENSION* ext) { ++ const X509V3_EXT_METHOD* method = X509V3_EXT_get(ext); ++ CHECK(method == X509V3_EXT_get_nid(NID_subject_alt_name)); + + GENERAL_NAMES* names = static_cast<GENERAL_NAMES*>(X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext)); + if (names == nullptr) + return false; + ++ bool ok = true; ++ + for (int i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) { + GENERAL_NAME* gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i); + + if (i != 0) + BIO_write(out.get(), ", ", 2); + +- if (gen->type == GEN_DNS) { +- ASN1_IA5STRING* name = gen->d.dNSName; +- +- BIO_write(out.get(), "DNS:", 4); +- BIO_write(out.get(), name->data, name->length); +- } else { +- STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)* nval = i2v_GENERAL_NAME( +- const_cast<X509V3_EXT_METHOD*>(method), gen, nullptr); +- if (nval == nullptr) +- return false; +- X509V3_EXT_val_prn(out.get(), nval, 0, 0); +- sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(nval, X509V3_conf_free); ++ if (!(ok = PrintGeneralName(out, gen))) { ++ break; + } + } + sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free); + +- return true; ++ return ok; ++} ++ ++bool SafeX509InfoAccessPrint(const BIOPointer& out, X509_EXTENSION* ext) { ++ const X509V3_EXT_METHOD* method = X509V3_EXT_get(ext); ++ CHECK(method == X509V3_EXT_get_nid(NID_info_access)); ++ ++ AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS* descs = ++ static_cast<AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS*>(X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext)); ++ if (descs == nullptr) ++ return false; ++ ++ bool ok = true; ++ ++ for (int i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(descs); i++) { ++ ACCESS_DESCRIPTION* desc = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(descs, i); ++ ++ if (i != 0) ++ BIO_write(out.get(), "\n", 1); ++ ++ char objtmp[80]; ++ i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(objtmp, sizeof(objtmp), desc->method); ++ BIO_printf(out.get(), "%s - ", objtmp); ++ if (!(ok = PrintGeneralName(out, desc->location))) { ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_pop_free(descs, ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free); ++ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR < 3 ++ BIO_write(out.get(), "\n", 1); ++#endif ++ ++ return ok; ++} ++ ++v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value> GetSubjectAltNameString( ++ Environment* env, ++ const BIOPointer& bio, ++ X509* cert) { ++ int index = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, -1); ++ if (index < 0) ++ return Undefined(env->isolate()); ++ ++ X509_EXTENSION* ext = X509_get_ext(cert, index); ++ CHECK_NOT_NULL(ext); ++ ++ if (!SafeX509SubjectAltNamePrint(bio, ext)) { ++ USE(BIO_reset(bio.get())); ++ return v8::Null(env->isolate()); ++ } ++ ++ return ToV8Value(env, bio); ++} ++ ++v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Value> GetInfoAccessString( ++ Environment* env, ++ const BIOPointer& bio, ++ X509* cert) { ++ int index = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, NID_info_access, -1); ++ if (index < 0) ++ return Undefined(env->isolate()); ++ ++ X509_EXTENSION* ext = X509_get_ext(cert, index); ++ CHECK_NOT_NULL(ext); ++ ++ if (!SafeX509InfoAccessPrint(bio, ext)) { ++ USE(BIO_reset(bio.get())); ++ return v8::Null(env->isolate()); ++ } ++ ++ return ToV8Value(env, bio); + } + + MaybeLocal<Value> GetFingerprintDigest( +@@ -628,27 +909,6 @@ MaybeLocal<Value> GetModulusString( + return ToV8Value(env, bio); + } + +-template <int nid> +-MaybeLocal<Value> GetInfoString( +- Environment* env, +- const BIOPointer& bio, +- X509* cert) { +- int index = X509_get_ext_by_NID(cert, nid, -1); +- if (index < 0) +- return Undefined(env->isolate()); +- +- X509_EXTENSION* ext = X509_get_ext(cert, index); +- CHECK_NOT_NULL(ext); +- +- if (!SafeX509ExtPrint(bio, ext) && +- X509V3_EXT_print(bio.get(), ext, 0, 0) != 1) { +- USE(BIO_reset(bio.get())); +- return Null(env->isolate()); +- } +- +- return ToV8Value(env, bio); +-} +- + MaybeLocal<Value> GetIssuerString( + Environment* env, + const BIOPointer& bio, +@@ -917,11 +1177,11 @@ MaybeLocal<Object> X509ToObject(Environment* env, X509* cert) { + !Set<Value>(context, + info, + env->subjectaltname_string(), +- GetInfoString<NID_subject_alt_name>(env, bio, cert)) || ++ GetSubjectAltNameString(env, bio, cert)) || + !Set<Value>(context, + info, + env->infoaccess_string(), +- GetInfoString<NID_info_access>(env, bio, cert))) { ++ GetInfoAccessString(env, bio, cert))) { + return MaybeLocal<Object>(); + } + +diff --git a/test/common/index.js b/test/common/index.js +index 8cd9841527..98b586cafd 100644 +--- a/test/common/index.js ++++ b/test/common/index.js +@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@ const noop = () => {}; + const hasCrypto = Boolean(process.versions.openssl) && + !process.env.NODE_SKIP_CRYPTO; + ++const hasOpenSSL3 = hasCrypto && ++ require('crypto').constants.OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 805306368; ++ ++const hasQuic = hasCrypto && !!process.config.variables.openssl_quic; ++ + // Check for flags. Skip this for workers (both, the `cluster` module and + // `worker_threads`) and child processes. + // If the binary was built without-ssl then the crypto flags are +@@ -714,6 +719,8 @@ const common = { + getTTYfd, + hasIntl, + hasCrypto, ++ hasOpenSSL3, ++ hasQuic, + hasMultiLocalhost, + invalidArgTypeHelper, + isAIX, +diff --git a/test/fixtures/keys/Makefile b/test/fixtures/keys/Makefile +index 824704c724..49cc29ad1c 100644 +--- a/test/fixtures/keys/Makefile ++++ b/test/fixtures/keys/Makefile +@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ all: \ + ed448_public.pem \ + x448_private.pem \ + x448_public.pem \ ++ incorrect_san_correct_subject-cert.pem \ ++ incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem \ + + # + # Create Certificate Authority: ca1 +@@ -733,6 +735,18 @@ x448_private.pem: + x448_public.pem: x448_private.pem + openssl pkey -in x448_private.pem -pubout -out x448_public.pem + ++incorrect_san_correct_subject-cert.pem: incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem ++ openssl req -x509 \ ++ -key incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem \ ++ -out incorrect_san_correct_subject-cert.pem \ ++ -sha256 \ ++ -days 3650 \ ++ -subj "/CN=good.example.com" \ ++ -addext "subjectAltName = DNS:evil.example.com" ++ ++incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem: ++ openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem ++ + clean: + rm -f *.pfx *.pem *.srl ca2-database.txt ca2-serial fake-startcom-root-serial *.print *.old fake-startcom-root-issued-certs/*.pem + @> fake-startcom-root-database.txt +diff --git a/test/fixtures/keys/incorrect_san_correct_subject-cert.pem b/test/fixtures/keys/incorrect_san_correct_subject-cert.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..787d9f1135 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/keys/incorrect_san_correct_subject-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIBqDCCAU6gAwIBAgIUE3Kx4WUjkwuKy/fBOM+UJkb9aSAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw ++GzEZMBcGA1UEAwwQZ29vZC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTAeFw0yMTEyMTExNjUxNDVaFw0z ++MTEyMDkxNjUxNDVaMBsxGTAXBgNVBAMMEGdvb2QuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wWTATBgcq ++hkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAASQ/CKa5uMZuLYssnNOm7DPdw3I5Doa0Qpyf3cS ++7aGatfK3tuY8qG7nJ5OGtl1WOL/gN0vRRN0/KA/iRJyjafzzo3AwbjAdBgNVHQ4E ++FgQUFkpgPzE1ePjK5UsPcR0gk5uLsTUwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUFkpgPzE1ePjK5UsP ++cR0gk5uLsTUwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAbBgNVHREEFDASghBldmlsLmV4YW1w ++bGUuY29tMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIQCMZAinQXkOEhfp+moxVnLbcUPAAqsl ++1KCq3NRG91TGCgIgC4grmOhCRqJMF1RPNWobGogX/yNrYNjiGzNVyJzMR0s= ++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/keys/incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem b/test/fixtures/keys/incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..f7f51253a8 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/keys/incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- ++MHcCAQEEIOOVRgLS3H2T2fUhj4ASCFq60ySwO6yvSK6rvZHldAHuoAoGCCqGSM49 ++AwEHoUQDQgAEkPwimubjGbi2LLJzTpuwz3cNyOQ6GtEKcn93Eu2hmrXyt7bmPKhu ++5yeThrZdVji/4DdL0UTdPygP4kSco2n88w== ++-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/.gitignore b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/.gitignore +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..504afef81f +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/.gitignore +@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ ++node_modules/ ++package-lock.json +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-0-cert.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-0-cert.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..30e6fa6c3f +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-0-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIE5jCCAs6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv ++WiayictqCJWtmsbsSli4yG3P6Ddi/V3Se8W+/yB71Qh2c3wQNMPMukncps2odRGt ++qJe4EOpret1jgkFqQJy5geXVuPU5N7DvGXUVZzWN7TisFNAZMUhF2YlljJz1sjD1 ++aRjqayh3TDU8NwuFlLd6aH95hovjMBBatWFB9bN/itnMVoj9rmfSjvlpSRO6/EMN ++DnVXZ3paRJTcps6d/Ylb5Ald/Ow056JgD0Cd9jn16+vgYR4bxVl0a5Qbf24MIhaY ++BRPx6WFdepWr410GpzpVQ0sMluoKYzH8RynjwQc7pfm5ebTFWJkhU80jOqKJGFW3 ++icV/A9BmtOBqrb60Pv/MPXIQPg7UWGUOXm3AfY3v6gbToewSW5B0s+uPsh52md4Z ++UoyzTvwN2i/uPqJxi/9FkdV60OWvMMMeMslbDHIBbN0Z2SG0wY93oH2LhO0X89Tc ++nedukufld8QEW7iMn7D7la+TlrrSAXURHL84sEz97yyujawQEimnW03XAlUFk61M ++iLhVUOHANFBSLBvZ3VF7sZDv6ZzPkP/TWrFbpL7DQgqunAlSNHealrQ5T3wp8pUm ++R7J4QEuQSEN2cZMOpn0T+JyQaiytbaAABgqDNeTvbl2nFN2ksSix8NunAgMBAAGj ++NTAzMDEGA1UdEQQqMCiCJmdvb2QuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sIEROUzpldmlsLmV4YW1w ++bGUuY29tMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4ICAQAcsy+PIduM8NRrdqcTqufiajsAajQz ++eB5+5+lZLi9MliXqoS4HsdrDMDevMa2cC+wB+XZW9SJXjtqrwXAxTAHtEyhsCi25 ++XV0sJPWmZM+OQkGTtp7Ain12htr/t/DJ13YJpT03W6kYogA1kKJ5OMYMTcGT+7UB ++zM4G2LUSrrSisxhfz9bF8Q9s1piG2gb5ACEQUiMLRrZXl8WLlaY59lloKyMa/9g6 ++i3TgLxhp7XNS/bh/f2tDx+7ZgdtHUlkNhl1MycIVQRGK3BaZBEd+sDxS52kwym5I ++CWLXGLutU3OeaNgqyvZuMvy//2oER3PysizyjwNoFlUbIz3zMnXvBeEjeGtEHsCJ ++EBtX+xBWwMhUKE2QcMLxQaZNJCZFVFw8fDeEgFjTdEBcLsZ1PngT3jgXSHEWA+YL ++C3rQhFMjyjy2h8u1sjySFrTlbZPm8gC3q/+LaXxhf5i5xiZOOcVfeYiWFUa5gQal ++FaWj2SlQFaN2nidPaQO62vRIYn0Y/qbtUQAPkq4VVeycgxiuZaVVWCdct8UCYb9F ++b9QSMpK4r99MKy+s41RiJodDJy0XraOxy7hUDjyObL2fuuPUK6mQAFGwWtajv3qq ++vrRMvBEXdOPVmbETyzIosUHvOXT+v8WoCbC14mqMZTWVywRg7bD/NTHJDRIBrqvi ++O6Zqbod3EImVnQ== ++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-1-cert.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-1-cert.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..63883c2bbf +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-1-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIE0zCCArugAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv 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mode 100644 +index 0000000000..574ad1ca8f +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-13-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIEzzCCAregAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv ++WiayictqCJWtmsbsSli4yG3P6Ddi/V3Se8W+/yB71Qh2c3wQNMPMukncps2odRGt ++qJe4EOpret1jgkFqQJy5geXVuPU5N7DvGXUVZzWN7TisFNAZMUhF2YlljJz1sjD1 ++aRjqayh3TDU8NwuFlLd6aH95hovjMBBatWFB9bN/itnMVoj9rmfSjvlpSRO6/EMN ++DnVXZ3paRJTcps6d/Ylb5Ald/Ow056JgD0Cd9jn16+vgYR4bxVl0a5Qbf24MIhaY ++BRPx6WFdepWr410GpzpVQ0sMluoKYzH8RynjwQc7pfm5ebTFWJkhU80jOqKJGFW3 ++icV/A9BmtOBqrb60Pv/MPXIQPg7UWGUOXm3AfY3v6gbToewSW5B0s+uPsh52md4Z ++UoyzTvwN2i/uPqJxi/9FkdV60OWvMMMeMslbDHIBbN0Z2SG0wY93oH2LhO0X89Tc ++nedukufld8QEW7iMn7D7la+TlrrSAXURHL84sEz97yyujawQEimnW03XAlUFk61M 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a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-14-cert.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-14-cert.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..0265b5992c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-14-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIE5TCCAs2gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv ++WiayictqCJWtmsbsSli4yG3P6Ddi/V3Se8W+/yB71Qh2c3wQNMPMukncps2odRGt ++qJe4EOpret1jgkFqQJy5geXVuPU5N7DvGXUVZzWN7TisFNAZMUhF2YlljJz1sjD1 ++aRjqayh3TDU8NwuFlLd6aH95hovjMBBatWFB9bN/itnMVoj9rmfSjvlpSRO6/EMN ++DnVXZ3paRJTcps6d/Ylb5Ald/Ow056JgD0Cd9jn16+vgYR4bxVl0a5Qbf24MIhaY ++BRPx6WFdepWr410GpzpVQ0sMluoKYzH8RynjwQc7pfm5ebTFWJkhU80jOqKJGFW3 ++icV/A9BmtOBqrb60Pv/MPXIQPg7UWGUOXm3AfY3v6gbToewSW5B0s+uPsh52md4Z ++UoyzTvwN2i/uPqJxi/9FkdV60OWvMMMeMslbDHIBbN0Z2SG0wY93oH2LhO0X89Tc 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a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-27-cert.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-27-cert.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..268abdd300 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-27-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIE0TCCArmgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv ++WiayictqCJWtmsbsSli4yG3P6Ddi/V3Se8W+/yB71Qh2c3wQNMPMukncps2odRGt ++qJe4EOpret1jgkFqQJy5geXVuPU5N7DvGXUVZzWN7TisFNAZMUhF2YlljJz1sjD1 ++aRjqayh3TDU8NwuFlLd6aH95hovjMBBatWFB9bN/itnMVoj9rmfSjvlpSRO6/EMN ++DnVXZ3paRJTcps6d/Ylb5Ald/Ow056JgD0Cd9jn16+vgYR4bxVl0a5Qbf24MIhaY ++BRPx6WFdepWr410GpzpVQ0sMluoKYzH8RynjwQc7pfm5ebTFWJkhU80jOqKJGFW3 ++icV/A9BmtOBqrb60Pv/MPXIQPg7UWGUOXm3AfY3v6gbToewSW5B0s+uPsh52md4Z ++UoyzTvwN2i/uPqJxi/9FkdV60OWvMMMeMslbDHIBbN0Z2SG0wY93oH2LhO0X89Tc 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++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-28-cert.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-28-cert.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..147fba3aff +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-28-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIE1DCCArygAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv ++WiayictqCJWtmsbsSli4yG3P6Ddi/V3Se8W+/yB71Qh2c3wQNMPMukncps2odRGt ++qJe4EOpret1jgkFqQJy5geXVuPU5N7DvGXUVZzWN7TisFNAZMUhF2YlljJz1sjD1 ++aRjqayh3TDU8NwuFlLd6aH95hovjMBBatWFB9bN/itnMVoj9rmfSjvlpSRO6/EMN ++DnVXZ3paRJTcps6d/Ylb5Ald/Ow056JgD0Cd9jn16+vgYR4bxVl0a5Qbf24MIhaY ++BRPx6WFdepWr410GpzpVQ0sMluoKYzH8RynjwQc7pfm5ebTFWJkhU80jOqKJGFW3 ++icV/A9BmtOBqrb60Pv/MPXIQPg7UWGUOXm3AfY3v6gbToewSW5B0s+uPsh52md4Z 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++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-8-cert.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-8-cert.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..201b520f8b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-8-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIExDCCAqygAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv ++WiayictqCJWtmsbsSli4yG3P6Ddi/V3Se8W+/yB71Qh2c3wQNMPMukncps2odRGt ++qJe4EOpret1jgkFqQJy5geXVuPU5N7DvGXUVZzWN7TisFNAZMUhF2YlljJz1sjD1 ++aRjqayh3TDU8NwuFlLd6aH95hovjMBBatWFB9bN/itnMVoj9rmfSjvlpSRO6/EMN ++DnVXZ3paRJTcps6d/Ylb5Ald/Ow056JgD0Cd9jn16+vgYR4bxVl0a5Qbf24MIhaY ++BRPx6WFdepWr410GpzpVQ0sMluoKYzH8RynjwQc7pfm5ebTFWJkhU80jOqKJGFW3 ++icV/A9BmtOBqrb60Pv/MPXIQPg7UWGUOXm3AfY3v6gbToewSW5B0s+uPsh52md4Z ++UoyzTvwN2i/uPqJxi/9FkdV60OWvMMMeMslbDHIBbN0Z2SG0wY93oH2LhO0X89Tc ++nedukufld8QEW7iMn7D7la+TlrrSAXURHL84sEz97yyujawQEimnW03XAlUFk61M ++iLhVUOHANFBSLBvZ3VF7sZDv6ZzPkP/TWrFbpL7DQgqunAlSNHealrQ5T3wp8pUm ++R7J4QEuQSEN2cZMOpn0T+JyQaiytbaAABgqDNeTvbl2nFN2ksSix8NunAgMBAAGj ++EzARMA8GA1UdEQQIMAaHBAgICAgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggIBAHfvavrzBLuS ++MMJwNkJGVt1W856zeZ6NZJ5vx2ZXziYxAkzw9N0pLHwgfzS8pXEPSZ6vMoeYMaH0 ++zr/S5tHSMGEwOp/dIoxE4Hm1uMzugHFxNp34hvqsaDbwKMpQQzEPhN1QvAkD9IXL ++H2wOLqm+ZaTkT3OvOyJoml56wyUJ0nU746RuXgJHTFiWsUTPqT9bvofedC80MUyH ++MX2lA1oy8nzJa9h7JqsxOE4uccRhpCRf+PxeYvOdsUxyDWw8+rjwe4Ulr0yVjwnD ++x9ha/fTl96mYXyJGLtQvZmkllrctxcs0o82+wMZWBw4iPH/VnI7dj36b2uIHdrrf ++cVurEPcVE03zLwukjQPZh9otleTwmQI1wqg/Gm2OahXy/0f0fpBDQnPycczn8nFw ++nj6avmHubWVvzmEoKmOtavGEAbUn7ntQfsvM5JpiM+ck3MDMP9i9cMZvWKH8Eial ++ZnYcXkgAatWwp4Cbsv4H7LMNisKjrcY+r+MpaYYIpTRNp/s/P5bMCIVt07yosePg ++m9VWy03+hQJmD4/THeJsjuczPSBtsoJiKoTJ5TndmpFaG6J6lBVvpXJhoiW/QIgX ++u2QIb8Z6bRK/eQ8UVYm0/ZQLN+OOzYiQfm0AFbFpYhl46o6QNZ03P6GRLshv+N3E ++CX66ucPLd4QJitUy39LZjMlC0YxTZUry ++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-9-cert.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-9-cert.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..660e65b8ed +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/alt-9-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIExDCCAqygAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv ++WiayictqCJWtmsbsSli4yG3P6Ddi/V3Se8W+/yB71Qh2c3wQNMPMukncps2odRGt ++qJe4EOpret1jgkFqQJy5geXVuPU5N7DvGXUVZzWN7TisFNAZMUhF2YlljJz1sjD1 ++aRjqayh3TDU8NwuFlLd6aH95hovjMBBatWFB9bN/itnMVoj9rmfSjvlpSRO6/EMN ++DnVXZ3paRJTcps6d/Ylb5Ald/Ow056JgD0Cd9jn16+vgYR4bxVl0a5Qbf24MIhaY ++BRPx6WFdepWr410GpzpVQ0sMluoKYzH8RynjwQc7pfm5ebTFWJkhU80jOqKJGFW3 ++icV/A9BmtOBqrb60Pv/MPXIQPg7UWGUOXm3AfY3v6gbToewSW5B0s+uPsh52md4Z ++UoyzTvwN2i/uPqJxi/9FkdV60OWvMMMeMslbDHIBbN0Z2SG0wY93oH2LhO0X89Tc ++nedukufld8QEW7iMn7D7la+TlrrSAXURHL84sEz97yyujawQEimnW03XAlUFk61M ++iLhVUOHANFBSLBvZ3VF7sZDv6ZzPkP/TWrFbpL7DQgqunAlSNHealrQ5T3wp8pUm ++R7J4QEuQSEN2cZMOpn0T+JyQaiytbaAABgqDNeTvbl2nFN2ksSix8NunAgMBAAGj ++EzARMA8GA1UdEQQIMAaHBAgIBAQwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggIBAIefUJjnOtt8 ++viFkr3lupabUMwSgtBXVCp+M9xhKqcSnYReSgg/LcqVDaXmU4s23n0Bc0M51HQMG ++puTpfr34ZUSQiLup9huELm5L+lcpYANJsKrBo+vz1w+fkPlcxXvXHpLzgb393XSJ ++/Prn7lNBrrh9b74azUEhz1KPmFbbMs7IwlhE1+stQ107VeSGvKlAOmaYdnVG1PXl ++AG7KJynpE5Ex8XF1ONQLneTdvo8gXZueb07SY+my5wrCQhSlh4/6Y2MnE9h+9ugx ++BfdU72okDaYRH1MAfFeAsUE7Y52cQqm26b7nBz0+IeP+uk7oqDLF+PGHfjeUGXGW ++aGFfaLk8Dl2gMg1DsRE8zcT215Dl4rqOtwbhW8kX7XzYE0sA7cnyZ0daLrrtxwe6 ++MhrAOjYklRZpwUvy6E2IyipKwWSuKHLUk3mVxPrxVqvye2enZWW1PJeHNdL//Ogx ++5Mm++BOTNR+61pg/UrATlO3GMK6ggAfkP8H1r3jp24hc/TkXRkoUuWZqtjC5+qwB ++KVIPlr+/0zIhzDjNbN0TMgqv/Yz4/wCUjsmCPJu21C3+BP2O5ZD2e4hYe/X9kuhC ++YGWTf8dpq0LgYgVHqwXo0gCU/Ich9KtaJmCgZRUrzMl1aIYhqpuR2EW8H1bs3a0P ++/7wXhGudHCwm6j2H5/tbsREeYInl3mv4 ++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/create-certs.js b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/create-certs.js +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..b84547e1d0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/create-certs.js +@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@ ++'use strict'; ++ ++const asn1 = require('asn1.js'); ++const crypto = require('crypto'); ++const { writeFileSync } = require('fs'); ++const rfc5280 = require('asn1.js-rfc5280'); ++const BN = asn1.bignum; ++ ++const oid = { ++ commonName: [2, 5, 4, 3], ++ countryName: [2, 5, 4, 6], ++ localityName: [2, 5, 4, 7], ++ rsaEncryption: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1], ++ sha256WithRSAEncryption: [1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11], ++ xmppAddr: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 5], ++ srvName: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 8, 7], ++ ocsp: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1], ++ caIssuers: [1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 2], ++ privateUnrecognized: [1, 3, 9999, 12, 34] ++}; ++ ++const digest = 'SHA256'; ++ ++const { privateKey, publicKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { ++ modulusLength: 4096, ++ publicKeyEncoding: { ++ type: 'pkcs1', ++ format: 'der' ++ } ++}); ++ ++writeFileSync('server-key.pem', privateKey.export({ ++ type: 'pkcs8', ++ format: 'pem' ++})); ++ ++const now = Date.now(); ++const days = 3650; ++ ++function utilType(name, fn) { ++ return asn1.define(name, function() { ++ this[fn](); ++ }); ++} ++ ++const Null_ = utilType('Null_', 'null_'); ++const null_ = Null_.encode('der'); ++ ++const IA5String = utilType('IA5String', 'ia5str'); ++const PrintableString = utilType('PrintableString', 'printstr'); ++const UTF8String = utilType('UTF8String', 'utf8str'); ++ ++const subjectCommonName = PrintableString.encode('evil.example.com', 'der'); ++ ++const sans = [ ++ { type: 'dNSName', value: 'good.example.com, DNS:evil.example.com' }, ++ { type: 'uniformResourceIdentifier', value: 'http://example.com/' }, ++ { type: 'uniformResourceIdentifier', value: 'http://example.com/?a=b&c=d' }, ++ { type: 'uniformResourceIdentifier', value: 'http://example.com/a,b' }, ++ { type: 'uniformResourceIdentifier', value: 'http://example.com/a%2Cb' }, ++ { ++ type: 'uniformResourceIdentifier', ++ value: 'http://example.com/a, DNS:good.example.com' ++ }, ++ { type: 'dNSName', value: Buffer.from('exämple.com', 'latin1') }, ++ { type: 'dNSName', value: '"evil.example.com"' }, ++ { type: 'iPAddress', value: Buffer.from('08080808', 'hex') }, ++ { type: 'iPAddress', value: Buffer.from('08080404', 'hex') }, ++ { type: 'iPAddress', value: Buffer.from('0008080404', 'hex') }, ++ { type: 'iPAddress', value: Buffer.from('000102030405', 'hex') }, ++ { ++ type: 'iPAddress', ++ value: Buffer.from('0a0b0c0d0e0f0000000000007a7b7c7d', 'hex') ++ }, ++ { type: 'rfc822Name', value: 'foo@example.com' }, ++ { type: 'rfc822Name', value: 'foo@example.com, DNS:good.example.com' }, ++ { ++ type: 'directoryName', ++ value: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.countryName, ++ value: PrintableString.encode('DE', 'der') ++ } ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.localityName, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('Hannover', 'der') ++ } ++ ] ++ ] ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'directoryName', ++ value: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.countryName, ++ value: PrintableString.encode('DE', 'der') ++ } ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.localityName, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('München', 'der') ++ } ++ ] ++ ] ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'directoryName', ++ value: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.countryName, ++ value: PrintableString.encode('DE', 'der') ++ } ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.localityName, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('Berlin, DNS:good.example.com', 'der') ++ } ++ ] ++ ] ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'directoryName', ++ value: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.countryName, ++ value: PrintableString.encode('DE', 'der') ++ } ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.localityName, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('Berlin, DNS:good.example.com\0evil.example.com', 'der') ++ } ++ ] ++ ] ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'directoryName', ++ value: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.countryName, ++ value: PrintableString.encode('DE', 'der') ++ } ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.localityName, ++ value: UTF8String.encode( ++ 'Berlin, DNS:good.example.com\\\0evil.example.com', 'der') ++ } ++ ] ++ ] ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'directoryName', ++ value: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.countryName, ++ value: PrintableString.encode('DE', 'der') ++ } ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.localityName, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('Berlin\r\n', 'der') ++ } ++ ] ++ ] ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'directoryName', ++ value: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.countryName, ++ value: PrintableString.encode('DE', 'der') ++ } ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ type: oid.localityName, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('Berlin/CN=good.example.com', 'der') ++ } ++ ] ++ ] ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'registeredID', ++ value: oid.sha256WithRSAEncryption ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'registeredID', ++ value: oid.privateUnrecognized ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.xmppAddr, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('abc123', 'der') ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.xmppAddr, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('abc123, DNS:good.example.com', 'der') ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.xmppAddr, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('good.example.com\0abc123', 'der') ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.privateUnrecognized, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('abc123', 'der') ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.srvName, ++ value: IA5String.encode('abc123', 'der') ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.srvName, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('abc123', 'der') ++ } ++ }, ++ { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.srvName, ++ value: IA5String.encode('abc\0def', 'der') ++ } ++ } ++]; ++ ++for (let i = 0; i < sans.length; i++) { ++ const san = sans[i]; ++ ++ const tbs = { ++ version: 'v3', ++ serialNumber: new BN('01', 16), ++ signature: { ++ algorithm: oid.sha256WithRSAEncryption, ++ parameters: null_ ++ }, ++ issuer: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { type: oid.commonName, value: subjectCommonName } ++ ] ++ ] ++ }, ++ validity: { ++ notBefore: { type: 'utcTime', value: now }, ++ notAfter: { type: 'utcTime', value: now + days * 86400000 } ++ }, ++ subject: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { type: oid.commonName, value: subjectCommonName } ++ ] ++ ] ++ }, ++ subjectPublicKeyInfo: { ++ algorithm: { ++ algorithm: oid.rsaEncryption, ++ parameters: null_ ++ }, ++ subjectPublicKey: { ++ unused: 0, ++ data: publicKey ++ } ++ }, ++ extensions: [ ++ { ++ extnID: 'subjectAlternativeName', ++ critical: false, ++ extnValue: [san] ++ } ++ ] ++ }; ++ ++ // Self-sign the certificate. ++ const tbsDer = rfc5280.TBSCertificate.encode(tbs, 'der'); ++ const signature = crypto.createSign(digest).update(tbsDer).sign(privateKey); ++ ++ // Construct the signed certificate. ++ const cert = { ++ tbsCertificate: tbs, ++ signatureAlgorithm: { ++ algorithm: oid.sha256WithRSAEncryption, ++ parameters: null_ ++ }, ++ signature: { ++ unused: 0, ++ data: signature ++ } ++ }; ++ ++ // Store the signed certificate. ++ const pem = rfc5280.Certificate.encode(cert, 'pem', { ++ label: 'CERTIFICATE' ++ }); ++ writeFileSync(`./alt-${i}-cert.pem`, `${pem}\n`); ++} ++ ++const infoAccessExtensions = [ ++ [ ++ { ++ accessMethod: oid.ocsp, ++ accessLocation: { ++ type: 'uniformResourceIdentifier', ++ value: 'http://good.example.com/\nOCSP - URI:http://evil.example.com/', ++ }, ++ }, ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ accessMethod: oid.caIssuers, ++ accessLocation: { ++ type: 'uniformResourceIdentifier', ++ value: 'http://ca.example.com/\nOCSP - URI:http://evil.example.com', ++ }, ++ }, ++ { ++ accessMethod: oid.ocsp, ++ accessLocation: { ++ type: 'dNSName', ++ value: 'good.example.com\nOCSP - URI:http://ca.nodejs.org/ca.cert', ++ }, ++ }, ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ accessMethod: oid.privateUnrecognized, ++ accessLocation: { ++ type: 'uniformResourceIdentifier', ++ value: 'http://ca.example.com/', ++ }, ++ }, ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ accessMethod: oid.ocsp, ++ accessLocation: { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.xmppAddr, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('good.example.com', 'der'), ++ }, ++ }, ++ }, ++ { ++ accessMethod: oid.ocsp, ++ accessLocation: { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.privateUnrecognized, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('abc123', 'der') ++ }, ++ }, ++ }, ++ { ++ accessMethod: oid.ocsp, ++ accessLocation: { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.srvName, ++ value: IA5String.encode('abc123', 'der') ++ } ++ } ++ }, ++ ], ++ [ ++ { ++ accessMethod: oid.ocsp, ++ accessLocation: { ++ type: 'otherName', ++ value: { ++ 'type-id': oid.xmppAddr, ++ value: UTF8String.encode('good.example.com\0abc123', 'der'), ++ }, ++ }, ++ }, ++ ], ++]; ++ ++for (let i = 0; i < infoAccessExtensions.length; i++) { ++ const infoAccess = infoAccessExtensions[i]; ++ ++ const tbs = { ++ version: 'v3', ++ serialNumber: new BN('01', 16), ++ signature: { ++ algorithm: oid.sha256WithRSAEncryption, ++ parameters: null_ ++ }, ++ issuer: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { type: oid.commonName, value: subjectCommonName } ++ ] ++ ] ++ }, ++ validity: { ++ notBefore: { type: 'utcTime', value: now }, ++ notAfter: { type: 'utcTime', value: now + days * 86400000 } ++ }, ++ subject: { ++ type: 'rdnSequence', ++ value: [ ++ [ ++ { type: oid.commonName, value: subjectCommonName } ++ ] ++ ] ++ }, ++ subjectPublicKeyInfo: { ++ algorithm: { ++ algorithm: oid.rsaEncryption, ++ parameters: null_ ++ }, ++ subjectPublicKey: { ++ unused: 0, ++ data: publicKey ++ } ++ }, ++ extensions: [ ++ { ++ extnID: 'authorityInformationAccess', ++ critical: false, ++ extnValue: infoAccess ++ } ++ ] ++ }; ++ ++ // Self-sign the certificate. ++ const tbsDer = rfc5280.TBSCertificate.encode(tbs, 'der'); ++ const signature = crypto.createSign(digest).update(tbsDer).sign(privateKey); ++ ++ // Construct the signed certificate. ++ const cert = { ++ tbsCertificate: tbs, ++ signatureAlgorithm: { ++ algorithm: oid.sha256WithRSAEncryption, ++ parameters: null_ ++ }, ++ signature: { ++ unused: 0, ++ data: signature ++ } ++ }; ++ ++ // Store the signed certificate. ++ const pem = rfc5280.Certificate.encode(cert, 'pem', { ++ label: 'CERTIFICATE' ++ }); ++ writeFileSync(`./info-${i}-cert.pem`, `${pem}\n`); ++} +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/intermediate.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/intermediate.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..9d2aeb32c4 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/intermediate.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIBjjCCATSgAwIBAgIBAjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRSb290MCAX ++DTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIwOTkwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAXMRUwEwYDVQQDEwxJbnRl ++cm1lZGlhdGUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR7DaOQvpvA47q2XxjM ++qxJVf/FvZm2ftiFRXNJMe/fhSlDh2CybdkFIw2mE5g4ShW5UBJe+sohqy5V9WRkY ++tM/Bo3cwdTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MB0GA1UdDgQWBBQlGcYbYohaK3S+XGeq ++CTi4LLHeLTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQlGcYbYohaK3S+XGeqCTi4LLHeLTAiBgNVHR4B ++Af8EGDAWoBQwEoIQYXR0YWNrZXIuZXhhbXBsZTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiEA ++uZhmF3buUdhzHjXLZQSOyT41DqUUX/VKBEraDu+gj+wCIG/R1arbHFRFnEuoVgZI ++bihwUpUZjIZ5YwJcBu6yuXlZ ++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/key.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/key.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..102a9d8816 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/key.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- ++MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgaNbpDxJET5xVHxd/ ++ig5x2u2KUIe0jaCVWqarpIN/582hRANCAAR7DaOQvpvA47q2XxjMqxJVf/FvZm2f ++tiFRXNJMe/fhSlDh2CybdkFIw2mE5g4ShW5UBJe+sohqy5V9WRkYtM/B ++-----END PRIVATE KEY----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf0.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf0.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..ce19dc9699 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf0.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIBajCCARCgAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAXMRUwEwYDVQQDEwxJbnRlcm1l ++ZGlhdGUwIBcNMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjA5OTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMA8xDTALBgNV ++BAMTBExlYWYwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR7DaOQvpvA47q2XxjM ++qxJVf/FvZm2ftiFRXNJMe/fhSlDh2CybdkFIw2mE5g4ShW5UBJe+sohqy5V9WRkY ++tM/Bo1MwUTAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCUZxhtiiFordL5cZ6oJ ++OLgssd4tMCAGA1UdEQQZMBeCFWJsYWguYXR0YWNrZXIuZXhhbXBsZTAKBggqhkjO ++PQQDAgNIADBFAiEA4NgHDxVrBjNW+So4MrRZMwDknvjRaBsB4j2IwVRKl4sCIDpg ++Bhm4ZdHwlUYrALkXa3dFBy8kXBkVumY7UJpbB2mO ++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf1.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf1.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..0b45056656 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf1.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIBdTCCARygAwIBAgIBBDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAXMRUwEwYDVQQDEwxJbnRlcm1l ++ZGlhdGUwIBcNMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjA5OTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMA8xDTALBgNV ++BAMTBExlYWYwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR7DaOQvpvA47q2XxjM ++qxJVf/FvZm2ftiFRXNJMe/fhSlDh2CybdkFIw2mE5g4ShW5UBJe+sohqy5V9WRkY ++tM/Bo18wXTAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCUZxhtiiFordL5cZ6oJ ++OLgssd4tMCwGA1UdEQQlMCOCCm5vZGVqcy5vcmeCFWJsYWguYXR0YWNrZXIuZXhh ++bXBsZTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiAOFFOCfA6c/iZWxbDn5QMjNdtZbtJPBcRv ++uEgSqWrGTAIgK5RK0xGK8UZb2aM2VjGNTYozlcwKaLgQukA+UnKrrJg= ++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/google/leaf2.pem 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b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-2-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIE5DCCAsygAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv ++WiayictqCJWtmsbsSli4yG3P6Ddi/V3Se8W+/yB71Qh2c3wQNMPMukncps2odRGt ++qJe4EOpret1jgkFqQJy5geXVuPU5N7DvGXUVZzWN7TisFNAZMUhF2YlljJz1sjD1 ++aRjqayh3TDU8NwuFlLd6aH95hovjMBBatWFB9bN/itnMVoj9rmfSjvlpSRO6/EMN ++DnVXZ3paRJTcps6d/Ylb5Ald/Ow056JgD0Cd9jn16+vgYR4bxVl0a5Qbf24MIhaY ++BRPx6WFdepWr410GpzpVQ0sMluoKYzH8RynjwQc7pfm5ebTFWJkhU80jOqKJGFW3 ++icV/A9BmtOBqrb60Pv/MPXIQPg7UWGUOXm3AfY3v6gbToewSW5B0s+uPsh52md4Z ++UoyzTvwN2i/uPqJxi/9FkdV60OWvMMMeMslbDHIBbN0Z2SG0wY93oH2LhO0X89Tc ++nedukufld8QEW7iMn7D7la+TlrrSAXURHL84sEz97yyujawQEimnW03XAlUFk61M ++iLhVUOHANFBSLBvZ3VF7sZDv6ZzPkP/TWrFbpL7DQgqunAlSNHealrQ5T3wp8pUm ++R7J4QEuQSEN2cZMOpn0T+JyQaiytbaAABgqDNeTvbl2nFN2ksSix8NunAgMBAAGj ++MzAxMC8GCCsGAQUFBwEBBCMwITAfBgUrzg8MIoYWaHR0cDovL2NhLmV4YW1wbGUu ++Y29tLzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAgEABR5VyTZEQ0AQvdqlk+IDQT85qyf891eN ++BREiSg5KCei9Kmubv3ZJGoNVwZgybr5sCi5GqWOtG7S0GXvzS6c2Qy+cW0R4DDYs ++s6IIUn+ex1XygGrRHTDHu6tEUwSJMmOMKBh+iLjhtamD+YHjgOLG3MfadO5/9mvp ++r412MPhU1VvQ3FC3dZmBUW2gIKNEU4mzwISgPkLJXmBsnxu8F9YqHPgppqsfJ9AF ++KIc2nX7N3s8w9fCc03FrihdkE2C802jy71px5aPqa1xrIT/YBq/1fKTcYRAWF/pd ++iy2G1v0pz0kYu2/yPIC/xlFcUgeFqR/biwxAD9T9rp7rq+dpIJA5BUCpXVULqhY1 ++SVZ22WKS0NR5rbu4BPDMShTOiwaDSwFQtI0OxM0g5zVFVjFOc6YbFu7ZyfLQ582S ++vgVU5/vaHANnEsCSUegXyLofqxTMPbM1rqibFmv2A4pm1Mp18ZFmqwh8cm6C0f7F ++qjdzBuSkcktTCq/dLX5yTm9aocyzye9cfNBjiGUregJEF7sD3nzsokEGj+S320w2 ++5yUl95xgrHr+5bdDUEox+trTeBnddC4VxrieeH+Wv45try0Go48yK7b1Aqfu9G4B ++B/as+upQ+YjMG8mAe6JJ9JibpTvTmatYAsssEKT1vDZ5trqo4C5/utfbuyaf7qtx ++O+jFfYToPtE= ++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-3-cert.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-3-cert.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..1825949bd3 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-3-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIFMDCCAxigAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv ++WiayictqCJWtmsbsSli4yG3P6Ddi/V3Se8W+/yB71Qh2c3wQNMPMukncps2odRGt ++qJe4EOpret1jgkFqQJy5geXVuPU5N7DvGXUVZzWN7TisFNAZMUhF2YlljJz1sjD1 ++aRjqayh3TDU8NwuFlLd6aH95hovjMBBatWFB9bN/itnMVoj9rmfSjvlpSRO6/EMN ++DnVXZ3paRJTcps6d/Ylb5Ald/Ow056JgD0Cd9jn16+vgYR4bxVl0a5Qbf24MIhaY ++BRPx6WFdepWr410GpzpVQ0sMluoKYzH8RynjwQc7pfm5ebTFWJkhU80jOqKJGFW3 ++icV/A9BmtOBqrb60Pv/MPXIQPg7UWGUOXm3AfY3v6gbToewSW5B0s+uPsh52md4Z ++UoyzTvwN2i/uPqJxi/9FkdV60OWvMMMeMslbDHIBbN0Z2SG0wY93oH2LhO0X89Tc ++nedukufld8QEW7iMn7D7la+TlrrSAXURHL84sEz97yyujawQEimnW03XAlUFk61M ++iLhVUOHANFBSLBvZ3VF7sZDv6ZzPkP/TWrFbpL7DQgqunAlSNHealrQ5T3wp8pUm ++R7J4QEuQSEN2cZMOpn0T+JyQaiytbaAABgqDNeTvbl2nFN2ksSix8NunAgMBAAGj ++fzB9MHsGCCsGAQUFBwEBBG8wbTAqBggrBgEFBQcwAaAeBggrBgEFBQcIBaASDBBn ++b29kLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB0GCCsGAQUFBzABoBEGBSvODwwioAgMBmFiYzEyMzAg ++BggrBgEFBQcwAaAUBggrBgEFBQcIB6AIFgZhYmMxMjMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAD ++ggIBACR9nH4pRlcSIIF9DEExlJvLtkeFWHGIAYLBuauHmdzPdbq9Py9M5DOcc7yd ++OQYVYwW26hASb+3CYzhRQaWKOR+T/OwP+QMUl5Y6nc3HzLdYTSen2LLAYHySXK3G ++gTdOhmVQwdh+IzhpjLXC67/9gn/F1p73Ixv/0PBZzmC64DOp1ogso9RICu0xTAbo ++h8mdN4/Tbh9Ikd89lb91x1Xf86NyC7ZvSA9dUO07/3B6B0kkqCdP9Ytlsrt2wbt3 ++2TVPp+ghjbPjdLrJUi3fbdC2CgjV2oLiYr1h7qn7SmYPNgOpDPKBI4Cei7UO+Wow ++yLCxBO0HgLZKcZorJFofekPjqtQYYj1sw3OEIcifMAmoHT7H57onfoQbRDpt57k2 ++rHJKgzrRuT8Qbl3OHSkiWRE3u0S9kAg7QEq27e2fuvh23p+YHEiYIjAR9XLVh7/Q ++EG5QDfDq3MvtgD/khAd36il61T5h8F4u3MhONFMuwJ/TYtGR6QINrv4DqLBM1pRr ++LMApQYi0w/MCRj2wLeAro9NflE+PFDk+l44ojvnEUYAGUyIzWp80bjQrV7Up6sgQ ++HehcmxxTrOmiqrfw08c1aHhmGeplmPpQEET1wIjnyj49sfdSPYxg5Lh+f/l79fLb ++jFemE8otKfog84vNGbPFl/AHwxjKCeCA/MaNJz3y3RYVsZn6 ++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-4-cert.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-4-cert.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..8f1e69afec +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/info-4-cert.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ ++-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIE9jCCAt6gAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAbMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmls ++LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMB4XDTIxMTIyMDE0NTczNVoXDTMxMTIxODE0NTczNVowGzEZ ++MBcGA1UEAxMQZXZpbC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIP ++ADCCAgoCggIBALERZ3TS70T1P+SjpZwIqOFnu2Od9XKWcDszQQc7C92K+APjp4Bv ++WiayictqCJWtmsbsSli4yG3P6Ddi/V3Se8W+/yB71Qh2c3wQNMPMukncps2odRGt ++qJe4EOpret1jgkFqQJy5geXVuPU5N7DvGXUVZzWN7TisFNAZMUhF2YlljJz1sjD1 ++aRjqayh3TDU8NwuFlLd6aH95hovjMBBatWFB9bN/itnMVoj9rmfSjvlpSRO6/EMN ++DnVXZ3paRJTcps6d/Ylb5Ald/Ow056JgD0Cd9jn16+vgYR4bxVl0a5Qbf24MIhaY ++BRPx6WFdepWr410GpzpVQ0sMluoKYzH8RynjwQc7pfm5ebTFWJkhU80jOqKJGFW3 ++icV/A9BmtOBqrb60Pv/MPXIQPg7UWGUOXm3AfY3v6gbToewSW5B0s+uPsh52md4Z ++UoyzTvwN2i/uPqJxi/9FkdV60OWvMMMeMslbDHIBbN0Z2SG0wY93oH2LhO0X89Tc ++nedukufld8QEW7iMn7D7la+TlrrSAXURHL84sEz97yyujawQEimnW03XAlUFk61M ++iLhVUOHANFBSLBvZ3VF7sZDv6ZzPkP/TWrFbpL7DQgqunAlSNHealrQ5T3wp8pUm ++R7J4QEuQSEN2cZMOpn0T+JyQaiytbaAABgqDNeTvbl2nFN2ksSix8NunAgMBAAGj ++RTBDMEEGCCsGAQUFBwEBBDUwMzAxBggrBgEFBQcwAaAlBggrBgEFBQcIBaAZDBdn ++b29kLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAGFiYzEyMzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAgEAQERLvjQB ++E2fmTVgHbr4MVXPfse9Xxk9TK8/IhxDNnql4bor3xat5oP+tDHVRi2StajfIcJlX ++C9blYOWg4w6QH3pmD6M7eQGOw7ntOUid4R2vhX3XiK3QB1h8lWSPFmSwBHA47mMJ ++IkrKNIo9+M9b7M05YwbAENi3TPgT8h2Ej9V4DUjLIEhDcu8fSh3FkNpZ2HohZ2I3 ++QPe23FB052jX7uPfeZ9gcjL/iGxuTuPbKWxzZ/Gy2RmS8xfLkJESvvQ8a0H4f7Ij ++yjn7qYUkY6FoHxyg5BU34YNaJCmfgzRIE53Kv2FMPwj2JaXmIguR+mSDAbc0xjw3 ++G3dRoCqhZugn8C6I5FhuXHdu6zSuuHtwOGEf07y5Im2sBsPVoq+Txh/mv3Zy9Ydy ++0yCDuq87jKSZd7FKorHOEoQY94UMs33PYjS4h/hYWiysYUeR0mlbjr4gyv1KH6K8 ++JERGpI/OE+vzfOtgj/Z46/+wn7jF0LBCin7Jn5Zw1a1TNsiHKAjqW/P4vJxxUW++ ++FtYwJhI7XJehwNNFra9rSC5M4TkpaqAZnbPvWZWxWVJIEYFgNjnt+b/VOpRpv5bJ ++7BOlVvP+56KF+vlmCnzVBmlHcr45sZUZ3mw3Sb6dcF0V0VaNQKw/F5EteQyafIIl ++dvCwwV4OwLwPliPAvwYfVEI41Dv3mF4fN7k= ++-----END CERTIFICATE----- +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/package.json b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/package.json +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..37d9f2a938 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/package.json +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++{ ++ "name": "x509-escaping", ++ "version": "1.0.0", ++ "description": "create certificates for x509-escaping test", ++ "main": "createCert.js", ++ "license": "SEE LICENSE IN ../../../LICENSE", ++ "private": true, ++ "dependencies": { ++ "asn1.js": "^5.4.1", ++ "asn1.js-rfc5280": "^3.0.0" ++ } ++} +diff --git a/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/server-key.pem b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/server-key.pem +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..db1d2652d0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/fixtures/x509-escaping/server-key.pem +@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ ++-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- ++MIIJQwIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCCS0wggkpAgEAAoICAQCxEWd00u9E9T/k ++o6WcCKjhZ7tjnfVylnA7M0EHOwvdivgD46eAb1omsonLagiVrZrG7EpYuMhtz+g3 ++Yv1d0nvFvv8ge9UIdnN8EDTDzLpJ3KbNqHURraiXuBDqa3rdY4JBakCcuYHl1bj1 ++OTew7xl1FWc1je04rBTQGTFIRdmJZYyc9bIw9WkY6msod0w1PDcLhZS3emh/eYaL ++4zAQWrVhQfWzf4rZzFaI/a5n0o75aUkTuvxDDQ51V2d6WkSU3KbOnf2JW+QJXfzs ++NOeiYA9AnfY59evr4GEeG8VZdGuUG39uDCIWmAUT8elhXXqVq+NdBqc6VUNLDJbq ++CmMx/Ecp48EHO6X5uXm0xViZIVPNIzqiiRhVt4nFfwPQZrTgaq2+tD7/zD1yED4O ++1FhlDl5twH2N7+oG06HsEluQdLPrj7IedpneGVKMs078Ddov7j6icYv/RZHVetDl ++rzDDHjLJWwxyAWzdGdkhtMGPd6B9i4TtF/PU3J3nbpLn5XfEBFu4jJ+w+5Wvk5a6 ++0gF1ERy/OLBM/e8sro2sEBIpp1tN1wJVBZOtTIi4VVDhwDRQUiwb2d1Re7GQ7+mc ++z5D/01qxW6S+w0IKrpwJUjR3mpa0OU98KfKVJkeyeEBLkEhDdnGTDqZ9E/ickGos ++rW2gAAYKgzXk725dpxTdpLEosfDbpwIDAQABAoICAAwUElkTPHQZQKsBiL38jzyU ++/WDduQ0AexZmuCRcoEIUBTgKsvXdYqpqGmEwUfaX2YuBOc8Uh8OJ357Ll1nrjjre ++fPvDxrPllJodZuQGVpzMOuqjd5zlmi8DRNAg1cg9TfjVXSPzuYsqiYvcw9JDdRqa ++A6jRDiIEBwVs+oIiFaU8MpvQXL/fNbSX5QhlHuMwwNZ93beoV3F+ojFvpWswLNg+ ++DhsY86lIuYxttZRqdgtIZc49PpD6VoalmC7t8mivJofImi9g/8ytxx97umNGpzOy ++ssWgY1/7NdS+czdXbDE1sPsaQ8cDxrDmGxPjswV7rK4/Um/1ufnoGXFMlRinS1lQ ++nns4VAFefVUCk81LRyFb+X97NXPGC1p4zNlC1ZoihMgWKJBzH0uk5K/hURS/wDNZ ++epm9ssnEQrFGJhEI+635srfn9SVRZ8xNh+oCguo5NaZm/BezC6iBQeoaBmVL2lY8 ++KLztN/JQd6MMZi3CWhTn0ZAtVNMxGjU9/yrdWIkX9EV8Sw68fqLGoKQXI67AOynQ ++5AnUyEjhVu7M39gYL71l7BVpuG7qaX8l4brzBcgzFldvuhuNCx0SW4gU2/Nx4OwY ++BLOX1LOrpD+5M9YwcbtSxcxz97nP8efb3hUK3QD2iuZ9Fa6zKWsoreMb7Jku38i7 ++e41lupAIkxxuxGBe1YrZAoIBAQDVF7Kru6tsaWtvJw5cbZpKxcuUHHQ0X3XRgA+H ++uWfT8EbxmDpgcG8polqiYuXPFWcrElmtWeBCYXazGZocHRV8y+ri/9c2rMTH6Bni ++TcYfsc4E8WY6adxfUqajgQ2zShdZbxZtBvSP50HheZ0a+L2qn2MWDUN/mbwYEmom ++SonVx3MSJWm/Vrh5i4b/L/+9u7uumIjWYFK6pKdLerTfbXO7ZsNR9KDIOBLDnUcf +++6K2vcclZN7aga1S7wTsrX+k9C/OQuj8ONMWQHCxryp5RAmgtArTBrJZq8el1lcG ++518Vo4QuOqsqTdAhqiImoPKe4NNCs1iTS9BdCqNYiF8sbmeJAoIBAQDUuL5ebQ68 ++6vqTKYD47ZtCzeqziN3Y/0a1BsyZh0/snNmK5WIr4T0vX0Y/XG0EpkZdpW3odMBv ++CemKs6Zm+pfOUGu20PTJcdSOXRbFiVYSeQnfa0l3iXZvY9Ottz/IU/mWPuU3hc18 ++hOZD9tKiwYDzZREg6L4XRizfT70UkD2eTz4lGBjR092TTj8WqSaI9GF6d9B6Aw9Y ++OCZdTqV7hPe0Rnvd1XiGsk68HN2Np47HHwwPsKMCYj8YNKmsUF8QSXmCkijlDeJW ++bC6TjAHlvnN6n1LjaLwULUs9Rb2fkNUOqsgR+T8YlqbclJbzC7gW53M/68c9eOQ1 ++Y01JnzsB3S2vAoIBAQDT8DP2djtzIg6GiNPRvfj9cWifMQWqqV8nNTU9Cnxn4MzO ++sVcuX+VQBXgblj13D5SC1Ed5ELDplMJYM5iBabPbYX2GtGq6qG83XHOSD0SEdXWw ++mN/SLUPPUwcGC+8yaPh8LO6jFY3cKmft9+T31Hnf35LPdfWyTZc0YexNlUkt5Kdg ++XvGkKn5j9RAZcwXrEXMDnhZLEZZ2qBj0C2El71hyBS0ysBnRyWNwR1dcSgx1sJ8H ++ZCH6NYvLtoqxU4Zm6684eHf9lA7uTL1JHC0kWzUwLqGtbTWp1h5FpL790NVTUkS/ ++Lf7bnnTpZqt8vAtTVc0IxBPOvFLKlzALd+cg69XxAoIBAQCv6Sbkh2NMrzUQRZ42 ++PKfMkuSoG2L6dABQ65J+0/swPHVZ+1830kf6yNsawqAU3DwMbSV6ujH4oUXUQcQ2 ++HL01DCRHRn1nqQ6RvEF8kZnwJNAZRmu2wqKCcxc17Ph9/ZPEv7ZmN+w6MN0LDy4Z ++EdRFcyq7AD1SmeG5ugMu4ilSpU1K96ZuvrnZezeI0dDgKNgDotlwTN9/oM95EfSf ++NNJy7ma4iDPnj8S0o1pELnBQEkizIOtsqTpsFgDKUpyKp3golh3jbZvixAuwUHOx ++PdHZca/mB1KhjONPhEDPl8HZIznYQzn+Z3cNqoM58lMF/di834ogN7zguYHMhDUT ++0YhZAoIBAHlYhuni+gyrn4tyZgep68VXW7wQxSvgSj8cpZAuT/w0UKAU53J5QTWZ ++aGHeICXvgvpalUL+2dGwASlOvPa52ekcOPd2+qKWyss0zA4ksI7mNE2vjFUcOr+S ++n9QSNvu3E8dYAjzSIsizcQbPTlk6A/TmytNJ4x67ZVGCmKXw1ZzzSrxSbAIdY254 ++TxSGchrfcy0ofXIL2HXq16FRmesORTJFkkyQaldzn4y7S6HJ/vGppImTfeac1MwG ++jLYljIkIbt+nB1c8HeNvARmBa6M2pxB9f72oRMVqFdUUc5AxXuWP9v6xk227EuCq ++TBORAafu9WxKVwUsHa1rE1uGgNEfRJ8= ++-----END PRIVATE KEY----- +diff --git a/test/parallel/test-tls-0-dns-altname.js b/test/parallel/test-tls-0-dns-altname.js +index 4bc87e44cb..e5cb8e3d48 100644 +--- a/test/parallel/test-tls-0-dns-altname.js ++++ b/test/parallel/test-tls-0-dns-altname.js +@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ const server = tls.createServer({ + }, common.mustCall(() => { + const cert = c.getPeerCertificate(); + assert.strictEqual(cert.subjectaltname, +- 'DNS:good.example.org\0.evil.example.com, ' + ++ 'DNS:"good.example.org\\u0000.evil.example.com", ' + + 'DNS:just-another.example.com, ' + + 'IP Address:8.8.8.8, ' + + 'IP Address:8.8.4.4, ' + +diff --git a/test/parallel/test-x509-escaping.js b/test/parallel/test-x509-escaping.js +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..4e0f82767d +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/parallel/test-x509-escaping.js +@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ ++'use strict'; ++ ++const common = require('../common'); ++if (!common.hasCrypto) ++ common.skip('missing crypto'); ++ ++const assert = require('assert'); ++const tls = require('tls'); ++const fixtures = require('../common/fixtures'); ++ ++const { hasOpenSSL3 } = common; ++ ++// Test that all certificate chains provided by the reporter are rejected. ++{ ++ const rootPEM = fixtures.readSync('x509-escaping/google/root.pem'); ++ const intermPEM = fixtures.readSync('x509-escaping/google/intermediate.pem'); ++ const keyPEM = fixtures.readSync('x509-escaping/google/key.pem'); ++ ++ const numLeaves = 5; ++ ++ for (let i = 0; i < numLeaves; i++) { ++ // TODO(tniessen): this test case requires proper handling of URI SANs, ++ // which node currently does not implement. ++ if (i === 3) continue; ++ ++ const name = `x509-escaping/google/leaf${i}.pem`; ++ const leafPEM = fixtures.readSync(name, 'utf8'); ++ ++ const server = tls.createServer({ ++ key: keyPEM, ++ cert: leafPEM + intermPEM, ++ }, common.mustNotCall()).listen(common.mustCall(() => { ++ const { port } = server.address(); ++ const socket = tls.connect(port, { ++ ca: rootPEM, ++ servername: 'nodejs.org', ++ }, common.mustNotCall()); ++ socket.on('error', common.mustCall()); ++ })).unref(); ++ } ++} ++ ++// Test escaping rules for subject alternative names. ++{ ++ const expectedSANs = [ ++ 'DNS:"good.example.com\\u002c DNS:evil.example.com"', ++ // URIs should not require escaping. ++ 'URI:http://example.com/', ++ 'URI:http://example.com/?a=b&c=d', ++ // Unless they contain commas. ++ 'URI:"http://example.com/a\\u002cb"', ++ // Percent encoding should not require escaping. ++ 'URI:http://example.com/a%2Cb', ++ // Malicious attempts should be escaped. ++ 'URI:"http://example.com/a\\u002c DNS:good.example.com"', ++ // Non-ASCII characters in DNS names should be treated as Latin-1. ++ 'DNS:"ex\\u00e4mple.com"', ++ // It should not be possible to cause unescaping without escaping. ++ 'DNS:"\\"evil.example.com\\""', ++ // IPv4 addresses should be represented as usual. ++ 'IP Address:8.8.8.8', ++ 'IP Address:8.8.4.4', ++ // For backward-compatibility, include invalid IP address lengths. ++ hasOpenSSL3 ? 'IP Address:<invalid length=5>' : 'IP Address:<invalid>', ++ hasOpenSSL3 ? 'IP Address:<invalid length=6>' : 'IP Address:<invalid>', ++ // IPv6 addresses are represented as OpenSSL does. ++ 'IP Address:A0B:C0D:E0F:0:0:0:7A7B:7C7D', ++ // Regular email addresses don't require escaping. ++ 'email:foo@example.com', ++ // ... but should be escaped if they contain commas. ++ 'email:"foo@example.com\\u002c DNS:good.example.com"', ++ 'DirName:/C=DE/L=Hannover', ++ // TODO(tniessen): support UTF8 in DirName ++ 'DirName:"/C=DE/L=M\\\\xC3\\\\xBCnchen"', ++ 'DirName:"/C=DE/L=Berlin\\u002c DNS:good.example.com"', ++ 'DirName:"/C=DE/L=Berlin\\u002c DNS:good.example.com\\\\x00' + ++ 'evil.example.com"', ++ 'DirName:"/C=DE/L=Berlin\\u002c DNS:good.example.com\\\\\\\\x00' + ++ 'evil.example.com"', ++ // These next two tests might be surprising. OpenSSL applies its own rules ++ // first, which introduce backslashes, which activate node's escaping. ++ // Unfortunately, there are also differences between OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 3.0. ++ 'DirName:"/C=DE/L=Berlin\\\\x0D\\\\x0A"', ++ hasOpenSSL3 ? ++ 'DirName:"/C=DE/L=Berlin\\\\/CN=good.example.com"' : ++ 'DirName:/C=DE/L=Berlin/CN=good.example.com', ++ // TODO(tniessen): even OIDs that are well-known (such as the following, ++ // which is sha256WithRSAEncryption) should be represented numerically only. ++ 'Registered ID:sha256WithRSAEncryption', ++ // This is an OID that will likely never be assigned to anything, thus ++ // OpenSSL should not know it. ++ 'Registered ID:1.3.9999.12.34', ++ hasOpenSSL3 ? ++ 'othername: XmppAddr::abc123' : ++ 'othername:<unsupported>', ++ hasOpenSSL3 ? ++ 'othername:" XmppAddr::abc123\\u002c DNS:good.example.com"' : ++ 'othername:<unsupported>', ++ hasOpenSSL3 ? ++ 'othername:" XmppAddr::good.example.com\\u0000abc123"' : ++ 'othername:<unsupported>', ++ // This is unsupported because the OID is not recognized. ++ 'othername:<unsupported>', ++ hasOpenSSL3 ? 'othername: SRVName::abc123' : 'othername:<unsupported>', ++ // This is unsupported because it is an SRVName with a UTF8String value, ++ // which is not allowed for SRVName. ++ 'othername:<unsupported>', ++ hasOpenSSL3 ? ++ 'othername:" SRVName::abc\\u0000def"' : ++ 'othername:<unsupported>', ++ ]; ++ ++ const serverKey = fixtures.readSync('x509-escaping/server-key.pem', 'utf8'); ++ ++ for (let i = 0; i < expectedSANs.length; i++) { ++ const pem = fixtures.readSync(`x509-escaping/alt-${i}-cert.pem`, 'utf8'); ++ ++ // X509Certificate interface is not supported in v12.x & v14.x. Disable ++ // checks for subjectAltName with expectedSANs. The testcase is ported ++ // from v17.x ++ // ++ // Test the subjectAltName property of the X509Certificate API. ++ // const cert = new X509Certificate(pem); ++ // assert.strictEqual(cert.subjectAltName, expectedSANs[i]); ++ ++ // Test that the certificate obtained by checkServerIdentity has the correct ++ // subjectaltname property. ++ const server = tls.createServer({ ++ key: serverKey, ++ cert: pem, ++ }, common.mustCall((conn) => { ++ conn.destroy(); ++ server.close(); ++ })).listen(common.mustCall(() => { ++ const { port } = server.address(); ++ tls.connect(port, { ++ ca: pem, ++ servername: 'example.com', ++ checkServerIdentity: (hostname, peerCert) => { ++ assert.strictEqual(hostname, 'example.com'); ++ assert.strictEqual(peerCert.subjectaltname, expectedSANs[i]); ++ }, ++ }, common.mustCall()); ++ })); ++ } ++} ++ ++// Test escaping rules for authority info access. ++{ ++ const expectedInfoAccess = [ ++ { ++ text: 'OCSP - URI:"http://good.example.com/\\u000a' + ++ 'OCSP - URI:http://evil.example.com/"', ++ legacy: { ++ 'OCSP - URI': [ ++ 'http://good.example.com/\nOCSP - URI:http://evil.example.com/', ++ ], ++ }, ++ }, ++ { ++ text: 'CA Issuers - URI:"http://ca.example.com/\\u000a' + ++ 'OCSP - URI:http://evil.example.com"\n' + ++ 'OCSP - DNS:"good.example.com\\u000a' + ++ 'OCSP - URI:http://ca.nodejs.org/ca.cert"', ++ legacy: { ++ 'CA Issuers - URI': [ ++ 'http://ca.example.com/\nOCSP - URI:http://evil.example.com', ++ ], ++ 'OCSP - DNS': [ ++ 'good.example.com\nOCSP - URI:http://ca.nodejs.org/ca.cert', ++ ], ++ }, ++ }, ++ { ++ text: '1.3.9999.12.34 - URI:http://ca.example.com/', ++ legacy: { ++ '1.3.9999.12.34 - URI': [ ++ 'http://ca.example.com/', ++ ], ++ }, ++ }, ++ hasOpenSSL3 ? { ++ text: 'OCSP - othername: XmppAddr::good.example.com\n' + ++ 'OCSP - othername:<unsupported>\n' + ++ 'OCSP - othername: SRVName::abc123', ++ legacy: { ++ 'OCSP - othername': [ ++ ' XmppAddr::good.example.com', ++ '<unsupported>', ++ ' SRVName::abc123', ++ ], ++ }, ++ } : { ++ text: 'OCSP - othername:<unsupported>\n' + ++ 'OCSP - othername:<unsupported>\n' + ++ 'OCSP - othername:<unsupported>', ++ legacy: { ++ 'OCSP - othername': [ ++ '<unsupported>', ++ '<unsupported>', ++ '<unsupported>', ++ ], ++ }, ++ }, ++ hasOpenSSL3 ? { ++ text: 'OCSP - othername:" XmppAddr::good.example.com\\u0000abc123"', ++ legacy: { ++ 'OCSP - othername': [ ++ ' XmppAddr::good.example.com\0abc123', ++ ], ++ }, ++ } : { ++ text: 'OCSP - othername:<unsupported>', ++ legacy: { ++ 'OCSP - othername': [ ++ '<unsupported>', ++ ], ++ }, ++ }, ++ ]; ++ ++ const serverKey = fixtures.readSync('x509-escaping/server-key.pem', 'utf8'); ++ ++ for (let i = 0; i < expectedInfoAccess.length; i++) { ++ const pem = fixtures.readSync(`x509-escaping/info-${i}-cert.pem`, 'utf8'); ++ const expected = expectedInfoAccess[i]; ++ ++ // X509Certificate interface is not supported in v12.x & v14.x. Disable ++ // checks for cert.infoAccess with expected text. The testcase is ported ++ // from v17.x ++ // Test the subjectAltName property of the X509Certificate API. ++ // const cert = new X509Certificate(pem); ++ // assert.strictEqual(cert.infoAccess, ++ // `${expected.text}${hasOpenSSL3 ? '' : '\n'}`); ++ ++ // Test that the certificate obtained by checkServerIdentity has the correct ++ // subjectaltname property. ++ const server = tls.createServer({ ++ key: serverKey, ++ cert: pem, ++ }, common.mustCall((conn) => { ++ conn.destroy(); ++ server.close(); ++ })).listen(common.mustCall(() => { ++ const { port } = server.address(); ++ tls.connect(port, { ++ ca: pem, ++ servername: 'example.com', ++ checkServerIdentity: (hostname, peerCert) => { ++ assert.strictEqual(hostname, 'example.com'); ++ assert.deepStrictEqual(peerCert.infoAccess, ++ Object.assign(Object.create(null), ++ expected.legacy)); ++ }, ++ }, common.mustCall()); ++ })); ++ } ++} ++ ++// The internal parsing logic must match the JSON specification exactly. ++{ ++ // This list is partially based on V8's own JSON tests. ++ const invalidJSON = [ ++ '"\\a invalid escape"', ++ '"\\v invalid escape"', ++ '"\\\' invalid escape"', ++ '"\\x42 invalid escape"', ++ '"\\u202 invalid escape"', ++ '"\\012 invalid escape"', ++ '"Unterminated string', ++ '"Unterminated string\\"', ++ '"Unterminated string\\\\\\"', ++ '"\u0000 control character"', ++ '"\u001e control character"', ++ '"\u001f control character"', ++ ]; ++ ++ for (const invalidStringLiteral of invalidJSON) { ++ // Usually, checkServerIdentity returns an error upon verification failure. ++ // In this case, however, it should throw an error since this is not a ++ // verification error. Node.js itself will never produce invalid JSON string ++ // literals, so this can only happen when users construct invalid subject ++ // alternative name strings (that do not follow escaping rules). ++ assert.throws(() => { ++ tls.checkServerIdentity('example.com', { ++ subjectaltname: `DNS:${invalidStringLiteral}`, ++ }); ++ }, { ++ code: 'ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_FORMAT', ++ message: 'Invalid subject alternative name string' ++ }); ++ } ++} ++ ++// While node does not produce commas within SAN entries, it should parse them ++// correctly (i.e., not simply split at commas). ++{ ++ // Regardless of the quotes, splitting this SAN string at commas would ++ // cause checkServerIdentity to see 'DNS:b.example.com' and thus to accept ++ // the certificate for b.example.com. ++ const san = 'DNS:"a.example.com, DNS:b.example.com, DNS:c.example.com"'; ++ ++ // This is what node used to do, and which is not correct! ++ const hostname = 'b.example.com'; ++ assert.strictEqual(san.split(', ')[1], `DNS:${hostname}`); ++ ++ // The new implementation should parse the string correctly. ++ const err = tls.checkServerIdentity(hostname, { subjectaltname: san }); ++ assert(err); ++ assert.strictEqual(err.code, 'ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID'); ++ assert.strictEqual(err.message, 'Hostname/IP does not match certificate\'s ' + ++ 'altnames: Host: b.example.com. is not in ' + ++ 'the cert\'s altnames: DNS:"a.example.com, ' + ++ 'DNS:b.example.com, DNS:c.example.com"'); ++} ++ ++// The subject MUST be ignored if a dNSName subject alternative name exists. ++{ ++ const key = fixtures.readKey('incorrect_san_correct_subject-key.pem'); ++ const cert = fixtures.readKey('incorrect_san_correct_subject-cert.pem'); ++ ++ // The hostname is the CN, but not a SAN entry. ++ const servername = 'good.example.com'; ++ ++ // X509Certificate interface is not supported in v12.x & v14.x. Disable ++ // checks for certX509.subject and certX509.subjectAltName with expected ++ // value. The testcase is ported from v17.x ++ // ++ // const certX509 = new X509Certificate(cert); ++ // assert.strictEqual(certX509.subject, `CN=${servername}`); ++ // assert.strictEqual(certX509.subjectAltName, 'DNS:evil.example.com'); ++ ++ // Try connecting to a server that uses the self-signed certificate. ++ const server = tls.createServer({ key, cert }, common.mustNotCall()); ++ server.listen(common.mustCall(() => { ++ const { port } = server.address(); ++ const socket = tls.connect(port, { ++ ca: cert, ++ servername, ++ }, common.mustNotCall()); ++ socket.on('error', common.mustCall((err) => { ++ assert.strictEqual(err.code, 'ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID'); ++ assert.strictEqual(err.message, 'Hostname/IP does not match ' + ++ "certificate's altnames: Host: " + ++ "good.example.com. is not in the cert's" + ++ ' altnames: DNS:evil.example.com'); ++ })); ++ })).unref(); ++} +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_12.21.0.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_12.22.2.bb index b9e3821776..2c7d3b3edd 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_12.21.0.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_12.22.2.bb @@ -22,11 +22,12 @@ SRC_URI = "http://nodejs.org/dist/v${PV}/node-v${PV}.tar.xz \ file://big-endian.patch \ file://mips-warnings.patch \ file://0001-Remove-use-of-register-r7-because-llvm-now-issues-an.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-44532.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_class-target = " \ file://0002-Using-native-binaries.patch \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "052f37ace6f569b513b5a1154b2a45d3c4d8b07d7d7c807b79f1566db61e979d" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7fd805571df106f086f4c45e131efed98bfd62628d9dec96bd62f8c11b0c48dc" S = "${WORKDIR}/node-v${PV}" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/protobuf/protobuf/CVE-2021-22570.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/protobuf/protobuf/CVE-2021-22570.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bb9594e968 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/protobuf/protobuf/CVE-2021-22570.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From f5ce0700d80c776186b0fb0414ef20966a3a6a03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Sana.Kazi" <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> +Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 15:50:16 +0530 +Subject: [PATCH] protobuf: Fix CVE-2021-22570 + +CVE: CVE-2021-22570 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/protobuf/blob/394beeacb500861f76473d47e10314e6a3600810/f/CVE-2021-22570.patch] +Comment: Removed first and second hunk +Signed-off-by: Sana.Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> + +--- + src/google/protobuf/descriptor.cc | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/google/protobuf/descriptor.cc b/src/google/protobuf/descriptor.cc +index 6835a3cde..1514ae531 100644 +--- a/src/google/protobuf/descriptor.cc ++++ b/src/google/protobuf/descriptor.cc +@@ -2603,6 +2603,8 @@ void Descriptor::DebugString(int depth, std::string* contents, + const Descriptor::ReservedRange* range = reserved_range(i); + if (range->end == range->start + 1) { + strings::SubstituteAndAppend(contents, "$0, ", range->start); ++ } else if (range->end > FieldDescriptor::kMaxNumber) { ++ strings::SubstituteAndAppend(contents, "$0 to max, ", range->start); + } else { + strings::SubstituteAndAppend(contents, "$0 to $1, ", range->start, + range->end - 1); +@@ -2815,6 +2817,8 @@ void EnumDescriptor::DebugString( + const EnumDescriptor::ReservedRange* range = reserved_range(i); + if (range->end == range->start) { + strings::SubstituteAndAppend(contents, "$0, ", range->start); ++ } else if (range->end == INT_MAX) { ++ strings::SubstituteAndAppend(contents, "$0 to max, ", range->start); + } else { + strings::SubstituteAndAppend(contents, "$0 to $1, ", range->start, + range->end); +@@ -4002,6 +4006,11 @@ bool DescriptorBuilder::AddSymbol(const std::string& full_name, + // Use its file as the parent instead. + if (parent == nullptr) parent = file_; + ++ if (full_name.find('\0') != std::string::npos) { ++ AddError(full_name, proto, DescriptorPool::ErrorCollector::NAME, ++ "\"" + full_name + "\" contains null character."); ++ return false; ++ } + if (tables_->AddSymbol(full_name, symbol)) { + if (!file_tables_->AddAliasUnderParent(parent, name, symbol)) { + // This is only possible if there was already an error adding something of +@@ -4041,6 +4050,11 @@ bool DescriptorBuilder::AddSymbol(const std::string& full_name, + void DescriptorBuilder::AddPackage(const std::string& name, + const Message& proto, + const FileDescriptor* file) { ++ if (name.find('\0') != std::string::npos) { ++ AddError(name, proto, DescriptorPool::ErrorCollector::NAME, ++ "\"" + name + "\" contains null character."); ++ return; ++ } + if (tables_->AddSymbol(name, Symbol(file))) { + // Success. Also add parent package, if any. + std::string::size_type dot_pos = name.find_last_of('.'); +@@ -4354,6 +4368,12 @@ FileDescriptor* DescriptorBuilder::BuildFileImpl( + } + result->pool_ = pool_; + ++ if (result->name().find('\0') != std::string::npos) { ++ AddError(result->name(), proto, DescriptorPool::ErrorCollector::NAME, ++ "\"" + result->name() + "\" contains null character."); ++ return nullptr; ++ } ++ + // Add to tables. + if (!tables_->AddFile(result)) { + AddError(proto.name(), proto, DescriptorPool::ErrorCollector::OTHER, diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/protobuf/protobuf_3.11.4.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/protobuf/protobuf_3.11.4.bb index d2f22ba6b8..55d56ff08e 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/protobuf/protobuf_3.11.4.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/protobuf/protobuf_3.11.4.bb @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/google/protobuf.git;branch=3.11.x;protocol=https \ file://0001-protobuf-fix-configure-error.patch \ file://0001-Makefile.am-include-descriptor.cc-when-building-libp.patch \ file://0001-examples-Makefile-respect-CXX-LDFLAGS-variables-fix-.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-22570.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/files/CVE-2016-9296.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/files/CVE-2016-9296.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..98e186cbf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/files/CVE-2016-9296.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +p7zip: Update CVE-2016-9296 patch URL. +From: Robert Luberda <robert@debian.org> +Date: Sat, 19 Nov 2016 08:48:08 +0100 +Subject: Fix nullptr dereference (CVE-2016-9296) + +Patch taken from https://sourceforge.net/p/p7zip/bugs/185/ +This patch file taken from Debian's patch set for p7zip + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceforge.net/p/p7zip/bugs/185/] +CVE: CVE-2016-9296 + +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> + +Index: p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Archive/7z/7zIn.cpp +=================================================================== +--- p7zip_16.02.orig/CPP/7zip/Archive/7z/7zIn.cpp ++++ p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Archive/7z/7zIn.cpp +@@ -1097,7 +1097,8 @@ HRESULT CInArchive::ReadAndDecodePackedS + if (CrcCalc(data, unpackSize) != folders.FolderCRCs.Vals[i]) + ThrowIncorrect(); + } +- HeadersSize += folders.PackPositions[folders.NumPackStreams]; ++ if (folders.PackPositions) ++ HeadersSize += folders.PackPositions[folders.NumPackStreams]; + return S_OK; + } + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/files/CVE-2018-5996.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/files/CVE-2018-5996.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b6deb5d3a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/files/CVE-2018-5996.patch @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +From: Robert Luberda <robert@debian.org> +Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 23:47:40 +0100 +Subject: CVE-2018-5996 + +Hopefully fix Memory Corruptions via RAR PPMd (CVE-2018-5996) by +applying a few changes from 7Zip 18.00-beta. + +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/#888314 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sources.debian.org/data/non-free/p/p7zip-rar/16.02-3/debian/patches/06-CVE-2018-5996.patch] +CVE: CVE-2018-5996 + +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar1Decoder.cpp | 13 +++++++++---- + CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar1Decoder.h | 1 + + CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar2Decoder.cpp | 10 +++++++++- + CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar2Decoder.h | 1 + + CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar3Decoder.cpp | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- + CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar3Decoder.h | 2 ++ + 6 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +Index: p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar1Decoder.cpp +=================================================================== +--- p7zip_16.02.orig/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar1Decoder.cpp ++++ p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar1Decoder.cpp +@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ public: + }; + */ + +-CDecoder::CDecoder(): m_IsSolid(false) { } ++CDecoder::CDecoder(): m_IsSolid(false), _errorMode(false) { } + + void CDecoder::InitStructures() + { +@@ -406,9 +406,14 @@ HRESULT CDecoder::CodeReal(ISequentialIn + InitData(); + if (!m_IsSolid) + { ++ _errorMode = false; + InitStructures(); + InitHuff(); + } ++ ++ if (_errorMode) ++ return S_FALSE; ++ + if (m_UnpackSize > 0) + { + GetFlagsBuf(); +@@ -477,9 +482,9 @@ STDMETHODIMP CDecoder::Code(ISequentialI + const UInt64 *inSize, const UInt64 *outSize, ICompressProgressInfo *progress) + { + try { return CodeReal(inStream, outStream, inSize, outSize, progress); } +- catch(const CInBufferException &e) { return e.ErrorCode; } +- catch(const CLzOutWindowException &e) { return e.ErrorCode; } +- catch(...) { return S_FALSE; } ++ catch(const CInBufferException &e) { _errorMode = true; return e.ErrorCode; } ++ catch(const CLzOutWindowException &e) { _errorMode = true; return e.ErrorCode; } ++ catch(...) { _errorMode = true; return S_FALSE; } + } + + STDMETHODIMP CDecoder::SetDecoderProperties2(const Byte *data, UInt32 size) +Index: p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar1Decoder.h +=================================================================== +--- p7zip_16.02.orig/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar1Decoder.h ++++ p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar1Decoder.h +@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ public: + + Int64 m_UnpackSize; + bool m_IsSolid; ++ bool _errorMode; + + UInt32 ReadBits(int numBits); + HRESULT CopyBlock(UInt32 distance, UInt32 len); +Index: p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar2Decoder.cpp +=================================================================== +--- p7zip_16.02.orig/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar2Decoder.cpp ++++ p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar2Decoder.cpp +@@ -80,7 +80,8 @@ static const UInt32 kHistorySize = 1 << + static const UInt32 kWindowReservSize = (1 << 22) + 256; + + CDecoder::CDecoder(): +- m_IsSolid(false) ++ m_IsSolid(false), ++ m_TablesOK(false) + { + } + +@@ -100,6 +101,8 @@ UInt32 CDecoder::ReadBits(unsigned numBi + + bool CDecoder::ReadTables(void) + { ++ m_TablesOK = false; ++ + Byte levelLevels[kLevelTableSize]; + Byte newLevels[kMaxTableSize]; + m_AudioMode = (ReadBits(1) == 1); +@@ -170,6 +173,8 @@ bool CDecoder::ReadTables(void) + } + + memcpy(m_LastLevels, newLevels, kMaxTableSize); ++ m_TablesOK = true; ++ + return true; + } + +@@ -344,6 +349,9 @@ HRESULT CDecoder::CodeReal(ISequentialIn + return S_FALSE; + } + ++ if (!m_TablesOK) ++ return S_FALSE; ++ + UInt64 startPos = m_OutWindowStream.GetProcessedSize(); + while (pos < unPackSize) + { +Index: p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar2Decoder.h +=================================================================== +--- p7zip_16.02.orig/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar2Decoder.h ++++ p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar2Decoder.h +@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ class CDecoder : + + UInt64 m_PackSize; + bool m_IsSolid; ++ bool m_TablesOK; + + void InitStructures(); + UInt32 ReadBits(unsigned numBits); +Index: p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar3Decoder.cpp +=================================================================== +--- p7zip_16.02.orig/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar3Decoder.cpp ++++ p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar3Decoder.cpp +@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ CDecoder::CDecoder(): + _writtenFileSize(0), + _vmData(0), + _vmCode(0), +- m_IsSolid(false) ++ m_IsSolid(false), ++ _errorMode(false) + { + Ppmd7_Construct(&_ppmd); + } +@@ -545,6 +546,9 @@ HRESULT CDecoder::ReadTables(bool &keepD + return InitPPM(); + } + ++ TablesRead = false; ++ TablesOK = false; ++ + _lzMode = true; + PrevAlignBits = 0; + PrevAlignCount = 0; +@@ -606,6 +610,9 @@ HRESULT CDecoder::ReadTables(bool &keepD + } + } + } ++ if (InputEofError()) ++ return S_FALSE; ++ + TablesRead = true; + + // original code has check here: +@@ -623,6 +630,9 @@ HRESULT CDecoder::ReadTables(bool &keepD + RIF(m_LenDecoder.Build(&newLevels[kMainTableSize + kDistTableSize + kAlignTableSize])); + + memcpy(m_LastLevels, newLevels, kTablesSizesSum); ++ ++ TablesOK = true; ++ + return S_OK; + } + +@@ -824,7 +834,12 @@ HRESULT CDecoder::CodeReal(ICompressProg + PpmEscChar = 2; + PpmError = true; + InitFilters(); ++ _errorMode = false; + } ++ ++ if (_errorMode) ++ return S_FALSE; ++ + if (!m_IsSolid || !TablesRead) + { + bool keepDecompressing; +@@ -838,6 +853,8 @@ HRESULT CDecoder::CodeReal(ICompressProg + bool keepDecompressing; + if (_lzMode) + { ++ if (!TablesOK) ++ return S_FALSE; + RINOK(DecodeLZ(keepDecompressing)) + } + else +@@ -901,8 +918,8 @@ STDMETHODIMP CDecoder::Code(ISequentialI + _unpackSize = outSize ? *outSize : (UInt64)(Int64)-1; + return CodeReal(progress); + } +- catch(const CInBufferException &e) { return e.ErrorCode; } +- catch(...) { return S_FALSE; } ++ catch(const CInBufferException &e) { _errorMode = true; return e.ErrorCode; } ++ catch(...) { _errorMode = true; return S_FALSE; } + // CNewException is possible here. But probably CNewException is caused + // by error in data stream. + } +Index: p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar3Decoder.h +=================================================================== +--- p7zip_16.02.orig/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar3Decoder.h ++++ p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Compress/Rar3Decoder.h +@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ class CDecoder: + UInt32 _lastFilter; + + bool m_IsSolid; ++ bool _errorMode; + + bool _lzMode; + bool _unsupportedFilter; +@@ -200,6 +201,7 @@ class CDecoder: + UInt32 PrevAlignCount; + + bool TablesRead; ++ bool TablesOK; + + CPpmd7 _ppmd; + int PpmEscChar; diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/files/change_numMethods_from_bool_to_unsigned.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/files/change_numMethods_from_bool_to_unsigned.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dcde83e8a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/files/change_numMethods_from_bool_to_unsigned.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +fixes the below error + +| ../../../../CPP/7zip/Archive/Wim/WimHandler.cpp: In member function 'virtual LONG NArchive::NWim::CHandler::GetArchiveProperty(PROPID, PROPVARIANT*)': +| ../../../../CPP/7zip/Archive/Wim/WimHandler.cpp:308:11: error: use of an operand of type 'bool' in 'operator++' is forbidden in C++17 +| 308 | numMethods++; +| | ^~~~~~~~~~ +| ../../../../CPP/7zip/Archive/Wim/WimHandler.cpp:318:9: error: use of an operand of type 'bool' in 'operator++' is forbidden in C++17 +| 318 | numMethods++; + + +use unsigned instead of bool +Signed-off-by: Nisha Parrakat <Nisha.Parrakat@kpit.com> + +Upstream-Status: Pending +Index: p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Archive/Wim/WimHandler.cpp +=================================================================== +--- p7zip_16.02.orig/CPP/7zip/Archive/Wim/WimHandler.cpp ++++ p7zip_16.02/CPP/7zip/Archive/Wim/WimHandler.cpp +@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ STDMETHODIMP CHandler::GetArchivePropert + + AString res; + +- bool numMethods = 0; ++ unsigned numMethods = 0; + for (unsigned i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(k_Methods); i++) + { + if (methodMask & ((UInt32)1 << i)) diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/p7zip_16.02.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/p7zip_16.02.bb index 13479a90fe..79677c6487 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/p7zip_16.02.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/p7zip/p7zip_16.02.bb @@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://downloads.sourceforge.net/p7zip/p7zip/${PV}/p7zip_${PV}_src_al file://do_not_override_compiler_and_do_not_strip.patch \ file://CVE-2017-17969.patch \ file://0001-Fix-narrowing-errors-Wc-11-narrowing.patch \ + file://change_numMethods_from_bool_to_unsigned.patch \ + file://CVE-2018-5996.patch \ + file://CVE-2016-9296.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a0128d661cfe7cc8c121e73519c54fbf" @@ -16,10 +19,26 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5eb20ac0e2944f6cb9c2d51dd6c4518941c185347d4089ea89087ffdd6 S = "${WORKDIR}/${BPN}_${PV}" +do_compile_append() { + oe_runmake 7z +} +FILES_${PN} += "${libdir}/* ${bindir}/7z" + +FILES_SOLIBSDEV = "" +INSANE_SKIP_${PN} += "dev-so" + do_install() { install -d ${D}${bindir} - install -m 0755 ${S}/bin/* ${D}${bindir} + install -d ${D}${bindir}/Codecs + install -d ${D}${libdir} + install -d ${D}${libdir}/Codecs + install -m 0755 ${S}/bin/7za ${D}${bindir} ln -s 7za ${D}${bindir}/7z + install -m 0755 ${S}/bin/Codecs/* ${D}${libdir}/Codecs/ + install -m 0755 ${S}/bin/7z.so ${D}${libdir}/lib7z.so } -BBCLASSEXTEND = "native" +RPROVIDES_${PN} += "lib7z.so()(64bit) 7z lib7z.so" +RPROVIDES_${PN}-dev += "lib7z.so()(64bit) 7z lib7z.so" + +BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/files/CVE-2021-4034.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/files/CVE-2021-4034.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cab1c83c09 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/files/CVE-2021-4034.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From ed8b418f1341cf7fc576f6b17de5c6dd4017e034 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jeremy A. Puhlman" <jpuhlman@mvista.com> +Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 00:01:27 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2021-4034: Local privilege escalation in pkexec due to + incorrect handling of argument vector + +Upstream-Status: Backport https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/polkit/polkit/-/commit/a2bf5c9c83b6ae46cbd5c779d3055bff81ded683 +CVE: CVE-2021-4034 + +Signed-off-by: Jeremy A. Puhlman <jpuhlman@mvista.com> +--- + src/programs/pkcheck.c | 6 ++++++ + src/programs/pkexec.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/programs/pkcheck.c b/src/programs/pkcheck.c +index f1bb4e1..aff4f60 100644 +--- a/src/programs/pkcheck.c ++++ b/src/programs/pkcheck.c +@@ -363,6 +363,12 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) + local_agent_handle = NULL; + ret = 126; + ++ if (argc < 1) ++ { ++ help(); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ + /* Disable remote file access from GIO. */ + setenv ("GIO_USE_VFS", "local", 1); + +diff --git a/src/programs/pkexec.c b/src/programs/pkexec.c +index 7698c5c..3ff4c58 100644 +--- a/src/programs/pkexec.c ++++ b/src/programs/pkexec.c +@@ -488,6 +488,17 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) + pid_t pid_of_caller; + gpointer local_agent_handle; + ++ ++ /* ++ * If 'pkexec' is called wrong, just show help and bail out. ++ */ ++ if (argc<1) ++ { ++ clearenv(); ++ usage(argc, argv); ++ exit(1); ++ } ++ + ret = 127; + authority = NULL; + subject = NULL; +@@ -636,7 +647,15 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) + goto out; + } + g_free (path); +- argv[n] = path = s; ++ path = s; ++ ++ /* argc<2 and pkexec runs just shell, argv is guaranteed to be null-terminated. ++ * /-less shell shouldn't happen, but let's be defensive and don't write to null-termination ++ */ ++ if (argv[n] != NULL) ++ { ++ argv[n] = path; ++ } + } + if (access (path, F_OK) != 0) + { +-- +2.26.2 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/files/CVE-2021-4115.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/files/CVE-2021-4115.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..37e0d6063c --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/files/CVE-2021-4115.patch @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +From 41cb093f554da8772362654a128a84dd8a5542a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Rybar <jrybar@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 08:29:05 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2021-4115 (GHSL-2021-077) fix + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/polkit/polkit/-/commit/41cb093f554da8772362654a128a84dd8a5542a7.patch] +CVE: CVE-2021-4115 +Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com> + +--- + src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c b/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c +index 8ed1363..2fbf5f1 100644 +--- a/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c ++++ b/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c +@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ enum + PROP_NAME, + }; + ++ ++guint8 dbus_call_respond_fails; // has to be global because of callback ++ ++ + static void subject_iface_init (PolkitSubjectIface *subject_iface); + + G_DEFINE_TYPE_WITH_CODE (PolkitSystemBusName, polkit_system_bus_name, G_TYPE_OBJECT, +@@ -364,6 +368,7 @@ on_retrieved_unix_uid_pid (GObject *src, + if (!v) + { + data->caught_error = TRUE; ++ dbus_call_respond_fails += 1; + } + else + { +@@ -405,6 +410,8 @@ polkit_system_bus_name_get_creds_sync (PolkitSystemBusName *system_bus + tmp_context = g_main_context_new (); + g_main_context_push_thread_default (tmp_context); + ++ dbus_call_respond_fails = 0; ++ + /* Do two async calls as it's basically as fast as one sync call. + */ + g_dbus_connection_call (connection, +@@ -432,11 +439,34 @@ polkit_system_bus_name_get_creds_sync (PolkitSystemBusName *system_bus + on_retrieved_unix_uid_pid, + &data); + +- while (!((data.retrieved_uid && data.retrieved_pid) || data.caught_error)) +- g_main_context_iteration (tmp_context, TRUE); ++ while (TRUE) ++ { ++ /* If one dbus call returns error, we must wait until the other call ++ * calls _call_finish(), otherwise fd leak is possible. ++ * Resolves: GHSL-2021-077 ++ */ + +- if (data.caught_error) +- goto out; ++ if ( (dbus_call_respond_fails > 1) ) ++ { ++ // we got two faults, we can leave ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ((data.caught_error && (data.retrieved_pid || data.retrieved_uid))) ++ { ++ // we got one fault and the other call finally finished, we can leave ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ if ( !(data.retrieved_uid && data.retrieved_pid) ) ++ { ++ g_main_context_iteration (tmp_context, TRUE); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ break; ++ } ++ } + + if (out_uid) + *out_uid = data.uid; +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/polkit/CVE-2021-3560.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/polkit/CVE-2021-3560.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..76308ffdb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/polkit/CVE-2021-3560.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From a04d13affe0fa53ff618e07aa8f57f4c0e3b9b81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jan Rybar <jrybar@redhat.com> +Date: Wed, 2 Jun 2021 15:43:38 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] GHSL-2021-074: authentication bypass vulnerability in polkit + +initial values returned if error caught + +CVE: CVE-2021-3560 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/polkit/polkit/-/commit/a04d13affe0fa53ff618e07aa8f57f4c0e3b9b81] + +Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <mingli.yu@windriver.com> +--- + src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c b/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c +index 8daa12c..8ed1363 100644 +--- a/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c ++++ b/src/polkit/polkitsystembusname.c +@@ -435,6 +435,9 @@ polkit_system_bus_name_get_creds_sync (PolkitSystemBusName *system_bus + while (!((data.retrieved_uid && data.retrieved_pid) || data.caught_error)) + g_main_context_iteration (tmp_context, TRUE); + ++ if (data.caught_error) ++ goto out; ++ + if (out_uid) + *out_uid = data.uid; + if (out_pid) +-- +2.29.2 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/polkit_0.116.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/polkit_0.116.bb index ad1973b136..dd8e208616 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/polkit_0.116.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/polkit/polkit_0.116.bb @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ PAM_SRC_URI = "file://polkit-1_pam.patch" SRC_URI = "http://www.freedesktop.org/software/polkit/releases/polkit-${PV}.tar.gz \ ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', '${PAM_SRC_URI}', '', d)} \ file://0003-make-netgroup-support-optional.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3560.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-4034.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-4115.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4b37258583393e83069a0e2e89c0162a" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "88170c9e711e8db305a12fdb8234fac5706c61969b94e084d0f117d8ec5d34b1" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/graphviz/graphviz_2.40.1.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/graphviz/graphviz_2.40.1.bb index 81ab86c762..72e2f5cc7a 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/graphviz/graphviz_2.40.1.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/graphviz/graphviz_2.40.1.bb @@ -55,6 +55,17 @@ do_install_append_class-native() { install -m755 ${B}/lib/gvpr/mkdefs ${D}${bindir} } +# create /usr/lib/graphviz/config6 +graphviz_sstate_postinst() { + mkdir -p ${SYSROOT_DESTDIR}${bindir} + dest=${SYSROOT_DESTDIR}${bindir}/postinst-${PN} + echo '#!/bin/sh' > $dest + echo '' >> $dest + echo 'dot -c' >> $dest + chmod 0755 $dest +} +SYSROOT_PREPROCESS_FUNCS_append_class-native = " graphviz_sstate_postinst" + PACKAGES =+ "${PN}-python ${PN}-perl ${PN}-demo" FILES_${PN}-python += "${libdir}/python*/site-packages/ ${libdir}/graphviz/python/" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973-1.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..98988e686e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From 21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com> +Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 19:57:27 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early + +width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily +valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large +values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack +overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early +as possible. + +This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of +written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length. + +See commit 8ee335227bbc for details. + +Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2019-12973 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c +index 0af52f816..ec34f535b 100644 +--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c ++++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c +@@ -622,13 +622,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height) + { +- OPJ_UINT32 x, y; ++ OPJ_UINT32 x, y, written; + OPJ_UINT8 *pix; + const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond; + + beyond = pData + stride * height; + pix = pData; +- x = y = 0U; ++ x = y = written = 0U; + while (y < height) { + int c = getc(IN); + if (c == EOF) { +@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && + ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) { + *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU)); ++ written++; + } + } else { /* absolute mode */ + c = getc(IN); +@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN); + } + *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU)); ++ written++; + } + if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */ + getc(IN); +@@ -678,6 +680,10 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + } + } + } /* while(y < height) */ ++ if (written != width * height) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "warning, image's actual size does not match advertized one\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + return OPJ_TRUE; + } + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973-2.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2177bfdbdb --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From 3aef207f90e937d4931daf6d411e092f76d82e66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com> +Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:09:59 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] bmp_read_rle4_data(): avoid potential infinite loop + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2019-12973 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c +index ec34f535b..2fc4e9bc4 100644 +--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c ++++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c +@@ -632,12 +632,18 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + while (y < height) { + int c = getc(IN); + if (c == EOF) { +- break; ++ return OPJ_FALSE; + } + + if (c) { /* encoded mode */ +- int j; +- OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN); ++ int j, c1_int; ++ OPJ_UINT8 c1; ++ ++ c1_int = getc(IN); ++ if (c1_int == EOF) { ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int; + + for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && + ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) { +@@ -647,7 +653,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + } else { /* absolute mode */ + c = getc(IN); + if (c == EOF) { +- break; ++ return OPJ_FALSE; + } + + if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */ +@@ -658,8 +664,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + break; + } else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */ + c = getc(IN); ++ if (c == EOF) { ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + x += (OPJ_UINT32)c; + c = getc(IN); ++ if (c == EOF) { ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + y += (OPJ_UINT32)c; + pix = pData + y * stride + x; + } else { /* 03 .. 255 : absolute mode */ +@@ -669,13 +681,21 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData, + for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) && + ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) { + if ((j & 1) == 0) { +- c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN); ++ int c1_int; ++ c1_int = getc(IN); ++ if (c1_int == EOF) { ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int; + } + *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU)); + written++; + } + if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */ +- getc(IN); ++ c = getc(IN); ++ if (c == EOF) { ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } + } + } + } diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-15389.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-15389.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f22e153b52 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-15389.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From e8e258ab049240c2dd1f1051b4e773b21e2d3dc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2020 14:19:59 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] opj_decompress: fix double-free on input directory with mix + of valid and invalid images (CVE-2020-15389) + +Fixes #1261 + +Credits to @Ruia-ruia for reporting and analysis. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-15389 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c b/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c +index 7eeb0952f..2634907f0 100644 +--- a/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c ++++ b/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c +@@ -1316,10 +1316,6 @@ static opj_image_t* upsample_image_components(opj_image_t* original) + int main(int argc, char **argv) + { + opj_decompress_parameters parameters; /* decompression parameters */ +- opj_image_t* image = NULL; +- opj_stream_t *l_stream = NULL; /* Stream */ +- opj_codec_t* l_codec = NULL; /* Handle to a decompressor */ +- opj_codestream_index_t* cstr_index = NULL; + + OPJ_INT32 num_images, imageno; + img_fol_t img_fol; +@@ -1393,6 +1389,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + + /*Decoding image one by one*/ + for (imageno = 0; imageno < num_images ; imageno++) { ++ opj_image_t* image = NULL; ++ opj_stream_t *l_stream = NULL; /* Stream */ ++ opj_codec_t* l_codec = NULL; /* Handle to a decompressor */ ++ opj_codestream_index_t* cstr_index = NULL; + + if (!parameters.quiet) { + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-1.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..da06db6db7 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From eaa098b59b346cb88e4d10d505061f669d7134fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 13:49:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Encoder: grow buffer size in + opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() to avoid write heap buffer overflow in + opj_mqc_flush (fixes #1283) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-27814 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c +@@ -1235,9 +1235,11 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_a + + /* +1 is needed for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/835 */ + /* and actually +2 required for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/982 */ ++ /* and +7 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 3) */ ++ /* and +26 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 7) */ + /* TODO: is there a theoretical upper-bound for the compressed code */ + /* block size ? */ +- l_data_size = 2 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) * ++ l_data_size = 26 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) * + (p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32)); + + if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) { diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-2.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9c5894c720 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 15cf3d95814dc931ca0ecb132f81cb152e051bae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 18:14:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Encoder: grow again buffer size in + opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() (fixes #1283) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-27814 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c +@@ -1237,9 +1237,10 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_a + /* and actually +2 required for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/982 */ + /* and +7 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 3) */ + /* and +26 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 7) */ ++ /* and +28 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 44) */ + /* TODO: is there a theoretical upper-bound for the compressed code */ + /* block size ? */ +- l_data_size = 26 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) * ++ l_data_size = 28 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) * + (p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32)); + + if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) { diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-3.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1eb030af46 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 649298dcf84b2f20cfe458d887c1591db47372a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: yuan <zodf0055980@gmail.com> +Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2020 20:41:39 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Encoder: grow again buffer size in + opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() (fixes #1283) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-27814 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 6 ++++-- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c +@@ -1238,10 +1238,12 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_a + /* and +7 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 3) */ + /* and +26 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 7) */ + /* and +28 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 44) */ ++ /* and +33 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 4) */ ++ /* and +63 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 4 -IMF 2K) */ + /* TODO: is there a theoretical upper-bound for the compressed code */ + /* block size ? */ +- l_data_size = 28 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) * +- (p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32)); ++ l_data_size = 63 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) * ++ (p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32)); + + if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) { + if (p_code_block->data) { diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-4.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1c267c313b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814-4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From 4ce7d285a55d29b79880d0566d4b010fe1907aa9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: yuan <zodf0055980@gmail.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 19:00:22 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Encoder: grow again buffer size in + opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() (fixes #1283) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-27814 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c +@@ -1240,9 +1240,10 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_a + /* and +28 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 44) */ + /* and +33 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 4) */ + /* and +63 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 4 -IMF 2K) */ ++ /* and +74 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 4 -n 8 -s 7,7 -I) */ + /* TODO: is there a theoretical upper-bound for the compressed code */ + /* block size ? */ +- l_data_size = 63 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) * ++ l_data_size = 74 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) * + (p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32)); + + if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) { diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27823.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27823.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e4373d0d32 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27823.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From b2072402b7e14d22bba6fb8cde2a1e9996e9a919 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 22:31:51 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] pngtoimage(): fix wrong computation of x1,y1 if -d option is + used, that would result in a heap buffer overflow (fixes #1284) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-27823 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/bin/jp2/convertpng.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertpng.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertpng.c +index 328c91beb..00f596e27 100644 +--- a/src/bin/jp2/convertpng.c ++++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertpng.c +@@ -223,9 +223,9 @@ opj_image_t *pngtoimage(const char *read_idf, opj_cparameters_t * params) + image->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)params->image_offset_x0; + image->y0 = (OPJ_UINT32)params->image_offset_y0; + image->x1 = (OPJ_UINT32)(image->x0 + (width - 1) * (OPJ_UINT32) +- params->subsampling_dx + 1 + image->x0); ++ params->subsampling_dx + 1); + image->y1 = (OPJ_UINT32)(image->y0 + (height - 1) * (OPJ_UINT32) +- params->subsampling_dy + 1 + image->y0); ++ params->subsampling_dy + 1); + + row32s = (OPJ_INT32 *)malloc((size_t)width * nr_comp * sizeof(OPJ_INT32)); + if (row32s == NULL) { diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27824.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27824.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5f3deb4dda --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27824.patch @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +From 6daf5f3e1ec6eff03b7982889874a3de6617db8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 22:37:07 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Encoder: avoid global buffer overflow on irreversible + conversion when too many decomposition levels are specified (fixes #1286) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-27824 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/dwt.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/dwt.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/dwt.c +@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ void opj_dwt_calc_explicit_stepsizes(opj + if (tccp->qntsty == J2K_CCP_QNTSTY_NOQNT) { + stepsize = 1.0; + } else { +- OPJ_FLOAT64 norm = opj_dwt_norms_real[orient][level]; ++ OPJ_FLOAT64 norm = opj_dwt_getnorm_real(level, orient); + stepsize = (1 << (gain)) / norm; + } + opj_dwt_encode_stepsize((OPJ_INT32) floor(stepsize * 8192.0), diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27841.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27841.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..db6d12dc2c --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27841.patch @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +From 00383e162ae2f8fc951f5745bf1011771acb8dce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2020 14:02:17 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] pi.c: avoid out of bounds access with POC (refs + https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1293#issuecomment-737122836) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-27841 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/pi.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- + src/lib/openjp2/pi.h | 10 +++++++-- + src/lib/openjp2/t2.c | 4 ++-- + 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/pi.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/pi.c +@@ -192,10 +192,12 @@ static void opj_get_all_encoding_paramet + * @param p_image the image used to initialize the packet iterator (in fact only the number of components is relevant. + * @param p_cp the coding parameters. + * @param tileno the index of the tile from which creating the packet iterator. ++ * @param manager Event manager + */ + static opj_pi_iterator_t * opj_pi_create(const opj_image_t *p_image, + const opj_cp_t *p_cp, +- OPJ_UINT32 tileno); ++ OPJ_UINT32 tileno, ++ opj_event_mgr_t* manager); + /** + * FIXME DOC + */ +@@ -230,12 +232,6 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_check_next_level( + ========================================================== + */ + +-static void opj_pi_emit_error(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi, const char* msg) +-{ +- (void)pi; +- (void)msg; +-} +- + static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_lrcp(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi) + { + opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL; +@@ -272,7 +268,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_lrcp(opj_pi_ + /* include should be resized when a POC arises, or */ + /* the POC should be rejected */ + if (index >= pi->include_size) { +- opj_pi_emit_error(pi, "Invalid access to pi->include"); ++ opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, "Invalid access to pi->include"); + return OPJ_FALSE; + } + if (!pi->include[index]) { +@@ -318,7 +314,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rlcp(opj_pi_ + index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno * + pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p; + if (index >= pi->include_size) { +- opj_pi_emit_error(pi, "Invalid access to pi->include"); ++ opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, "Invalid access to pi->include"); + return OPJ_FALSE; + } + if (!pi->include[index]) { +@@ -449,7 +445,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_ + index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno * + pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p; + if (index >= pi->include_size) { +- opj_pi_emit_error(pi, "Invalid access to pi->include"); ++ opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, "Invalid access to pi->include"); + return OPJ_FALSE; + } + if (!pi->include[index]) { +@@ -473,6 +469,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_ + opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL; + OPJ_UINT32 index = 0; + ++ if (pi->poc.compno0 >= pi->numcomps || ++ pi->poc.compno1 >= pi->numcomps + 1) { ++ opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, ++ "opj_pi_next_pcrl(): invalid compno0/compno1"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ + if (!pi->first) { + comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno]; + goto LABEL_SKIP; +@@ -580,7 +583,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_ + index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno * + pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p; + if (index >= pi->include_size) { +- opj_pi_emit_error(pi, "Invalid access to pi->include"); ++ opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, "Invalid access to pi->include"); + return OPJ_FALSE; + } + if (!pi->include[index]) { +@@ -604,6 +607,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_ + opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL; + OPJ_UINT32 index = 0; + ++ if (pi->poc.compno0 >= pi->numcomps || ++ pi->poc.compno1 >= pi->numcomps + 1) { ++ opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, ++ "opj_pi_next_cprl(): invalid compno0/compno1"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ + if (!pi->first) { + comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno]; + goto LABEL_SKIP; +@@ -708,7 +718,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_ + index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno * + pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p; + if (index >= pi->include_size) { +- opj_pi_emit_error(pi, "Invalid access to pi->include"); ++ opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, "Invalid access to pi->include"); + return OPJ_FALSE; + } + if (!pi->include[index]) { +@@ -981,7 +991,8 @@ static void opj_get_all_encoding_paramet + + static opj_pi_iterator_t * opj_pi_create(const opj_image_t *image, + const opj_cp_t *cp, +- OPJ_UINT32 tileno) ++ OPJ_UINT32 tileno, ++ opj_event_mgr_t* manager) + { + /* loop*/ + OPJ_UINT32 pino, compno; +@@ -1015,6 +1026,8 @@ static opj_pi_iterator_t * opj_pi_create + l_current_pi = l_pi; + for (pino = 0; pino < l_poc_bound ; ++pino) { + ++ l_current_pi->manager = manager; ++ + l_current_pi->comps = (opj_pi_comp_t*) opj_calloc(image->numcomps, + sizeof(opj_pi_comp_t)); + if (! l_current_pi->comps) { +@@ -1352,7 +1365,8 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_check_next_level( + */ + opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_create_decode(opj_image_t *p_image, + opj_cp_t *p_cp, +- OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no) ++ OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no, ++ opj_event_mgr_t* manager) + { + OPJ_UINT32 numcomps = p_image->numcomps; + +@@ -1407,7 +1421,7 @@ opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_create_decode( + } + + /* memory allocation for pi */ +- l_pi = opj_pi_create(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no); ++ l_pi = opj_pi_create(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no, manager); + if (!l_pi) { + opj_free(l_tmp_data); + opj_free(l_tmp_ptr); +@@ -1552,7 +1566,8 @@ opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_create_decode( + opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_initialise_encode(const opj_image_t *p_image, + opj_cp_t *p_cp, + OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no, +- J2K_T2_MODE p_t2_mode) ++ J2K_T2_MODE p_t2_mode, ++ opj_event_mgr_t* manager) + { + OPJ_UINT32 numcomps = p_image->numcomps; + +@@ -1606,7 +1621,7 @@ opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_initialise_enc + } + + /* memory allocation for pi*/ +- l_pi = opj_pi_create(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no); ++ l_pi = opj_pi_create(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no, manager); + if (!l_pi) { + opj_free(l_tmp_data); + opj_free(l_tmp_ptr); +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/pi.h ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/pi.h +@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ typedef struct opj_pi_iterator { + OPJ_INT32 x, y; + /** FIXME DOC*/ + OPJ_UINT32 dx, dy; ++ /** event manager */ ++ opj_event_mgr_t* manager; + } opj_pi_iterator_t; + + /** @name Exported functions */ +@@ -119,13 +121,15 @@ typedef struct opj_pi_iterator { + * @param cp the coding parameters. + * @param tileno index of the tile being encoded. + * @param t2_mode the type of pass for generating the packet iterator ++ * @param manager Event manager + * + * @return a list of packet iterator that points to the first packet of the tile (not true). + */ + opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_initialise_encode(const opj_image_t *image, + opj_cp_t *cp, + OPJ_UINT32 tileno, +- J2K_T2_MODE t2_mode); ++ J2K_T2_MODE t2_mode, ++ opj_event_mgr_t* manager); + + /** + * Updates the encoding parameters of the codec. +@@ -161,12 +165,14 @@ Create a packet iterator for Decoder + @param image Raw image for which the packets will be listed + @param cp Coding parameters + @param tileno Number that identifies the tile for which to list the packets ++@param manager Event manager + @return Returns a packet iterator that points to the first packet of the tile + @see opj_pi_destroy + */ + opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_create_decode(opj_image_t * image, + opj_cp_t * cp, +- OPJ_UINT32 tileno); ++ OPJ_UINT32 tileno, ++ opj_event_mgr_t* manager); + /** + * Destroys a packet iterator array. + * +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/t2.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/t2.c +@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ OPJ_BOOL opj_t2_encode_packets(opj_t2_t* + l_image->numcomps : 1; + OPJ_UINT32 l_nb_pocs = l_tcp->numpocs + 1; + +- l_pi = opj_pi_initialise_encode(l_image, l_cp, p_tile_no, p_t2_mode); ++ l_pi = opj_pi_initialise_encode(l_image, l_cp, p_tile_no, p_t2_mode, p_manager); + if (!l_pi) { + return OPJ_FALSE; + } +@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ OPJ_BOOL opj_t2_decode_packets(opj_tcd_t + #endif + + /* create a packet iterator */ +- l_pi = opj_pi_create_decode(l_image, l_cp, p_tile_no); ++ l_pi = opj_pi_create_decode(l_image, l_cp, p_tile_no, p_manager); + if (!l_pi) { + return OPJ_FALSE; + } diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27842.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27842.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6984aa8602 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27842.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From fbd30b064f8f9607d500437b6fedc41431fd6cdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 19:51:35 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] opj_t2_encode_packet(): avoid out of bound access of #1294, + but likely not the proper fix + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-27842 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/t2.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/t2.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/t2.c +@@ -711,6 +711,15 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_t2_encode_packet(OPJ + continue; + } + ++ /* Avoid out of bounds access of https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1294 */ ++ /* but likely not a proper fix. */ ++ if (precno >= res->pw * res->ph) { ++ opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR, ++ "opj_t2_encode_packet(): accessing precno=%u >= %u\n", ++ precno, res->pw * res->ph); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ + prc = &band->precincts[precno]; + opj_tgt_reset(prc->incltree); + opj_tgt_reset(prc->imsbtree); diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27843.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27843.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..53c86ea5e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27843.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 38d661a3897052c7ff0b39b30c29cb067e130121 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2020 13:13:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] opj_t2_encode_packet(): avoid out of bound access of #1297, + but likely not the proper fix + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-27843 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/t2.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/t2.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/t2.c +@@ -787,6 +787,15 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_t2_encode_packet(OPJ + continue; + } + ++ /* Avoid out of bounds access of https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1297 */ ++ /* but likely not a proper fix. */ ++ if (precno >= res->pw * res->ph) { ++ opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR, ++ "opj_t2_encode_packet(): accessing precno=%u >= %u\n", ++ precno, res->pw * res->ph); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ + prc = &band->precincts[precno]; + l_nb_blocks = prc->cw * prc->ch; + cblk = prc->cblks.enc; diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27845.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27845.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a1aa49a217 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27845.patch @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From 8f5aff1dff510a964d3901d0fba281abec98ab63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 20:45:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] pi.c: avoid out of bounds access with POC (fixes #1302) + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/openjpeg2/2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1/openjpeg2_2.3.1-1ubuntu4.20.04.1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2020-27845 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + src/lib/openjp2/pi.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/lib/openjp2/pi.c ++++ b/src/lib/openjp2/pi.c +@@ -238,6 +238,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_lrcp(opj_pi_ + opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL; + OPJ_UINT32 index = 0; + ++ if (pi->poc.compno0 >= pi->numcomps || ++ pi->poc.compno1 >= pi->numcomps + 1) { ++ opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, ++ "opj_pi_next_lrcp(): invalid compno0/compno1\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ + if (!pi->first) { + comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno]; + res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno]; +@@ -291,6 +298,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rlcp(opj_pi_ + opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL; + OPJ_UINT32 index = 0; + ++ if (pi->poc.compno0 >= pi->numcomps || ++ pi->poc.compno1 >= pi->numcomps + 1) { ++ opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, ++ "opj_pi_next_rlcp(): invalid compno0/compno1\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ + if (!pi->first) { + comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno]; + res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno]; +@@ -337,6 +351,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_ + opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL; + OPJ_UINT32 index = 0; + ++ if (pi->poc.compno0 >= pi->numcomps || ++ pi->poc.compno1 >= pi->numcomps + 1) { ++ opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, ++ "opj_pi_next_rpcl(): invalid compno0/compno1\n"); ++ return OPJ_FALSE; ++ } ++ + if (!pi->first) { + goto LABEL_SKIP; + } else { +@@ -472,7 +493,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_ + if (pi->poc.compno0 >= pi->numcomps || + pi->poc.compno1 >= pi->numcomps + 1) { + opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, +- "opj_pi_next_pcrl(): invalid compno0/compno1"); ++ "opj_pi_next_pcrl(): invalid compno0/compno1\n"); + return OPJ_FALSE; + } + +@@ -610,7 +631,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_cprl(opj_pi_ + if (pi->poc.compno0 >= pi->numcomps || + pi->poc.compno1 >= pi->numcomps + 1) { + opj_event_msg(pi->manager, EVT_ERROR, +- "opj_pi_next_cprl(): invalid compno0/compno1"); ++ "opj_pi_next_cprl(): invalid compno0/compno1\n"); + return OPJ_FALSE; + } + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg_2.3.1.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg_2.3.1.bb index 2fdcec0ec2..218dc911fe 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg_2.3.1.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/openjpeg/openjpeg_2.3.1.bb @@ -8,8 +8,21 @@ DEPENDS = "libpng tiff lcms zlib" SRC_URI = " \ git://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://0002-Do-not-ask-cmake-to-export-binaries-they-don-t-make-.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-12973-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2019-12973-2.patch \ file://CVE-2020-6851.patch \ file://CVE-2020-8112.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-15389.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27814-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27814-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27814-3.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27814-4.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27823.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27824.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27841.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27842.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27843.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-27845.patch \ " SRCREV = "57096325457f96d8cd07bd3af04fe81d7a2ba788" S = "${WORKDIR}/git" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/spir/spirv-tools_git.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/spir/spirv-tools_git.bb index ec68edf098..a76c97ad60 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/spir/spirv-tools_git.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/spir/spirv-tools_git.bb @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/KhronosGroup/SPIRV-Tools.git;name=spirv-tools;branch git://github.com/KhronosGroup/SPIRV-Headers.git;name=spirv-headers;destsuffix=${DEST_DIR}/spirv-headers;branch=master;protocol=https \ git://github.com/google/effcee.git;name=effcee;destsuffix=${DEST_DIR}/effcee;branch=master;protocol=https \ git://github.com/google/re2.git;name=re2;destsuffix=${DEST_DIR}/re2;branch=master;protocol=https \ - git://github.com/google/googletest.git;name=googletest;destsuffix=${DEST_DIR}/googletest;branch=master;protocol=https \ + git://github.com/google/googletest.git;name=googletest;destsuffix=${DEST_DIR}/googletest;branch=main;protocol=https \ file://0001-Respect-CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR-in-installed-CMake-file.patch \ file://0001-Avoid-pessimizing-std-move-3124.patch \ " diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/c-ares/c-ares_1.16.1.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/c-ares/c-ares_1.16.1.bb index b77604797d..692a5f0d6e 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/c-ares/c-ares_1.16.1.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/c-ares/c-ares_1.16.1.bb @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ SECTION = "libs" LICENSE = "MIT" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE.md;md5=fb997454c8d62aa6a47f07a8cd48b006" -PV = "1.16.0+gitr${SRCPV}" +PV = "1.16.1+gitr${SRCPV}" SRC_URI = "\ git://github.com/c-ares/c-ares.git;branch=main;protocol=https \ diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/imagemagick/imagemagick_7.0.9.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/imagemagick/imagemagick_7.0.9.bb index 26a5d4a4d2..21f51ff155 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/imagemagick/imagemagick_7.0.9.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/imagemagick/imagemagick_7.0.9.bb @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ DEPENDS = "lcms bzip2 jpeg libpng tiff zlib fftw freetype libtool" BASE_PV := "${PV}" PV .= "_13" -SRC_URI = "git://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick.git;branch=master;protocol=https" +SRC_URI = "git://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick.git;branch=main;protocol=https" SRCREV = "15b935d64f613b5a0fc9d3fead5c6ec1b0e3908f" S = "${WORKDIR}/git" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/multipath-tools/multipath-tools_0.8.4.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/multipath-tools/multipath-tools_0.8.4.bb index 3cff3b90e5..90cfd7d202 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/multipath-tools/multipath-tools_0.8.4.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/multipath-tools/multipath-tools_0.8.4.bb @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ DEPENDS = "libdevmapper \ LICENSE = "GPLv2" -SRC_URI = "git://git.opensvc.com/multipath-tools/.git;protocol=http;branch=master \ +SRC_URI = "git://github.com/opensvc/multipath-tools.git;protocol=http;branch=master \ file://multipathd.oe \ file://multipath.conf.example \ file://0021-RH-fixup-udev-rules-for-redhat.patch \ diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2022-22747.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2022-22747.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cccb73187d --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2022-22747.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +# HG changeset patch +# User John M. Schanck <jschanck@mozilla.com> +# Date 1633990165 0 +# Node ID 7ff99e71f3e37faed12bc3cc90a3eed27e3418d0 +# Parent f80fafd04cf82b4d315c8fe42bb4639703f6ee4f +Bug 1735028 - check for missing signedData field r=keeler + +Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D128112 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/raw-rev/7ff99e71f3e37faed12bc3cc90a3eed27e3418d0] +CVE: CVE-2022-22747 +Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com> + +diff --git a/nss/gtests/certdb_gtest/decode_certs_unittest.cc b/nss/gtests/certdb_gtest/decode_certs_unittest.cc +--- a/nss/gtests/certdb_gtest/decode_certs_unittest.cc ++++ b/nss/gtests/certdb_gtest/decode_certs_unittest.cc +@@ -21,8 +21,21 @@ TEST_F(DecodeCertsTest, EmptyCertPackage + unsigned char emptyCertPackage[] = {0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, + 0x48, 0x01, 0x86, 0xf8, 0x42, 0x02, + 0x05, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00}; + EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, CERT_DecodeCertFromPackage( + reinterpret_cast<char*>(emptyCertPackage), + sizeof(emptyCertPackage))); + EXPECT_EQ(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER, PR_GetError()); + } ++ ++TEST_F(DecodeCertsTest, EmptySignedData) { ++ // This represents a PKCS#7 ContentInfo of contentType ++ // 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 (signedData) with missing content. ++ unsigned char emptySignedData[] = {0x30, 0x80, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, ++ 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, ++ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00}; ++ ++ EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, ++ CERT_DecodeCertFromPackage(reinterpret_cast<char*>(emptySignedData), ++ sizeof(emptySignedData))); ++ EXPECT_EQ(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER, PR_GetError()); ++} +diff --git a/nss/lib/pkcs7/certread.c b/nss/lib/pkcs7/certread.c +--- a/nss/lib/pkcs7/certread.c ++++ b/nss/lib/pkcs7/certread.c +@@ -134,16 +134,21 @@ SEC_ReadPKCS7Certs(SECItem *pkcs7Item, C + pkcs7Item) != SECSuccess) { + goto done; + } + + if (GetContentTypeTag(&contentInfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA) { + goto done; + } + ++ if (contentInfo.content.signedData == NULL) { ++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER); ++ goto done; ++ } ++ + rv = SECSuccess; + + certs = contentInfo.content.signedData->certificates; + if (certs) { + count = 0; + + while (*certs) { + count++; diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.51.1.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.51.1.bb index f03473b1a0..8b59f7ea8f 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.51.1.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.51.1.bb @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/security/nss/releases/${VERSIO file://CVE-2020-12403_1.patch \ file://CVE-2020-12403_2.patch \ file://CVE-2021-43527.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-22747.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "6acaf1ddff69306ae30a908881c6f233" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/udisks/udisks2/CVE-2021-3802.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/udisks/udisks2/CVE-2021-3802.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0189833b49 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/udisks/udisks2/CVE-2021-3802.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From 2517b8feb13919c382e53ab5f9b63c5b5ee5b063 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Emilio Pozuelo Monfort <pochu@debian.org> +Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2021 09:29:13 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] udisks2 security update + +mount options: Always use errors=remount-ro for ext filesystems + +Stefan Walter found that udisks2, a service to access and manipulate +storage devices, could cause denial of service via system crash if a +corrupted or specially crafted ext2/3/4 device or image was mounted, +which could happen automatically on certain environments. + +For Debian 9 stretch, this problem has been fixed in version +2.1.8-1+deb9u1. + +Default mount options are focused primarily on data safety, mounting +damaged ext2/3/4 filesystem as readonly would indicate something's wrong. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/u/udisks2/udisks2_2.1.8-1+deb9u1.debian.tar.xz] +CVE: CVE-2021-3802 + +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> + +--- + src/udiskslinuxfilesystem.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/udiskslinuxfilesystem.c b/src/udiskslinuxfilesystem.c +index a5a3898c..eac8cab3 100644 +--- a/src/udiskslinuxfilesystem.c ++++ b/src/udiskslinuxfilesystem.c +@@ -421,6 +421,21 @@ static const gchar *hfsplus_allow[] = { "creator", "type", "umask", "session", " + static const gchar *hfsplus_allow_uid_self[] = { "uid", NULL }; + static const gchar *hfsplus_allow_gid_self[] = { "gid", NULL }; + ++/* ---------------------- ext2 -------------------- */ ++ ++static const gchar *ext2_defaults[] = { "errors=remount-ro", NULL }; ++static const gchar *ext2_allow[] = { "errors=remount-ro", NULL }; ++ ++/* ---------------------- ext3 -------------------- */ ++ ++static const gchar *ext3_defaults[] = { "errors=remount-ro", NULL }; ++static const gchar *ext3_allow[] = { "errors=remount-ro", NULL }; ++ ++/* ---------------------- ext4 -------------------- */ ++ ++static const gchar *ext4_defaults[] = { "errors=remount-ro", NULL }; ++static const gchar *ext4_allow[] = { "errors=remount-ro", NULL }; ++ + /* ------------------------------------------------ */ + /* TODO: support context= */ + +@@ -434,6 +449,9 @@ static const FSMountOptions fs_mount_options[] = + { "udf", udf_defaults, udf_allow, udf_allow_uid_self, udf_allow_gid_self }, + { "exfat", exfat_defaults, exfat_allow, exfat_allow_uid_self, exfat_allow_gid_self }, + { "hfsplus", hfsplus_defaults, hfsplus_allow, hfsplus_allow_uid_self, hfsplus_allow_gid_self }, ++ { "ext2", ext2_defaults, ext2_allow, NULL, NULL }, ++ { "ext3", ext3_defaults, ext3_allow, NULL, NULL }, ++ { "ext4", ext4_defaults, ext4_allow, NULL, NULL }, + }; + + /* ------------------------------------------------ */ diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/udisks/udisks2_git.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/udisks/udisks2_git.bb index c4d0fa75ee..58c8a9899a 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/udisks/udisks2_git.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/udisks/udisks2_git.bb @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ RDEPENDS_${PN} = "acl" SRC_URI = " \ git://github.com/storaged-project/udisks.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ + file://CVE-2021-3802.patch \ " PV = "2.8.4+git${SRCREV}" SRCREV = "db5f487345da2eaa87976450ea51c2c465d9b82e" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-test/googletest/googletest_git.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-test/googletest/googletest_git.bb index 898f23fafb..35fe1bed00 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-test/googletest/googletest_git.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-test/googletest/googletest_git.bb @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ PROVIDES += "gmock gtest" S = "${WORKDIR}/git" SRCREV = "703bd9caab50b139428cea1aaff9974ebee5742e" -SRC_URI = "git://github.com/google/googletest.git;branch=master;protocol=https" +SRC_URI = "git://github.com/google/googletest.git;branch=main;protocol=https" inherit cmake diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2020-26137.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2020-26137.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3cc8bcd02a --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2020-26137.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From 1dd69c5c5982fae7c87a620d487c2ebf7a6b436b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Seth Michael Larson <sethmichaellarson@gmail.com> +Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2020 15:34:48 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] Raise ValueError if method contains control characters + (#1800) + +CVE: CVE-2020-26137 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/1dd69c5c5982fae7c87a620d487c2ebf7a6b436b.patch] +Signed-off-by: Nikhil R <nikhil.r@kpit.com> +Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com> +Comment: Removed one hunk in CHANGES.rst and refresh other to remove +patch fuzz warnings + +--- + src/urllib3/connection.py | 14 ++++++++++++++ + test/with_dummyserver/test_connectionpool.py | 6 ++++++ + 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/urllib3/connection.py b/src/urllib3/connection.py +index 71e6790b1b..f7b1760938 100644 +--- a/src/urllib3/connection.py ++++ b/src/urllib3/connection.py +@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ + from __future__ import absolute_import ++import re + import datetime + import logging + import os +@@ -58,6 +59,8 @@ port_by_scheme = {"http": 80, "https": 443} + # (ie test_recent_date is failing) update it to ~6 months before the current date. + RECENT_DATE = datetime.date(2019, 1, 1) + ++_CONTAINS_CONTROL_CHAR_RE = re.compile(r"[^-!#$%&'*+.^_`|~0-9a-zA-Z]") ++ + + class DummyConnection(object): + """Used to detect a failed ConnectionCls import.""" +@@ -184,6 +187,17 @@ class HTTPConnection(_HTTPConnection, object): + conn = self._new_conn() + self._prepare_conn(conn) + ++ def putrequest(self, method, url, *args, **kwargs): ++ """Send a request to the server""" ++ match = _CONTAINS_CONTROL_CHAR_RE.search(method) ++ if match: ++ raise ValueError( ++ "Method cannot contain non-token characters %r (found at least %r)" ++ % (method, match.group()) ++ ) ++ ++ return _HTTPConnection.putrequest(self, method, url, *args, **kwargs) ++ + def request_chunked(self, method, url, body=None, headers=None): + """ + Alternative to the common request method, which sends the +diff --git a/test/with_dummyserver/test_connectionpool.py b/test/with_dummyserver/test_connectionpool.py +index 57f0dbd2f4..79cbd27185 100644 +--- a/test/with_dummyserver/test_connectionpool.py ++++ b/test/with_dummyserver/test_connectionpool.py +@@ -677,6 +677,12 @@ class TestConnectionPool(HTTPDummyServerTestCase): + with pytest.raises(MaxRetryError): + pool.request("GET", "/test", retries=2) + ++ @pytest.mark.parametrize("char", [" ", "\r", "\n", "\x00"]) ++ def test_invalid_method_not_allowed(self, char): ++ with pytest.raises(ValueError): ++ with HTTPConnectionPool(self.host, self.port) as pool: ++ pool.request("GET" + char, "/") ++ + def test_percent_encode_invalid_target_chars(self): + with HTTPConnectionPool(self.host, self.port) as pool: + r = pool.request("GET", "/echo_params?q=\r&k=\n \n") diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2021-33503.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2021-33503.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..838add9555 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2021-33503.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From 2d4a3fee6de2fa45eb82169361918f759269b4ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Seth Michael Larson <sethmichaellarson@gmail.com> +Date: Wed, 26 May 2021 10:43:12 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Improve performance of sub-authority splitting in URL + +CVE: CVE-2021-33503 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/2d4a3fee6de2fa45eb82169361918f759269b4ec.patch] +Signed-off-by: Nikhil R <nikhil.r@kpit.com> +Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com> +Comment: Refresh hunks to remove patch fuzz warnings + +--- + src/urllib3/util/url.py | 8 +++++--- + test/test_util.py | 10 ++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/urllib3/util/url.py b/src/urllib3/util/url.py +index 6ff238fe3c..81a03da9e3 100644 +--- a/src/urllib3/util/url.py ++++ b/src/urllib3/util/url.py +@@ -63,12 +63,12 @@ IPV6_ADDRZ_RE = re.compile("^" + IPV6_ADDRZ_PAT + "$") + BRACELESS_IPV6_ADDRZ_RE = re.compile("^" + IPV6_ADDRZ_PAT[2:-2] + "$") + ZONE_ID_RE = re.compile("(" + ZONE_ID_PAT + r")\]$") + +-SUBAUTHORITY_PAT = (u"^(?:(.*)@)?(%s|%s|%s)(?::([0-9]{0,5}))?$") % ( ++_HOST_PORT_PAT = ("^(%s|%s|%s)(?::([0-9]{0,5}))?$") % ( + REG_NAME_PAT, + IPV4_PAT, + IPV6_ADDRZ_PAT, + ) +-SUBAUTHORITY_RE = re.compile(SUBAUTHORITY_PAT, re.UNICODE | re.DOTALL) ++_HOST_PORT_RE = re.compile(_HOST_PORT_PAT, re.UNICODE | re.DOTALL) + + UNRESERVED_CHARS = set( + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789._-~" +@@ -368,7 +368,9 @@ def parse_url(url): + scheme = scheme.lower() + + if authority: +- auth, host, port = SUBAUTHORITY_RE.match(authority).groups() ++ auth, _, host_port = authority.rpartition("@") ++ auth = auth or None ++ host, port = _HOST_PORT_RE.match(host_port).groups() + if auth and normalize_uri: + auth = _encode_invalid_chars(auth, USERINFO_CHARS) + if port == "": +diff --git a/test/test_util.py b/test/test_util.py +index a5b68a084b..88409e2d6c 100644 +--- a/test/test_util.py ++++ b/test/test_util.py +@@ -425,6 +425,16 @@ class TestUtil(object): + query="%0D%0ASET%20test%20failure12%0D%0A:8080/test/?test=a", + ), + ), ++ # Tons of '@' causing backtracking ++ ("https://" + ("@" * 10000) + "[", False), ++ ( ++ "https://user:" + ("@" * 10000) + "example.com", ++ Url( ++ scheme="https", ++ auth="user:" + ("%40" * 9999), ++ host="example.com", ++ ), ++ ), + ] + + @pytest.mark.parametrize("url, expected_url", url_vulnerabilities) diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3_1.25.7.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3_1.25.7.bb index 8d987a1f30..73399d9439 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3_1.25.7.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3_1.25.7.bb @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f3c5fd51747d450d4dcf6f923c81f78f811aab8205fda64b0aba34a4e4 inherit pypi setuptools3 -SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2020-7212.patch" - +SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2020-7212.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-26137.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-33503.patch \ + " RDEPENDS_${PN} += "\ ${PYTHON_PN}-certifi \ ${PYTHON_PN}-cryptography \ diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0001-configure-use-pkg-config-for-PCRE-detection.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0001-configure-use-pkg-config-for-PCRE-detection.patch index 6c0286457c..50775be533 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0001-configure-use-pkg-config-for-PCRE-detection.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0001-configure-use-pkg-config-for-PCRE-detection.patch @@ -1,44 +1,43 @@ -From d2cedfa3394365689a3f7c8cfe8e0dd56b29bed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From ba9015386cbc044e111d7c266f13e2be045e4bf1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Koen Kooi <koen.kooi@linaro.org> Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2014 09:10:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] configure: use pkg-config for PCRE detection -Upstream-Status: Pending +Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [embedded specific] Signed-off-by: Koen Kooi <koen.kooi@linaro.org> --- - configure.in | 27 +++++---------------------- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) + configure.in | 26 +++++--------------------- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in -index 9feaceb..dc6ea15 100644 +index 38c1d0a..c799aec 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in -@@ -215,28 +215,11 @@ fi - AC_ARG_WITH(pcre, - APACHE_HELP_STRING(--with-pcre=PATH,Use external PCRE library)) +@@ -221,27 +221,11 @@ else if which $with_pcre 2>/dev/null; then :; else + fi + fi --AC_PATH_PROG(PCRE_CONFIG, pcre-config, false) --if test -d "$with_pcre" && test -x "$with_pcre/bin/pcre-config"; then -- PCRE_CONFIG=$with_pcre/bin/pcre-config --elif test -x "$with_pcre"; then -- PCRE_CONFIG=$with_pcre --fi +-AC_CHECK_TARGET_TOOLS(PCRE_CONFIG, [pcre2-config pcre-config], +- [`which $with_pcre 2>/dev/null`], $with_pcre) - --if test "$PCRE_CONFIG" != "false"; then +-if test "x$PCRE_CONFIG" != "x"; then - if $PCRE_CONFIG --version >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else -- AC_MSG_ERROR([Did not find pcre-config script at $PCRE_CONFIG]) +- AC_MSG_ERROR([Did not find working script at $PCRE_CONFIG]) - fi - case `$PCRE_CONFIG --version` in +- [1[0-9].*]) +- AC_DEFINE(HAVE_PCRE2, 1, [Detected PCRE2]) +- ;; - [[1-5].*]) - AC_MSG_ERROR([Need at least pcre version 6.0]) - ;; - esac - AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using external PCRE library from $PCRE_CONFIG]) - APR_ADDTO(PCRE_INCLUDES, [`$PCRE_CONFIG --cflags`]) -- APR_ADDTO(PCRE_LIBS, [`$PCRE_CONFIG --libs`]) +- APR_ADDTO(PCRE_LIBS, [`$PCRE_CONFIG --libs8 2>/dev/null || $PCRE_CONFIG --libs`]) -else -- AC_MSG_ERROR([pcre-config for libpcre not found. PCRE is required and available from http://pcre.org/]) +- AC_MSG_ERROR([pcre(2)-config for libpcre not found. PCRE is required and available from http://pcre.org/]) -fi +PKG_CHECK_MODULES([PCRE], [libpcre], [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PCRE], [1], [Define if you have PCRE library]) @@ -49,5 +48,5 @@ index 9feaceb..dc6ea15 100644 AC_MSG_NOTICE([]) -- -2.7.4 +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0002-apache2-bump-up-the-core-size-limit-if-CoreDumpDirec.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0002-apache2-bump-up-the-core-size-limit-if-CoreDumpDirec.patch index 85fe6ae4bd..bbe8b325b5 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0002-apache2-bump-up-the-core-size-limit-if-CoreDumpDirec.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0002-apache2-bump-up-the-core-size-limit-if-CoreDumpDirec.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From 7df207ad4d0dcda2ad36e5642296e0dec7e13647 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 5074ab3425e5f1e01fd9cfa2d9b7300ea1b3f38f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2012 11:27:39 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] apache2: bump up the core size limit if CoreDumpDirectory - is configured +Subject: [PATCH] apache2: bump up the core size limit if CoreDumpDirectory is + configured Bump up the core size limit if CoreDumpDirectory is configured. @@ -11,16 +11,15 @@ Upstream-Status: Pending Note: upstreaming was discussed but there are competing desires; there are portability oddities here too. - --- server/core.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) diff --git a/server/core.c b/server/core.c -index eacb54f..7aa841f 100644 +index 090e397..3020090 100644 --- a/server/core.c +++ b/server/core.c -@@ -4965,6 +4965,25 @@ static int core_post_config(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog, apr_pool_t *pte +@@ -5107,6 +5107,25 @@ static int core_post_config(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog, apr_pool_t *pte } apr_pool_cleanup_register(pconf, NULL, ap_mpm_end_gen_helper, apr_pool_cleanup_null); @@ -47,5 +46,5 @@ index eacb54f..7aa841f 100644 } -- -2.7.4 +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0003-apache2-do-not-export-apr-apr-util-symbols-when-usin.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0003-apache2-do-not-export-apr-apr-util-symbols-when-usin.patch index 081a02baa3..adb728ba31 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0003-apache2-do-not-export-apr-apr-util-symbols-when-usin.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0003-apache2-do-not-export-apr-apr-util-symbols-when-usin.patch @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -From ddd560024a6d526187fd126f306b59533ca3f7e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 9c03ed909b8da0e1a288f53fda535a3f15bcf791 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2012 11:27:39 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] apache2: do not export apr/apr-util symbols when using - shared libapr +Subject: [PATCH] apache2: do not export apr/apr-util symbols when using shared + libapr There is no need to "suck in" the apr/apr-util symbols when using a shared libapr{,util}, it just bloats the symbol table; so don't. @@ -10,13 +10,12 @@ a shared libapr{,util}, it just bloats the symbol table; so don't. Upstream-Status: Pending Note: EXPORT_DIRS change is conditional on using shared apr - --- server/Makefile.in | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/server/Makefile.in b/server/Makefile.in -index 1fa3344..f635d76 100644 +index 8111877..8c0c396 100644 --- a/server/Makefile.in +++ b/server/Makefile.in @@ -60,9 +60,6 @@ export_files: @@ -30,5 +29,5 @@ index 1fa3344..f635d76 100644 exports.c: export_files -- -2.7.4 +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0004-apache2-log-the-SELinux-context-at-startup.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0004-apache2-log-the-SELinux-context-at-startup.patch index 78a04d9af4..5d82919685 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0004-apache2-log-the-SELinux-context-at-startup.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0004-apache2-log-the-SELinux-context-at-startup.patch @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From dfa834ebd449df299f54e98f0fb3a7bb4008fb03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 37699e9be04d83c5923644e298f400e077f76e85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2012 11:27:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Log the SELinux context at startup. @@ -8,17 +8,16 @@ Log the SELinux context at startup. Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [other] Note: unlikely to be any interest in this upstream - --- configure.in | 5 +++++ server/core.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in -index dc6ea15..caa6f54 100644 +index c799aec..76811e7 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in -@@ -466,6 +466,11 @@ getloadavg +@@ -491,6 +491,11 @@ getloadavg dnl confirm that a void pointer is large enough to store a long integer APACHE_CHECK_VOID_PTR_LEN @@ -31,10 +30,10 @@ index dc6ea15..caa6f54 100644 [AC_TRY_RUN(#define _GNU_SOURCE #include <unistd.h> diff --git a/server/core.c b/server/core.c -index 7aa841f..79f34db 100644 +index 3020090..8fef5fd 100644 --- a/server/core.c +++ b/server/core.c -@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ +@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ #include <unistd.h> #endif @@ -45,7 +44,7 @@ index 7aa841f..79f34db 100644 /* LimitRequestBody handling */ #define AP_LIMIT_REQ_BODY_UNSET ((apr_off_t) -1) #define AP_DEFAULT_LIMIT_REQ_BODY ((apr_off_t) 0) -@@ -4984,6 +4988,28 @@ static int core_post_config(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog, apr_pool_t *pte +@@ -5126,6 +5130,28 @@ static int core_post_config(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog, apr_pool_t *pte } #endif @@ -75,5 +74,5 @@ index 7aa841f..79f34db 100644 } -- -2.7.4 +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0005-replace-lynx-to-curl-in-apachectl-script.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0005-replace-lynx-to-curl-in-apachectl-script.patch index 47320a9ee5..7b4a1b932b 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0005-replace-lynx-to-curl-in-apachectl-script.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0005-replace-lynx-to-curl-in-apachectl-script.patch @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 7db1b650bb4b01a5194a34cd7573f915656a595b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From e59aab44a28c654e518080693d573ca472ca5a08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yulong Pei <Yulong.pei@windriver.com> Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2011 01:03:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] replace lynx to curl in apachectl script @@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ index 3281c2e..6ab4ba5 100644 *) $HTTPD "$@" -- -2.7.4 +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0006-apache2-fix-the-race-issue-of-parallel-installation.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0006-apache2-fix-the-race-issue-of-parallel-installation.patch index 227d04064b..dbaf01d2c5 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0006-apache2-fix-the-race-issue-of-parallel-installation.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0006-apache2-fix-the-race-issue-of-parallel-installation.patch @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 4f4d7d6b88b6e440263ebeb22dfb40c52bb30fd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From fb09f1fe4525058b16b3d4edb2e3ae693154026e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhenhua Luo <zhenhua.luo@freescale.com> Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2013 18:10:50 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] apache2: fix the race issue of parallel installation @@ -31,5 +31,5 @@ index e2d5bb6..dde5ae0 100755 pathcomp="$pathcomp/" done -- -2.7.4 +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0007-apache2-allow-to-disable-selinux-support.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0007-apache2-allow-to-disable-selinux-support.patch index fed6b5010b..3ff6894409 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0007-apache2-allow-to-disable-selinux-support.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0007-apache2-allow-to-disable-selinux-support.patch @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 964ef2c1af74984602f46e7db938d3b95b148385 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 0686564f64130f230870db8b4846973e3edbd646 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wenzong Fan <wenzong.fan@windriver.com> Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 02:08:27 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] apache2: allow to disable selinux support @@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Wenzong Fan <wenzong.fan@windriver.com> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in -index caa6f54..eab2090 100644 +index 76811e7..4df3ff3 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in -@@ -466,10 +466,16 @@ getloadavg +@@ -491,10 +491,16 @@ getloadavg dnl confirm that a void pointer is large enough to store a long integer APACHE_CHECK_VOID_PTR_LEN @@ -36,5 +36,5 @@ index caa6f54..eab2090 100644 AC_CACHE_CHECK([for gettid()], ac_cv_gettid, [AC_TRY_RUN(#define _GNU_SOURCE -- -2.7.4 +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/apache-configure_perlbin.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0008-Fix-perl-install-directory-to-usr-bin.patch index 61669e3641..dc5b5c88f2 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/apache-configure_perlbin.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0008-Fix-perl-install-directory-to-usr-bin.patch @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 5412077c398dec74321388fe6e593a44c4c80de6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 443d15b91d4e4979d92405610303797663f31102 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: echo <fei.geng@windriver.com> Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2009 03:11:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Fix perl install directory to /usr/bin @@ -11,16 +11,15 @@ error: bad interpreter: No such file or directory Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com> - --- configure.in | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in -index d828512..be7bd25 100644 +index 4df3ff3..4eeb609 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in -@@ -855,10 +855,7 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SERVER_CONFIG_FILE, "${rel_sysconfdir}/${progname}.conf", +@@ -903,10 +903,7 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SERVER_CONFIG_FILE, "${rel_sysconfdir}/${progname}.conf", AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(AP_TYPES_CONFIG_FILE, "${rel_sysconfdir}/mime.types", [Location of the MIME types config file, relative to the Apache root directory]) @@ -32,3 +31,6 @@ index d828512..be7bd25 100644 AC_SUBST(perlbin) dnl If we are running on BSD/OS, we need to use the BSD .include syntax. +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0001-support-apxs.in-force-destdir-to-be-empty-string.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0009-support-apxs.in-force-destdir-to-be-empty-string.patch index bdedd146c2..d1f9bb0f43 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0001-support-apxs.in-force-destdir-to-be-empty-string.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0009-support-apxs.in-force-destdir-to-be-empty-string.patch @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ -From 705c0a7e9d9c1e64ee09fc0b54f6b5a4e27de1ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 43a4ad04e0d8771267a73f98b5918bcd10b167ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trevor Gamblin <trevor.gamblin@windriver.com> Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2020 06:31:35 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] support/apxs.in: force destdir to be empty string -If destdir is assigned to anything other than the empty string, the -search path for apache2 config files is appended to itself, and +If destdir is assigned to anything other than the empty string, the +search path for apache2 config files is appended to itself, and related packages like apache-websocket will be unable to locate them: | cannot open @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Trevor Gamblin <trevor.gamblin@windriver.com> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/support/apxs.in b/support/apxs.in -index 65e1288527..9d96e33728 100644 +index b2705fa..781f2ab 100644 --- a/support/apxs.in +++ b/support/apxs.in @@ -28,10 +28,12 @@ package apxs; @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ index 65e1288527..9d96e33728 100644 my %config_vars = (); -- -2.17.1 +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0008-apache2-do-not-use-relative-path-for-gen_test_char.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0010-apache2-do-not-use-relative-path-for-gen_test_char.patch index 82e9e8c35f..ced8469f3a 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0008-apache2-do-not-use-relative-path-for-gen_test_char.patch +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2/0010-apache2-do-not-use-relative-path-for-gen_test_char.patch @@ -1,16 +1,15 @@ -From b62c4cd2295c98b2ebe12641e5f01590bd96ae94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From d9993cbc33565c0acd29b0127d651dafa2a16975 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2012 11:27:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] apache2: do not use relative path for gen_test_char Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [embedded specific] - --- server/Makefile.in | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/server/Makefile.in b/server/Makefile.in -index f635d76..0d48924 100644 +index 8c0c396..3544f55 100644 --- a/server/Makefile.in +++ b/server/Makefile.in @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ gen_test_char: $(gen_test_char_OBJECTS) @@ -23,5 +22,5 @@ index f635d76..0d48924 100644 util.lo: test_char.h -- -2.7.4 +2.25.1 diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.51.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.53.bb index d6e736d31d..225f6fc4f6 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.51.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/apache2/apache2_2.4.53.bb @@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ SRC_URI = "${APACHE_MIRROR}/httpd/httpd-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://0005-replace-lynx-to-curl-in-apachectl-script.patch \ file://0006-apache2-fix-the-race-issue-of-parallel-installation.patch \ file://0007-apache2-allow-to-disable-selinux-support.patch \ - file://apache-configure_perlbin.patch \ - file://0001-support-apxs.in-force-destdir-to-be-empty-string.patch \ + file://0008-Fix-perl-install-directory-to-usr-bin.patch \ + file://0009-support-apxs.in-force-destdir-to-be-empty-string.patch \ " -SRC_URI_append_class-target = " \ - file://0008-apache2-do-not-use-relative-path-for-gen_test_char.patch \ +SRC_URI:append:class-target = " \ + file://0010-apache2-do-not-use-relative-path-for-gen_test_char.patch \ file://init \ file://apache2-volatile.conf \ file://apache2.service \ @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ SRC_URI_append_class-target = " \ " LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=bddeddfac80b2c9a882241d008bb41c3" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20e01d81fecf077690a4439e3969a9b22a09a8d43c525356e863407741b838f4" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d0bbd1121a57b5f2a6ff92d7b96f8050c5a45d3f14db118f64979d525858db63" S = "${WORKDIR}/httpd-${PV}" diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/files/CVE-2019-20372.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/files/CVE-2019-20372.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..45653e422e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/files/CVE-2019-20372.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 6511195c023bf03e0fb19a36f41f42f4edde6e88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ruslan Ermilov <ru@nginx.com> +Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2019 15:45:46 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Discard request body when redirecting to a URL via + error_page. + +Reported by Bert JW Regeer and Francisco Oca Gonzalez. + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2019-20372 + +Reference to upstream patch: +https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/c1be55f97211d38b69ac0c2027e6812ab8b1b94e + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> +--- + src/http/ngx_http_special_response.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/http/ngx_http_special_response.c b/src/http/ngx_http_special_response.c +index 4ffb2cc8..76e67058 100644 +--- a/src/http/ngx_http_special_response.c ++++ b/src/http/ngx_http_special_response.c +@@ -623,6 +623,12 @@ ngx_http_send_error_page(ngx_http_request_t *r, ngx_http_err_page_t *err_page) + return ngx_http_named_location(r, &uri); + } + ++ r->expect_tested = 1; ++ ++ if (ngx_http_discard_request_body(r) != NGX_OK) { ++ r->keepalive = 0; ++ } ++ + location = ngx_list_push(&r->headers_out.headers); + + if (location == NULL) { +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.16.1.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.16.1.bb index 207642575b..09d58b8fb9 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.16.1.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-webserver/recipes-httpd/nginx/nginx_1.16.1.bb @@ -4,3 +4,5 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=52e384aaac868b755b93ad5535e2d075" SRC_URI[md5sum] = "45a80f75336c980d240987badc3dcf60" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f11c2a6dd1d3515736f0324857957db2de98be862461b5a542a3ac6188dbe32b" + +SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2019-20372.patch" diff --git a/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-tools/tpm2-tools/0001-tpm2_import-fix-fixed-AES-key-CVE-2021-3565.patch b/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-tools/tpm2-tools/0001-tpm2_import-fix-fixed-AES-key-CVE-2021-3565.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3832063967 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-tools/tpm2-tools/0001-tpm2_import-fix-fixed-AES-key-CVE-2021-3565.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 784be35c52a7083b9535bad2fcca416ff9cfd26b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com> +Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 12:22:31 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] tpm2_import: fix fixed AES key CVE-2021-3565 + +tpm2_import used a fixed AES key for the inner wrapper, which means that +a MITM attack would be able to unwrap the imported key. Even the +use of an encrypted session will not prevent this. The TPM only +encrypts the first parameter which is the fixed symmetric key. + +To fix this, ensure the key size is 16 bytes or bigger and use +OpenSSL to generate a secure random AES key. + +Fixes: #2738 + +Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/commit/c069e4f179d5e6653a84fb236816c375dca82515 +CVE: CVE-2021-3565 +Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> +--- + tools/tpm2_import.c | 12 +++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/tools/tpm2_import.c b/tools/tpm2_import.c +index 6404cac..acd8ac8 100644 +--- a/tools/tpm2_import.c ++++ b/tools/tpm2_import.c +@@ -146,7 +146,17 @@ static tool_rc key_import(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, TPM2B_PUBLIC *parent_pub, + TPM2B_DATA enc_sensitive_key = { + .size = parent_pub->publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.symmetric.keyBits.sym / 8 + }; +- memset(enc_sensitive_key.buffer, 0xFF, enc_sensitive_key.size); ++ ++ if(enc_sensitive_key.size < 16) { ++ LOG_ERR("Calculated wrapping keysize is less than 16 bytes, got: %u", enc_sensitive_key.size); ++ return tool_rc_general_error; ++ } ++ ++ int ossl_rc = RAND_bytes(enc_sensitive_key.buffer, enc_sensitive_key.size); ++ if (ossl_rc != 1) { ++ LOG_ERR("RAND_bytes failed: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); ++ return tool_rc_general_error; ++ } + + /* + * Calculate the object name. diff --git a/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-tools/tpm2-tools_4.1.1.bb b/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-tools/tpm2-tools_4.1.1.bb deleted file mode 100644 index e90dcfe6e4..0000000000 --- a/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-tools/tpm2-tools_4.1.1.bb +++ /dev/null @@ -1,17 +0,0 @@ -SUMMARY = "Tools for TPM2." -DESCRIPTION = "tpm2-tools" -LICENSE = "BSD" -LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=0eb1216e46938bd723098d93a23c3bcc" -SECTION = "tpm" - -DEPENDS = "tpm2-abrmd tpm2-tss openssl curl autoconf-archive" - -SRC_URI = "https://github.com/tpm2-software/${BPN}/releases/download/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz" - -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "701ae9e8c8cbdd37d89c8ad774f55395" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "40b9263d8b949bd2bc03a3cd60fa242e27116727467f9bbdd0b5f2539a25a7b1" -SRC_URI[sha1sum] = "d097d321237983435f05c974533ad90e6f20acef" -SRC_URI[sha384sum] = "396547f400e4f5626d7741d77ec543f312d94e6697899f4c36260d15fab3f4f971ad2c0487e6eaa2d60256f3cf68f85f" -SRC_URI[sha512sum] = "25952cf947f0acd16b1a8dbd3ac8573bce85ff970a7e24c290c4f9cd29418e77a3e48ac82c932fbd250887a9303ab301ff92db594c2fffaba47b873382444d26" - -inherit autotools pkgconfig bash-completion diff --git a/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-tools/tpm2-tools_4.1.3.bb b/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-tools/tpm2-tools_4.1.3.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..39854d5121 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-tools/tpm2-tools_4.1.3.bb @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +SUMMARY = "Tools for TPM2." +DESCRIPTION = "tpm2-tools" +LICENSE = "BSD" +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=0eb1216e46938bd723098d93a23c3bcc" +SECTION = "tpm" + +DEPENDS = "tpm2-abrmd tpm2-tss openssl curl autoconf-archive" + +FILESEXTRAPATHS_prepend := "${THISDIR}/${PN}:" + +SRC_URI = "https://github.com/tpm2-software/${BPN}/releases/download/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz" +SRC_URI += "file://0001-tpm2_import-fix-fixed-AES-key-CVE-2021-3565.patch" + +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "48e0f58232b6a86fe4d007acf12af283" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bb5d3310620e75468fe33dbd530bd73dd648c70ec707b4579c74d9f63fc82704" +SRC_URI[sha1sum] = "b2cef4d06817a6859082d50863464a858a493a63" +SRC_URI[sha384sum] = "996c33201c92bcbdbf8f11f84d25a8e2938c330fb7fb66a47eafb3c5a41fab9bcb9a769dc20226accdea2486b626bd68" +SRC_URI[sha512sum] = "bf1ba9f8a4e12c71987650b309710574cc796e78d26c5de1cae77b0e150cea0f3b3695e56415be1994c4a6ad90e8f991d5db603138933fd21c46f7b86148a9b4" + +inherit autotools pkgconfig bash-completion diff --git a/meta-security/recipes-scanners/clamav/clamav_0.101.5.bb b/meta-security/recipes-scanners/clamav/clamav_0.101.5.bb index 47fbae49ff..5fc9ac3eef 100644 --- a/meta-security/recipes-scanners/clamav/clamav_0.101.5.bb +++ b/meta-security/recipes-scanners/clamav/clamav_0.101.5.bb @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ inherit autotools pkgconfig useradd systemd multilib_header multilib_script CLAMAV_UID ?= "clamav" CLAMAV_GID ?= "clamav" -INSTALL_CLAMAV_CVD ?= "1" +INSTALL_CLAMAV_CVD ?= "0" CLAMAV_USR_DIR = "${STAGING_DIR_NATIVE}/usr" CLAMAV_USR_DIR_class-target = "${STAGING_DIR_HOST}/usr" @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[bz2] = "--with-libbz2-prefix=${CLAMAV_USR_DIR}, --disable-bzip2, b PACKAGECONFIG[ncurses] = "--with-libncurses-prefix=${CLAMAV_USR_DIR}, --without-libncurses-prefix, ncurses, " PACKAGECONFIG[systemd] = "--with-systemdsystemunitdir=${systemd_unitdir}/system/, --without-systemdsystemunitdir, " -MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-dev:${bindir}/clamav-config ${PN}-cvd:${localstatedir}/lib/clamav/mirrors.dat" +MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-dev:${bindir}/clamav-config" EXTRA_OECONF_CLAMAV = "--without-libcheck-prefix --disable-unrar \ --disable-mempool \ @@ -71,14 +71,6 @@ do_configure_class-native () { ${S}/configure ${CONFIGUREOPTS} ${EXTRA_OECONF} } -do_compile_append_class-target() { - if [ "${INSTALL_CLAMAV_CVD}" = "1" ]; then - bbnote "CLAMAV creating cvd" - install -d ${S}/clamav_db - ${STAGING_BINDIR_NATIVE}/freshclam --datadir=${S}/clamav_db --config=${WORKDIR}/freshclam-native.conf - fi -} - do_install_append_class-target () { install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir} install -d ${D}/${localstatedir}/lib/clamav @@ -111,7 +103,7 @@ pkg_postinst_ontarget_${PN} () { } -PACKAGES = "${PN} ${PN}-dev ${PN}-dbg ${PN}-daemon ${PN}-doc ${PN}-cvd \ +PACKAGES = "${PN} ${PN}-dev ${PN}-dbg ${PN}-daemon ${PN}-doc \ ${PN}-clamdscan ${PN}-freshclam ${PN}-libclamav ${PN}-staticdev" FILES_${PN} = "${bindir}/clambc ${bindir}/clamscan ${bindir}/clamsubmit \ @@ -155,8 +147,6 @@ FILES_${PN}-doc = "${mandir}/man/* \ ${datadir}/man/* \ ${docdir}/* " -FILES_${PN}-cvd = "${localstatedir}/lib/clamav/*.cvd ${localstatedir}/lib/clamav/*.dat" - USERADD_PACKAGES = "${PN}" GROUPADD_PARAM_${PN} = "--system ${CLAMAV_UID}" USERADD_PARAM_${PN} = "--system -g ${CLAMAV_GID} --home-dir \ diff --git a/meta-security/recipes-scanners/rootkits/chkrootkit_0.53.bb b/meta-security/recipes-scanners/rootkits/chkrootkit_0.53.bb index 4536be3934..8d4b3b5175 100644 --- a/meta-security/recipes-scanners/rootkits/chkrootkit_0.53.bb +++ b/meta-security/recipes-scanners/rootkits/chkrootkit_0.53.bb @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ SECTION = "security" LICENSE = "BSD-2-Clause" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYRIGHT;md5=fdbe53788f7081c63387d8087273f5ff" -SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.pangeia.com.br/pub/seg/pac/${BPN}.tar.gz" +SRC_URI = "http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/universe/c/${BPN}/${BPN}_${PV}.orig.tar.gz" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7262dae33b338976828b5d156b70d159e0043c0db43ada8dee66c97387cf45b5" diff --git a/meta-security/recipes-security/packagegroup/packagegroup-core-security.bb b/meta-security/recipes-security/packagegroup/packagegroup-core-security.bb index fd6da9ecca..bd9abcc134 100644 --- a/meta-security/recipes-security/packagegroup/packagegroup-core-security.bb +++ b/meta-security/recipes-security/packagegroup/packagegroup-core-security.bb @@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ SUMMARY_packagegroup-security-scanners = "Security scanners" RDEPENDS_packagegroup-security-scanners = "\ nikto \ checksecurity \ - ${@bb.utils.contains_any("TUNE_FEATURES", "riscv32 riscv64", "", " clamav clamav-freshclam clamav-cvd",d)} \ + ${@bb.utils.contains_any("TUNE_FEATURES", "riscv32 riscv64", "", " clamav clamav-freshclam",d)} \ " -RDEPENDS_packagegroup-security-scanners_remove_libc-musl = "clamav clamav-freshclam clamav-cvd" +RDEPENDS_packagegroup-security-scanners_remove_libc-musl = "clamav clamav-freshclam" SUMMARY_packagegroup-security-audit = "Security Audit tools " RDEPENDS_packagegroup-security-audit = " \ diff --git a/meta-security/recipes-security/sssd/sssd_1.16.4.bb b/meta-security/recipes-security/sssd/sssd_1.16.4.bb index 916f1ac2a5..186c9e0b9e 100644 --- a/meta-security/recipes-security/sssd/sssd_1.16.4.bb +++ b/meta-security/recipes-security/sssd/sssd_1.16.4.bb @@ -116,10 +116,17 @@ SYSTEMD_SERVICE_${PN} = " \ " SYSTEMD_AUTO_ENABLE = "disable" -FILES_${PN} += "${libdir} ${datadir} ${base_libdir}/security/pam_sss.so" -FILES_${PN}-dev = " ${includedir}/* ${libdir}/*la ${libdir}/*/*la" - -# The package contains symlinks that trip up insane -INSANE_SKIP_${PN} = "dev-so" - -RDEPENDS_${PN} = "bind dbus libldb libpam" +PACKAGES =+ "libsss-sudo libsss-autofs" +ALLOW_EMPTY_libsss-sudo = "1" +ALLOW_EMPTY_libsss-autofs = "1" + +FILES_${PN}-dev += "${libdir}/sssd/modules/lib*.so" +FILES_${PN} += "${base_libdir}/security/pam_sss*.so \ + ${datadir}/dbus-1/system-services/*.service \ + ${libdir}/krb5/* \ + ${libdir}/ldb/* \ + " +FILES_libsss-autofs = "${libdir}/sssd/modules/libsss_autofs.so" +FILES_libsss-sudo = "${libdir}/libsss_sudo.so" + +RDEPENDS_${PN} = "bind dbus libldb libpam libsss-sudo libsss-autofs" diff --git a/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/fetch2/__init__.py b/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/fetch2/__init__.py index dc99914cd9..3e6555bd67 100644 --- a/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/fetch2/__init__.py +++ b/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/fetch2/__init__.py @@ -562,6 +562,9 @@ def verify_checksum(ud, d, precomputed={}): checksum_expected = getattr(ud, "%s_expected" % checksum_id) + if checksum_expected == '': + checksum_expected = None + return { "id": checksum_id, "name": checksum_name, @@ -612,7 +615,7 @@ def verify_checksum(ud, d, precomputed={}): for ci in checksum_infos: if ci["expected"] and ci["expected"] != ci["data"]: - messages.append("File: '%s' has %s checksum %s when %s was " \ + messages.append("File: '%s' has %s checksum '%s' when '%s' was " \ "expected" % (ud.localpath, ci["id"], ci["data"], ci["expected"])) bad_checksum = ci["data"] diff --git a/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/server/process.py b/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/server/process.py index 7b13576274..4bdb84ae37 100644 --- a/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/server/process.py +++ b/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/server/process.py @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import subprocess import errno import re import datetime +import gc import bb.server.xmlrpcserver from bb import daemonize from multiprocessing import queues @@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ class ProcessServer(multiprocessing.Process): try: print("Running command %s" % command) self.command_channel_reply.send(self.cooker.command.runCommand(command)) + print("Command Completed") except Exception as e: logger.exception('Exception in server main event loop running command %s (%s)' % (command, str(e))) @@ -670,8 +672,10 @@ class ConnectionWriter(object): def send(self, obj): obj = multiprocessing.reduction.ForkingPickler.dumps(obj) + gc.disable() with self.wlock: self.writer.send_bytes(obj) + gc.enable() def fileno(self): return self.writer.fileno() diff --git a/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/tests/fetch.py b/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/tests/fetch.py index 44dc0945a0..301c468399 100644 --- a/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/tests/fetch.py +++ b/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/tests/fetch.py @@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ class FetcherNetworkTest(FetcherTest): """ Prevent regression on deeply nested submodules not being checked out properly, even though they were fetched. """ # This repository also has submodules where the module (name), path and url do not align - url = "gitsm://github.com/azure/iotedge.git;protocol=https;rev=d76e0316c6f324345d77c48a83ce836d09392699" + url = "gitsm://github.com/azure/iotedge.git;protocol=https;rev=d76e0316c6f324345d77c48a83ce836d09392699;branch=main" fetcher = bb.fetch.Fetch([url], self.d) fetcher.download() # Previous cwd has been deleted diff --git a/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/tinfoil.py b/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/tinfoil.py index ae69038952..28f1e5623f 100644 --- a/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/tinfoil.py +++ b/poky/bitbake/lib/bb/tinfoil.py @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ class Tinfoil: self.run_actions(config_params) self.recipes_parsed = True - def run_command(self, command, *params): + def run_command(self, command, *params, handle_events=True): """ Run a command on the server (as implemented in bb.command). Note that there are two types of command - synchronous and @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ class Tinfoil: try: result = self.server_connection.connection.runCommand(commandline) finally: - while True: + while handle_events: event = self.wait_event() if not event: break diff --git a/poky/documentation/bsp-guide/bsp.rst b/poky/documentation/bsp-guide/bsp.rst index d0275eea9a..efb5328911 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/bsp-guide/bsp.rst +++ b/poky/documentation/bsp-guide/bsp.rst @@ -166,8 +166,9 @@ section. #. *Determine the BSP Layer You Want:* The Yocto Project supports many BSPs, which are maintained in their own layers or in layers designed to contain several BSPs. To get an idea of machine support through - BSP layers, you can look at the `index of - machines <&YOCTO_RELEASE_DL_URL;/machines>`__ for the release. + BSP layers, you can look at the + :yocto_dl:`index of machines </releases/yocto/&DISTRO_REL_TAG;/machines>` + for the release. #. *Optionally Clone the meta-intel BSP Layer:* If your hardware is based on current Intel CPUs and devices, you can leverage this BSP diff --git a/poky/documentation/conf.py b/poky/documentation/conf.py index 0d61afc9da..df67a5cdf2 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/conf.py +++ b/poky/documentation/conf.py @@ -15,9 +15,27 @@ import os import sys import datetime +try: + import yaml +except ImportError: + sys.stderr.write("The Yocto Project Sphinx documentation requires PyYAML.\ + \nPlease make sure to install pyyaml python package.\n") + sys.exit(1) -current_version = "3.1.13" -bitbake_version = "1.46" +# current_version = "dev" +# bitbake_version = "" # Leave empty for development branch +# Obtain versions from poky.yaml instead +with open("poky.yaml") as data: + buff = data.read() + subst_vars = yaml.safe_load(buff) + if "DOCCONF_VERSION" not in subst_vars: + sys.stderr.write("Please set DOCCONF_VERSION in poky.yaml") + sys.exit(1) + current_version = subst_vars["DOCCONF_VERSION"] + if "BITBAKE_SERIES" not in subst_vars: + sys.stderr.write("Please set BITBAKE_SERIES in poky.yaml") + sys.exit(1) + bitbake_version = subst_vars["BITBAKE_SERIES"] # String used in sidebar version = 'Version: ' + current_version diff --git a/poky/documentation/dev-manual/dev-manual-common-tasks.rst b/poky/documentation/dev-manual/dev-manual-common-tasks.rst index d401d3b4ee..159da6a019 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/dev-manual/dev-manual-common-tasks.rst +++ b/poky/documentation/dev-manual/dev-manual-common-tasks.rst @@ -2168,7 +2168,7 @@ recipe, but which one? You can configure your build to call out the kernel recipe you want by using the :term:`PREFERRED_PROVIDER` variable. As an example, consider the -`x86-base.inc <https://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/poky/tree/meta/conf/machine/include/x86-base.inc>`_ +:yocto_git:`x86-base.inc </cgit/cgit.cgi/poky/tree/meta/conf/machine/include/x86-base.inc>` include file, which is a machine (i.e. :term:`MACHINE`) configuration file. This include file is the reason all x86-based machines use the diff --git a/poky/documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-development-environment.rst b/poky/documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-development-environment.rst index 4bedd6df67..a5469d4d78 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-development-environment.rst +++ b/poky/documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-development-environment.rst @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ files. Git uses "branches" to organize different development efforts. For example, the ``poky`` repository has several branches that include the current "&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;" branch, the "master" branch, and many branches for past Yocto Project releases. You can see all the branches -by going to https://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit.cgi/poky/ and clicking on the +by going to :yocto_git:`/cgit.cgi/poky/` and clicking on the ``[...]`` link beneath the "Branch" heading. Each of these branches represents a specific area of development. The @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Git uses "tags" to mark specific changes in a repository branch structure. Typically, a tag is used to mark a special point such as the final change (or commit) before a project is released. You can see the tags used with the ``poky`` Git repository by going to -https://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit.cgi/poky/ and clicking on the ``[...]`` link +:yocto_git:`/cgit.cgi/poky/` and clicking on the ``[...]`` link beneath the "Tag" heading. Some key tags for the ``poky`` repository are ``jethro-14.0.3``, diff --git a/poky/documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-yp-intro.rst b/poky/documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-yp-intro.rst index f1c725ac27..6dd10f2187 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-yp-intro.rst +++ b/poky/documentation/overview-manual/overview-manual-yp-intro.rst @@ -271,8 +271,8 @@ with the string ``meta-``. , but it is a commonly accepted standard in the Yocto Project community. -For example, if you were to examine the `tree -view <https://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/poky/tree/>`__ of the +For example, if you were to examine the :yocto_git:`tree +view </cgit/cgit.cgi/poky/tree/>` of the ``poky`` repository, you will see several layers: ``meta``, ``meta-skeleton``, ``meta-selftest``, ``meta-poky``, and ``meta-yocto-bsp``. Each of these repositories represents a distinct diff --git a/poky/documentation/poky.yaml b/poky/documentation/poky.yaml index 8da5f5915d..edc23f8aa7 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/poky.yaml +++ b/poky/documentation/poky.yaml @@ -1,11 +1,13 @@ -DISTRO : "3.1.13" +DISTRO : "3.1.15" DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP : "dunfell" DISTRO_NAME : "Dunfell" DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP_MINUS_ONE : "zeus" -YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.13" +YOCTO_DOC_VERSION : "3.1.15" YOCTO_DOC_VERSION_MINUS_ONE : "3.0.4" -DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.13" -POKYVERSION : "23.0.13" +DISTRO_REL_TAG : "yocto-3.1.15" +DOCCONF_VERSION : "3.1.15" +BITBAKE_SERIES : "1.46" +POKYVERSION : "23.0.15" YOCTO_POKY : "poky-&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;-&POKYVERSION;" YOCTO_DL_URL : "https://downloads.yoctoproject.org" YOCTO_AB_URL : "https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org" diff --git a/poky/documentation/profile-manual/profile-manual-usage.rst b/poky/documentation/profile-manual/profile-manual-usage.rst index d3c020a1cf..15cf1efe1c 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/profile-manual/profile-manual-usage.rst +++ b/poky/documentation/profile-manual/profile-manual-usage.rst @@ -1169,9 +1169,8 @@ e.g. 'perf help' or 'perf help record'. However, by default Yocto doesn't install man pages, but perf invokes the man pages for most help functionality. This is a bug and is being -addressed by a Yocto bug: `Bug 3388 - perf: enable man pages for basic -'help' -functionality <https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3388>`__. +addressed by a Yocto bug: :yocto_bugs:`Bug 3388 - perf: enable man pages for basic +'help' functionality </show_bug.cgi?id=3388>`. The man pages in text form, along with some other files, such as a set of examples, can be found in the 'perf' directory of the kernel tree: :: diff --git a/poky/documentation/ref-manual/ref-system-requirements.rst b/poky/documentation/ref-manual/ref-system-requirements.rst index 041f64c598..109aa60d05 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/ref-manual/ref-system-requirements.rst +++ b/poky/documentation/ref-manual/ref-system-requirements.rst @@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ distributions: - Fedora 34 +- Fedora 35 + - CentOS 7.x - Debian GNU/Linux 8.x (Jessie) @@ -73,6 +75,9 @@ distributions: - OpenSUSE Leap 15.2 +- OpenSUSE Leap 15.3 + +- AlmaLinux 8.5 .. note:: @@ -346,7 +351,7 @@ Downloading a Pre-Built ``buildtools`` Tarball Downloading and running a pre-built buildtools installer is the easiest of the two methods by which you can get these tools: -1. Locate and download the ``*.sh`` at &YOCTO_RELEASE_DL_URL;/buildtools/ +1. Locate and download the ``*.sh`` at :yocto_dl:`/releases/yocto/&DISTRO_REL_TAG;/buildtools/` 2. Execute the installation script. Here is an example for the traditional installer: diff --git a/poky/documentation/releases.rst b/poky/documentation/releases.rst index 57e4566e1b..affe63403c 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/releases.rst +++ b/poky/documentation/releases.rst @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ Release Series 3.1 (dunfell) - :yocto_docs:`3.1.11 Documentation </3.1.11>` - :yocto_docs:`3.1.12 Documentation </3.1.12>` - :yocto_docs:`3.1.13 Documentation </3.1.13>` +- :yocto_docs:`3.1.14 Documentation </3.1.14>` ========================== Outdated Release Manuals diff --git a/poky/documentation/sphinx-static/switchers.js b/poky/documentation/sphinx-static/switchers.js index bda15485c0..1d65fa7fae 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/sphinx-static/switchers.js +++ b/poky/documentation/sphinx-static/switchers.js @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ '3.4.1': '3.4.1', '3.3.4': '3.3.4', '3.2.4': '3.2.4', - '3.1.13': '3.1.13', + '3.1.14': '3.1.14', '3.0.4': '3.0.4', '2.7.4': '2.7.4', }; diff --git a/poky/documentation/toaster-manual/toaster-manual-reference.rst b/poky/documentation/toaster-manual/toaster-manual-reference.rst index e5e3531e83..bd3a060eee 100644 --- a/poky/documentation/toaster-manual/toaster-manual-reference.rst +++ b/poky/documentation/toaster-manual/toaster-manual-reference.rst @@ -173,13 +173,13 @@ As shipped, Toaster is configured to work with the following releases: - *Yocto Project &DISTRO; "&DISTRO_NAME;" or OpenEmbedded "&DISTRO_NAME;":* This release causes your Toaster projects to build against the head of the &DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP; branch at - https://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/poky/log/?h=&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP; or + :yocto_git:`/cgit/cgit.cgi/poky/log/?h=&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;` or http://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/commit/?h=&DISTRO_NAME_NO_CAP;. - *Yocto Project "Master" or OpenEmbedded "Master":* This release causes your Toaster Projects to build against the head of the master branch, which is where active development takes place, at - https://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/poky/log/ or + :yocto_git:`/cgit/cgit.cgi/poky/log/` or http://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core/log/. - *Local Yocto Project or Local OpenEmbedded:* This release causes your diff --git a/poky/meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf b/poky/meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf index 7274657037..6ade4e07c8 100644 --- a/poky/meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf +++ b/poky/meta-poky/conf/distro/poky.conf @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ DISTRO = "poky" DISTRO_NAME = "Poky (Yocto Project Reference Distro)" -DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.14" +DISTRO_VERSION = "3.1.15" DISTRO_CODENAME = "dunfell" SDK_VENDOR = "-pokysdk" SDK_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('DISTRO_VERSION').replace('snapshot-${DATE}', 'snapshot')}" @@ -39,16 +39,6 @@ DISTRO_EXTRA_RDEPENDS_append_qemux86-64 = " ${POKYQEMUDEPS}" TCLIBCAPPEND = "" -PREMIRRORS ??= "\ -bzr://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ -cvs://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ -git://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ -gitsm://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ -hg://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ -osc://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ -p4://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ -svn://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n" - SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS ?= " \ poky-2.7 \n \ poky-3.0 \n \ @@ -62,6 +52,7 @@ SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS ?= " \ fedora-32 \n \ fedora-33 \n \ fedora-34 \n \ + fedora-35 \n \ centos-7 \n \ centos-8 \n \ debian-8 \n \ @@ -70,6 +61,8 @@ SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS ?= " \ debian-11 \n \ opensuseleap-15.1 \n \ opensuseleap-15.2 \n \ + opensuseleap-15.3 \n \ + almalinux-8.5 \n \ " # add poky sanity bbclass INHERIT += "poky-sanity" diff --git a/poky/meta-yocto-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bbappend b/poky/meta-yocto-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bbappend index cd059c06c4..b2824cbb1d 100644 --- a/poky/meta-yocto-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bbappend +++ b/poky/meta-yocto-bsp/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bbappend @@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ KMACHINE_genericx86 ?= "common-pc" KMACHINE_genericx86-64 ?= "common-pc-64" KMACHINE_beaglebone-yocto ?= "beaglebone" -SRCREV_machine_genericx86 ?= "76404f1ae59698b6a446dba29c885ca78c69c330" -SRCREV_machine_genericx86-64 ?= "76404f1ae59698b6a446dba29c885ca78c69c330" +SRCREV_machine_genericx86 ?= "e2020dbe2ccaef50d7e8f37a5bf08c68a006a064" +SRCREV_machine_genericx86-64 ?= "e2020dbe2ccaef50d7e8f37a5bf08c68a006a064" SRCREV_machine_edgerouter ?= "706efec4c1e270ec5dda92275898cd465dfdc7dd" SRCREV_machine_beaglebone-yocto ?= "706efec4c1e270ec5dda92275898cd465dfdc7dd" @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ COMPATIBLE_MACHINE_genericx86-64 = "genericx86-64" COMPATIBLE_MACHINE_edgerouter = "edgerouter" COMPATIBLE_MACHINE_beaglebone-yocto = "beaglebone-yocto" -LINUX_VERSION_genericx86 = "5.4.158" -LINUX_VERSION_genericx86-64 = "5.4.158" +LINUX_VERSION_genericx86 = "5.4.178" +LINUX_VERSION_genericx86-64 = "5.4.178" LINUX_VERSION_edgerouter = "5.4.58" LINUX_VERSION_beaglebone-yocto = "5.4.58" diff --git a/poky/meta/classes/buildhistory.bbclass b/poky/meta/classes/buildhistory.bbclass index 2746996cbb..6a1a20653a 100644 --- a/poky/meta/classes/buildhistory.bbclass +++ b/poky/meta/classes/buildhistory.bbclass @@ -865,6 +865,7 @@ python buildhistory_eventhandler() { if os.path.isdir(olddir): shutil.rmtree(olddir) rootdir = e.data.getVar("BUILDHISTORY_DIR") + bb.utils.mkdirhier(rootdir) entries = [ x for x in os.listdir(rootdir) if not x.startswith('.') ] bb.utils.mkdirhier(olddir) for entry in entries: diff --git a/poky/meta/classes/cml1.bbclass b/poky/meta/classes/cml1.bbclass index 8ab240589a..46a19fce32 100644 --- a/poky/meta/classes/cml1.bbclass +++ b/poky/meta/classes/cml1.bbclass @@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ python do_menuconfig() { except OSError: mtime = 0 + # setup native pkg-config variables (kconfig scripts call pkg-config directly, cannot generically be overriden to pkg-config-native) + d.setVar("PKG_CONFIG_DIR", "${STAGING_DIR_NATIVE}${libdir_native}/pkgconfig") + d.setVar("PKG_CONFIG_PATH", "${PKG_CONFIG_DIR}:${STAGING_DATADIR_NATIVE}/pkgconfig") + d.setVar("PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR", "${PKG_CONFIG_DIR}") + d.setVarFlag("PKG_CONFIG_SYSROOT_DIR", "unexport", "1") + # ensure that environment variables are overwritten with this tasks 'd' values + d.appendVar("OE_TERMINAL_EXPORTS", " PKG_CONFIG_DIR PKG_CONFIG_PATH PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR PKG_CONFIG_SYSROOT_DIR") + oe_terminal("sh -c \"make %s; if [ \\$? -ne 0 ]; then echo 'Command failed.'; printf 'Press any key to continue... '; read r; fi\"" % d.getVar('KCONFIG_CONFIG_COMMAND'), d.getVar('PN') + ' Configuration', d) diff --git a/poky/meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass b/poky/meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass index 6eecbdbf13..75c5b92b96 100644 --- a/poky/meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass +++ b/poky/meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass @@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ python do_cve_check () { } addtask cve_check before do_build after do_fetch -do_cve_check[lockfiles] += "${CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE_LOCK}" do_cve_check[depends] = "cve-update-db-native:do_fetch" do_cve_check[nostamp] = "1" @@ -143,6 +142,7 @@ python cve_check_write_rootfs_manifest () { manifest_name = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_MANIFEST") cve_tmp_file = d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_TMP_FILE") + bb.utils.mkdirhier(os.path.dirname(manifest_name)) shutil.copyfile(cve_tmp_file, manifest_name) if manifest_name and os.path.exists(manifest_name): @@ -322,7 +322,8 @@ def get_cve_info(d, cves): import sqlite3 cve_data = {} - conn = sqlite3.connect(d.getVar("CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE")) + db_file = d.expand("file:${CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE}?mode=ro") + conn = sqlite3.connect(db_file, uri=True) for cve in cves: for row in conn.execute("SELECT * FROM NVD WHERE ID IS ?", (cve,)): diff --git a/poky/meta/classes/mirrors.bbclass b/poky/meta/classes/mirrors.bbclass index a36236df9f..669d0cc8ff 100644 --- a/poky/meta/classes/mirrors.bbclass +++ b/poky/meta/classes/mirrors.bbclass @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ ftp://sourceware.org/pub http://ftp.gwdg.de/pub/linux/sources.redhat.com/sourcew cvs://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ svn://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ git://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ +gitsm://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ hg://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ bzr://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ p4://.*/.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ @@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ npm://.*/?.* http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/ \n \ cvs://.*/.* http://sources.openembedded.org/ \n \ svn://.*/.* http://sources.openembedded.org/ \n \ git://.*/.* http://sources.openembedded.org/ \n \ +gitsm://.*/.* http://sources.openembedded.org/ \n \ hg://.*/.* http://sources.openembedded.org/ \n \ bzr://.*/.* http://sources.openembedded.org/ \n \ p4://.*/.* http://sources.openembedded.org/ \n \ diff --git a/poky/meta/classes/python3targetconfig.bbclass b/poky/meta/classes/python3targetconfig.bbclass index fc1025c207..a6e67f1bf8 100644 --- a/poky/meta/classes/python3targetconfig.bbclass +++ b/poky/meta/classes/python3targetconfig.bbclass @@ -15,3 +15,15 @@ do_compile_prepend_class-target() { do_install_prepend_class-target() { export _PYTHON_SYSCONFIGDATA_NAME="_sysconfigdata" } + +do_configure:prepend:class-nativesdk() { + export _PYTHON_SYSCONFIGDATA_NAME="_sysconfigdata" +} + +do_compile:prepend:class-nativesdk() { + export _PYTHON_SYSCONFIGDATA_NAME="_sysconfigdata" +} + +do_install:prepend:class-nativesdk() { + export _PYTHON_SYSCONFIGDATA_NAME="_sysconfigdata" +} diff --git a/poky/meta/classes/sanity.bbclass b/poky/meta/classes/sanity.bbclass index 2325ee2747..37354af9d5 100644 --- a/poky/meta/classes/sanity.bbclass +++ b/poky/meta/classes/sanity.bbclass @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ def check_connectivity(d): msg += " Please ensure your host's network is configured correctly.\n" msg += " If your ISP or network is blocking the above URL,\n" msg += " try with another domain name, for example by setting:\n" - msg += " CONNECTIVITY_CHECK_URIS = \"https://www.yoctoproject.org/\"" + msg += " CONNECTIVITY_CHECK_URIS = \"https://www.example.com/\"" msg += " You could also set BB_NO_NETWORK = \"1\" to disable network\n" msg += " access if all required sources are on local disk.\n" retval = msg diff --git a/poky/meta/classes/sstate.bbclass b/poky/meta/classes/sstate.bbclass index c2720cde92..3d6fb84d63 100644 --- a/poky/meta/classes/sstate.bbclass +++ b/poky/meta/classes/sstate.bbclass @@ -841,14 +841,18 @@ sstate_create_package () { fi chmod 0664 $TFILE # Skip if it was already created by some other process - if [ ! -e ${SSTATE_PKG} ]; then + if [ -h ${SSTATE_PKG} ] && [ ! -e ${SSTATE_PKG} ]; then + # There is a symbolic link, but it links to nothing. + # Forcefully replace it with the new file. + ln -f $TFILE ${SSTATE_PKG} || true + elif [ ! -e ${SSTATE_PKG} ]; then # Move into place using ln to attempt an atomic op. # Abort if it already exists - ln $TFILE ${SSTATE_PKG} && rm $TFILE + ln $TFILE ${SSTATE_PKG} || true else - rm $TFILE + touch ${SSTATE_PKG} 2>/dev/null || true fi - touch ${SSTATE_PKG} 2>/dev/null || true + rm $TFILE } python sstate_sign_package () { @@ -878,7 +882,7 @@ python sstate_report_unihash() { sstate_unpack_package () { tar -xvzf ${SSTATE_PKG} # update .siginfo atime on local/NFS mirror if it is a symbolic link - [ ! -h ${SSTATE_PKG}.siginfo ] || touch -a ${SSTATE_PKG}.siginfo 2>/dev/null || true + [ ! -h ${SSTATE_PKG}.siginfo ] || [ ! -e ${SSTATE_PKG}.siginfo ] || touch -a ${SSTATE_PKG}.siginfo 2>/dev/null || true # update each symbolic link instead of any referenced file touch --no-dereference ${SSTATE_PKG} 2>/dev/null || true [ ! -e ${SSTATE_PKG}.sig ] || touch --no-dereference ${SSTATE_PKG}.sig 2>/dev/null || true @@ -957,7 +961,7 @@ def sstate_checkhashes(sq_data, d, siginfo=False, currentcount=0, summary=True, localdata2 = bb.data.createCopy(localdata) srcuri = "file://" + sstatefile - localdata.setVar('SRC_URI', srcuri) + localdata2.setVar('SRC_URI', srcuri) bb.debug(2, "SState: Attempting to fetch %s" % srcuri) try: diff --git a/poky/meta/classes/uninative.bbclass b/poky/meta/classes/uninative.bbclass index 3c7ccd66f4..4412d7c567 100644 --- a/poky/meta/classes/uninative.bbclass +++ b/poky/meta/classes/uninative.bbclass @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ UNINATIVE_LOADER ?= "${UNINATIVE_STAGING_DIR}-uninative/${BUILD_ARCH}-linux/lib/ UNINATIVE_STAGING_DIR ?= "${STAGING_DIR}" UNINATIVE_URL ?= "unset" -UNINATIVE_TARBALL ?= "${BUILD_ARCH}-nativesdk-libc.tar.xz" +UNINATIVE_TARBALL ?= "${BUILD_ARCH}-nativesdk-libc-${UNINATIVE_VERSION}.tar.xz" # Example checksums #UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] = "dead" #UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] = "dead" diff --git a/poky/meta/conf/distro/include/default-distrovars.inc b/poky/meta/conf/distro/include/default-distrovars.inc index 0240589c81..038acc1504 100644 --- a/poky/meta/conf/distro/include/default-distrovars.inc +++ b/poky/meta/conf/distro/include/default-distrovars.inc @@ -48,4 +48,4 @@ KERNEL_IMAGETYPES ??= "${KERNEL_IMAGETYPE}" # fetch from the network (and warn you if not). To disable the test set # the variable to be empty. # Git example url: git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-firewall-test;protocol=git;rev=master;branch=master -CONNECTIVITY_CHECK_URIS ?= "https://www.example.com/" +CONNECTIVITY_CHECK_URIS ?= "https://yoctoproject.org/connectivity.html" diff --git a/poky/meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc b/poky/meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc index 3165fc93b8..bfe05ce1eb 100644 --- a/poky/meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc +++ b/poky/meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc @@ -6,9 +6,10 @@ # to the distro running on the build machine. # -UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.34" +UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.35" +UNINATIVE_VERSION = "3.5" -UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/3.4/" -UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "3013cdda8f0dc6639ce1c80f33eabce66f06b890bd5b58739a6d7a92a0bb7100" -UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "abed500de584aad63ec237546db20cdd0c69d8870a6f8e94ac31721ace64b376" -UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "126f4f7f6f21084ee140dac3eb4c536b963837826b7c38599db0b512c3377ba2" +UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/${UNINATIVE_VERSION}/" +UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "6de0771bd21e0fcb5e80388e5b561a8023b24083bcbf46e056a089982aff75d7" +UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "8c8745becbfa1c341bae839c7eab56ddf17ce36c303bcd73d3b2f2f788b631c2" +UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "e8047a5748e6f266165da141eb6d08b23674f30e477b0e5505b6403d50fbc4b2" diff --git a/poky/meta/files/common-licenses/Spencer-94 b/poky/meta/files/common-licenses/Spencer-94 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..75ba7f7d2e --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/files/common-licenses/Spencer-94 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +Copyright 1992, 1993, 1994 Henry Spencer. All rights reserved. +This software is not subject to any license of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company or of the Regents of the University of California. + +Permission is granted to anyone to use this software for any purpose on any computer system, and to alter it and redistribute it, subject to the following restrictions: + +1. The author is not responsible for the consequences of use of this software, no matter how awful, even if they arise from flaws in it. + +2. The origin of this software must not be misrepresented, either by explicit claim or by omission. Since few users ever read sources, credits must appear in the documentation. + +3. Altered versions must be plainly marked as such, and must not be misrepresented as being the original software. Since few users ever read sources, credits must appear in the documentation. + +4. This notice may not be removed or altered. diff --git a/poky/meta/files/toolchain-shar-relocate.sh b/poky/meta/files/toolchain-shar-relocate.sh index 3ece04db0a..cee9adbf39 100644 --- a/poky/meta/files/toolchain-shar-relocate.sh +++ b/poky/meta/files/toolchain-shar-relocate.sh @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ fi # fix dynamic loader paths in all ELF SDK binaries native_sysroot=$($SUDO_EXEC cat $env_setup_script |grep 'OECORE_NATIVE_SYSROOT='|cut -d'=' -f2|tr -d '"') -dl_path=$($SUDO_EXEC find $native_sysroot/lib -name "ld-linux*") +dl_path=$($SUDO_EXEC find $native_sysroot/lib -maxdepth 1 -name "ld-linux*") if [ "$dl_path" = "" ] ; then echo "SDK could not be set up. Relocate script unable to find ld-linux.so. Abort!" exit 1 diff --git a/poky/meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/ping.py b/poky/meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/ping.py index f6603f75ec..498f80d0a5 100644 --- a/poky/meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/ping.py +++ b/poky/meta/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/ping.py @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from subprocess import Popen, PIPE from oeqa.runtime.case import OERuntimeTestCase from oeqa.core.decorator.oetimeout import OETimeout +from oeqa.core.exception import OEQATimeoutError class PingTest(OERuntimeTestCase): @@ -13,14 +14,17 @@ class PingTest(OERuntimeTestCase): def test_ping(self): output = '' count = 0 - while count < 5: - cmd = 'ping -c 1 %s' % self.target.ip - proc = Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=PIPE) - output += proc.communicate()[0].decode('utf-8') - if proc.poll() == 0: - count += 1 - else: - count = 0 + try: + while count < 5: + cmd = 'ping -c 1 %s' % self.target.ip + proc = Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=PIPE) + output += proc.communicate()[0].decode('utf-8') + if proc.poll() == 0: + count += 1 + else: + count = 0 + except OEQATimeoutError: + self.fail("Ping timeout error for address %s, count %s, output: %s" % (self.target.ip, count, output)) msg = ('Expected 5 consecutive, got %d.\n' 'ping output is:\n%s' % (count,output)) self.assertEqual(count, 5, msg = msg) diff --git a/poky/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/tinfoil.py b/poky/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/tinfoil.py index 4fcbe594c9..686ce7e6b9 100644 --- a/poky/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/tinfoil.py +++ b/poky/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/tinfoil.py @@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ class TinfoilTests(OESelftestTestCase): with bb.tinfoil.Tinfoil() as tinfoil: tinfoil.prepare(config_only=True) - tinfoil.set_event_mask(['bb.event.FilesMatchingFound', 'bb.command.CommandCompleted']) + tinfoil.set_event_mask(['bb.event.FilesMatchingFound', 'bb.command.CommandCompleted', 'bb.command.CommandFailed', 'bb.command.CommandExit']) # Need to drain events otherwise events that were masked may still be in the queue while tinfoil.wait_event(): pass pattern = 'conf' - res = tinfoil.run_command('testCookerCommandEvent', pattern) + res = tinfoil.run_command('testCookerCommandEvent', pattern, handle_events=False) self.assertTrue(res) eventreceived = False @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ class TinfoilTests(OESelftestTestCase): else: self.fail('Unexpected event: %s' % event) - self.assertTrue(commandcomplete, 'Timed out waiting for CommandCompleted event from bitbake server') + self.assertTrue(commandcomplete, 'Timed out waiting for CommandCompleted event from bitbake server (Matching event received: %s)' % str(eventreceived)) self.assertTrue(eventreceived, 'Did not receive FilesMatchingFound event from bitbake server') def test_setvariable_clean(self): diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eaaa7effae --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 0900f11def2e7fbb4880efff0cd9c9b32f1cdb86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 14:39:45 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] mmap: Fix memory leak when iterating over mapped memory + +When returning from grub_mmap_iterate() the memory allocated to present +is not being released causing it to leak. + +Fixes: CID 96655 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=8cb2848f9699642a698af84b12ba187cab722031] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/mmap/mmap.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c b/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c +index 7ebf32e..8bf235f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c ++++ b/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c +@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ grub_mmap_iterate (grub_memory_hook_t hook, void *hook_data) + hook_data)) + { + grub_free (ctx.scanline_events); ++ grub_free (present); + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + +@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ grub_mmap_iterate (grub_memory_hook_t hook, void *hook_data) + } + + grub_free (ctx.scanline_events); ++ grub_free (present); + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d00821f5c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From f216a75e884ed5e4e94bf86965000dde51148f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2020 15:10:26 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] net/net: Fix possible dereference to of a NULL pointer + +It is always possible that grub_zalloc() could fail, so we should check for +a NULL return. Otherwise we run the risk of dereferencing a NULL pointer. + +Fixes: CID 296221 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=03f2515ae0c503406f1a99a2178405049c6555db] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/net/net.c | 9 +++++++-- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c +index 38f19df..7c2cdf2 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/net.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/net.c +@@ -86,8 +86,13 @@ grub_net_link_layer_add_address (struct grub_net_card *card, + + /* Add sender to cache table. */ + if (card->link_layer_table == NULL) +- card->link_layer_table = grub_zalloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE +- * sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0])); ++ { ++ card->link_layer_table = grub_zalloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE ++ * sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0])); ++ if (card->link_layer_table == NULL) ++ return; ++ } ++ + entry = &(card->link_layer_table[card->new_ll_entry]); + entry->avail = 1; + grub_memcpy (&entry->ll_address, ll, sizeof (entry->ll_address)); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3b4633507d --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 09cc0df477758b60f51fbc0da1dee2f5d54c333d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 17:12:23 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] net/tftp: Fix dangling memory pointer + +The static code analysis tool, Parfait, reported that the valid of +file->data was left referencing memory that was freed by the call to +grub_free(data) where data was initialized from file->data. + +To ensure that there is no unintentional access to this memory +referenced by file->data we should set the pointer to NULL. + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=0cb838b281a68b536a09681f9557ea6a7ac5da7a] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/net/tftp.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/tftp.c b/grub-core/net/tftp.c +index 7d90bf6..f76b19f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/tftp.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/tftp.c +@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ tftp_close (struct grub_file *file) + } + destroy_pq (data); + grub_free (data); ++ file->data = NULL; + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..933416605c --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 8861fa6226f7229105722ba669465e879b56ee2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:32:41 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] kern/parser: Fix resource leak if argc == 0 + +After processing the command-line yet arriving at the point where we are +setting argv, we are allocating memory, even if argc == 0, which makes +no sense since we never put anything into the allocated argv. + +The solution is to simply return that we've successfully processed the +arguments but that argc == 0, and also ensure that argv is NULL when +we're not allocating anything in it. + +There are only 2 callers of this function, and both are handling a zero +value in argc assuming nothing is allocated in argv. + +Fixes: CID 96680 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=d06161b035dde4769199ad65aa0a587a5920012b] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/kern/parser.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/parser.c b/grub-core/kern/parser.c +index 619db31..d1cf061 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/parser.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/parser.c +@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *cmdline, + int i; + + *argc = 0; ++ *argv = NULL; + do + { + if (!rd || !*rd) +@@ -207,6 +208,10 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *cmdline, + (*argc)++; + } + ++ /* If there are no args, then we're done. */ ++ if (!*argc) ++ return 0; ++ + /* Reserve memory for the return values. */ + args = grub_malloc (bp - buffer); + if (!args) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04748befc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +From 16a4d739b19f8680cf93a3c8fa0ae9fc1b1c310b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> +Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 16:53:27 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] efi: Fix some malformed device path arithmetic errors + +Several places we take the length of a device path and subtract 4 from +it, without ever checking that it's >= 4. There are also cases where +this kind of malformation will result in unpredictable iteration, +including treating the length from one dp node as the type in the next +node. These are all errors, no matter where the data comes from. + +This patch adds a checking macro, GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID(), which +can be used in several places, and makes GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH() +return NULL and GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH() evaluate as true when +the length is too small. Additionally, it makes several places in the +code check for and return errors in these cases. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=d2cf823d0e31818d1b7a223daff6d5e006596543] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 13 +++++- + grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c | 9 +++-- + include/grub/efi/api.h | 14 ++++--- + 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c +index ad170c7..6a38080 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c +@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0) + + dp = dp0; + +- while (1) ++ while (dp) + { + grub_efi_uint8_t type = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp); + grub_efi_uint8_t subtype = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp); +@@ -370,9 +370,15 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0) + if (type == GRUB_EFI_MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE + && subtype == GRUB_EFI_FILE_PATH_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE) + { +- grub_efi_uint16_t len; +- len = ((GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp) - 4) +- / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t)); ++ grub_efi_uint16_t len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp); ++ ++ if (len < 4) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ len = (len - 4) / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t); + filesize += GRUB_MAX_UTF8_PER_UTF16 * len + 2; + } + +@@ -388,7 +394,7 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0) + if (!name) + return NULL; + +- while (1) ++ while (dp) + { + grub_efi_uint8_t type = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp); + grub_efi_uint8_t subtype = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp); +@@ -404,8 +410,15 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0) + + *p++ = '/'; + +- len = ((GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp) - 4) +- / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t)); ++ len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp); ++ if (len < 4) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ len = (len - 4) / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t); + fp = (grub_efi_file_path_device_path_t *) dp; + /* According to EFI spec Path Name is NULL terminated */ + while (len > 0 && fp->path_name[len - 1] == 0) +@@ -480,7 +493,26 @@ grub_efi_duplicate_device_path (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp) + ; + p = GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH (p)) + { +- total_size += GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (p); ++ grub_size_t len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (p); ++ ++ /* ++ * In the event that we find a node that's completely garbage, for ++ * example if we get to 0x7f 0x01 0x02 0x00 ... (EndInstance with a size ++ * of 2), GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH() will be true and ++ * GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH() will return NULL, so we won't continue, ++ * and neither should our consumers, but there won't be any error raised ++ * even though the device path is junk. ++ * ++ * This keeps us from passing junk down back to our caller. ++ */ ++ if (len < 4) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ total_size += len; + if (GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (p)) + break; + } +@@ -525,7 +557,7 @@ dump_vendor_path (const char *type, grub_efi_vendor_device_path_t *vendor) + void + grub_efi_print_device_path (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp) + { +- while (1) ++ while (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp)) + { + grub_efi_uint8_t type = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp); + grub_efi_uint8_t subtype = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp); +@@ -937,7 +969,10 @@ grub_efi_compare_device_paths (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp1, + /* Return non-zero. */ + return 1; + +- while (1) ++ if (dp1 == dp2) ++ return 0; ++ ++ while (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp1) && GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp2)) + { + grub_efi_uint8_t type1, type2; + grub_efi_uint8_t subtype1, subtype2; +@@ -973,5 +1008,14 @@ grub_efi_compare_device_paths (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp1, + dp2 = (grub_efi_device_path_t *) ((char *) dp2 + len2); + } + ++ /* ++ * There's no "right" answer here, but we probably don't want to call a valid ++ * dp and an invalid dp equal, so pick one way or the other. ++ */ ++ if (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp1) && !GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp2)) ++ return 1; ++ else if (!GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp1) && GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp2)) ++ return -1; ++ + return 0; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c +index daf8c6b..a8d7b91 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c +@@ -156,9 +156,18 @@ make_file_path (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp, const char *filename) + + size = 0; + d = dp; +- while (1) ++ while (d) + { +- size += GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (d); ++ grub_size_t len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (d); ++ ++ if (len < 4) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ size += len; + if ((GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (d))) + break; + d = GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH (d); +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c +index b7d176b..c50cb54 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c +@@ -516,14 +516,15 @@ grub_cmd_devprop_load (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), + + devhead = buf; + buf = devhead + 1; +- dpstart = buf; ++ dp = dpstart = buf; + +- do ++ while (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp) && buf < bufend) + { +- dp = buf; + buf = (char *) buf + GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp); ++ if (GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (dp)) ++ break; ++ dp = buf; + } +- while (!GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (dp) && buf < bufend); + + dev = grub_xnu_devprop_add_device (dpstart, (char *) buf + - (char *) dpstart); +diff --git a/include/grub/efi/api.h b/include/grub/efi/api.h +index addcbfa..cf1355a 100644 +--- a/include/grub/efi/api.h ++++ b/include/grub/efi/api.h +@@ -625,6 +625,7 @@ typedef struct grub_efi_device_path grub_efi_device_path_protocol_t; + #define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE(dp) ((dp)->type & 0x7f) + #define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE(dp) ((dp)->subtype) + #define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH(dp) ((dp)->length) ++#define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID(dp) ((dp) != NULL && GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp) >= 4) + + /* The End of Device Path nodes. */ + #define GRUB_EFI_END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (0xff & 0x7f) +@@ -633,13 +634,16 @@ typedef struct grub_efi_device_path grub_efi_device_path_protocol_t; + #define GRUB_EFI_END_THIS_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE 0x01 + + #define GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH(dp) \ +- (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp) == GRUB_EFI_END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE \ +- && (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp) \ +- == GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE)) ++ (!GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp) || \ ++ (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp) == GRUB_EFI_END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE \ ++ && (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp) \ ++ == GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE))) + + #define GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH(dp) \ +- ((grub_efi_device_path_t *) ((char *) (dp) \ +- + GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp))) ++ (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp) \ ++ ? ((grub_efi_device_path_t *) \ ++ ((char *) (dp) + GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp))) \ ++ : NULL) + + /* Hardware Device Path. */ + #define GRUB_EFI_HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE 1 diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9d7327cee6 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From d4fd0243920b71cc6e03cc0cadf23b4fe03c352f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:15:25 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi: Fix memory leak on failure + +Free the memory allocated to name before returning on failure. + +Fixes: CID 296222 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=ed286ceba6015d37a9304f04602451c47bf195d7] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c +index 6a38080..baeeef0 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c +@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0) + { + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, + "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len); ++ grub_free (name); + return NULL; + } + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d55709406b --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From be03a18b8767be50f16a845c389fd5ed29aae055 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 15:03:13 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi/mm: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference + +The model of grub_efi_get_memory_map() is that if memory_map is NULL, +then the purpose is to discover how much memory should be allocated to +it for the subsequent call. + +The problem here is that with grub_efi_is_finished set to 1, there is no +check at all that the function is being called with a non-NULL memory_map. + +While this MAY be true, we shouldn't assume it. + +The solution to this is to behave as expected, and if memory_map is NULL, +then don't try to use it and allow memory_map_size to be filled in, and +return 0 as is done later in the code if the buffer is too small (or NULL). + +Additionally, drop unneeded ret = 1. + +Fixes: CID 96632 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=6aee4bfd6973c714056fb7b56890b8d524e94ee1] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c +index b02fab1..5afcef7 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c +@@ -328,15 +328,24 @@ grub_efi_get_memory_map (grub_efi_uintn_t *memory_map_size, + if (grub_efi_is_finished) + { + int ret = 1; +- if (*memory_map_size < finish_mmap_size) ++ ++ if (memory_map != NULL) + { +- grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, *memory_map_size); +- ret = 0; ++ if (*memory_map_size < finish_mmap_size) ++ { ++ grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, *memory_map_size); ++ ret = 0; ++ } ++ else ++ grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, finish_mmap_size); + } + else + { +- grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, finish_mmap_size); +- ret = 1; ++ /* ++ * Incomplete, no buffer to copy into, same as ++ * GRUB_EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL below. ++ */ ++ ret = 0; + } + *memory_map_size = finish_mmap_size; + if (map_key) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..74ffb559e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 9d36bce5d516b6379ba3a0dd1a94a9c035838827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 14:41:27 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regexec: Resolve unused variable + +This is a really minor issue where a variable is being assigned to but +not checked before it is overwritten again. + +The reason for this issue is that we are not building with DEBUG set and +this in turn means that the assert() that reads the value of the +variable match_last is being processed out. + +The solution, move the assignment to match_last in to an ifdef DEBUG too. + +Fixes: CID 292459 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a983d36bd9178d377d2072fd4b11c635fdc404b4] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 + + .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch + +diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +index 46c4e95..9b01152 100644 +--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist ++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh + + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch ++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/no-abort.patch + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..ba51f1b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ ++--- a/lib/regexec.c 2020-10-21 14:25:35.310195912 +0000 +++++ b/lib/regexec.c 2020-10-21 14:32:07.961765604 +0000 ++@@ -828,7 +828,11 @@ ++ break; ++ if (__glibc_unlikely (err != REG_NOMATCH)) ++ goto free_return; +++#ifdef DEBUG +++ /* Only used for assertion below when DEBUG is set, otherwise +++ it will be over-written when we loop around. */ ++ match_last = -1; +++#endif ++ } ++ else ++ break; /* We found a match. */ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b6e3c7edbe --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 2af8df02cca7fd4b584575eac304cd03fa23f5cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 13:54:06 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regcomp: Fix uninitialized token structure + +The code is assuming that the value of br_token.constraint was +initialized to zero when it wasn't. + +While some compilers will ensure that, not all do, so it is better to +fix this explicitly than leave it to chance. + +Fixes: CID 73749 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=75c3d3cec4f408848f575d6d5e30a95bd6313db0] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 + + .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch | 11 +++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch + +diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +index 9b01152..9e55458 100644 +--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist ++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh + + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch ++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/no-abort.patch +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..7b4d9f6 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++--- a/lib/regcomp.c 2020-10-22 13:49:06.770168928 +0000 +++++ b/lib/regcomp.c 2020-10-22 13:50:37.026528298 +0000 ++@@ -3662,7 +3662,7 @@ ++ Idx alloc = 0; ++ #endif /* not RE_ENABLE_I18N */ ++ reg_errcode_t ret; ++- re_token_t br_token; +++ re_token_t br_token = {0}; ++ bin_tree_t *tree; ++ ++ sbcset = (re_bitset_ptr_t) calloc (sizeof (bitset_t), 1); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..102a494561 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From eaf9da8b5f8349c51cfc89dd8e39a1a61f89790a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 14:43:01 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/argp-help: Fix dereference of a possibly NULL state + +All other instances of call to __argp_failure() where there is +a dgettext() call is first checking whether state is NULL before +attempting to dereference it to get the root_argp->argp_domain. + +Fixes: CID 292436 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=3a37bf120a9194c373257c70175cdb5b337bc107] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 + + .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch + +diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +index 9e55458..96d7e69 100644 +--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist ++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh + + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch ++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..813ec09 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++--- a/lib/argp-help.c 2020-10-28 14:32:19.189215988 +0000 +++++ b/lib/argp-help.c 2020-10-28 14:38:21.204673940 +0000 ++@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ ++ if (*(int *)((char *)upptr + up->uparams_offs) >= upptr->rmargin) ++ { ++ __argp_failure (state, 0, 0, ++- dgettext (state->root_argp->argp_domain, +++ dgettext (state == NULL ? NULL +++ : state->root_argp->argp_domain, ++ "\ ++ ARGP_HELP_FMT: %s value is less than or equal to %s"), ++ "rmargin", up->name); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4f43fcf7d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 244dc2b1f518635069a556c424b2e7627f0cf036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:57:14 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regexec: Fix possible null-dereference + +It appears to be possible that the mctx->state_log field may be NULL, +and the name of this function, clean_state_log_if_needed(), suggests +that it should be checking that it is valid to be cleaned before +assuming that it does. + +Fixes: CID 86720 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=0b7f347638153e403ee2dd518af3ce26f4f99647] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 + + .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch + +diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +index 96d7e69..d27d3a9 100644 +--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist ++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh + + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch ++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..db6dac9 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++--- a/lib/regexec.c 2020-10-21 14:25:35.310195912 +0000 +++++ b/lib/regexec.c 2020-11-05 10:55:09.621542984 +0000 ++@@ -1692,6 +1692,9 @@ ++ { ++ Idx top = mctx->state_log_top; ++ +++ if (mctx->state_log == NULL) +++ return REG_NOERROR; +++ ++ if ((next_state_log_idx >= mctx->input.bufs_len ++ && mctx->input.bufs_len < mctx->input.len) ++ || (next_state_log_idx >= mctx->input.valid_len diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0507e0cd66 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 512b6bb380a77233b88c84b7a712896c70281d2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 18:04:22 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regcomp: Fix uninitialized re_token + +This issue has been fixed in the latest version of gnulib, so to +maintain consistency, I've backported that change rather than doing +something different. + +Fixes: CID 73828 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=03477085f9a33789ba6cca7cd49ab9326a1baa0e] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 + + .../gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch | 15 +++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch + +diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +index d27d3a9..ffe6829 100644 +--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist ++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh + + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch ++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..02e0631 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ ++--- a/lib/regcomp.c 2020-11-24 17:06:08.159223858 +0000 +++++ b/lib/regcomp.c 2020-11-24 17:06:15.630253923 +0000 ++@@ -3808,11 +3808,7 @@ ++ create_tree (re_dfa_t *dfa, bin_tree_t *left, bin_tree_t *right, ++ re_token_type_t type) ++ { ++- re_token_t t; ++-#if defined GCC_LINT || defined lint ++- memset (&t, 0, sizeof t); ++-#endif ++- t.type = type; +++ re_token_t t = { .type = type }; ++ return create_token_tree (dfa, left, right, &t); ++ } ++ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1190b0d090 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From c529ca446424f1a9c64f0007dfe31fa7645d13ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 14:44:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] io/lzopio: Resolve unnecessary self-assignment errors + +These 2 assignments are unnecessary since they are just assigning +to themselves. + +Fixes: CID 73643 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=59666e520f44177c97b82a44c169b3b315d63b42] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/io/lzopio.c | 4 ---- + 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/io/lzopio.c b/grub-core/io/lzopio.c +index 3014485..a7d4425 100644 +--- a/grub-core/io/lzopio.c ++++ b/grub-core/io/lzopio.c +@@ -125,8 +125,6 @@ read_block_header (struct grub_lzopio *lzopio) + sizeof (lzopio->block.ucheck)) != + sizeof (lzopio->block.ucheck)) + return -1; +- +- lzopio->block.ucheck = lzopio->block.ucheck; + } + + /* Read checksum of compressed data. */ +@@ -143,8 +141,6 @@ read_block_header (struct grub_lzopio *lzopio) + sizeof (lzopio->block.ccheck)) != + sizeof (lzopio->block.ccheck)) + return -1; +- +- lzopio->block.ccheck = lzopio->block.ccheck; + } + } + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..19d881c1ca --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From f55ffe6bd8b844a8cd9956702f42ac2eb96ad56f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:29:59 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] zstd: Initialize seq_t structure fully + +While many compilers will initialize this to zero, not all will, so it +is better to be sure that fields not being explicitly set are at known +values, and there is code that checks this fields value elsewhere in the +code. + +Fixes: CID 292440 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=2777cf4466719921dbe4b30af358a75e7d76f217] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c b/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c +index 711b5b6..e4b5670 100644 +--- a/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c ++++ b/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c +@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ typedef enum { ZSTD_lo_isRegularOffset, ZSTD_lo_isLongOffset=1 } ZSTD_longOffset + FORCE_INLINE_TEMPLATE seq_t + ZSTD_decodeSequence(seqState_t* seqState, const ZSTD_longOffset_e longOffsets) + { +- seq_t seq; ++ seq_t seq = {0}; + U32 const llBits = seqState->stateLL.table[seqState->stateLL.state].nbAdditionalBits; + U32 const mlBits = seqState->stateML.table[seqState->stateML.state].nbAdditionalBits; + U32 const ofBits = seqState->stateOffb.table[seqState->stateOffb.state].nbAdditionalBits; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..af9fcd45cc --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 0da8ef2e03a8591586b53a29af92d2ace76a04e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 09:49:59 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] kern/partition: Check for NULL before dereferencing input + string + +There is the possibility that the value of str comes from an external +source and continuing to use it before ever checking its validity is +wrong. So, needs fixing. + +Additionally, drop unneeded part initialization. + +Fixes: CID 292444 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=bc9c468a2ce84bc767234eec888b71f1bc744fff] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/kern/partition.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/partition.c b/grub-core/kern/partition.c +index e499147..b10a184 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/partition.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/partition.c +@@ -109,11 +109,14 @@ grub_partition_map_probe (const grub_partition_map_t partmap, + grub_partition_t + grub_partition_probe (struct grub_disk *disk, const char *str) + { +- grub_partition_t part = 0; ++ grub_partition_t part; + grub_partition_t curpart = 0; + grub_partition_t tail; + const char *ptr; + ++ if (str == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ + part = tail = disk->partition; + + for (ptr = str; *ptr;) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1687c75d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +From 0c5d0fd796e6cafba179321de396681a493c4158 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 11:53:03 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: Make sure comp data is freed before exiting from + make_vg() + +Several error handling paths in make_vg() do not free comp data before +jumping to fail2 label and returning from the function. This will leak +memory. So, let's fix all issues of that kind. + +Fixes: CID 73804 + +Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=23e39f50ca7a107f6b66396ed4d177a914dee035] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +index 58f8a53..428415f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +@@ -554,7 +554,11 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + comp->segments = grub_calloc (comp->segment_alloc, + sizeof (*comp->segments)); + if (!comp->segments) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + } + else + { +@@ -562,7 +566,11 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + comp->segment_count = 1; + comp->segments = grub_malloc (sizeof (*comp->segments)); + if (!comp->segments) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + comp->segments->start_extent = 0; + comp->segments->extent_count = lv->size; + comp->segments->layout = 0; +@@ -574,15 +582,26 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + comp->segments->layout = GRUB_RAID_LAYOUT_SYMMETRIC_MASK; + } + else +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->segments); ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + ptr += *ptr + 1; + ptr++; + if (!(vblk[i].flags & 0x10)) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->segments); ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + if (ptr >= vblk[i].dynamic + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic) + || ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic + + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic)) + { ++ grub_free (comp->segments); + grub_free (comp->internal_id); + grub_free (comp); + goto fail2; +@@ -592,6 +611,7 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + if (ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic + + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic)) + { ++ grub_free (comp->segments); + grub_free (comp->internal_id); + grub_free (comp); + goto fail2; +@@ -601,7 +621,12 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + comp->segments->nodes = grub_calloc (comp->segments->node_alloc, + sizeof (*comp->segments->nodes)); + if (!lv->segments->nodes) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->segments); ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + } + + if (lv->segments->node_alloc == lv->segments->node_count) +@@ -611,11 +636,23 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + + if (grub_mul (lv->segments->node_alloc, 2, &lv->segments->node_alloc) || + grub_mul (lv->segments->node_alloc, sizeof (*lv->segments->nodes), &sz)) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->segments->nodes); ++ grub_free (comp->segments); ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + + t = grub_realloc (lv->segments->nodes, sz); + if (!t) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->segments->nodes); ++ grub_free (comp->segments); ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + lv->segments->nodes = t; + } + lv->segments->nodes[lv->segments->node_count].pv = 0; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ecdb230f76 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 253485e8df3c9dedac848567e638157530184295 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com> +Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 10:07:47 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: If failed then free vg variable too + +Fixes: CID 73809 + +Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=e0b83df5da538d2a38f770e60817b3a4b9d5b4d7] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +index 428415f..54713f4 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + { + grub_free (vg->uuid); + grub_free (vg->name); ++ grub_free (vg); + return NULL; + } + grub_memcpy (vg->uuid, label->group_guid, LDM_GUID_STRLEN); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..26932f674c --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 3e1d2f1959acbe5152cdd5818d495f6455d1a158 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 10:00:51 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: Fix memory leak on uninserted lv references + +The problem here is that the memory allocated to the variable lv is not +yet inserted into the list that is being processed at the label fail2. + +As we can already see at line 342, which correctly frees lv before going +to fail2, we should also be doing that at these earlier jumps to fail2. + +Fixes: CID 73824 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=156c281a1625dc73fd350530630c6f2d5673d4f6] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +index 54713f4..e82e989 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +@@ -321,7 +321,10 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + lv->visible = 1; + lv->segments = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*lv->segments)); + if (!lv->segments) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (lv); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + lv->segments->start_extent = 0; + lv->segments->type = GRUB_DISKFILTER_MIRROR; + lv->segments->node_count = 0; +@@ -329,7 +332,10 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + lv->segments->nodes = grub_calloc (lv->segments->node_alloc, + sizeof (*lv->segments->nodes)); + if (!lv->segments->nodes) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (lv); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + ptr = vblk[i].dynamic; + if (ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic + + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic)) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd7fda357d --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 2550aaa0c23fdf8b6c54e00c6b838f2e3aa81fe2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 11:38:31 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] disk/cryptodisk: Fix potential integer overflow + +The encrypt and decrypt functions expect a grub_size_t. So, we need to +ensure that the constant bit shift is using grub_size_t rather than +unsigned int when it is performing the shift. + +Fixes: CID 307788 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a201ad17caa430aa710654fdf2e6ab4c8166f031] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index 5037768..6883f48 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -311,10 +311,10 @@ grub_cryptodisk_endecrypt (struct grub_cryptodisk *dev, + case GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MODE_CBC: + if (do_encrypt) + err = grub_crypto_cbc_encrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i, +- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv); ++ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv); + else + err = grub_crypto_cbc_decrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i, +- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv); ++ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv); + if (err) + return err; + break; +@@ -322,10 +322,10 @@ grub_cryptodisk_endecrypt (struct grub_cryptodisk *dev, + case GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MODE_PCBC: + if (do_encrypt) + err = grub_crypto_pcbc_encrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i, +- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv); ++ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv); + else + err = grub_crypto_pcbc_decrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i, +- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv); ++ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv); + if (err) + return err; + break; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eb459c547f --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 7c1813eeec78892fa651046cc224ae4e80d0c94d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 17:09:31 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] hfsplus: Check that the volume name length is valid + +HFS+ documentation suggests that the maximum filename and volume name is +255 Unicode characters in length. + +So, when converting from big-endian to little-endian, we should ensure +that the name of the volume has a length that is between 0 and 255, +inclusive. + +Fixes: CID 73641 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=2298f6e0d951251bb9ca97d891d1bc8b74515f8c] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c +index dae43be..03c3c4c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c +@@ -1007,6 +1007,15 @@ grub_hfsplus_label (grub_device_t device, char **label) + grub_hfsplus_btree_recptr (&data->catalog_tree, node, ptr); + + label_len = grub_be_to_cpu16 (catkey->namelen); ++ ++ /* Ensure that the length is >= 0. */ ++ if (label_len < 0) ++ label_len = 0; ++ ++ /* Ensure label length is at most 255 Unicode characters. */ ++ if (label_len > 255) ++ label_len = 255; ++ + label_name = grub_calloc (label_len, sizeof (*label_name)); + if (!label_name) + { diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..12418858f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From c757779e5d09719666c3b155afd2421978a107bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 16:41:49 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix possible negative shift operation + +While it is possible for the return value from zfs_log2() to be zero +(0), it is quite unlikely, given that the previous assignment to blksz +is shifted up by SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT (9) before 9 is subtracted at the +assignment to epbs. + +But, while unlikely during a normal operation, it may be that a carefully +crafted ZFS filesystem could result in a zero (0) value to the +dn_datalbkszsec field, which means that the shift left does nothing +and assigns zero (0) to blksz, resulting in a negative epbs value. + +Fixes: CID 73608 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a02091834d3e167320d8a262ff04b8e83c5e616d] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index 36d0373..0c42cba 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -2667,6 +2667,11 @@ dnode_get (dnode_end_t * mdn, grub_uint64_t objnum, grub_uint8_t type, + blksz = grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (mdn->dn.dn_datablkszsec, + mdn->endian) << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT; + epbs = zfs_log2 (blksz) - DNODE_SHIFT; ++ ++ /* While this should never happen, we should check that epbs is not negative. */ ++ if (epbs < 0) ++ epbs = 0; ++ + blkid = objnum >> epbs; + idx = objnum & ((1 << epbs) - 1); + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5ded5520e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From 83fdffc07ec4586b375ab36189f255ffbd8f99c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com> +Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 18:54:49 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix resource leaks while constructing path + +There are several exit points in dnode_get_path() that are causing possible +memory leaks. + +In the while(1) the correct exit mechanism should not be to do a direct return, +but to instead break out of the loop, setting err first if it is not already set. + +The reason behind this is that the dnode_path is a linked list, and while doing +through this loop, it is being allocated and built up - the only way to +correctly unravel it is to traverse it, which is what is being done at the end +of the function outside of the loop. + +Several of the existing exit points correctly did a break, but not all so this +change makes that more consistent and should resolve the leaking of memory as +found by Coverity. + +Fixes: CID 73741 + +Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com> +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=89bdab965805e8d54d7f75349024e1a11cbe2eb8] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index 0c42cba..9087a72 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -2836,8 +2836,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + + if (dnode_path->dn.dn.dn_type != DMU_OT_DIRECTORY_CONTENTS) + { +- grub_free (path_buf); +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, N_("not a directory")); ++ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, N_("not a directory")); ++ break; + } + err = zap_lookup (&(dnode_path->dn), cname, &objnum, + data, subvol->case_insensitive); +@@ -2879,11 +2879,18 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT); + + if (blksz == 0) +- return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "0-sized block"); ++ { ++ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "0-sized block"); ++ break; ++ } + + sym_value = grub_malloc (sym_sz); + if (!sym_value) +- return grub_errno; ++ { ++ err = grub_errno; ++ break; ++ } ++ + for (block = 0; block < (sym_sz + blksz - 1) / blksz; block++) + { + void *t; +@@ -2893,7 +2900,7 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + if (err) + { + grub_free (sym_value); +- return err; ++ break; + } + + movesize = sym_sz - block * blksz; +@@ -2903,6 +2910,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + grub_memcpy (sym_value + block * blksz, t, movesize); + grub_free (t); + } ++ if (err) ++ break; + free_symval = 1; + } + path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sym_sz + grub_strlen (oldpath) + 1); +@@ -2911,7 +2920,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + grub_free (oldpathbuf); + if (free_symval) + grub_free (sym_value); +- return grub_errno; ++ err = grub_errno; ++ break; + } + grub_memcpy (path, sym_value, sym_sz); + if (free_symval) +@@ -2949,11 +2959,12 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + + err = zio_read (bp, dnode_path->dn.endian, &sahdrp, NULL, data); + if (err) +- return err; ++ break; + } + else + { +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "filesystem is corrupt"); ++ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "filesystem is corrupt"); ++ break; + } + + hdrsize = SA_HDR_SIZE (((sa_hdr_phys_t *) sahdrp)); +@@ -2974,7 +2985,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + if (!path_buf) + { + grub_free (oldpathbuf); +- return grub_errno; ++ err = grub_errno; ++ break; + } + grub_memcpy (path, sym_value, sym_sz); + path [sym_sz] = 0; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8df758b41f --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From ec35d862f3567671048aa0d0d8ad1ded1fd25336 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 22:17:04 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix possible integer overflows + +In all cases the problem is that the value being acted upon by +a left-shift is a 32-bit number which is then being used in the +context of a 64-bit number. + +To avoid overflow we ensure that the number being shifted is 64-bit +before the shift is done. + +Fixes: CID 73684, CID 73695, CID 73764 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=302c12ff5714bc455949117c1c9548ccb324d55b] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index 9087a72..b078ccc 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ find_bestub (uberblock_phys_t * ub_array, + ubptr = (uberblock_phys_t *) ((grub_properly_aligned_t *) ub_array + + ((i << ub_shift) + / sizeof (grub_properly_aligned_t))); +- err = uberblock_verify (ubptr, offset, 1 << ub_shift); ++ err = uberblock_verify (ubptr, offset, (grub_size_t) 1 << ub_shift); + if (err) + { + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; +@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ read_device (grub_uint64_t offset, struct grub_zfs_device_desc *desc, + + high = grub_divmod64 ((offset >> desc->ashift) + c, + desc->n_children, &devn); +- csize = bsize << desc->ashift; ++ csize = (grub_size_t) bsize << desc->ashift; + if (csize > len) + csize = len; + +@@ -1635,8 +1635,8 @@ read_device (grub_uint64_t offset, struct grub_zfs_device_desc *desc, + + while (len > 0) + { +- grub_size_t csize; +- csize = ((s / (desc->n_children - desc->nparity)) ++ grub_size_t csize = s; ++ csize = ((csize / (desc->n_children - desc->nparity)) + << desc->ashift); + if (csize > len) + csize = len; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..555dc19168 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From b085da8efda9b81f94aa197ee045226563554fdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 10:56:45 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] zfsinfo: Correct a check for error allocating memory + +While arguably the check for grub_errno is correct, we should really be +checking the return value from the function since it is always possible +that grub_errno was set elsewhere, making this code behave incorrectly. + +Fixes: CID 73668 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=7aab03418ec6a9b991aa44416cb2585aff4e7972] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c +index c8a28ac..bf29180 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c +@@ -358,8 +358,8 @@ grub_cmd_zfs_bootfs (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("one argument expected")); + + devname = grub_file_get_device_name (args[0]); +- if (grub_errno) +- return grub_errno; ++ if (devname == NULL) ++ return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + dev = grub_device_open (devname); + grub_free (devname); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..435130516c --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From 929c2ce8214c53cb95abff57a89556cd18444097 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 12:48:07 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] affs: Fix memory leaks + +The node structure reference is being allocated but not freed if it +reaches the end of the function. If any of the hooks had returned +a non-zero value, then node would have been copied in to the context +reference, but otherwise node is not stored and should be freed. + +Similarly, the call to grub_affs_create_node() replaces the allocated +memory in node with a newly allocated structure, leaking the existing +memory pointed by node. + +Finally, when dir->parent is set, then we again replace node with newly +allocated memory, which seems unnecessary when we copy in the values +from dir->parent immediately after. + +Fixes: CID 73759 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=178ac5107389f8e5b32489d743d6824a5ebf342a] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/fs/affs.c | 18 ++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/affs.c b/grub-core/fs/affs.c +index 220b371..230e26a 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/affs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/affs.c +@@ -400,12 +400,12 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + { + unsigned int i; + struct grub_affs_file file; +- struct grub_fshelp_node *node = 0; ++ struct grub_fshelp_node *node, *orig_node; + struct grub_affs_data *data = dir->data; + grub_uint32_t *hashtable; + + /* Create the directory entries for `.' and `..'. */ +- node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node)); ++ node = orig_node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node)); + if (!node) + return 1; + +@@ -414,9 +414,6 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + return 1; + if (dir->parent) + { +- node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node)); +- if (!node) +- return 1; + *node = *dir->parent; + if (hook ("..", GRUB_FSHELP_DIR, node, hook_data)) + return 1; +@@ -456,17 +453,18 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + + if (grub_affs_create_node (dir, hook, hook_data, &node, &hashtable, + next, &file)) +- return 1; ++ { ++ /* Node has been replaced in function. */ ++ grub_free (orig_node); ++ return 1; ++ } + + next = grub_be_to_cpu32 (file.next); + } + } + +- grub_free (hashtable); +- return 0; +- + fail: +- grub_free (node); ++ grub_free (orig_node); + grub_free (hashtable); + return 0; + } diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f500f1a296 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 9b16d7bcad1c7fea7f26eb2fb3af1a5ca70ba34e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 16:43:37 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] libgcrypt/mpi: Fix possible unintended sign extension + +The array of unsigned char gets promoted to a signed 32-bit int before +it is finally promoted to a size_t. There is the possibility that this +may result in the signed-bit being set for the intermediate signed +32-bit int. We should ensure that the promotion is to the correct type +before we bitwise-OR the values. + +Fixes: CID 96697 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=e8814c811132a70f9b55418f7567378a34ad3883] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> + +--- + grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c +index a3435ed..7ecad27 100644 +--- a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c ++++ b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c +@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ gcry_mpi_scan (struct gcry_mpi **ret_mpi, enum gcry_mpi_format format, + if (len && len < 4) + return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT); + +- n = (s[0] << 24 | s[1] << 16 | s[2] << 8 | s[3]); ++ n = ((size_t)s[0] << 24 | (size_t)s[1] << 16 | (size_t)s[2] << 8 | (size_t)s[3]); + s += 4; + if (len) + len -= 4; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..08299d021e --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From d26c8771293637b0465f2cb67d97cb58bacc62da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 10:41:54 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] libgcrypt/mpi: Fix possible NULL dereference + +The code in gcry_mpi_scan() assumes that buffer is not NULL, but there +is no explicit check for that, so we add one. + +Fixes: CID 73757 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=ae0f3fabeba7b393113d5dc185b6aff9b728136d] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c +index 7ecad27..6fe3891 100644 +--- a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c ++++ b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c +@@ -379,6 +379,9 @@ gcry_mpi_scan (struct gcry_mpi **ret_mpi, enum gcry_mpi_format format, + unsigned int len; + int secure = (buffer && gcry_is_secure (buffer)); + ++ if (!buffer) ++ return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG); ++ + if (format == GCRYMPI_FMT_SSH) + len = 0; + else diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d8c21d88f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From ea12feb69b6af93c7e2fa03df7ac3bd1f4edd599 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 15:31:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] syslinux: Fix memory leak while parsing + +In syslinux_parse_real() the 2 points where return is being called +didn't release the memory stored in buf which is no longer required. + +Fixes: CID 176634 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=95bc016dba94cab3d398dd74160665915cd08ad6] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c | 6 +++++- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c b/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c +index 4afa992..3acc6b4 100644 +--- a/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c ++++ b/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c +@@ -737,7 +737,10 @@ syslinux_parse_real (struct syslinux_menu *menu) + && grub_strncasecmp ("help", ptr3, ptr4 - ptr3) == 0)) + { + if (helptext (ptr5, file, menu)) +- return 1; ++ { ++ grub_free (buf); ++ return 1; ++ } + continue; + } + +@@ -757,6 +760,7 @@ syslinux_parse_real (struct syslinux_menu *menu) + } + fail: + grub_file_close (file); ++ grub_free (buf); + return err; + } + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a26e5bc5b --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 2367049d2021e00d82d19cee923e06a4b04ebc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 18:56:48 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] normal/completion: Fix leaking of memory when processing a + completion + +It is possible for the code to reach the end of the function without +freeing the memory allocated to argv and argc still to be 0. + +We should always call grub_free(argv). The grub_free() will handle +a NULL argument correctly if it reaches that code without the memory +being allocated. + +Fixes: CID 96672 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=9213575b7a95b514bce80be5964a28d407d7d56d] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/normal/completion.c | 10 ++++------ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/normal/completion.c b/grub-core/normal/completion.c +index 5961028..46e473c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/normal/completion.c ++++ b/grub-core/normal/completion.c +@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ char * + grub_normal_do_completion (char *buf, int *restore, + void (*hook) (const char *, grub_completion_type_t, int)) + { +- int argc; +- char **argv; ++ int argc = 0; ++ char **argv = NULL; + + /* Initialize variables. */ + match = 0; +@@ -516,10 +516,8 @@ grub_normal_do_completion (char *buf, int *restore, + + fail: + if (argc != 0) +- { +- grub_free (argv[0]); +- grub_free (argv); +- } ++ grub_free (argv[0]); ++ grub_free (argv); + grub_free (match); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e34a19e12c --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From b136fa14d26d1833ffcb852f86e65da5960cfb99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com> +Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 23:41:24 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] commands/hashsum: Fix a memory leak + +check_list() uses grub_file_getline(), which allocates a buffer. +If the hash list file contains invalid lines, the function leaks +this buffer when it returns an error. + +Fixes: CID 176635 + +Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=8b6f528e52e18b7a69f90b8dc3671d7b1147d9f3] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/commands/hashsum.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c b/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c +index 456ba90..b8a22b0 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c +@@ -128,11 +128,17 @@ check_list (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const char *hashfilename, + high = hextoval (*p++); + low = hextoval (*p++); + if (high < 0 || low < 0) +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list"); ++ { ++ grub_free (buf); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list"); ++ } + expected[i] = (high << 4) | low; + } + if ((p[0] != ' ' && p[0] != '\t') || (p[1] != ' ' && p[1] != '\t')) +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list"); ++ { ++ grub_free (buf); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list"); ++ } + p += 2; + if (prefix) + { +@@ -140,7 +146,10 @@ check_list (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const char *hashfilename, + + filename = grub_xasprintf ("%s/%s", prefix, p); + if (!filename) +- return grub_errno; ++ { ++ grub_free (buf); ++ return grub_errno; ++ } + file = grub_file_open (filename, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH + | (!uncompress ? GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS + : GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE)); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7e4e951245 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 2a1e5659763790201a342f8a897c8c9d8d91b1cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 21:14:31 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] video/efi_gop: Remove unnecessary return value of + grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info() + +The return value of grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info() is never able to be +anything other than GRUB_ERR_NONE. So, rather than continue to return +a value and checking it each time, it is more correct to redefine the +function to not return anything and remove checks of its return value +altogether. + +Fixes: CID 96701 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=fc5951d3b1616055ef81a019a5affc09d13344d0] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/video/efi_gop.c | 25 ++++++------------------- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c b/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c +index 7f9d1c2..db2ee98 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c +@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ grub_video_gop_fill_real_mode_info (unsigned mode, + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + +-static grub_err_t ++static void + grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (unsigned mode, + struct grub_efi_gop_mode_info *in, + struct grub_video_mode_info *out) +@@ -252,8 +252,6 @@ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (unsigned mode, + out->blit_format = GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_BGRA_8888; + out->mode_type |= (GRUB_VIDEO_MODE_TYPE_DOUBLE_BUFFERED + | GRUB_VIDEO_MODE_TYPE_UPDATING_SWAP); +- +- return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + + static int +@@ -266,7 +264,6 @@ grub_video_gop_iterate (int (*hook) (const struct grub_video_mode_info *info, vo + grub_efi_uintn_t size; + grub_efi_status_t status; + struct grub_efi_gop_mode_info *info = NULL; +- grub_err_t err; + struct grub_video_mode_info mode_info; + + status = efi_call_4 (gop->query_mode, gop, mode, &size, &info); +@@ -277,12 +274,7 @@ grub_video_gop_iterate (int (*hook) (const struct grub_video_mode_info *info, vo + continue; + } + +- err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (mode, info, &mode_info); +- if (err) +- { +- grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; +- continue; +- } ++ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (mode, info, &mode_info); + if (hook (&mode_info, hook_arg)) + return 1; + } +@@ -466,13 +458,8 @@ grub_video_gop_setup (unsigned int width, unsigned int height, + + info = gop->mode->info; + +- err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info, +- &framebuffer.mode_info); +- if (err) +- { +- grub_dprintf ("video", "GOP: couldn't fill mode info\n"); +- return err; +- } ++ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info, ++ &framebuffer.mode_info); + + framebuffer.ptr = (void *) (grub_addr_t) gop->mode->fb_base; + framebuffer.offscreen +@@ -486,8 +473,8 @@ grub_video_gop_setup (unsigned int width, unsigned int height, + { + grub_dprintf ("video", "GOP: couldn't allocate shadow\n"); + grub_errno = 0; +- err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info, +- &framebuffer.mode_info); ++ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info, ++ &framebuffer.mode_info); + buffer = framebuffer.ptr; + } + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8165ea3f71 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +From 99ecf5a44b99d529a6405fe276bedcefa3657a0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 15:10:51 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/fbfill: Fix potential integer overflow + +The multiplication of 2 unsigned 32-bit integers may overflow before +promotion to unsigned 64-bit. We should ensure that the multiplication +is done with overflow detection. Additionally, use grub_sub() for +subtraction. + +Fixes: CID 73640, CID 73697, CID 73702, CID 73823 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=7ce3259f67ac2cd93acb0ec0080c24b3b69e66c6] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c b/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c +index 11816d0..a37acd1 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + #include <grub/fbfill.h> + #include <grub/fbutil.h> + #include <grub/types.h> ++#include <grub/safemath.h> + #include <grub/video.h> + + /* Generic filler that works for every supported mode. */ +@@ -61,7 +62,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct32 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst, + + /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line + to the beginning of the next line. */ +- rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width; ++ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) || ++ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip)) ++ return; + + /* Get the start address. */ + dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y); +@@ -98,7 +101,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct24 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst, + #endif + /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line + to the beginning of the next line. */ +- rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width; ++ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) || ++ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip)) ++ return; + + /* Get the start address. */ + dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y); +@@ -131,7 +136,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct16 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst, + + /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line + to the beginning of the next line. */ +- rowskip = (dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width); ++ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) || ++ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip)) ++ return; + + /* Get the start address. */ + dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y); +@@ -161,7 +168,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct8 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst, + + /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line + to the beginning of the next line. */ +- rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width; ++ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) || ++ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip)) ++ return; + + /* Get the start address. */ + dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..544e7f31ae --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +From 69b91f7466a5ad5fb85039a5b4118efb77ad6347 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 14:43:44 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/video_fb: Fix multiple integer overflows + +The calculation of the unsigned 64-bit value is being generated by +multiplying 2, signed or unsigned, 32-bit integers which may overflow +before promotion to unsigned 64-bit. Fix all of them. + +Fixes: CID 73703, CID 73767, CID 73833 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=08e098b1dbf01e96376f594b337491bc4cfa48dd] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c +index 1a602c8..1c9a138 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include <grub/fbutil.h> + #include <grub/bitmap.h> + #include <grub/dl.h> ++#include <grub/safemath.h> + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -1417,15 +1418,23 @@ doublebuf_blit_update_screen (void) + { + if (framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line + <= framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line) +- grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[0] +- + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line +- * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, +- (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data +- + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line +- * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, +- framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch +- * (framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line +- - framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line)); ++ { ++ grub_size_t copy_size; ++ ++ if (grub_sub (framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line, ++ framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line, ©_size) || ++ grub_mul (framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, copy_size, ©_size)) ++ { ++ /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */ ++ return GRUB_ERR_BUG; ++ } ++ ++ grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[0] + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line * ++ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, ++ (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line * ++ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, ++ copy_size); ++ } + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line + = framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.height; + framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line = 0; +@@ -1439,7 +1448,7 @@ grub_video_fb_doublebuf_blit_init (struct grub_video_fbrender_target **back, + volatile void *framebuf) + { + grub_err_t err; +- grub_size_t page_size = mode_info.pitch * mode_info.height; ++ grub_size_t page_size = (grub_size_t) mode_info.pitch * mode_info.height; + + framebuffer.offscreen_buffer = grub_zalloc (page_size); + if (! framebuffer.offscreen_buffer) +@@ -1482,12 +1491,23 @@ doublebuf_pageflipping_update_screen (void) + last_line = framebuffer.previous_dirty.last_line; + + if (first_line <= last_line) +- grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[framebuffer.render_page] +- + first_line * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, +- (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data +- + first_line * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, +- framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch +- * (last_line - first_line)); ++ { ++ grub_size_t copy_size; ++ ++ if (grub_sub (last_line, first_line, ©_size) || ++ grub_mul (framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, copy_size, ©_size)) ++ { ++ /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */ ++ return GRUB_ERR_BUG; ++ } ++ ++ grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[framebuffer.render_page] + first_line * ++ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, ++ (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data + first_line * ++ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, ++ copy_size); ++ } ++ + framebuffer.previous_dirty = framebuffer.current_dirty; + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line + = framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.height; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c82b2c7df0 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From aac5574ff340a665ccc78d4c3d61596ac67acbbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 14:51:30 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/video_fb: Fix possible integer overflow + +It is minimal possibility that the values being used here will overflow. +So, change the code to use the safemath function grub_mul() to ensure +that doesn't happen. + +Fixes: CID 73761 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=08413f2f4edec0e2d9bf15f836f6ee5ca2e379cb] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c +index 1c9a138..ae6b89f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c +@@ -1537,7 +1537,13 @@ doublebuf_pageflipping_init (struct grub_video_mode_info *mode_info, + volatile void *page1_ptr) + { + grub_err_t err; +- grub_size_t page_size = mode_info->pitch * mode_info->height; ++ grub_size_t page_size = 0; ++ ++ if (grub_mul (mode_info->pitch, mode_info->height, &page_size)) ++ { ++ /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */ ++ return GRUB_ERR_BUG; ++ } + + framebuffer.offscreen_buffer = grub_malloc (page_size); + if (! framebuffer.offscreen_buffer) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3fca2aecb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 88361a7fd4e481a76e1159a63c9014fa997ef29c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 15:39:00 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Test for an invalid next marker reference + from a jpeg file + +While it may never happen, and potentially could be caught at the end of +the function, it is worth checking up front for a bad reference to the +next marker just in case of a maliciously crafted file being provided. + +Fixes: CID 73694 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=5f5eb7ca8e971227e95745abe541df3e1509360e] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c +index 31359a4..0b6ce3c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c +@@ -253,6 +253,12 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_quan_table (struct grub_jpeg_data *data) + next_marker = data->file->offset; + next_marker += grub_jpeg_get_word (data); + ++ if (next_marker > data->file->size) ++ { ++ /* Should never be set beyond the size of the file. */ ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: invalid next reference"); ++ } ++ + while (data->file->offset + sizeof (data->quan_table[id]) + 1 + <= next_marker) + { diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..61e5e5797d --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 9433cb3a37c03f22c2fa769121f1f509fd031ae9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 14:44:47 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gfxmenu/gui_list: Remove code that coverity is flagging as + dead + +The test of value for NULL before calling grub_strdup() is not required, +since the if condition prior to this has already tested for value being +NULL and cannot reach this code if it is. + +Fixes: CID 73659 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=4a1aa5917595650efbd46b581368c470ebee42ab] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c b/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c +index 01477cd..df334a6 100644 +--- a/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c ++++ b/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c +@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ list_set_property (void *vself, const char *name, const char *value) + { + self->need_to_recreate_boxes = 1; + grub_free (self->selected_item_box_pattern); +- self->selected_item_box_pattern = value ? grub_strdup (value) : 0; ++ self->selected_item_box_pattern = grub_strdup (value); + self->selected_item_box_pattern_inherit = 0; + } + } diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..34643e10ab --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 7899384c8fdf9ed96566978c49b0c6e40e70703d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 21:47:13 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] loader/bsd: Check for NULL arg up-front + +The code in the next block suggests that it is possible for .set to be +true but .arg may still be NULL. + +This code assumes that it is never NULL, yet later is testing if it is +NULL - that is inconsistent. + +So we should check first if .arg is not NULL, and remove this check that +is being flagged by Coverity since it is no longer required. + +Fixes: CID 292471 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=5d5391b0a05abe76e04c1eb68dcc6cbef5326c4a] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c +index b92cbe9..8432283 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c +@@ -1605,7 +1605,7 @@ grub_cmd_openbsd (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char *argv[]) + kernel_type = KERNEL_TYPE_OPENBSD; + bootflags = grub_bsd_parse_flags (ctxt->state, openbsd_flags); + +- if (ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].set) ++ if (ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].set && ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].arg != NULL) + { + const char *arg = ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].arg; + unsigned type, unit, part; +@@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ grub_cmd_openbsd (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char *argv[]) + "unknown disk type name"); + + unit = grub_strtoul (arg, (char **) &arg, 10); +- if (! (arg && *arg >= 'a' && *arg <= 'z')) ++ if (! (*arg >= 'a' && *arg <= 'z')) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + "only device specifications of form " + "<type><number><lowercase letter> are supported"); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41f09a22fc --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 0a4aa7c16f65cdfaa1013f0796afa929f8d6dc1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 12:53:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Fix memory leak + +The code here is finished with the memory stored in name, but it only +frees it if there curvalue is valid, while it could actually free it +regardless. + +The fix is a simple relocation of the grub_free() to before the test +of curvalue. + +Fixes: CID 96646 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=bcb59ece3263d118510c4440c4da0950f224bb7f] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +index 07232d2..b3029a8 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +@@ -1388,9 +1388,9 @@ grub_xnu_fill_devicetree (void) + name[len] = 0; + + curvalue = grub_xnu_create_value (curkey, name); ++ grub_free (name); + if (!curvalue) + return grub_errno; +- grub_free (name); + + data = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (var->value) + 1); + if (!data) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9ad0fc34c --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From 81117a77a9e945ee5e7c1f12bd5667e2a16cbe32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 12:18:24 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Free driverkey data when an error is detected in + grub_xnu_writetree_toheap() + +... to avoid memory leaks. + +Fixes: CID 96640 + +Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=4b4027b6b1c877d7ab467896b04c7bd1aadcfa15] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +index b3029a8..39ceff8 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +@@ -224,26 +224,33 @@ grub_xnu_writetree_toheap (grub_addr_t *target, grub_size_t *size) + if (! memorymap) + return grub_errno; + +- driverkey = (struct grub_xnu_devtree_key *) grub_malloc (sizeof (*driverkey)); ++ driverkey = (struct grub_xnu_devtree_key *) grub_zalloc (sizeof (*driverkey)); + if (! driverkey) + return grub_errno; + driverkey->name = grub_strdup ("DeviceTree"); + if (! driverkey->name) +- return grub_errno; ++ { ++ err = grub_errno; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + driverkey->datasize = sizeof (*extdesc); + driverkey->next = memorymap->first_child; + memorymap->first_child = driverkey; + driverkey->data = extdesc + = (struct grub_xnu_extdesc *) grub_malloc (sizeof (*extdesc)); + if (! driverkey->data) +- return grub_errno; ++ { ++ err = grub_errno; ++ goto fail; ++ } + + /* Allocate the space based on the size with dummy value. */ + *size = grub_xnu_writetree_get_size (grub_xnu_devtree_root, "/"); + err = grub_xnu_heap_malloc (ALIGN_UP (*size + 1, GRUB_XNU_PAGESIZE), + &src, target); + if (err) +- return err; ++ goto fail; + + /* Put real data in the dummy. */ + extdesc->addr = *target; +@@ -252,6 +259,15 @@ grub_xnu_writetree_toheap (grub_addr_t *target, grub_size_t *size) + /* Write the tree to heap. */ + grub_xnu_writetree_toheap_real (src, grub_xnu_devtree_root, "/"); + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ ++ fail: ++ memorymap->first_child = NULL; ++ ++ grub_free (driverkey->data); ++ grub_free (driverkey->name); ++ grub_free (driverkey); ++ ++ return err; + } + + /* Find a key or value in parent key. */ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8081f7763a --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 778a3fffd19229e5650a1abfb06c974949991cd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com> +Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 10:36:00 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Check if pointer is NULL before using it + +Fixes: CID 73654 + +Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@canonical.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=7c8a2b5d1421a0f2a33d33531f7561f3da93b844] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +index 39ceff8..adc048c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +@@ -667,6 +667,9 @@ grub_xnu_load_driver (char *infoplistname, grub_file_t binaryfile, + char *name, *nameend; + int namelen; + ++ if (infoplistname == NULL) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, N_("missing p-list filename")); ++ + name = get_name_ptr (infoplistname); + nameend = grub_strchr (name, '/'); + +@@ -698,10 +701,7 @@ grub_xnu_load_driver (char *infoplistname, grub_file_t binaryfile, + else + macho = 0; + +- if (infoplistname) +- infoplist = grub_file_open (infoplistname, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_INFO_PLIST); +- else +- infoplist = 0; ++ infoplist = grub_file_open (infoplistname, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_INFO_PLIST); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + if (infoplist) + { diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ea563a41a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 5d2dd0052474a882a22e47cc8c3ed87a01819f6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 18:35:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] util/grub-install: Fix NULL pointer dereferences + +Two grub_device_open() calls does not have associated NULL checks +for returned values. Fix that and appease the Coverity. + +Fixes: CID 314583 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=8b3a95655b4391122e7b0315d8cc6f876caf8183] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + util/grub-install.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/util/grub-install.c b/util/grub-install.c +index a82725f..367350f 100644 +--- a/util/grub-install.c ++++ b/util/grub-install.c +@@ -1775,6 +1775,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) + fill_core_services (core_services); + + ins_dev = grub_device_open (install_drive); ++ if (ins_dev == NULL) ++ grub_util_error ("%s", grub_errmsg); + + bless (ins_dev, core_services, 0); + +@@ -1875,6 +1877,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) + fill_core_services(core_services); + + ins_dev = grub_device_open (install_drive); ++ if (ins_dev == NULL) ++ grub_util_error ("%s", grub_errmsg); + + bless (ins_dev, boot_efi, 1); + if (!removable && update_nvram) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0cd8ec3611 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 3d68daf2567aace4b52bd238cfd4a8111af3bc04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 14:33:50 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] util/grub-editenv: Fix incorrect casting of a signed value + +The return value of ftell() may be negative (-1) on error. While it is +probably unlikely to occur, we should not blindly cast to an unsigned +value without first testing that it is not negative. + +Fixes: CID 73856 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=5dc41edc4eba259c6043ae7698c245ec1baaacc6] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + util/grub-editenv.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/util/grub-editenv.c b/util/grub-editenv.c +index f3662c9..db6f187 100644 +--- a/util/grub-editenv.c ++++ b/util/grub-editenv.c +@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ open_envblk_file (const char *name) + { + FILE *fp; + char *buf; ++ long loc; + size_t size; + grub_envblk_t envblk; + +@@ -143,7 +144,12 @@ open_envblk_file (const char *name) + grub_util_error (_("cannot seek `%s': %s"), name, + strerror (errno)); + +- size = (size_t) ftell (fp); ++ loc = ftell (fp); ++ if (loc < 0) ++ grub_util_error (_("cannot get file location `%s': %s"), name, ++ strerror (errno)); ++ ++ size = (size_t) loc; + + if (fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) + grub_util_error (_("cannot seek `%s': %s"), name, diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..66d7c0aa42 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From e301a0f38a2130eb80f346c31e43bf5089af583c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 15:04:28 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] util/glue-efi: Fix incorrect use of a possibly negative value + +It is possible for the ftell() function to return a negative value, +although it is fairly unlikely here, we should be checking for +a negative value before we assign it to an unsigned value. + +Fixes: CID 73744 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=1641d74e16f9d1ca35ba1a87ee4a0bf3afa48e72] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + util/glue-efi.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/util/glue-efi.c b/util/glue-efi.c +index 68f5316..de0fa6d 100644 +--- a/util/glue-efi.c ++++ b/util/glue-efi.c +@@ -39,13 +39,23 @@ write_fat (FILE *in32, FILE *in64, FILE *out, const char *out_filename, + struct grub_macho_fat_header head; + struct grub_macho_fat_arch arch32, arch64; + grub_uint32_t size32, size64; ++ long size; + char *buf; + + fseek (in32, 0, SEEK_END); +- size32 = ftell (in32); ++ size = ftell (in32); ++ if (size < 0) ++ grub_util_error ("cannot get end of input file '%s': %s", ++ name32, strerror (errno)); ++ size32 = (grub_uint32_t) size; + fseek (in32, 0, SEEK_SET); ++ + fseek (in64, 0, SEEK_END); +- size64 = ftell (in64); ++ size = ftell (in64); ++ if (size < 0) ++ grub_util_error ("cannot get end of input file '%s': %s", ++ name64, strerror (errno)); ++ size64 = (grub_uint64_t) size; + fseek (in64, 0, SEEK_SET); + + head.magic = grub_cpu_to_le32_compile_time (GRUB_MACHO_FAT_EFI_MAGIC); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b279222fff --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From f5fb56954e5926ced42a980c3e0842ffd5fea2aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> +Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 23:05:13 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Fix NULL dereference in + grub_script_execute_cmdline() + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=41ae93b2e6c75453514629bcfe684300e3aec0ce] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/script/execute.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c +index 7e028e1..5ea2aef 100644 +--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c ++++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c +@@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ grub_script_execute_cmdline (struct grub_script_cmd *cmd) + struct grub_script_argv argv = { 0, 0, 0 }; + + /* Lookup the command. */ +- if (grub_script_arglist_to_argv (cmdline->arglist, &argv) || ! argv.args[0]) ++ if (grub_script_arglist_to_argv (cmdline->arglist, &argv) || ! argv.args || ! argv.args[0]) + return grub_errno; + + for (i = 0; i < argv.argc; i++) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5a327fe1d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From dd82f98fa642907817f59aeaf3761b786898df85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> +Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 16:57:37 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] commands/ls: Require device_name is not NULL before printing + +This can be triggered with: + ls -l (0 0*) +and causes a NULL deref in grub_normal_print_device_info(). + +I'm not sure if there's any implication with the IEEE 1275 platform. + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=6afbe6063c95b827372f9ec310c9fc7461311eb1] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/commands/ls.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/ls.c b/grub-core/commands/ls.c +index 5b7491a..326d2d6 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/ls.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/ls.c +@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ grub_ls_list_files (char *dirname, int longlist, int all, int human) + goto fail; + } + +- if (! *path) ++ if (! *path && device_name) + { + if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_FS) + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84117a9073 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From df2505c4c3cf42b0c419c99a5f9e1ce63e5a5938 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> +Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 17:30:42 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Avoid crash when using "$#" outside a + function scope + +"$#" represents the number of arguments to a function. It is only +defined in a function scope, where "scope" is non-NULL. Currently, +if we attempt to evaluate "$#" outside a function scope, "scope" will +be NULL and we will crash with a NULL pointer dereference. + +Do not attempt to count arguments for "$#" if "scope" is NULL. This +will result in "$#" being interpreted as an empty string if evaluated +outside a function scope. + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=fe0586347ee46f927ae27bb9673532da9f5dead5] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/script/execute.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c +index 5ea2aef..23d34bd 100644 +--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c ++++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c +@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ gettext_putvar (const char *str, grub_size_t len, + return 0; + + /* Enough for any number. */ +- if (len == 1 && str[0] == '#') ++ if (len == 1 && str[0] == '#' && scope != NULL) + { + grub_snprintf (*ptr, 30, "%u", scope->argv.argc); + *ptr += grub_strlen (*ptr); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25632.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25632.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0b37c72f0f --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25632.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From 7630ec5397fe418276b360f9011934b8c034936c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 14:08:55 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] dl: Only allow unloading modules that are not dependencies + +When a module is attempted to be removed its reference counter is always +decremented. This means that repeated rmmod invocations will cause the +module to be unloaded even if another module depends on it. + +This may lead to a use-after-free scenario allowing an attacker to execute +arbitrary code and by-pass the UEFI Secure Boot protection. + +While being there, add the extern keyword to some function declarations in +that header file. + +Fixes: CVE-2020-25632 + +Reported-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com> +Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=7630ec5397fe418276b360f9011934b8c034936c] +CVE: CVE-2020-25632 +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/commands/minicmd.c | 7 +++++-- + grub-core/kern/dl.c | 9 +++++++++ + include/grub/dl.h | 8 +++++--- + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c +index 6bbce3128..fa498931e 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c +@@ -140,8 +140,11 @@ grub_mini_cmd_rmmod (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), + if (grub_dl_is_persistent (mod)) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "cannot unload persistent module"); + +- if (grub_dl_unref (mod) <= 0) +- grub_dl_unload (mod); ++ if (grub_dl_ref_count (mod) > 1) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "cannot unload referenced module"); ++ ++ grub_dl_unref (mod); ++ grub_dl_unload (mod); + + return 0; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c +index 48eb5e7b6..48f8a7907 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c +@@ -549,6 +549,15 @@ grub_dl_unref (grub_dl_t mod) + return --mod->ref_count; + } + ++int ++grub_dl_ref_count (grub_dl_t mod) ++{ ++ if (mod == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return mod->ref_count; ++} ++ + static void + grub_dl_flush_cache (grub_dl_t mod) + { +diff --git a/include/grub/dl.h b/include/grub/dl.h +index f03c03561..b3753c9ca 100644 +--- a/include/grub/dl.h ++++ b/include/grub/dl.h +@@ -203,9 +203,11 @@ grub_dl_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_load) (const char *name); + grub_dl_t grub_dl_load_core (void *addr, grub_size_t size); + grub_dl_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_load_core_noinit) (void *addr, grub_size_t size); + int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unload) (grub_dl_t mod); +-void grub_dl_unload_unneeded (void); +-int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref) (grub_dl_t mod); +-int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unref) (grub_dl_t mod); ++extern void grub_dl_unload_unneeded (void); ++extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref) (grub_dl_t mod); ++extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unref) (grub_dl_t mod); ++extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref_count) (grub_dl_t mod); ++ + extern grub_dl_t EXPORT_VAR(grub_dl_head); + + #ifndef GRUB_UTIL +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25647.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25647.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cb77fd4772 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-25647.patch @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +From 128c16a682034263eb519c89bc0934eeb6fa8cfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 19:19:21 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] usb: Avoid possible out-of-bound accesses caused by malicious + devices + +The maximum number of configurations and interfaces are fixed but there is +no out-of-bound checking to prevent a malicious USB device to report large +values for these and cause accesses outside the arrays' memory. + +Fixes: CVE-2020-25647 + +Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro <joseph.tartaro@ioactive.com> +Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com> +Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=128c16a682034263eb519c89bc0934eeb6fa8cfa] +CVE: CVE-2020-25647 +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <marta.rybczynska@huawei.com> +--- + grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- + include/grub/usb.h | 10 +++++++--- + 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c b/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c +index 8da5e4c74..7cb3cc230 100644 +--- a/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c ++++ b/grub-core/bus/usb/usb.c +@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ grub_usb_controller_iterate (grub_usb_controller_iterate_hook_t hook, + grub_usb_err_t + grub_usb_clear_halt (grub_usb_device_t dev, int endpoint) + { ++ if (endpoint >= GRUB_USB_MAX_TOGGLE) ++ return GRUB_USB_ERR_BADDEVICE; ++ + dev->toggle[endpoint] = 0; + return grub_usb_control_msg (dev, (GRUB_USB_REQTYPE_OUT + | GRUB_USB_REQTYPE_STANDARD +@@ -134,10 +137,10 @@ grub_usb_device_initialize (grub_usb_device_t dev) + return err; + descdev = &dev->descdev; + +- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF; i++) + dev->config[i].descconf = NULL; + +- if (descdev->configcnt == 0) ++ if (descdev->configcnt == 0 || descdev->configcnt > GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF) + { + err = GRUB_USB_ERR_BADDEVICE; + goto fail; +@@ -172,6 +175,12 @@ grub_usb_device_initialize (grub_usb_device_t dev) + /* Skip the configuration descriptor. */ + pos = dev->config[i].descconf->length; + ++ if (dev->config[i].descconf->numif > GRUB_USB_MAX_IF) ++ { ++ err = GRUB_USB_ERR_BADDEVICE; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + /* Read all interfaces. */ + for (currif = 0; currif < dev->config[i].descconf->numif; currif++) + { +@@ -217,7 +226,7 @@ grub_usb_device_initialize (grub_usb_device_t dev) + + fail: + +- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ++ for (i = 0; i < GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF; i++) + grub_free (dev->config[i].descconf); + + return err; +diff --git a/include/grub/usb.h b/include/grub/usb.h +index 512ae1dd0..6475c552f 100644 +--- a/include/grub/usb.h ++++ b/include/grub/usb.h +@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ + #include <grub/usbdesc.h> + #include <grub/usbtrans.h> + ++#define GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF 8 ++#define GRUB_USB_MAX_IF 32 ++#define GRUB_USB_MAX_TOGGLE 256 ++ + typedef struct grub_usb_device *grub_usb_device_t; + typedef struct grub_usb_controller *grub_usb_controller_t; + typedef struct grub_usb_controller_dev *grub_usb_controller_dev_t; +@@ -167,7 +171,7 @@ struct grub_usb_configuration + struct grub_usb_desc_config *descconf; + + /* Interfaces associated to this configuration. */ +- struct grub_usb_interface interf[32]; ++ struct grub_usb_interface interf[GRUB_USB_MAX_IF]; + }; + + struct grub_usb_hub_port +@@ -191,7 +195,7 @@ struct grub_usb_device + struct grub_usb_controller controller; + + /* Device configurations (after opening the device). */ +- struct grub_usb_configuration config[8]; ++ struct grub_usb_configuration config[GRUB_USB_MAX_CONF]; + + /* Device address. */ + int addr; +@@ -203,7 +207,7 @@ struct grub_usb_device + int initialized; + + /* Data toggle values (used for bulk transfers only). */ +- int toggle[256]; ++ int toggle[GRUB_USB_MAX_TOGGLE]; + + /* Used by libusb wrapper. Schedulded for removal. */ + void *data; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc index db7c23a84a..0d3f6d05da 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ CVE_PRODUCT = "grub2" # Applies only to RHEL CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2019-14865" +# Applies only to SUSE +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-46705" SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-Disable-mfpmath-sse-as-well-when-SSE-is-disabled.patch \ @@ -45,7 +47,55 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2020-27779_5.patch \ file://CVE-2020-27779_6.patch \ file://CVE-2020-27779_7.patch \ -" + file://CVE-2020-25632.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-25647.patch \ + file://0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch \ + file://0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch \ + file://0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch \ + file://0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch \ + file://0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch \ + file://0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch \ + file://0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch \ + file://0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch \ + file://0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch \ + file://0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch \ + file://0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch \ + file://0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch \ + file://0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch \ + file://0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch \ + file://0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch \ + file://0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch \ + file://0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch \ + file://0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch \ + file://0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \ + file://0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch \ + file://0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch \ + file://0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch \ + file://0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch \ + file://0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch \ + file://0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch \ + file://0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch \ + file://0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch \ + file://0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch \ + file://0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch \ + file://0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch \ + file://0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch \ + file://0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \ + file://0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch \ + file://0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch \ + file://0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch \ + file://0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch \ + file://0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch \ + file://0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch \ + file://0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch \ + file://0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch \ + file://0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch \ + file://0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch \ + file://0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch \ + file://0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch \ + file://0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch \ + file://0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch \ + " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.35.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.37.bb index 4652529623..afc8cf0b3b 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.35.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.11.37.bb @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ DESCRIPTION = "BIND 9 provides a full-featured Domain Name Server system" SECTION = "console/network" LICENSE = "ISC & BSD" -LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYRIGHT;md5=b88e7ca5f21908e1b2720169f6807cf6" +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYRIGHT;md5=89a97ebbf713f7125fe5c02223d3ae95" DEPENDS = "openssl libcap zlib" @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1c882705827b6aafa45d917ae3b20eccccc8d5df3c4477df44b04382e6c47562" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0d8efbe7ec166ada90e46add4267b7e7c934790cba9bd5af6b8380a4fbfb5aff" UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/" # stay at 9.11 until 9.16, from 9.16 follow the ESV versions divisible by 4 diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc index 34796fdd20..4d4348898a 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5.inc @@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/bluetooth/bluez-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0001-test-gatt-Fix-hung-issue.patch \ file://CVE-2021-0129.patch \ file://CVE-2021-3588.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3658.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-0204.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/bluez-${PV}" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2021-3658.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2021-3658.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1738ca13da --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2021-3658.patch @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +From b497b5942a8beb8f89ca1c359c54ad67ec843055 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> +Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2021 16:32:04 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] adapter: Fix storing discoverable setting + +discoverable setting shall only be store when changed via Discoverable +property and not when discovery client set it as that be considered +temporary just for the lifetime of the discovery. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/bluez/bluez/commit/b497b5942a8beb8f89ca1c359c54ad67ec843055] +Signed-off-by:Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com> +--- + src/adapter.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------- + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/adapter.c b/src/adapter.c +index 12e4ff5c0..663b778e4 100644 +--- a/src/adapter.c ++++ b/src/adapter.c +@@ -560,7 +560,11 @@ static void settings_changed(struct btd_adapter *adapter, uint32_t settings) + if (changed_mask & MGMT_SETTING_DISCOVERABLE) { + g_dbus_emit_property_changed(dbus_conn, adapter->path, + ADAPTER_INTERFACE, "Discoverable"); +- store_adapter_info(adapter); ++ /* Only persist discoverable setting if it was not set ++ * temporarily by discovery. ++ */ ++ if (!adapter->discovery_discoverable) ++ store_adapter_info(adapter); + btd_adv_manager_refresh(adapter->adv_manager); + } + +@@ -2162,8 +2166,6 @@ static bool filters_equal(struct mgmt_cp_start_service_discovery *a, + static int update_discovery_filter(struct btd_adapter *adapter) + { + struct mgmt_cp_start_service_discovery *sd_cp; +- GSList *l; +- + + DBG(""); + +@@ -2173,17 +2175,24 @@ static int update_discovery_filter(struct btd_adapter *adapter) + return -ENOMEM; + } + +- for (l = adapter->discovery_list; l; l = g_slist_next(l)) { +- struct discovery_client *client = l->data; ++ /* Only attempt to overwrite current discoverable setting when not ++ * discoverable. ++ */ ++ if (!(adapter->current_settings & MGMT_OP_SET_DISCOVERABLE)) { ++ GSList *l; + +- if (!client->discovery_filter) +- continue; ++ for (l = adapter->discovery_list; l; l = g_slist_next(l)) { ++ struct discovery_client *client = l->data; + +- if (client->discovery_filter->discoverable) +- break; +- } ++ if (!client->discovery_filter) ++ continue; + +- set_discovery_discoverable(adapter, l ? true : false); ++ if (client->discovery_filter->discoverable) { ++ set_discovery_discoverable(adapter, true); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ } + + /* + * If filters are equal, then don't update scan, except for when +@@ -2216,8 +2225,7 @@ static int discovery_stop(struct discovery_client *client) + return 0; + } + +- if (adapter->discovery_discoverable) +- set_discovery_discoverable(adapter, false); ++ set_discovery_discoverable(adapter, false); + + /* + * In the idle phase of a discovery, there is no need to stop it +@@ -6913,6 +6921,7 @@ static void adapter_stop(struct btd_adapter *adapter) + g_free(adapter->current_discovery_filter); + adapter->current_discovery_filter = NULL; + ++ set_discovery_discoverable(adapter, false); + adapter->discovering = false; + + while (adapter->connections) { +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..646b5ddfc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/bluez5/bluez5/CVE-2022-0204.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From 0d328fdf6564b67fc2ec3533e3da201ebabcc9e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> +Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:46:49 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] shared/gatt-server: Fix heap overflow when appending prepare + writes + +The code shall check if the prepare writes would append more the +allowed maximum attribute length. + +Fixes https://github.com/bluez/bluez/security/advisories/GHSA-479m-xcq5-9g2q + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/bluez/bluez/commit/591c546c536b42bef696d027f64aa22434f8c3f0] +Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> +CVE: CVE-2022-0204 + +--- + src/shared/gatt-server.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/shared/gatt-server.c b/src/shared/gatt-server.c +index 0c25a97..20e14bc 100644 +--- a/src/shared/gatt-server.c ++++ b/src/shared/gatt-server.c +@@ -816,6 +816,20 @@ static uint8_t authorize_req(struct bt_gatt_server *server, + server->authorize_data); + } + ++static uint8_t check_length(uint16_t length, uint16_t offset) ++{ ++ if (length > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN) ++ return BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_LEN; ++ ++ if (offset > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN) ++ return BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_OFFSET; ++ ++ if (length + offset > BT_ATT_MAX_VALUE_LEN) ++ return BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_LEN; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + static void write_cb(struct bt_att_chan *chan, uint8_t opcode, const void *pdu, + uint16_t length, void *user_data) + { +@@ -846,6 +860,10 @@ static void write_cb(struct bt_att_chan *chan, uint8_t opcode, const void *pdu, + (opcode == BT_ATT_OP_WRITE_REQ) ? "Req" : "Cmd", + handle); + ++ ecode = check_length(length, 0); ++ if (ecode) ++ goto error; ++ + ecode = check_permissions(server, attr, BT_ATT_PERM_WRITE_MASK); + if (ecode) + goto error; +@@ -1353,6 +1371,10 @@ static void prep_write_cb(struct bt_att_chan *chan, uint8_t opcode, + util_debug(server->debug_callback, server->debug_data, + "Prep Write Req - handle: 0x%04x", handle); + ++ ecode = check_length(length, offset); ++ if (ecode) ++ goto error; ++ + ecode = check_permissions(server, attr, BT_ATT_PERM_WRITE_MASK); + if (ecode) + goto error; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2021-33833.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2021-33833.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..770948fb69 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2021-33833.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From eceb2e8d2341c041df55a5e2f047d9a8c491463c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Valery Kashcheev <v.kascheev@omp.ru> +Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 18:58:24 +0200 +Subject: dnsproxy: Check the length of buffers before memcpy + +Fix using a stack-based buffer overflow attack by checking the length of +the ptr and uptr buffers. + +Fix debug message output. + +Fixes: CVE-2021-33833 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=eceb2e8d2341c041df55a5e2f047d9a8c491463c +CVE: CVE-2021-33833 +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + src/dnsproxy.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/dnsproxy.c b/src/dnsproxy.c +index de52df5a..38dbdd71 100644 +--- a/src/dnsproxy.c ++++ b/src/dnsproxy.c +@@ -1788,17 +1788,15 @@ static char *uncompress(int16_t field_count, char *start, char *end, + * tmp buffer. + */ + +- debug("pos %d ulen %d left %d name %s", pos, ulen, +- (int)(uncomp_len - (uptr - uncompressed)), uptr); +- +- ulen = strlen(name); +- if ((uptr + ulen + 1) > uncomp_end) { ++ ulen = strlen(name) + 1; ++ if ((uptr + ulen) > uncomp_end) + goto out; +- } +- strncpy(uptr, name, uncomp_len - (uptr - uncompressed)); ++ strncpy(uptr, name, ulen); ++ ++ debug("pos %d ulen %d left %d name %s", pos, ulen, ++ (int)(uncomp_end - (uptr + ulen)), uptr); + + uptr += ulen; +- *uptr++ = '\0'; + + ptr += pos; + +@@ -1841,7 +1839,7 @@ static char *uncompress(int16_t field_count, char *start, char *end, + } else if (dns_type == ns_t_a || dns_type == ns_t_aaaa) { + dlen = uptr[-2] << 8 | uptr[-1]; + +- if (ptr + dlen > end) { ++ if ((ptr + dlen) > end || (uptr + dlen) > uncomp_end) { + debug("data len %d too long", dlen); + goto out; + } +@@ -1880,6 +1878,10 @@ static char *uncompress(int16_t field_count, char *start, char *end, + * refresh interval, retry interval, expiration + * limit and minimum ttl). They are 20 bytes long. + */ ++ if ((uptr + 20) > uncomp_end || (ptr + 20) > end) { ++ debug("soa record too long"); ++ goto out; ++ } + memcpy(uptr, ptr, 20); + uptr += 20; + ptr += 20; +-- +cgit 1.2.3-1.el7 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-23096-7.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-23096-7.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7f27474830 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-23096-7.patch @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From e5a313736e13c90d19085e953a26256a198e4950 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Wagner <wagi@monom.org> +Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 10:00:24 +0100 +Subject: dnsproxy: Validate input data before using them + +dnsproxy is not validating various input data. Add a bunch of checks. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-23097 +Fixes: CVE-2022-23096 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=e5a313736e13c90d19085e953a26256a198e4950 + +CVE: CVE-2022-23096 CVE-2022-23097 +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + src/dnsproxy.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/dnsproxy.c b/src/dnsproxy.c +index cdfafbc2..c027bcb9 100644 +--- a/src/dnsproxy.c ++++ b/src/dnsproxy.c +@@ -1951,6 +1951,12 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol, + + if (offset < 0) + return offset; ++ if (reply_len < 0) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ if (reply_len < offset + 1) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ if ((size_t)reply_len < sizeof(struct domain_hdr)) ++ return -EINVAL; + + hdr = (void *)(reply + offset); + dns_id = reply[offset] | reply[offset + 1] << 8; +@@ -1986,23 +1992,31 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol, + */ + if (req->append_domain && ntohs(hdr->qdcount) == 1) { + uint16_t domain_len = 0; +- uint16_t header_len; ++ uint16_t header_len, payload_len; + uint16_t dns_type, dns_class; + uint8_t host_len, dns_type_pos; + char uncompressed[NS_MAXDNAME], *uptr; + char *ptr, *eom = (char *)reply + reply_len; ++ char *domain; + + /* + * ptr points to the first char of the hostname. + * ->hostname.domain.net + */ + header_len = offset + sizeof(struct domain_hdr); ++ if (reply_len < header_len) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ payload_len = reply_len - header_len; ++ + ptr = (char *)reply + header_len; + + host_len = *ptr; ++ domain = ptr + 1 + host_len; ++ if (domain > eom) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ + if (host_len > 0) +- domain_len = strnlen(ptr + 1 + host_len, +- reply_len - header_len); ++ domain_len = strnlen(domain, eom - domain); + + /* + * If the query type is anything other than A or AAAA, +@@ -2011,6 +2025,8 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol, + */ + dns_type_pos = host_len + 1 + domain_len + 1; + ++ if (ptr + (dns_type_pos + 3) > eom) ++ return -EINVAL; + dns_type = ptr[dns_type_pos] << 8 | + ptr[dns_type_pos + 1]; + dns_class = ptr[dns_type_pos + 2] << 8 | +@@ -2040,6 +2056,8 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol, + int new_len, fixed_len; + char *answers; + ++ if (len > payload_len) ++ return -EINVAL; + /* + * First copy host (without domain name) into + * tmp buffer. +@@ -2054,6 +2072,8 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol, + * Copy type and class fields of the question. + */ + ptr += len + domain_len + 1; ++ if (ptr + NS_QFIXEDSZ > eom) ++ return -EINVAL; + memcpy(uptr, ptr, NS_QFIXEDSZ); + + /* +@@ -2063,6 +2083,8 @@ static int forward_dns_reply(unsigned char *reply, int reply_len, int protocol, + uptr += NS_QFIXEDSZ; + answers = uptr; + fixed_len = answers - uncompressed; ++ if (ptr + offset > eom) ++ return -EINVAL; + + /* + * We then uncompress the result to buffer +@@ -2257,8 +2279,7 @@ static gboolean udp_server_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition, + + len = recv(sk, buf, sizeof(buf), 0); + +- if (len >= 12) +- forward_dns_reply(buf, len, IPPROTO_UDP, data); ++ forward_dns_reply(buf, len, IPPROTO_UDP, data); + + return TRUE; + } +-- +cgit 1.2.3-1.el7 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-23098.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-23098.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a40c9f583f --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman/CVE-2022-23098.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From d8708b85c1e8fe25af7803e8a20cf20e7201d8a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de> +Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 10:00:25 +0100 +Subject: dnsproxy: Avoid 100 % busy loop in TCP server case + +Once the TCP socket is connected and until the remote server is +responding (if ever) ConnMan executes a 100 % CPU loop, since +the connected socket will always be writable (G_IO_OUT). + +To fix this, modify the watch after the connection is established to +remove the G_IO_OUT from the callback conditions. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-23098 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=d8708b85c1e8fe25af7803e8a20cf20e7201d8a4 + +CVE: CVE-2022-23098 +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + src/dnsproxy.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/dnsproxy.c b/src/dnsproxy.c +index c027bcb9..1ccf36a9 100644 +--- a/src/dnsproxy.c ++++ b/src/dnsproxy.c +@@ -2360,6 +2360,18 @@ hangup: + } + } + ++ /* ++ * Remove the G_IO_OUT flag from the watch, otherwise we end ++ * up in a busy loop, because the socket is constantly writable. ++ * ++ * There seems to be no better way in g_io to do that than ++ * re-adding the watch. ++ */ ++ g_source_remove(server->watch); ++ server->watch = g_io_add_watch(server->channel, ++ G_IO_IN | G_IO_HUP | G_IO_NVAL | G_IO_ERR, ++ tcp_server_event, server); ++ + server->connected = true; + server_list = g_slist_append(server_list, server); + +-- +cgit 1.2.3-1.el7 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.37.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.37.bb index bdab4c4f18..bdd1e590ec 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.37.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/connman/connman_1.37.bb @@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2021-26675.patch \ file://CVE-2021-26676-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2021-26676-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-33833.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-23096-7.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-23098.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0002-resolve-musl-does-not-implement-res_ninit.patch" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/mobile-broadband-provider-info/mobile-broadband-provider-info_git.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/mobile-broadband-provider-info/mobile-broadband-provider-info_git.bb index b4cbc1a76c..781b9216c5 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/mobile-broadband-provider-info/mobile-broadband-provider-info_git.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/mobile-broadband-provider-info/mobile-broadband-provider-info_git.bb @@ -4,11 +4,12 @@ DESCRIPTION = "Mobile Broadband Service Provider Database stores service provide SECTION = "network" LICENSE = "PD" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=87964579b2a8ece4bc6744d2dc9a8b04" -SRCREV = "90f3fe28aa25135b7e4a54a7816388913bfd4a2a" -PV = "20201225" + +SRCREV = "4cbb44a9fe26aa6f0b28beb79f9488b37c097b5e" +PV = "20220315" PE = "1" -SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/mobile-broadband-provider-info.git;protocol=https;branch=master" +SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/mobile-broadband-provider-info.git;protocol=https;branch=main" S = "${WORKDIR}/git" inherit autotools diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1l.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1n.bb index bf7cd6527e..8538bd5a18 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1l.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1n.bb @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \ file://environment.d-openssl.sh \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0b7a3e5e59c34827fe0c3a74b7ec8baef302b98fa80088d7f9153aa16fa76bd1" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "40dceb51a4f6a5275bde0e6bf20ef4b91bfc32ed57c0552e2e8e15463372b17a" inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash" @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ do_install_ptest () { install -m755 ${B}/apps/CA.pl ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps install -d ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/engines + install -m755 ${B}/engines/dasync.so ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/engines install -m755 ${B}/engines/ossltest.so ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/engines } diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-23303-4.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-23303-4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..21e65ba961 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/CVE-2022-23303-4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,609 @@ +From 208e5687ff2e48622e28d8888ce5444a54353bbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 16:33:15 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] crypto: Add more bignum/EC helper functions + +These are needed for implementing SAE hash-to-element. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://w1.fi/security/2022-1/ + +CVE: CVE-2022-23303 CVE-2022-23304 +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + src/crypto/crypto.h | 45 ++++++++++++++++++ + src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + src/crypto/crypto_wolfssl.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 205 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto.h b/src/crypto/crypto.h +index 15f8ad04cea4..68476dbce96c 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/crypto.h ++++ b/src/crypto/crypto.h +@@ -518,6 +518,13 @@ struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init(void); + */ + struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_set(const u8 *buf, size_t len); + ++/** ++ * crypto_bignum_init_set - Allocate memory for bignum and set the value (uint) ++ * @val: Value to set ++ * Returns: Pointer to allocated bignum or %NULL on failure ++ */ ++struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_uint(unsigned int val); ++ + /** + * crypto_bignum_deinit - Free bignum + * @n: Bignum from crypto_bignum_init() or crypto_bignum_init_set() +@@ -612,6 +619,19 @@ int crypto_bignum_div(const struct crypto_bignum *a, + const struct crypto_bignum *b, + struct crypto_bignum *c); + ++/** ++ * crypto_bignum_addmod - d = a + b (mod c) ++ * @a: Bignum ++ * @b: Bignum ++ * @c: Bignum ++ * @d: Bignum; used to store the result of (a + b) % c ++ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure ++ */ ++int crypto_bignum_addmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *b, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *c, ++ struct crypto_bignum *d); ++ + /** + * crypto_bignum_mulmod - d = a * b (mod c) + * @a: Bignum +@@ -625,6 +645,28 @@ int crypto_bignum_mulmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, + const struct crypto_bignum *c, + struct crypto_bignum *d); + ++/** ++ * crypto_bignum_sqrmod - c = a^2 (mod b) ++ * @a: Bignum ++ * @b: Bignum ++ * @c: Bignum; used to store the result of a^2 % b ++ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure ++ */ ++int crypto_bignum_sqrmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *b, ++ struct crypto_bignum *c); ++ ++/** ++ * crypto_bignum_sqrtmod - returns sqrt(a) (mod b) ++ * @a: Bignum ++ * @b: Bignum ++ * @c: Bignum; used to store the result ++ * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure ++ */ ++int crypto_bignum_sqrtmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *b, ++ struct crypto_bignum *c); ++ + /** + * crypto_bignum_rshift - r = a >> n + * @a: Bignum +@@ -731,6 +773,9 @@ const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_prime(struct crypto_ec *e); + */ + const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_order(struct crypto_ec *e); + ++const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_a(struct crypto_ec *e); ++const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_b(struct crypto_ec *e); ++ + /** + * struct crypto_ec_point - Elliptic curve point + * +diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +index bab33a537293..ed463105e8f1 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c +@@ -1283,6 +1283,24 @@ struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_set(const u8 *buf, size_t len) + } + + ++struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_uint(unsigned int val) ++{ ++ BIGNUM *bn; ++ ++ if (TEST_FAIL()) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ bn = BN_new(); ++ if (!bn) ++ return NULL; ++ if (BN_set_word(bn, val) != 1) { ++ BN_free(bn); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ return (struct crypto_bignum *) bn; ++} ++ ++ + void crypto_bignum_deinit(struct crypto_bignum *n, int clear) + { + if (clear) +@@ -1449,6 +1467,28 @@ int crypto_bignum_div(const struct crypto_bignum *a, + } + + ++int crypto_bignum_addmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *b, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *c, ++ struct crypto_bignum *d) ++{ ++ int res; ++ BN_CTX *bnctx; ++ ++ if (TEST_FAIL()) ++ return -1; ++ ++ bnctx = BN_CTX_new(); ++ if (!bnctx) ++ return -1; ++ res = BN_mod_add((BIGNUM *) d, (const BIGNUM *) a, (const BIGNUM *) b, ++ (const BIGNUM *) c, bnctx); ++ BN_CTX_free(bnctx); ++ ++ return res ? 0 : -1; ++} ++ ++ + int crypto_bignum_mulmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, + const struct crypto_bignum *b, + const struct crypto_bignum *c, +@@ -1472,6 +1512,48 @@ int crypto_bignum_mulmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, + } + + ++int crypto_bignum_sqrmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *b, ++ struct crypto_bignum *c) ++{ ++ int res; ++ BN_CTX *bnctx; ++ ++ if (TEST_FAIL()) ++ return -1; ++ ++ bnctx = BN_CTX_new(); ++ if (!bnctx) ++ return -1; ++ res = BN_mod_sqr((BIGNUM *) c, (const BIGNUM *) a, (const BIGNUM *) b, ++ bnctx); ++ BN_CTX_free(bnctx); ++ ++ return res ? 0 : -1; ++} ++ ++ ++int crypto_bignum_sqrtmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *b, ++ struct crypto_bignum *c) ++{ ++ BN_CTX *bnctx; ++ BIGNUM *res; ++ ++ if (TEST_FAIL()) ++ return -1; ++ ++ bnctx = BN_CTX_new(); ++ if (!bnctx) ++ return -1; ++ res = BN_mod_sqrt((BIGNUM *) c, (const BIGNUM *) a, (const BIGNUM *) b, ++ bnctx); ++ BN_CTX_free(bnctx); ++ ++ return res ? 0 : -1; ++} ++ ++ + int crypto_bignum_rshift(const struct crypto_bignum *a, int n, + struct crypto_bignum *r) + { +@@ -1682,6 +1764,18 @@ const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_order(struct crypto_ec *e) + } + + ++const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_a(struct crypto_ec *e) ++{ ++ return (const struct crypto_bignum *) e->a; ++} ++ ++ ++const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_b(struct crypto_ec *e) ++{ ++ return (const struct crypto_bignum *) e->b; ++} ++ ++ + void crypto_ec_point_deinit(struct crypto_ec_point *p, int clear) + { + if (clear) +diff --git a/src/crypto/crypto_wolfssl.c b/src/crypto/crypto_wolfssl.c +index 4cedab4367cd..e9894b335e53 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/crypto_wolfssl.c ++++ b/src/crypto/crypto_wolfssl.c +@@ -1042,6 +1042,26 @@ struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_set(const u8 *buf, size_t len) + } + + ++struct crypto_bignum * crypto_bignum_init_uint(unsigned int val) ++{ ++ mp_int *a; ++ ++ if (TEST_FAIL()) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ a = (mp_int *) crypto_bignum_init(); ++ if (!a) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ if (mp_set_int(a, val) != MP_OKAY) { ++ os_free(a); ++ a = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (struct crypto_bignum *) a; ++} ++ ++ + void crypto_bignum_deinit(struct crypto_bignum *n, int clear) + { + if (!n) +@@ -1168,6 +1188,19 @@ int crypto_bignum_div(const struct crypto_bignum *a, + } + + ++int crypto_bignum_addmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *b, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *c, ++ struct crypto_bignum *d) ++{ ++ if (TEST_FAIL()) ++ return -1; ++ ++ return mp_addmod((mp_int *) a, (mp_int *) b, (mp_int *) c, ++ (mp_int *) d) == MP_OKAY ? 0 : -1; ++} ++ ++ + int crypto_bignum_mulmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, + const struct crypto_bignum *b, + const struct crypto_bignum *m, +@@ -1181,6 +1214,27 @@ int crypto_bignum_mulmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, + } + + ++int crypto_bignum_sqrmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *b, ++ struct crypto_bignum *c) ++{ ++ if (TEST_FAIL()) ++ return -1; ++ ++ return mp_sqrmod((mp_int *) a, (mp_int *) b, ++ (mp_int *) c) == MP_OKAY ? 0 : -1; ++} ++ ++ ++int crypto_bignum_sqrtmod(const struct crypto_bignum *a, ++ const struct crypto_bignum *b, ++ struct crypto_bignum *c) ++{ ++ /* TODO */ ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++ + int crypto_bignum_rshift(const struct crypto_bignum *a, int n, + struct crypto_bignum *r) + { +@@ -1386,6 +1440,18 @@ const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_order(struct crypto_ec *e) + } + + ++const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_a(struct crypto_ec *e) ++{ ++ return (const struct crypto_bignum *) &e->a; ++} ++ ++ ++const struct crypto_bignum * crypto_ec_get_b(struct crypto_ec *e) ++{ ++ return (const struct crypto_bignum *) &e->b; ++} ++ ++ + void crypto_ec_point_deinit(struct crypto_ec_point *p, int clear) + { + ecc_point *point = (ecc_point *) p; +-- +2.25.1 + +From 2232d3d5f188b65dbb6c823ac62175412739eb16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 13:47:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/4] dragonfly: Add sqrt() helper function + +This is a backport of "SAE: Move sqrt() implementation into a helper +function" to introduce the helper function needed for the following +patches. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/common/dragonfly.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + src/common/dragonfly.h | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/common/dragonfly.c b/src/common/dragonfly.c +index 547be66f1561..1e842716668e 100644 +--- a/src/common/dragonfly.c ++++ b/src/common/dragonfly.c +@@ -213,3 +213,37 @@ int dragonfly_generate_scalar(const struct crypto_bignum *order, + "dragonfly: Unable to get randomness for own scalar"); + return -1; + } ++ ++ ++/* res = sqrt(val) */ ++int dragonfly_sqrt(struct crypto_ec *ec, const struct crypto_bignum *val, ++ struct crypto_bignum *res) ++{ ++ const struct crypto_bignum *prime; ++ struct crypto_bignum *tmp, *one; ++ int ret = 0; ++ u8 prime_bin[DRAGONFLY_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; ++ size_t prime_len; ++ ++ /* For prime p such that p = 3 mod 4, sqrt(w) = w^((p+1)/4) mod p */ ++ ++ prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(ec); ++ prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(ec); ++ tmp = crypto_bignum_init(); ++ one = crypto_bignum_init_uint(1); ++ ++ if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(prime, prime_bin, sizeof(prime_bin), ++ prime_len) < 0 || ++ (prime_bin[prime_len - 1] & 0x03) != 3 || ++ !tmp || !one || ++ /* tmp = (p+1)/4 */ ++ crypto_bignum_add(prime, one, tmp) < 0 || ++ crypto_bignum_rshift(tmp, 2, tmp) < 0 || ++ /* res = sqrt(val) */ ++ crypto_bignum_exptmod(val, tmp, prime, res) < 0) ++ ret = -1; ++ ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp, 0); ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0); ++ return ret; ++} +diff --git a/src/common/dragonfly.h b/src/common/dragonfly.h +index ec3dd593eda4..84d67f575c54 100644 +--- a/src/common/dragonfly.h ++++ b/src/common/dragonfly.h +@@ -27,5 +27,7 @@ int dragonfly_generate_scalar(const struct crypto_bignum *order, + struct crypto_bignum *_rand, + struct crypto_bignum *_mask, + struct crypto_bignum *scalar); ++int dragonfly_sqrt(struct crypto_ec *ec, const struct crypto_bignum *val, ++ struct crypto_bignum *res); + + #endif /* DRAGONFLY_H */ +-- +2.25.1 + +From fe534b0baaa8c0e6ddeb24cf529d6e50e33dc501 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 13:47:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/4] SAE: Derive the y coordinate for PWE with own + implementation + +The crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord() wrapper function might not use +constant time operations in the crypto library and as such, could leak +side channel information about the password that is used to generate the +PWE in the hunting and pecking loop. As such, calculate the two possible +y coordinate values and pick the correct one to use with constant time +selection. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/common/sae.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common/sae.c b/src/common/sae.c +index 08fdbfd18173..8d79ed962768 100644 +--- a/src/common/sae.c ++++ b/src/common/sae.c +@@ -286,14 +286,16 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1, + int pwd_seed_odd = 0; + u8 prime[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + size_t prime_len; +- struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL; ++ struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL; + u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + u8 qr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + u8 qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; ++ u8 x_y[2 * SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + int res = -1; + u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_* + * mask */ ++ unsigned int is_eq; + + os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin)); + +@@ -402,25 +404,42 @@ static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1, + goto fail; + } + +- if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc) +- sae->tmp->pwe_ecc = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->tmp->ec); +- if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc) +- res = -1; +- else +- res = crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(sae->tmp->ec, +- sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, x, +- pwd_seed_odd); +- if (res < 0) { +- /* +- * This should not happen since we already checked that there +- * is a result. +- */ ++ /* y = sqrt(x^3 + ax + b) mod p ++ * if LSB(save) == LSB(y): PWE = (x, y) ++ * else: PWE = (x, p - y) ++ * ++ * Calculate y and the two possible values for PWE and after that, ++ * use constant time selection to copy the correct alternative. ++ */ ++ y = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(sae->tmp->ec, x); ++ if (!y || ++ dragonfly_sqrt(sae->tmp->ec, y, y) < 0 || ++ crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y, SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, ++ prime_len) < 0 || ++ crypto_bignum_sub(sae->tmp->prime, y, y) < 0 || ++ crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y + SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, ++ SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, prime_len) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not solve y"); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ is_eq = const_time_eq(pwd_seed_odd, x_y[prime_len - 1] & 0x01); ++ const_time_select_bin(is_eq, x_y, x_y + SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, ++ prime_len, x_y + prime_len); ++ os_memcpy(x_y, x_bin, prime_len); ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE", x_y, 2 * prime_len); ++ crypto_ec_point_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, 1); ++ sae->tmp->pwe_ecc = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(sae->tmp->ec, x_y); ++ if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not generate PWE"); ++ res = -1; + } + + fail: ++ forced_memzero(x_y, sizeof(x_y)); + crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 0); + crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 0); ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(y, 1); + os_free(dummy_password); + bin_clear_free(tmp_password, password_len); + crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1); +-- +2.25.1 + +From 603cd880e7f90595482658a7136fa6a7be5cb485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 18:52:27 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] EAP-pwd: Derive the y coordinate for PWE with own + implementation + +The crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord() wrapper function might not use +constant time operations in the crypto library and as such, could leak +side channel information about the password that is used to generate the +PWE in the hunting and pecking loop. As such, calculate the two possible +y coordinate values and pick the correct one to use with constant time +selection. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c +index 2b2b8efdbd01..ff22b29b087a 100644 +--- a/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c ++++ b/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c +@@ -127,7 +127,8 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num, + u8 qr_or_qnr_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + u8 x_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; + u8 prime_bin[MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; +- struct crypto_bignum *tmp2 = NULL; ++ u8 x_y[2 * MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; ++ struct crypto_bignum *tmp2 = NULL, *y = NULL; + struct crypto_hash *hash; + unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr; + int ret = 0, res; +@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num, + u8 found_ctr = 0, is_odd = 0; + int cmp_prime; + unsigned int in_range; ++ unsigned int is_eq; + + if (grp->pwe) + return -1; +@@ -151,11 +153,6 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num, + if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(prime, prime_bin, sizeof(prime_bin), + primebytelen) < 0) + return -1; +- grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(grp->group); +- if (!grp->pwe) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create bignums"); +- goto fail; +- } + + if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) { + wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf " +@@ -261,10 +258,37 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num, + */ + crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1); + x_candidate = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, primebytelen); +- if (!x_candidate || +- crypto_ec_point_solve_y_coord(grp->group, grp->pwe, x_candidate, +- is_odd) != 0) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Could not solve for y"); ++ if (!x_candidate) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* y = sqrt(x^3 + ax + b) mod p ++ * if LSB(y) == LSB(pwd-seed): PWE = (x, y) ++ * else: PWE = (x, p - y) ++ * ++ * Calculate y and the two possible values for PWE and after that, ++ * use constant time selection to copy the correct alternative. ++ */ ++ y = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(grp->group, x_candidate); ++ if (!y || ++ dragonfly_sqrt(grp->group, y, y) < 0 || ++ crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y, MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, primebytelen) < 0 || ++ crypto_bignum_sub(prime, y, y) < 0 || ++ crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y + MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, ++ MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, primebytelen) < 0) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not solve y"); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ /* Constant time selection of the y coordinate from the two ++ * options */ ++ is_eq = const_time_eq(is_odd, x_y[primebytelen - 1] & 0x01); ++ const_time_select_bin(is_eq, x_y, x_y + MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, ++ primebytelen, x_y + primebytelen); ++ os_memcpy(x_y, x_bin, primebytelen); ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: PWE", x_y, 2 * primebytelen); ++ grp->pwe = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(grp->group, x_y); ++ if (!grp->pwe) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Could not generate PWE"); + goto fail; + } + +@@ -289,6 +313,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num, + /* cleanliness and order.... */ + crypto_bignum_deinit(x_candidate, 1); + crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp2, 1); ++ crypto_bignum_deinit(y, 1); + crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 1); + crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 1); + bin_clear_free(prfbuf, primebytelen); +@@ -296,6 +321,7 @@ int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num, + os_memset(qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qnr_bin)); + os_memset(qr_or_qnr_bin, 0, sizeof(qr_or_qnr_bin)); + os_memset(pwe_digest, 0, sizeof(pwe_digest)); ++ forced_memzero(x_y, sizeof(x_y)); + + return ret; + } +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.9.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.9.bb index cddcfb6811..a8fb34b1a1 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.9.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.9.bb @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2021-0326.patch \ file://CVE-2021-27803.patch \ file://CVE-2021-30004.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-23303-4.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2d2958c782576dc9901092fbfecb4190" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fcbdee7b4a64bea8177973299c8c824419c413ec2e3a95db63dd6a5dc3541f17" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_8.31.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_8.31.bb index aabeee882c..3d569881e8 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_8.31.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_8.31.bb @@ -206,6 +206,3 @@ do_install_ptest () { } FILES_${PN}-ptest += "${bindir}/getlimits" - -# These are specific to Opensuse -CVE_WHITELIST += "CVE-2013-0221 CVE-2013-0222 CVE-2013-0223" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2021-46143.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2021-46143.patch index d6bafba0ff..b1a726d9a8 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2021-46143.patch +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2021-46143.patch @@ -4,6 +4,12 @@ Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2021 20:52:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] lib: Prevent integer overflow on m_groupSize in function doProlog (CVE-2021-46143) +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/538/commits/85ae9a2d7d0e9358f356b33977b842df8ebaec2b + +CVE: CVE-2021-46143 + +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> --- expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-23852.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-23852.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41425c108b --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-23852.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 847a645152f5ebc10ac63b74b604d0c1a79fae40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net> +Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2022 17:48:00 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] lib: Detect and prevent integer overflow in XML_GetBuffer + (CVE-2022-23852) + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/847a645152f5ebc10ac63b74b604d0c1a79fae40 + +CVE: CVE-2022-23852 + +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/expat/lib/xmlparse.c b/expat/lib/xmlparse.c +index d54af683..5ce31402 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -2067,6 +2067,11 @@ XML_GetBuffer(XML_Parser parser, int len) { + keep = (int)EXPAT_SAFE_PTR_DIFF(parser->m_bufferPtr, parser->m_buffer); + if (keep > XML_CONTEXT_BYTES) + keep = XML_CONTEXT_BYTES; ++ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */ ++ if (keep > INT_MAX - neededSize) { ++ parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; ++ return NULL; ++ } + neededSize += keep; + #endif /* defined XML_CONTEXT_BYTES */ + if (neededSize diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-23990.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-23990.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c599517b3e --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-23990.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From ede41d1e186ed2aba88a06e84cac839b770af3a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 02:36:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] lib: Prevent integer overflow in doProlog (CVE-2022-23990) + +The change from "int nameLen" to "size_t nameLen" +addresses the overflow on "nameLen++" in code +"for (; name[nameLen++];)" right above the second +change in the patch. + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/551/commits/ede41d1e186ed2aba88a06e84cac839b770af3a1 + +CVE: CVE-2022-23990 + +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + lib/xmlparse.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/expat/lib/xmlparse.c +index 5ce31402..d1d17005 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -5372,7 +5372,7 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end, + if (dtd->in_eldecl) { + ELEMENT_TYPE *el; + const XML_Char *name; +- int nameLen; ++ size_t nameLen; + const char *nxt + = (quant == XML_CQUANT_NONE ? next : next - enc->minBytesPerChar); + int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser); +@@ -5388,7 +5388,13 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end, + nameLen = 0; + for (; name[nameLen++];) + ; +- dtd->contentStringLen += nameLen; ++ ++ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */ ++ if (nameLen > UINT_MAX - dtd->contentStringLen) { ++ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; ++ } ++ ++ dtd->contentStringLen += (unsigned)nameLen; + if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler) + handleDefault = XML_FALSE; + } diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25235.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25235.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..be9182a5c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25235.patch @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +From ee2a5b50e7d1940ba8745715b62ceb9efd3a96da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 17:37:14 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] lib: Drop unused macro UTF8_GET_NAMING + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/562/commits + +CVE: CVE-2022-25235 + +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + expat/lib/xmltok.c | 5 ----- + 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmltok.c b/lib/xmltok.c +index a72200e8..3bddf125 100644 +--- a/lib/xmltok.c ++++ b/lib/xmltok.c +@@ -95,11 +95,6 @@ + + ((((byte)[1]) & 3) << 1) + ((((byte)[2]) >> 5) & 1)] \ + & (1u << (((byte)[2]) & 0x1F))) + +-#define UTF8_GET_NAMING(pages, p, n) \ +- ((n) == 2 \ +- ? UTF8_GET_NAMING2(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p)) \ +- : ((n) == 3 ? UTF8_GET_NAMING3(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p)) : 0)) +- + /* Detection of invalid UTF-8 sequences is based on Table 3.1B + of Unicode 3.2: http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr28/ + with the additional restriction of not allowing the Unicode +From 3f0a0cb644438d4d8e3294cd0b1245d0edb0c6c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 04:32:20 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] lib: Add missing validation of encoding (CVE-2022-25235) + +--- + expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c | 8 ++++++-- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmltok_impl.c b/lib/xmltok_impl.c +index 0430591b4..64a3b2c15 100644 +--- a/lib/xmltok_impl.c ++++ b/lib/xmltok_impl.c +@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ + if (end - ptr < n) \ + return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \ +- if (! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ ++ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ + *nextTokPtr = ptr; \ + return XML_TOK_INVALID; \ + } \ +@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ + if (end - ptr < n) \ + return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \ +- if (! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ ++ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ + *nextTokPtr = ptr; \ + return XML_TOK_INVALID; \ + } \ +@@ -1134,6 +1134,10 @@ PREFIX(prologTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end, + case BT_LEAD##n: \ + if (end - ptr < n) \ + return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \ ++ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ ++ *nextTokPtr = ptr; \ ++ return XML_TOK_INVALID; \ ++ } \ + if (IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ + ptr += n; \ + tok = XML_TOK_NAME; \ +From c85a3025e7a1be086dc34e7559fbc543914d047f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 01:00:38 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] lib: Add comments to BT_LEAD* cases where encoding has + already been validated + +--- + expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmltok_impl.c b/lib/xmltok_impl.c +index 64a3b2c1..84ff35f9 100644 +--- a/lib/xmltok_impl.c ++++ b/lib/xmltok_impl.c +@@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@ PREFIX(attributeValueTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end, + switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) { + # define LEAD_CASE(n) \ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ +- ptr += n; \ ++ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \ + break; + LEAD_CASE(2) + LEAD_CASE(3) +@@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ PREFIX(entityValueTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end, + switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) { + # define LEAD_CASE(n) \ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ +- ptr += n; \ ++ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \ + break; + LEAD_CASE(2) + LEAD_CASE(3) +@@ -1514,7 +1514,7 @@ PREFIX(getAtts)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, int attsMax, + state = inName; \ + } + # define LEAD_CASE(n) \ +- case BT_LEAD##n: \ ++ case BT_LEAD##n: /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \ + START_NAME ptr += (n - MINBPC(enc)); \ + break; + LEAD_CASE(2) +@@ -1726,7 +1726,7 @@ PREFIX(nameLength)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr) { + switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) { + # define LEAD_CASE(n) \ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ +- ptr += n; \ ++ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \ + break; + LEAD_CASE(2) + LEAD_CASE(3) +@@ -1771,7 +1771,7 @@ PREFIX(updatePosition)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end, + switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) { + # define LEAD_CASE(n) \ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ +- ptr += n; \ ++ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \ + break; + LEAD_CASE(2) + LEAD_CASE(3) +From 6a5510bc6b7efe743356296724e0b38300f05379 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 04:06:21 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] tests: Cover missing validation of encoding (CVE-2022-25235) + +--- + expat/tests/runtests.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c +index bc5344b1..9b155b82 100644 +--- a/tests/runtests.c ++++ b/tests/runtests.c +@@ -5998,6 +5998,105 @@ START_TEST(test_utf8_in_cdata_section_2) { + } + END_TEST + ++START_TEST(test_utf8_in_start_tags) { ++ struct test_case { ++ bool goodName; ++ bool goodNameStart; ++ const char *tagName; ++ }; ++ ++ // The idea with the tests below is this: ++ // We want to cover 1-, 2- and 3-byte sequences, 4-byte sequences ++ // go to isNever and are hence not a concern. ++ // ++ // We start with a character that is a valid name character ++ // (or even name-start character, see XML 1.0r4 spec) and then we flip ++ // single bits at places where (1) the result leaves the UTF-8 encoding space ++ // and (2) we stay in the same n-byte sequence family. ++ // ++ // The flipped bits are highlighted in angle brackets in comments, ++ // e.g. "[<1>011 1001]" means we had [0011 1001] but we now flipped ++ // the most significant bit to 1 to leave UTF-8 encoding space. ++ struct test_case cases[] = { ++ // 1-byte UTF-8: [0xxx xxxx] ++ {true, true, "\x3A"}, // [0011 1010] = ASCII colon ':' ++ {false, false, "\xBA"}, // [<1>011 1010] ++ {true, false, "\x39"}, // [0011 1001] = ASCII nine '9' ++ {false, false, "\xB9"}, // [<1>011 1001] ++ ++ // 2-byte UTF-8: [110x xxxx] [10xx xxxx] ++ {true, true, "\xDB\xA5"}, // [1101 1011] [1010 0101] = ++ // Arabic small waw U+06E5 ++ {false, false, "\x9B\xA5"}, // [1<0>01 1011] [1010 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xDB\x25"}, // [1101 1011] [<0>010 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xDB\xE5"}, // [1101 1011] [1<1>10 0101] ++ {true, false, "\xCC\x81"}, // [1100 1100] [1000 0001] = ++ // combining char U+0301 ++ {false, false, "\x8C\x81"}, // [1<0>00 1100] [1000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xCC\x01"}, // [1100 1100] [<0>000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xCC\xC1"}, // [1100 1100] [1<1>00 0001] ++ ++ // 3-byte UTF-8: [1110 xxxx] [10xx xxxx] [10xxxxxx] ++ {true, true, "\xE0\xA4\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0101] = ++ // Devanagari Letter A U+0905 ++ {false, false, "\xA0\xA4\x85"}, // [1<0>10 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\x24\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [<0>010 0100] [1000 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xE4\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [1<1>10 0100] [1000 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\x05"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [<0>000 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\xC5"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1<1>00 0101] ++ {true, false, "\xE0\xA4\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0001] = ++ // combining char U+0901 ++ {false, false, "\xA0\xA4\x81"}, // [1<0>10 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\x24\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [<0>010 0100] [1000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xE4\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [1<1>10 0100] [1000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\x01"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [<0>000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\xC1"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1<1>00 0001] ++ }; ++ const bool atNameStart[] = {true, false}; ++ ++ size_t i = 0; ++ char doc[1024]; ++ size_t failCount = 0; ++ ++ for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) { ++ size_t j = 0; ++ for (; j < sizeof(atNameStart) / sizeof(atNameStart[0]); j++) { ++ const bool expectedSuccess ++ = atNameStart[j] ? cases[i].goodNameStart : cases[i].goodName; ++ sprintf(doc, "<%s%s><!--", atNameStart[j] ? "" : "a", cases[i].tagName); ++ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL); ++ ++ const enum XML_Status status ++ = XML_Parse(parser, doc, (int)strlen(doc), /*isFinal=*/XML_FALSE); ++ ++ bool success = true; ++ if ((status == XML_STATUS_OK) != expectedSuccess) { ++ success = false; ++ } ++ if ((status == XML_STATUS_ERROR) ++ && (XML_GetErrorCode(parser) != XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN)) { ++ success = false; ++ } ++ ++ if (! success) { ++ fprintf( ++ stderr, ++ "FAIL case %2u (%sat name start, %u-byte sequence, error code %d)\n", ++ (unsigned)i + 1u, atNameStart[j] ? " " : "not ", ++ (unsigned)strlen(cases[i].tagName), XML_GetErrorCode(parser)); ++ failCount++; ++ } ++ ++ XML_ParserFree(parser); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (failCount > 0) { ++ fail("UTF-8 regression detected"); ++ } ++} ++END_TEST ++ + /* Test trailing spaces in elements are accepted */ + static void XMLCALL + record_element_end_handler(void *userData, const XML_Char *name) { +@@ -6175,6 +6274,14 @@ START_TEST(test_bad_doctype) { + } + END_TEST + ++START_TEST(test_bad_doctype_utf8) { ++ const char *text = "<!DOCTYPE \xDB\x25" ++ "doc><doc/>"; // [1101 1011] [<0>010 0101] ++ expect_failure(text, XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN, ++ "Invalid UTF-8 in DOCTYPE not faulted"); ++} ++END_TEST ++ + START_TEST(test_bad_doctype_utf16) { + const char text[] = + /* <!DOCTYPE doc [ \x06f2 ]><doc/> +@@ -11870,6 +11977,7 @@ make_suite(void) { + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_ext_entity_utf8_non_bom); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_cdata_section); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_cdata_section_2); ++ tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_start_tags); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_trailing_spaces_in_elements); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf16_attribute); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf16_second_attr); +@@ -11878,6 +11986,7 @@ make_suite(void) { + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_attr_desc_keyword); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_attr_desc_keyword_utf16); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype); ++ tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_utf8); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_utf16); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_plus); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_star); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ba6443fc6a --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236.patch @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +From 6881a4fc8596307ab9ff2e85e605afa2e413ab71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 00:19:13 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] lib: Fix (harmless) use of uninitialized memory + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/561/commits + +CVE: CVE-2022-25236 + +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 6 ++---- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c +index 902895d5..c768f856 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -718,8 +718,7 @@ XML_ParserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName) { + + XML_Parser XMLCALL + XML_ParserCreateNS(const XML_Char *encodingName, XML_Char nsSep) { +- XML_Char tmp[2]; +- *tmp = nsSep; ++ XML_Char tmp[2] = {nsSep, 0}; + return XML_ParserCreate_MM(encodingName, NULL, tmp); + } + +@@ -1344,8 +1343,7 @@ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate(XML_Parser oldParser, const XML_Char *context, + would be otherwise. + */ + if (parser->m_ns) { +- XML_Char tmp[2]; +- *tmp = parser->m_namespaceSeparator; ++ XML_Char tmp[2] = {parser->m_namespaceSeparator, 0}; + parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, tmp, newDtd); + } else { + parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, NULL, newDtd); +From a2fe525e660badd64b6c557c2b1ec26ddc07f6e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 01:09:29 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] lib: Protect against malicious namespace declarations + (CVE-2022-25236) + +--- + expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c +index c768f856..a3aef88c 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -3754,6 +3754,17 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId, + if (! mustBeXML && isXMLNS + && (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len])) + isXMLNS = XML_FALSE; ++ ++ // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986, ++ // we have to at least make sure that the XML processor on top of ++ // Expat (that is splitting tag names by namespace separator into ++ // 2- or 3-tuples (uri-local or uri-local-prefix)) cannot be confused ++ // by an attacker putting additional namespace separator characters ++ // into namespace declarations. That would be ambiguous and not to ++ // be expected. ++ if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)) { ++ return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX; ++ } + } + isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen; + isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen; +From 2de077423fb22750ebea599677d523b53cb93b1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 00:51:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] tests: Cover CVE-2022-25236 + +--- + expat/tests/runtests.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c +index d07203f2..bc5344b1 100644 +--- a/tests/runtests.c ++++ b/tests/runtests.c +@@ -7220,6 +7220,35 @@ START_TEST(test_ns_double_colon_doctype) { + } + END_TEST + ++START_TEST(test_ns_separator_in_uri) { ++ struct test_case { ++ enum XML_Status expectedStatus; ++ const char *doc; ++ }; ++ struct test_case cases[] = { ++ {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one_two' />"}, ++ {XML_STATUS_ERROR, "<doc xmlns='one
two' />"}, ++ }; ++ ++ size_t i = 0; ++ size_t failCount = 0; ++ for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) { ++ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreateNS(NULL, '\n'); ++ XML_SetElementHandler(parser, dummy_start_element, dummy_end_element); ++ if (XML_Parse(parser, cases[i].doc, (int)strlen(cases[i].doc), ++ /*isFinal*/ XML_TRUE) ++ != cases[i].expectedStatus) { ++ failCount++; ++ } ++ XML_ParserFree(parser); ++ } ++ ++ if (failCount) { ++ fail("Namespace separator handling is broken"); ++ } ++} ++END_TEST ++ + /* Control variable; the number of times duff_allocator() will successfully + * allocate */ + #define ALLOC_ALWAYS_SUCCEED (-1) +@@ -11905,6 +11934,7 @@ make_suite(void) { + tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_utf16_doctype); + tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_invalid_doctype); + tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_double_colon_doctype); ++ tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_separator_in_uri); + + suite_add_tcase(s, tc_misc); + tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_misc, NULL, basic_teardown); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25313-regression.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25313-regression.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..af255e8cb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25313-regression.patch @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +From b12f34fe32821a69dc12ff9a021daca0856de238 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net> +Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2022 23:59:25 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix build_model regression. + +The iterative approach in build_model failed to fill children arrays +correctly. A preorder traversal is not required and turned out to be the +culprit. Use an easier algorithm: + +Add nodes from scaffold tree starting at index 0 (root) to the target +array whenever children are encountered. This ensures that children +are adjacent to each other. This complies with the recursive version. + +Store only the scaffold index in numchildren field to prevent a direct +processing of these children, which would require a recursive solution. +This allows the algorithm to iterate through the target array from start +to end without jumping back and forth, converting on the fly. + +Co-authored-by: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +--- + lib/xmlparse.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c +index c479a258..84885b5a 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -7373,39 +7373,58 @@ build_model(XML_Parser parser) { + * + * The iterative approach works as follows: + * +- * - We use space in the target array for building a temporary stack structure +- * while that space is still unused. +- * The stack grows from the array's end downwards and the "actual data" +- * grows from the start upwards, sequentially. +- * (Because stack grows downwards, pushing onto the stack is a decrement +- * while popping off the stack is an increment.) ++ * - We have two writing pointers, both walking up the result array; one does ++ * the work, the other creates "jobs" for its colleague to do, and leads ++ * the way: + * +- * - A stack element appears as a regular XML_Content node on the outside, +- * but only uses a single field -- numchildren -- to store the source +- * tree node array index. These are the breadcrumbs leading the way back +- * during pre-order (node first) depth-first traversal. ++ * - The faster one, pointer jobDest, always leads and writes "what job ++ * to do" by the other, once they reach that place in the ++ * array: leader "jobDest" stores the source node array index (relative ++ * to array dtd->scaffold) in field "numchildren". + * +- * - The reason we know the stack will never grow into (or overlap with) +- * the area with data of value at the start of the array is because +- * the overall number of elements to process matches the size of the array, +- * and the sum of fully processed nodes and yet-to-be processed nodes +- * on the stack, cannot be more than the total number of nodes. +- * It is possible for the top of the stack and the about-to-write node +- * to meet, but that is safe because we get the source index out +- * before doing any writes on that node. ++ * - The slower one, pointer dest, looks at the value stored in the ++ * "numchildren" field (which actually holds a source node array index ++ * at that time) and puts the real data from dtd->scaffold in. ++ * ++ * - Before the loop starts, jobDest writes source array index 0 ++ * (where the root node is located) so that dest will have something to do ++ * when it starts operation. ++ * ++ * - Whenever nodes with children are encountered, jobDest appends ++ * them as new jobs, in order. As a result, tree node siblings are ++ * adjacent in the resulting array, for example: ++ * ++ * [0] root, has two children ++ * [1] first child of 0, has three children ++ * [3] first child of 1, does not have children ++ * [4] second child of 1, does not have children ++ * [5] third child of 1, does not have children ++ * [2] second child of 0, does not have children ++ * ++ * Or (the same data) presented in flat array view: ++ * ++ * [0] root, has two children ++ * ++ * [1] first child of 0, has three children ++ * [2] second child of 0, does not have children ++ * ++ * [3] first child of 1, does not have children ++ * [4] second child of 1, does not have children ++ * [5] third child of 1, does not have children ++ * ++ * - The algorithm repeats until all target array indices have been processed. + */ + XML_Content *dest = ret; /* tree node writing location, moves upwards */ + XML_Content *const destLimit = &ret[dtd->scaffCount]; +- XML_Content *const stackBottom = &ret[dtd->scaffCount]; +- XML_Content *stackTop = stackBottom; /* i.e. stack is initially empty */ ++ XML_Content *jobDest = ret; /* next free writing location in target array */ + str = (XML_Char *)&ret[dtd->scaffCount]; + +- /* Push source tree root node index onto the stack */ +- (--stackTop)->numchildren = 0; ++ /* Add the starting job, the root node (index 0) of the source tree */ ++ (jobDest++)->numchildren = 0; + + for (; dest < destLimit; dest++) { +- /* Pop source tree node index off the stack */ +- const int src_node = (int)(stackTop++)->numchildren; ++ /* Retrieve source tree array index from job storage */ ++ const int src_node = (int)dest->numchildren; + + /* Convert item */ + dest->type = dtd->scaffold[src_node].type; +@@ -7427,16 +7446,12 @@ build_model(XML_Parser parser) { + int cn; + dest->name = NULL; + dest->numchildren = dtd->scaffold[src_node].childcnt; +- dest->children = &dest[1]; ++ dest->children = jobDest; + +- /* Push children to the stack +- * in a way where the first child ends up at the top of the +- * (downwards growing) stack, in order to be processed first. */ +- stackTop -= dest->numchildren; ++ /* Append scaffold indices of children to array */ + for (i = 0, cn = dtd->scaffold[src_node].firstchild; +- i < dest->numchildren; i++, cn = dtd->scaffold[cn].nextsib) { +- (stackTop + i)->numchildren = (unsigned int)cn; +- } ++ i < dest->numchildren; i++, cn = dtd->scaffold[cn].nextsib) ++ (jobDest++)->numchildren = (unsigned int)cn; + } + } + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25313.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25313.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..470d66e9dd --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25313.patch @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +From 9b4ce651b26557f16103c3a366c91934ecd439ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net> +Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:54:29 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent stack exhaustion in build_model + +It is possible to trigger stack exhaustion in build_model function if +depth of nested children in DTD element is large enough. This happens +because build_node is a recursively called function within build_model. + +The code has been adjusted to run iteratively. It uses the already +allocated heap space as temporary stack (growing from top to bottom). + +Output is identical to recursive version. No new fields in data +structures were added, i.e. it keeps full API and ABI compatibility. +Instead the numchildren variable is used to temporarily keep the +index of items (uint vs int). + +Documentation and readability improvements kindly added by Sebastian. + +Proof of Concept: + +1. Compile poc binary which parses XML file line by line + +``` +cat > poc.c << EOF + #include <err.h> + #include <expat.h> + #include <stdio.h> + + XML_Parser parser; + + static void XMLCALL + dummy_element_decl_handler(void *userData, const XML_Char *name, + XML_Content *model) { + XML_FreeContentModel(parser, model); + } + + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { + FILE *fp; + char *p = NULL; + size_t s = 0; + ssize_t l; + if (argc != 2) + errx(1, "usage: poc poc.xml"); + if ((parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL)) == NULL) + errx(1, "XML_ParserCreate"); + XML_SetElementDeclHandler(parser, dummy_element_decl_handler); + if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "r")) == NULL) + err(1, "fopen"); + while ((l = getline(&p, &s, fp)) > 0) + if (XML_Parse(parser, p, (int)l, XML_FALSE) != XML_STATUS_OK) + errx(1, "XML_Parse"); + XML_ParserFree(parser); + free(p); + fclose(fp); + return 0; + } +EOF +cc -std=c11 -D_POSIX_C_SOURCE=200809L -lexpat -o poc poc.c +``` + +2. Create XML file with a lot of nested groups in DTD element + +``` +cat > poc.xml.zst.b64 << EOF +KLUv/aQkACAAPAEA+DwhRE9DVFlQRSB1d3UgWwo8IUVMRU1FTlQgdXd1CigBAHv/58AJAgAQKAIA +ECgCABAoAgAQKAIAECgCABAoAgAQKHwAAChvd28KKQIA2/8gV24XBAIAECkCABApAgAQKQIAECkC +ABApAgAQKQIAEClVAAAgPl0+CgEA4A4I2VwwnQ== +EOF +base64 -d poc.xml.zst.b64 | zstd -d > poc.xml +``` + +3. Run Proof of Concept + +``` +./poc poc.xml +``` + +Co-authored-by: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/558/commits/9b4ce651b26557f16103c3a366c91934ecd439ab + +CVE: CVE-2022-25313 + +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c +index 4b43e613..594cf12c 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -7317,44 +7317,15 @@ nextScaffoldPart(XML_Parser parser) { + return next; + } + +-static void +-build_node(XML_Parser parser, int src_node, XML_Content *dest, +- XML_Content **contpos, XML_Char **strpos) { +- DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */ +- dest->type = dtd->scaffold[src_node].type; +- dest->quant = dtd->scaffold[src_node].quant; +- if (dest->type == XML_CTYPE_NAME) { +- const XML_Char *src; +- dest->name = *strpos; +- src = dtd->scaffold[src_node].name; +- for (;;) { +- *(*strpos)++ = *src; +- if (! *src) +- break; +- src++; +- } +- dest->numchildren = 0; +- dest->children = NULL; +- } else { +- unsigned int i; +- int cn; +- dest->numchildren = dtd->scaffold[src_node].childcnt; +- dest->children = *contpos; +- *contpos += dest->numchildren; +- for (i = 0, cn = dtd->scaffold[src_node].firstchild; i < dest->numchildren; +- i++, cn = dtd->scaffold[cn].nextsib) { +- build_node(parser, cn, &(dest->children[i]), contpos, strpos); +- } +- dest->name = NULL; +- } +-} +- + static XML_Content * + build_model(XML_Parser parser) { ++ /* Function build_model transforms the existing parser->m_dtd->scaffold ++ * array of CONTENT_SCAFFOLD tree nodes into a new array of ++ * XML_Content tree nodes followed by a gapless list of zero-terminated ++ * strings. */ + DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */ + XML_Content *ret; +- XML_Content *cpos; +- XML_Char *str; ++ XML_Char *str; /* the current string writing location */ + + /* Detect and prevent integer overflow. + * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning +@@ -7380,10 +7351,81 @@ build_model(XML_Parser parser) { + if (! ret) + return NULL; + +- str = (XML_Char *)(&ret[dtd->scaffCount]); +- cpos = &ret[1]; ++ /* What follows is an iterative implementation (of what was previously done ++ * recursively in a dedicated function called "build_node". The old recursive ++ * build_node could be forced into stack exhaustion from input as small as a ++ * few megabyte, and so that was a security issue. Hence, a function call ++ * stack is avoided now by resolving recursion.) ++ * ++ * The iterative approach works as follows: ++ * ++ * - We use space in the target array for building a temporary stack structure ++ * while that space is still unused. ++ * The stack grows from the array's end downwards and the "actual data" ++ * grows from the start upwards, sequentially. ++ * (Because stack grows downwards, pushing onto the stack is a decrement ++ * while popping off the stack is an increment.) ++ * ++ * - A stack element appears as a regular XML_Content node on the outside, ++ * but only uses a single field -- numchildren -- to store the source ++ * tree node array index. These are the breadcrumbs leading the way back ++ * during pre-order (node first) depth-first traversal. ++ * ++ * - The reason we know the stack will never grow into (or overlap with) ++ * the area with data of value at the start of the array is because ++ * the overall number of elements to process matches the size of the array, ++ * and the sum of fully processed nodes and yet-to-be processed nodes ++ * on the stack, cannot be more than the total number of nodes. ++ * It is possible for the top of the stack and the about-to-write node ++ * to meet, but that is safe because we get the source index out ++ * before doing any writes on that node. ++ */ ++ XML_Content *dest = ret; /* tree node writing location, moves upwards */ ++ XML_Content *const destLimit = &ret[dtd->scaffCount]; ++ XML_Content *const stackBottom = &ret[dtd->scaffCount]; ++ XML_Content *stackTop = stackBottom; /* i.e. stack is initially empty */ ++ str = (XML_Char *)&ret[dtd->scaffCount]; ++ ++ /* Push source tree root node index onto the stack */ ++ (--stackTop)->numchildren = 0; ++ ++ for (; dest < destLimit; dest++) { ++ /* Pop source tree node index off the stack */ ++ const int src_node = (int)(stackTop++)->numchildren; ++ ++ /* Convert item */ ++ dest->type = dtd->scaffold[src_node].type; ++ dest->quant = dtd->scaffold[src_node].quant; ++ if (dest->type == XML_CTYPE_NAME) { ++ const XML_Char *src; ++ dest->name = str; ++ src = dtd->scaffold[src_node].name; ++ for (;;) { ++ *str++ = *src; ++ if (! *src) ++ break; ++ src++; ++ } ++ dest->numchildren = 0; ++ dest->children = NULL; ++ } else { ++ unsigned int i; ++ int cn; ++ dest->name = NULL; ++ dest->numchildren = dtd->scaffold[src_node].childcnt; ++ dest->children = &dest[1]; ++ ++ /* Push children to the stack ++ * in a way where the first child ends up at the top of the ++ * (downwards growing) stack, in order to be processed first. */ ++ stackTop -= dest->numchildren; ++ for (i = 0, cn = dtd->scaffold[src_node].firstchild; ++ i < dest->numchildren; i++, cn = dtd->scaffold[cn].nextsib) { ++ (stackTop + i)->numchildren = (unsigned int)cn; ++ } ++ } ++ } + +- build_node(parser, 0, ret, &cpos, &str); + return ret; + } + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25314.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25314.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2f713ebb54 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25314.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From efcb347440ade24b9f1054671e6bd05e60b4cafd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net> +Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:56:57 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent integer overflow in copyString + +The copyString function is only used for encoding string supplied by +the library user. + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/560/commits/efcb347440ade24b9f1054671e6bd05e60b4cafd + +CVE: CVE-2022-25314 + +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c +index 4b43e613..a39377c2 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -7412,7 +7412,7 @@ getElementType(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, + + static XML_Char * + copyString(const XML_Char *s, const XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *memsuite) { +- int charsRequired = 0; ++ size_t charsRequired = 0; + XML_Char *result; + + /* First determine how long the string is */ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25315.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25315.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a39771d28a --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25315.patch @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +From eb0362808b4f9f1e2345a0cf203b8cc196d776d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net> +Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:55:46 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent integer overflow in storeRawNames + +It is possible to use an integer overflow in storeRawNames for out of +boundary heap writes. Default configuration is affected. If compiled +with XML_UNICODE then the attack does not work. Compiling with +-fsanitize=address confirms the following proof of concept. + +The problem can be exploited by abusing the m_buffer expansion logic. +Even though the initial size of m_buffer is a power of two, eventually +it can end up a little bit lower, thus allowing allocations very close +to INT_MAX (since INT_MAX/2 can be surpassed). This means that tag +names can be parsed which are almost INT_MAX in size. + +Unfortunately (from an attacker point of view) INT_MAX/2 is also a +limitation in string pools. Having a tag name of INT_MAX/2 characters +or more is not possible. + +Expat can convert between different encodings. UTF-16 documents which +contain only ASCII representable characters are twice as large as their +ASCII encoded counter-parts. + +The proof of concept works by taking these three considerations into +account: + +1. Move the m_buffer size slightly below a power of two by having a + short root node <a>. This allows the m_buffer to grow very close + to INT_MAX. +2. The string pooling forbids tag names longer than or equal to + INT_MAX/2, so keep the attack tag name smaller than that. +3. To be able to still overflow INT_MAX even though the name is + limited at INT_MAX/2-1 (nul byte) we use UTF-16 encoding and a tag + which only contains ASCII characters. UTF-16 always stores two + bytes per character while the tag name is converted to using only + one. Our attack node byte count must be a bit higher than + 2/3 INT_MAX so the converted tag name is around INT_MAX/3 which + in sum can overflow INT_MAX. + +Thanks to our small root node, m_buffer can handle 2/3 INT_MAX bytes +without running into INT_MAX boundary check. The string pooling is +able to store INT_MAX/3 as tag name because the amount is below +INT_MAX/2 limitation. And creating the sum of both eventually overflows +in storeRawNames. + +Proof of Concept: + +1. Compile expat with -fsanitize=address. + +2. Create Proof of Concept binary which iterates through input + file 16 MB at once for better performance and easier integer + calculations: + +``` +cat > poc.c << EOF + #include <err.h> + #include <expat.h> + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <stdio.h> + + #define CHUNK (16 * 1024 * 1024) + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { + XML_Parser parser; + FILE *fp; + char *buf; + int i; + + if (argc != 2) + errx(1, "usage: poc file.xml"); + if ((parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL)) == NULL) + errx(1, "failed to create expat parser"); + if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "r")) == NULL) { + XML_ParserFree(parser); + err(1, "failed to open file"); + } + if ((buf = malloc(CHUNK)) == NULL) { + fclose(fp); + XML_ParserFree(parser); + err(1, "failed to allocate buffer"); + } + i = 0; + while (fread(buf, CHUNK, 1, fp) == 1) { + printf("iteration %d: XML_Parse returns %d\n", ++i, + XML_Parse(parser, buf, CHUNK, XML_FALSE)); + } + free(buf); + fclose(fp); + XML_ParserFree(parser); + return 0; + } +EOF +gcc -fsanitize=address -lexpat -o poc poc.c +``` + +3. Construct specially prepared UTF-16 XML file: + +``` +dd if=/dev/zero bs=1024 count=794624 | tr '\0' 'a' > poc-utf8.xml +echo -n '<a><' | dd conv=notrunc of=poc-utf8.xml +echo -n '><' | dd conv=notrunc of=poc-utf8.xml bs=1 seek=805306368 +iconv -f UTF-8 -t UTF-16LE poc-utf8.xml > poc-utf16.xml +``` + +4. Run proof of concept: + +``` +./poc poc-utf16.xml +``` + +Upstream-Status: Backport +https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/559/commits/eb0362808b4f9f1e2345a0cf203b8cc196d776d9 + +CVE: CVE-2022-25315 + +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> +--- + lib/xmlparse.c | 7 ++++++- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c +index 4b43e613..f34d6ab5 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -2563,6 +2563,7 @@ storeRawNames(XML_Parser parser) { + while (tag) { + int bufSize; + int nameLen = sizeof(XML_Char) * (tag->name.strLen + 1); ++ size_t rawNameLen; + char *rawNameBuf = tag->buf + nameLen; + /* Stop if already stored. Since m_tagStack is a stack, we can stop + at the first entry that has already been copied; everything +@@ -2574,7 +2575,11 @@ storeRawNames(XML_Parser parser) { + /* For re-use purposes we need to ensure that the + size of tag->buf is a multiple of sizeof(XML_Char). + */ +- bufSize = nameLen + ROUND_UP(tag->rawNameLength, sizeof(XML_Char)); ++ rawNameLen = ROUND_UP(tag->rawNameLength, sizeof(XML_Char)); ++ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow. */ ++ if (rawNameLen > (size_t)INT_MAX - nameLen) ++ return XML_FALSE; ++ bufSize = nameLen + (int)rawNameLen; + if (bufSize > tag->bufEnd - tag->buf) { + char *temp = (char *)REALLOC(parser, tag->buf, bufSize); + if (temp == NULL) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.9.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.9.bb index 757c18c5fa..f50e535922 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.9.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.9.bb @@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/libexpat/libexpat.git;protocol=https;branch=master \ file://CVE-2021-45960.patch \ file://CVE-2021-46143.patch \ file://CVE-2022-22822-27.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-23852.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-23990.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25235.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25236.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25313.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25313-regression.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25314.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25315.patch \ file://libtool-tag.patch \ " diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib.inc index c3ddf18387..1849a6e05c 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib.inc @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://developer.gnome.org/glib/" # pcre is under BSD; # docs/reference/COPYING is with a 'public domain'-like license! -LICENSE = "LGPLv2.1+ & BSD & PD" +LICENSE = "LGPLv2.1+ & BSD-3-Clause & PD" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c \ file://glib/glib.h;beginline=4;endline=17;md5=b88abb7f3ad09607e71cb9d530155906 \ file://gmodule/COPYING;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c \ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc index aac0d9b3bf..68efd09ece 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ SRCBRANCH ?= "release/2.31/master" PV = "2.31+git${SRCPV}" -SRCREV_glibc ?= "4f0a61f75385c9a5879cbe7202042e88f692a3c8" +SRCREV_glibc ?= "3ef8be9b89ef98300951741f381eb79126ac029f" SRCREV_localedef ?= "cd9f958c4c94a638fa7b2b4e21627364f1a1a655" GLIBC_GIT_URI ?= "git://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.31.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.31.bb index 4a545cb97d..0c37467fe4 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.31.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.31.bb @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ require glibc-version.inc CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-10029 CVE-2020-6096 CVE-2016-10228 CVE-2020-1751 CVE-2020-1752 \ CVE-2021-27645 CVE-2021-3326 CVE-2020-27618 CVE-2020-29562 CVE-2019-25013 \ + CVE-2022-23218 CVE-2022-23219 \ " # glibc https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2019-1010022 diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb index e75b82cf1e..7dfe382d58 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/images/build-appliance-image_15.0.0.bb @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ IMAGE_FSTYPES = "wic.vmdk" inherit core-image setuptools3 -SRCREV ?= "d752cbcbbeeea9adbcc9aa74def1761f34a9de54" +SRCREV ?= "b41d4e46d30ed32e11d68466721a0f4056bad700" SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/poky;branch=dunfell \ file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmx \ file://Yocto_Build_Appliance.vmxf \ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2022-23308-fix-regression.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2022-23308-fix-regression.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7fc243eec1 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2022-23308-fix-regression.patch @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +From 646fe48d1c8a74310c409ddf81fe7df6700052af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de> +Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 11:51:08 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix --without-valid build + +Regressed in commit 652dd12a. +--- + valid.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- + 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) +--- + +From https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2.git + commit 646fe48d1c8a74310c409ddf81fe7df6700052af + +CVE: CVE-2022-23308 +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> + +diff --git a/valid.c b/valid.c +index 8e596f1d..9684683a 100644 +--- a/valid.c ++++ b/valid.c +@@ -479,35 +479,6 @@ nodeVPop(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt) + return (ret); + } + +-/** +- * xmlValidNormalizeString: +- * @str: a string +- * +- * Normalize a string in-place. +- */ +-static void +-xmlValidNormalizeString(xmlChar *str) { +- xmlChar *dst; +- const xmlChar *src; +- +- if (str == NULL) +- return; +- src = str; +- dst = str; +- +- while (*src == 0x20) src++; +- while (*src != 0) { +- if (*src == 0x20) { +- while (*src == 0x20) src++; +- if (*src != 0) +- *dst++ = 0x20; +- } else { +- *dst++ = *src++; +- } +- } +- *dst = 0; +-} +- + #ifdef DEBUG_VALID_ALGO + static void + xmlValidPrintNode(xmlNodePtr cur) { +@@ -2636,6 +2607,35 @@ xmlDumpNotationTable(xmlBufferPtr buf, xmlNotationTablePtr table) { + (xmlDictOwns(dict, (const xmlChar *)(str)) == 0))) \ + xmlFree((char *)(str)); + ++/** ++ * xmlValidNormalizeString: ++ * @str: a string ++ * ++ * Normalize a string in-place. ++ */ ++static void ++xmlValidNormalizeString(xmlChar *str) { ++ xmlChar *dst; ++ const xmlChar *src; ++ ++ if (str == NULL) ++ return; ++ src = str; ++ dst = str; ++ ++ while (*src == 0x20) src++; ++ while (*src != 0) { ++ if (*src == 0x20) { ++ while (*src == 0x20) src++; ++ if (*src != 0) ++ *dst++ = 0x20; ++ } else { ++ *dst++ = *src++; ++ } ++ } ++ *dst = 0; ++} ++ + static int + xmlIsStreaming(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt) { + xmlParserCtxtPtr pctxt; +-- +2.35.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2022-23308.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2022-23308.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bf5604e81a --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2022-23308.patch @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +From 8b66850de350f0fcd786ae776a65ba15a5999e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de> +Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 03:29:24 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Use-after-free of ID and IDREF attributes + +If a document is parsed with XML_PARSE_DTDVALID and without +XML_PARSE_NOENT, the value of ID attributes has to be normalized after +potentially expanding entities in xmlRemoveID. Otherwise, later calls +to xmlGetID can return a pointer to previously freed memory. + +ID attributes which are empty or contain only whitespace after +entity expansion are affected in a similar way. This is fixed by +not storing such attributes in the ID table. + +The test to detect streaming mode when validating against a DTD was +broken. In connection with the defects above, this could result in a +use-after-free when using the xmlReader interface with validation. +Fix detection of streaming mode to avoid similar issues. (This changes +the expected result of a test case. But as far as I can tell, using the +XML reader with XIncludes referencing the root document never worked +properly, anyway.) + +All of these issues can result in denial of service. Using xmlReader +with validation could result in disclosure of memory via the error +channel, typically stderr. The security impact of xmlGetID returning +a pointer to freed memory depends on the application. The typical use +case of calling xmlGetID on an unmodified document is not affected. + +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/652dd12a858989b14eed4e84e453059cd3ba340e] + +The upstream patch 652dd12a858989b14eed4e84e453059cd3ba340e has been modified +to skip the patch to the testsuite result (result/XInclude/ns1.xml.rdr), as +this particular test does not exist in v2.9.10 (it was added later). + +CVE: CVE-2022-23308 +Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org> + +--- + valid.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- + 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/valid.c b/valid.c +index 07963e7..ee75311 100644 +--- a/valid.c ++++ b/valid.c +@@ -479,6 +479,35 @@ nodeVPop(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt) + return (ret); + } + ++/** ++ * xmlValidNormalizeString: ++ * @str: a string ++ * ++ * Normalize a string in-place. ++ */ ++static void ++xmlValidNormalizeString(xmlChar *str) { ++ xmlChar *dst; ++ const xmlChar *src; ++ ++ if (str == NULL) ++ return; ++ src = str; ++ dst = str; ++ ++ while (*src == 0x20) src++; ++ while (*src != 0) { ++ if (*src == 0x20) { ++ while (*src == 0x20) src++; ++ if (*src != 0) ++ *dst++ = 0x20; ++ } else { ++ *dst++ = *src++; ++ } ++ } ++ *dst = 0; ++} ++ + #ifdef DEBUG_VALID_ALGO + static void + xmlValidPrintNode(xmlNodePtr cur) { +@@ -2607,6 +2636,24 @@ xmlDumpNotationTable(xmlBufferPtr buf, xmlNotationTablePtr table) { + (xmlDictOwns(dict, (const xmlChar *)(str)) == 0))) \ + xmlFree((char *)(str)); + ++static int ++xmlIsStreaming(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt) { ++ xmlParserCtxtPtr pctxt; ++ ++ if (ctxt == NULL) ++ return(0); ++ /* ++ * These magic values are also abused to detect whether we're validating ++ * while parsing a document. In this case, userData points to the parser ++ * context. ++ */ ++ if ((ctxt->finishDtd != XML_CTXT_FINISH_DTD_0) && ++ (ctxt->finishDtd != XML_CTXT_FINISH_DTD_1)) ++ return(0); ++ pctxt = ctxt->userData; ++ return(pctxt->parseMode == XML_PARSE_READER); ++} ++ + /** + * xmlFreeID: + * @not: A id +@@ -2650,7 +2697,7 @@ xmlAddID(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *value, + if (doc == NULL) { + return(NULL); + } +- if (value == NULL) { ++ if ((value == NULL) || (value[0] == 0)) { + return(NULL); + } + if (attr == NULL) { +@@ -2681,7 +2728,7 @@ xmlAddID(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *value, + */ + ret->value = xmlStrdup(value); + ret->doc = doc; +- if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->vstateNr != 0)) { ++ if (xmlIsStreaming(ctxt)) { + /* + * Operating in streaming mode, attr is gonna disappear + */ +@@ -2820,6 +2867,7 @@ xmlRemoveID(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlAttrPtr attr) { + ID = xmlNodeListGetString(doc, attr->children, 1); + if (ID == NULL) + return(-1); ++ xmlValidNormalizeString(ID); + + id = xmlHashLookup(table, ID); + if (id == NULL || id->attr != attr) { +@@ -3009,7 +3057,7 @@ xmlAddRef(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *value, + * fill the structure. + */ + ret->value = xmlStrdup(value); +- if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->vstateNr != 0)) { ++ if (xmlIsStreaming(ctxt)) { + /* + * Operating in streaming mode, attr is gonna disappear + */ +@@ -4028,8 +4076,7 @@ xmlValidateAttributeValue2(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, + xmlChar * + xmlValidCtxtNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, + xmlNodePtr elem, const xmlChar *name, const xmlChar *value) { +- xmlChar *ret, *dst; +- const xmlChar *src; ++ xmlChar *ret; + xmlAttributePtr attrDecl = NULL; + int extsubset = 0; + +@@ -4070,19 +4117,7 @@ xmlValidCtxtNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, + ret = xmlStrdup(value); + if (ret == NULL) + return(NULL); +- src = value; +- dst = ret; +- while (*src == 0x20) src++; +- while (*src != 0) { +- if (*src == 0x20) { +- while (*src == 0x20) src++; +- if (*src != 0) +- *dst++ = 0x20; +- } else { +- *dst++ = *src++; +- } +- } +- *dst = 0; ++ xmlValidNormalizeString(ret); + if ((doc->standalone) && (extsubset == 1) && (!xmlStrEqual(value, ret))) { + xmlErrValidNode(ctxt, elem, XML_DTD_NOT_STANDALONE, + "standalone: %s on %s value had to be normalized based on external subset declaration\n", +@@ -4114,8 +4149,7 @@ xmlValidCtxtNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlValidCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlDocPtr doc, + xmlChar * + xmlValidNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr elem, + const xmlChar *name, const xmlChar *value) { +- xmlChar *ret, *dst; +- const xmlChar *src; ++ xmlChar *ret; + xmlAttributePtr attrDecl = NULL; + + if (doc == NULL) return(NULL); +@@ -4145,19 +4179,7 @@ xmlValidNormalizeAttributeValue(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlNodePtr elem, + ret = xmlStrdup(value); + if (ret == NULL) + return(NULL); +- src = value; +- dst = ret; +- while (*src == 0x20) src++; +- while (*src != 0) { +- if (*src == 0x20) { +- while (*src == 0x20) src++; +- if (*src != 0) +- *dst++ = 0x20; +- } else { +- *dst++ = *src++; +- } +- } +- *dst = 0; ++ xmlValidNormalizeString(ret); + return(ret); + } + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.10.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.10.bb index ebb996c8dd..c4bb8f29e0 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.10.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.10.bb @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ SUMMARY = "XML C Parser Library and Toolkit" DESCRIPTION = "The XML Parser Library allows for manipulation of XML files. Libxml2 exports Push and Pull type parser interfaces for both XML and HTML. It can do DTD validation at parse time, on a parsed document instance or with an arbitrary DTD. Libxml2 includes complete XPath, XPointer and Xinclude implementations. It also has a SAX like interface, which is designed to be compatible with Expat." -HOMEPAGE = "http://www.xmlsoft.org/" +HOMEPAGE = "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2" BUGTRACKER = "http://bugzilla.gnome.org/buglist.cgi?product=libxml2" SECTION = "libs" LICENSE = "MIT" @@ -11,8 +11,9 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://Copyright;md5=2044417e2e5006b65a8b9067b683fcf1 \ DEPENDS = "zlib virtual/libiconv" -SRC_URI = "http://www.xmlsoft.org/sources/libxml2-${PV}.tar.gz;name=libtar \ - http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20080827.tar.gz;subdir=${BP};name=testtar \ +inherit gnomebase + +SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20080827.tar.gz;subdir=${BP};name=testtar \ file://libxml-64bit.patch \ file://runtest.patch \ file://run-ptest \ @@ -27,10 +28,11 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.xmlsoft.org/sources/libxml2-${PV}.tar.gz;name=libtar \ file://CVE-2021-3537.patch \ file://CVE-2021-3518.patch \ file://CVE-2021-3541.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-23308.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-23308-fix-regression.patch \ " -SRC_URI[libtar.md5sum] = "10942a1dc23137a8aa07f0639cbfece5" -SRC_URI[libtar.sha256sum] = "aafee193ffb8fe0c82d4afef6ef91972cbaf5feea100edc2f262750611b4be1f" +SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "593b7b751dd18c2d6abcd0c4bcb29efc203d0b4373a6df98e3a455ea74ae2813" SRC_URI[testtar.md5sum] = "ae3d1ebe000a3972afa104ca7f0e1b4a" SRC_URI[testtar.sha256sum] = "96151685cec997e1f9f3387e3626d61e6284d4d6e66e0e440c209286c03e9cc7" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2021-3997-1.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2021-3997-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..341976822b --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2021-3997-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +Backport of the following upstream commit: +From fbb77e1e55866633c9f064e2b3bcf2b6402d962d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> +Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 15:55:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] shared/rm_rf: refactor rm_rf_children_inner() to shorten + code a bit + +CVE: CVE-2021-3997 +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/s/systemd/systemd_245.4-4ubuntu3.15.debian.tar.xz] +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <Purushottam.Choudhary@kpit.com> +--- + src/basic/rm-rf.c | 27 +++++++++------------------ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/basic/rm-rf.c ++++ b/src/basic/rm-rf.c +@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ + const struct stat *root_dev) { + + struct stat st; +- int r; ++ int r, q = 0; + + assert(fd >= 0); + assert(fname); +@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ + + if (is_dir) { + _cleanup_close_ int subdir_fd = -1; +- int q; + + /* if root_dev is set, remove subdirectories only if device is same */ + if (root_dev && st.st_dev != root_dev->st_dev) +@@ -86,23 +85,15 @@ + * again for each directory */ + q = rm_rf_children(TAKE_FD(subdir_fd), flags | REMOVE_PHYSICAL, root_dev); + +- r = unlinkat(fd, fname, AT_REMOVEDIR); +- if (r < 0) +- return r; +- if (q < 0) +- return q; +- +- return 1; +- +- } else if (!(flags & REMOVE_ONLY_DIRECTORIES)) { +- r = unlinkat(fd, fname, 0); +- if (r < 0) +- return r; +- +- return 1; +- } ++ } else if (flags & REMOVE_ONLY_DIRECTORIES) ++ return 0; + +- return 0; ++ r = unlinkat(fd, fname, is_dir ? AT_REMOVEDIR : 0); ++ if (r < 0) ++ return r; ++ if (q < 0) ++ return q; ++ return 1; + } + + int rm_rf_children( diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2021-3997-2.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2021-3997-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..066e10fbbc --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2021-3997-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +Backport of the following upstream commit: +From bd0127daaaae009ade053718f7d2f297aee4acaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> +Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 16:56:42 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] shared/rm_rf: refactor rm_rf() to shorten code a bit + +CVE: CVE-2021-3997 +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/s/systemd/systemd_245.4-4ubuntu3.15.debian.tar.xz] +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <Purushottam.Choudhary@kpit.com> +--- + src/basic/rm-rf.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/basic/rm-rf.c ++++ b/src/basic/rm-rf.c +@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ + } + + int rm_rf(const char *path, RemoveFlags flags) { +- int fd, r; ++ int fd, r, q = 0; + + assert(path); + +@@ -191,49 +191,47 @@ + } + + fd = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME); +- if (fd < 0) { ++ if (fd >= 0) { ++ /* We have a dir */ ++ r = rm_rf_children(fd, flags, NULL); ++ ++ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_ROOT)) { ++ q = rmdir(path); ++ if (q < 0) ++ q = -errno; ++ } ++ } else { + if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_MISSING_OK) && errno == ENOENT) + return 0; + + if (!IN_SET(errno, ENOTDIR, ELOOP)) + return -errno; + +- if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_ONLY_DIRECTORIES)) ++ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_ONLY_DIRECTORIES) || !FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_ROOT)) + return 0; + +- if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_ROOT)) { +- +- if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_PHYSICAL)) { +- struct statfs s; +- +- if (statfs(path, &s) < 0) +- return -errno; +- if (is_physical_fs(&s)) +- return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), +- "Attempted to remove files from a disk file system under \"%s\", refusing.", +- path); +- } +- +- if (unlink(path) < 0) { +- if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_MISSING_OK) && errno == ENOENT) +- return 0; ++ if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_PHYSICAL)) { ++ struct statfs s; + ++ if (statfs(path, &s) < 0) + return -errno; +- } ++ if (is_physical_fs(&s)) ++ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), ++ "Attempted to remove files from a disk file system under \"%s\", refusing.", ++ path); + } + +- return 0; ++ r = 0; ++ q = unlink(path); ++ if (q < 0) ++ q = -errno; + } + +- r = rm_rf_children(fd, flags, NULL); +- +- if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_ROOT) && +- rmdir(path) < 0 && +- r >= 0 && +- (!FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_MISSING_OK) || errno != ENOENT)) +- r = -errno; +- +- return r; ++ if (r < 0) ++ return r; ++ if (q < 0 && (q != -ENOENT || !FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_MISSING_OK))) ++ return q; ++ return 0; + } + + int rm_rf_child(int fd, const char *name, RemoveFlags flags) { diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2021-3997-3.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2021-3997-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c96b8d9a6e --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2021-3997-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +Backport of the following upstream commit: +From bef8e8e577368697b2e6f85183b1dbc99e0e520f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> +Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 22:29:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] shared/rm-rf: loop over nested directories instead of + instead of recursing + +To remove directory structures, we need to remove the innermost items first, +and then recursively remove higher-level directories. We would recursively +descend into directories and invoke rm_rf_children and rm_rm_children_inner. +This is problematic when too many directories are nested. + +Instead, let's create a "TODO" queue. In the the queue, for each level we +hold the DIR* object we were working on, and the name of the directory. This +allows us to leave a partially-processed directory, and restart the removal +loop one level down. When done with the inner directory, we use the name to +unlinkat() it from the parent, and proceed with the removal of other items. + +Because the nesting is increased by one level, it is best to view this patch +with -b/--ignore-space-change. + +This fixes CVE-2021-3997, https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2024639. +The issue was reported and patches reviewed by Qualys Team. +Mauro Matteo Cascella and Riccardo Schirone from Red Hat handled the disclosure. + +CVE: CVE-2021-3997 +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/s/systemd/systemd_245.4-4ubuntu3.15.debian.tar.xz] +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <Purushottam.Choudhary@kpit.com> +--- + src/basic/rm-rf.c | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + 1 file changed, 113 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/basic/rm-rf.c ++++ b/src/basic/rm-rf.c +@@ -26,12 +26,13 @@ + return !is_temporary_fs(sfs) && !is_cgroup_fs(sfs); + } + +-static int rm_rf_children_inner( ++static int rm_rf_inner_child( + int fd, + const char *fname, + int is_dir, + RemoveFlags flags, +- const struct stat *root_dev) { ++ const struct stat *root_dev, ++ bool allow_recursion) { + + struct stat st; + int r, q = 0; +@@ -49,9 +50,7 @@ + } + + if (is_dir) { +- _cleanup_close_ int subdir_fd = -1; +- +- /* if root_dev is set, remove subdirectories only if device is same */ ++ /* If root_dev is set, remove subdirectories only if device is same */ + if (root_dev && st.st_dev != root_dev->st_dev) + return 0; + +@@ -63,7 +62,6 @@ + return 0; + + if ((flags & REMOVE_SUBVOLUME) && st.st_ino == 256) { +- + /* This could be a subvolume, try to remove it */ + + r = btrfs_subvol_remove_fd(fd, fname, BTRFS_REMOVE_RECURSIVE|BTRFS_REMOVE_QUOTA); +@@ -77,13 +75,16 @@ + return 1; + } + +- subdir_fd = openat(fd, fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME); ++ if (!allow_recursion) ++ return -EISDIR; ++ ++ int subdir_fd = openat(fd, fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME); + if (subdir_fd < 0) + return -errno; + + /* We pass REMOVE_PHYSICAL here, to avoid doing the fstatfs() to check the file system type + * again for each directory */ +- q = rm_rf_children(TAKE_FD(subdir_fd), flags | REMOVE_PHYSICAL, root_dev); ++ q = rm_rf_children(subdir_fd, flags | REMOVE_PHYSICAL, root_dev); + + } else if (flags & REMOVE_ONLY_DIRECTORIES) + return 0; +@@ -96,64 +97,128 @@ + return 1; + } + ++typedef struct TodoEntry { ++ DIR *dir; /* A directory that we were operating on. */ ++ char *dirname; /* The filename of that directory itself. */ ++} TodoEntry; ++ ++static void free_todo_entries(TodoEntry **todos) { ++ for (TodoEntry *x = *todos; x && x->dir; x++) { ++ closedir(x->dir); ++ free(x->dirname); ++ } ++ ++ freep(todos); ++} ++ + int rm_rf_children( + int fd, + RemoveFlags flags, + const struct stat *root_dev) { + +- _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL; +- struct dirent *de; ++ _cleanup_(free_todo_entries) TodoEntry *todos = NULL; ++ size_t n_todo = 0, allocated = 0; ++ _cleanup_free_ char *dirname = NULL; /* Set when we are recursing and want to delete ourselves */ + int ret = 0, r; + +- assert(fd >= 0); ++ /* Return the first error we run into, but nevertheless try to go on. ++ * The passed fd is closed in all cases, including on failure. */ + +- /* This returns the first error we run into, but nevertheless tries to go on. This closes the passed +- * fd, in all cases, including on failure. */ ++ for (;;) { /* This loop corresponds to the directory nesting level. */ ++ _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL; ++ struct dirent *de; ++ ++ if (n_todo > 0) { ++ /* We know that we are in recursion here, because n_todo is set. ++ * We need to remove the inner directory we were operating on. */ ++ assert(dirname); ++ r = unlinkat(dirfd(todos[n_todo-1].dir), dirname, AT_REMOVEDIR); ++ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT && ret == 0) ++ ret = r; ++ dirname = mfree(dirname); ++ ++ /* And now let's back out one level up */ ++ n_todo --; ++ d = TAKE_PTR(todos[n_todo].dir); ++ dirname = TAKE_PTR(todos[n_todo].dirname); ++ ++ assert(d); ++ fd = dirfd(d); /* Retrieve the file descriptor from the DIR object */ ++ assert(fd >= 0); ++ } else { ++ next_fd: ++ assert(fd >= 0); ++ d = fdopendir(fd); ++ if (!d) { ++ safe_close(fd); ++ return -errno; ++ } ++ fd = dirfd(d); /* We donated the fd to fdopendir(). Let's make sure we sure we have ++ * the right descriptor even if it were to internally invalidate the ++ * one we passed. */ ++ ++ if (!(flags & REMOVE_PHYSICAL)) { ++ struct statfs sfs; ++ ++ if (fstatfs(fd, &sfs) < 0) ++ return -errno; ++ ++ if (is_physical_fs(&sfs)) { ++ /* We refuse to clean physical file systems with this call, unless ++ * explicitly requested. This is extra paranoia just to be sure we ++ * never ever remove non-state data. */ ++ ++ _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL; ++ ++ (void) fd_get_path(fd, &path); ++ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), ++ "Attempted to remove disk file system under \"%s\", and we can't allow that.", ++ strna(path)); ++ } ++ } ++ } + +- d = fdopendir(fd); +- if (!d) { +- safe_close(fd); +- return -errno; +- } ++ FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, return -errno) { ++ int is_dir; + +- if (!(flags & REMOVE_PHYSICAL)) { +- struct statfs sfs; ++ if (dot_or_dot_dot(de->d_name)) ++ continue; + +- if (fstatfs(dirfd(d), &sfs) < 0) +- return -errno; +- } ++ is_dir = de->d_type == DT_UNKNOWN ? -1 : de->d_type == DT_DIR; + +- if (is_physical_fs(&sfs)) { +- /* We refuse to clean physical file systems with this call, unless explicitly +- * requested. This is extra paranoia just to be sure we never ever remove non-state +- * data. */ +- +- _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL; +- +- (void) fd_get_path(fd, &path); +- return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), +- "Attempted to remove disk file system under \"%s\", and we can't allow that.", +- strna(path)); +- } +- } ++ r = rm_rf_inner_child(fd, de->d_name, is_dir, flags, root_dev, false); ++ if (r == -EISDIR) { ++ /* Push the current working state onto the todo list */ + +- FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, return -errno) { +- int is_dir; ++ if (!GREEDY_REALLOC0(todos, allocated, n_todo + 2)) ++ return log_oom(); + +- if (dot_or_dot_dot(de->d_name)) +- continue; ++ _cleanup_free_ char *newdirname = strdup(de->d_name); ++ if (!newdirname) ++ return log_oom(); + +- is_dir = +- de->d_type == DT_UNKNOWN ? -1 : +- de->d_type == DT_DIR; +- +- r = rm_rf_children_inner(dirfd(d), de->d_name, is_dir, flags, root_dev); +- if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT && ret == 0) +- ret = r; +- } ++ int newfd = openat(fd, de->d_name, ++ O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME); ++ if (newfd >= 0) { ++ todos[n_todo++] = (TodoEntry) { TAKE_PTR(d), TAKE_PTR(dirname) }; ++ fd = newfd; ++ dirname = TAKE_PTR(newdirname); ++ ++ goto next_fd; + +- if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_SYNCFS) && syncfs(dirfd(d)) < 0 && ret >= 0) +- ret = -errno; ++ } else if (errno != -ENOENT && ret == 0) ++ ret = -errno; ++ ++ } else if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT && ret == 0) ++ ret = r; ++ } ++ ++ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_SYNCFS) && syncfs(fd) < 0 && ret >= 0) ++ ret = -errno; ++ ++ if (n_todo == 0) ++ break; ++ } + + return ret; + } +@@ -250,5 +315,5 @@ + if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_ONLY_DIRECTORIES|REMOVE_SUBVOLUME)) + return -EINVAL; + +- return rm_rf_children_inner(fd, name, -1, flags, NULL); ++ return rm_rf_inner_child(fd, name, -1, flags, NULL, true); + } diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/rm-rf-optionally-fsync-after-removing-directory-tree.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/rm-rf-optionally-fsync-after-removing-directory-tree.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b860da008c --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/rm-rf-optionally-fsync-after-removing-directory-tree.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +Backport of the following upstream commit: +From bdfe7ada0d4d66e6d6e65f2822acbb1ec230f9c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> +Date: Tue, 5 Oct 2021 10:32:56 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] rm-rf: optionally fsync() after removing directory tree + +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/s/systemd/systemd_245.4-4ubuntu3.15.debian.tar.xz] +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <Purushottam.Choudhary@kpit.com> +--- + src/basic/rm-rf.c | 3 +++ + src/basic/rm-rf.h | 1 + + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) + +--- a/src/basic/rm-rf.c ++++ b/src/basic/rm-rf.c +@@ -161,6 +161,9 @@ + ret = r; + } + ++ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_SYNCFS) && syncfs(dirfd(d)) < 0 && ret >= 0) ++ ret = -errno; ++ + return ret; + } + +--- a/src/basic/rm-rf.h ++++ b/src/basic/rm-rf.h +@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ + REMOVE_PHYSICAL = 1 << 2, /* If not set, only removes files on tmpfs, never physical file systems */ + REMOVE_SUBVOLUME = 1 << 3, /* Drop btrfs subvolumes in the tree too */ + REMOVE_MISSING_OK = 1 << 4, /* If the top-level directory is missing, ignore the ENOENT for it */ ++ REMOVE_SYNCFS = 1 << 7, /* syncfs() the root of the specified directory after removing everything in it */ + } RemoveFlags; + + int rm_rf_children(int fd, RemoveFlags flags, const struct stat *root_dev); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/rm-rf-refactor-rm-rf-children-split-out-body-of-directory.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/rm-rf-refactor-rm-rf-children-split-out-body-of-directory.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f80e6433c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/rm-rf-refactor-rm-rf-children-split-out-body-of-directory.patch @@ -0,0 +1,318 @@ +Backport of the following upstream commit: +From 96906b22417c65d70933976e0ee920c70c9113a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> +Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2021 16:30:06 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] rm-rf: refactor rm_rf_children(), split out body of directory + iteration loop + +This splits out rm_rf_children_inner() as body of the loop. We can use +that to implement rm_rf_child() for deleting one specific entry in a +directory. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/s/systemd/systemd_245.4-4ubuntu3.15.debian.tar.xz] +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <Purushottam.Choudhary@kpit.com> +--- + src/basic/rm-rf.c | 223 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- + src/basic/rm-rf.h | 3 +- + 2 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-) + +--- a/src/basic/rm-rf.c ++++ b/src/basic/rm-rf.c +@@ -19,138 +19,153 @@ + #include "stat-util.h" + #include "string-util.h" + ++/* We treat tmpfs/ramfs + cgroupfs as non-physical file sytems. cgroupfs is similar to tmpfs in a way after ++ * all: we can create arbitrary directory hierarchies in it, and hence can also use rm_rf() on it to remove ++ * those again. */ + static bool is_physical_fs(const struct statfs *sfs) { + return !is_temporary_fs(sfs) && !is_cgroup_fs(sfs); + } + +-int rm_rf_children(int fd, RemoveFlags flags, struct stat *root_dev) { ++static int rm_rf_children_inner( ++ int fd, ++ const char *fname, ++ int is_dir, ++ RemoveFlags flags, ++ const struct stat *root_dev) { ++ ++ struct stat st; ++ int r; ++ ++ assert(fd >= 0); ++ assert(fname); ++ ++ if (is_dir < 0 || (is_dir > 0 && (root_dev || (flags & REMOVE_SUBVOLUME)))) { ++ ++ r = fstatat(fd, fname, &st, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); ++ if (r < 0) ++ return r; ++ ++ is_dir = S_ISDIR(st.st_mode); ++ } ++ ++ if (is_dir) { ++ _cleanup_close_ int subdir_fd = -1; ++ int q; ++ ++ /* if root_dev is set, remove subdirectories only if device is same */ ++ if (root_dev && st.st_dev != root_dev->st_dev) ++ return 0; ++ ++ /* Stop at mount points */ ++ r = fd_is_mount_point(fd, fname, 0); ++ if (r < 0) ++ return r; ++ if (r > 0) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if ((flags & REMOVE_SUBVOLUME) && st.st_ino == 256) { ++ ++ /* This could be a subvolume, try to remove it */ ++ ++ r = btrfs_subvol_remove_fd(fd, fname, BTRFS_REMOVE_RECURSIVE|BTRFS_REMOVE_QUOTA); ++ if (r < 0) { ++ if (!IN_SET(r, -ENOTTY, -EINVAL)) ++ return r; ++ ++ /* ENOTTY, then it wasn't a btrfs subvolume, continue below. */ ++ } else ++ /* It was a subvolume, done. */ ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ subdir_fd = openat(fd, fname, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME); ++ if (subdir_fd < 0) ++ return -errno; ++ ++ /* We pass REMOVE_PHYSICAL here, to avoid doing the fstatfs() to check the file system type ++ * again for each directory */ ++ q = rm_rf_children(TAKE_FD(subdir_fd), flags | REMOVE_PHYSICAL, root_dev); ++ ++ r = unlinkat(fd, fname, AT_REMOVEDIR); ++ if (r < 0) ++ return r; ++ if (q < 0) ++ return q; ++ ++ return 1; ++ ++ } else if (!(flags & REMOVE_ONLY_DIRECTORIES)) { ++ r = unlinkat(fd, fname, 0); ++ if (r < 0) ++ return r; ++ ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int rm_rf_children( ++ int fd, ++ RemoveFlags flags, ++ const struct stat *root_dev) { ++ + _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL; + struct dirent *de; + int ret = 0, r; +- struct statfs sfs; + + assert(fd >= 0); + + /* This returns the first error we run into, but nevertheless tries to go on. This closes the passed +- * fd, in all cases, including on failure.. */ ++ * fd, in all cases, including on failure. */ ++ ++ d = fdopendir(fd); ++ if (!d) { ++ safe_close(fd); ++ return -errno; ++ } + + if (!(flags & REMOVE_PHYSICAL)) { ++ struct statfs sfs; + +- r = fstatfs(fd, &sfs); +- if (r < 0) { +- safe_close(fd); ++ if (fstatfs(dirfd(d), &sfs) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + if (is_physical_fs(&sfs)) { +- /* We refuse to clean physical file systems with this call, +- * unless explicitly requested. This is extra paranoia just +- * to be sure we never ever remove non-state data. */ ++ /* We refuse to clean physical file systems with this call, unless explicitly ++ * requested. This is extra paranoia just to be sure we never ever remove non-state ++ * data. */ ++ + _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL; + + (void) fd_get_path(fd, &path); +- log_error("Attempted to remove disk file system under \"%s\", and we can't allow that.", +- strna(path)); +- +- safe_close(fd); +- return -EPERM; ++ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), ++ "Attempted to remove disk file system under \"%s\", and we can't allow that.", ++ strna(path)); + } + } + +- d = fdopendir(fd); +- if (!d) { +- safe_close(fd); +- return errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -errno; +- } +- + FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, return -errno) { +- bool is_dir; +- struct stat st; ++ int is_dir; + + if (dot_or_dot_dot(de->d_name)) + continue; + +- if (de->d_type == DT_UNKNOWN || +- (de->d_type == DT_DIR && (root_dev || (flags & REMOVE_SUBVOLUME)))) { +- if (fstatat(fd, de->d_name, &st, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) < 0) { +- if (ret == 0 && errno != ENOENT) +- ret = -errno; +- continue; +- } +- +- is_dir = S_ISDIR(st.st_mode); +- } else +- is_dir = de->d_type == DT_DIR; +- +- if (is_dir) { +- _cleanup_close_ int subdir_fd = -1; +- +- /* if root_dev is set, remove subdirectories only if device is same */ +- if (root_dev && st.st_dev != root_dev->st_dev) +- continue; +- +- subdir_fd = openat(fd, de->d_name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME); +- if (subdir_fd < 0) { +- if (ret == 0 && errno != ENOENT) +- ret = -errno; +- continue; +- } +- +- /* Stop at mount points */ +- r = fd_is_mount_point(fd, de->d_name, 0); +- if (r < 0) { +- if (ret == 0 && r != -ENOENT) +- ret = r; +- +- continue; +- } +- if (r > 0) +- continue; +- +- if ((flags & REMOVE_SUBVOLUME) && st.st_ino == 256) { +- +- /* This could be a subvolume, try to remove it */ +- +- r = btrfs_subvol_remove_fd(fd, de->d_name, BTRFS_REMOVE_RECURSIVE|BTRFS_REMOVE_QUOTA); +- if (r < 0) { +- if (!IN_SET(r, -ENOTTY, -EINVAL)) { +- if (ret == 0) +- ret = r; +- +- continue; +- } +- +- /* ENOTTY, then it wasn't a btrfs subvolume, continue below. */ +- } else +- /* It was a subvolume, continue. */ +- continue; +- } +- +- /* We pass REMOVE_PHYSICAL here, to avoid doing the fstatfs() to check the file +- * system type again for each directory */ +- r = rm_rf_children(TAKE_FD(subdir_fd), flags | REMOVE_PHYSICAL, root_dev); +- if (r < 0 && ret == 0) +- ret = r; +- +- if (unlinkat(fd, de->d_name, AT_REMOVEDIR) < 0) { +- if (ret == 0 && errno != ENOENT) +- ret = -errno; +- } +- +- } else if (!(flags & REMOVE_ONLY_DIRECTORIES)) { +- +- if (unlinkat(fd, de->d_name, 0) < 0) { +- if (ret == 0 && errno != ENOENT) +- ret = -errno; +- } +- } ++ is_dir = ++ de->d_type == DT_UNKNOWN ? -1 : ++ de->d_type == DT_DIR; ++ ++ r = rm_rf_children_inner(dirfd(d), de->d_name, is_dir, flags, root_dev); ++ if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT && ret == 0) ++ ret = r; + } ++ + return ret; + } + + int rm_rf(const char *path, RemoveFlags flags) { + int fd, r; +- struct statfs s; + + assert(path); + +@@ -195,9 +210,10 @@ + if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_ROOT)) { + + if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_PHYSICAL)) { ++ struct statfs s; ++ + if (statfs(path, &s) < 0) + return -errno; +- + if (is_physical_fs(&s)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), + "Attempted to remove files from a disk file system under \"%s\", refusing.", +@@ -225,3 +241,22 @@ + + return r; + } ++ ++int rm_rf_child(int fd, const char *name, RemoveFlags flags) { ++ ++ /* Removes one specific child of the specified directory */ ++ ++ if (fd < 0) ++ return -EBADF; ++ ++ if (!filename_is_valid(name)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if ((flags & (REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_MISSING_OK)) != 0) /* Doesn't really make sense here, we are not supposed to remove 'fd' anyway */ ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, REMOVE_ONLY_DIRECTORIES|REMOVE_SUBVOLUME)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ ++ return rm_rf_children_inner(fd, name, -1, flags, NULL); ++} +--- a/src/basic/rm-rf.h ++++ b/src/basic/rm-rf.h +@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ + REMOVE_MISSING_OK = 1 << 4, /* If the top-level directory is missing, ignore the ENOENT for it */ + } RemoveFlags; + +-int rm_rf_children(int fd, RemoveFlags flags, struct stat *root_dev); ++int rm_rf_children(int fd, RemoveFlags flags, const struct stat *root_dev); ++int rm_rf_child(int fd, const char *name, RemoveFlags flags); + int rm_rf(const char *path, RemoveFlags flags); + + /* Useful for usage with _cleanup_(), destroys a directory and frees the pointer */ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_244.5.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_244.5.bb index b6f5a47d63..a648272bc0 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_244.5.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_244.5.bb @@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \ file://network-merge-link_drop-and-link_detach_from_manager.patch \ file://network-also-drop-requests-when-link-enters-linger-state.patch \ file://network-fix-Link-reference-counter-issue.patch \ + file://rm-rf-refactor-rm-rf-children-split-out-body-of-directory.patch \ + file://rm-rf-optionally-fsync-after-removing-directory-tree.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3997-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3997-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3997-3.patch \ " # patches needed by musl @@ -211,6 +216,8 @@ EXTRA_OEMESON += "-Dnobody-user=nobody \ -Drootlibdir=${rootlibdir} \ -Drootprefix=${rootprefix} \ -Ddefault-locale=C \ + -Dsystem-uid-max=999 \ + -Dsystem-gid-max=999 \ " # Hardcode target binary paths to avoid using paths from sysroot diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2021-3995.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2021-3995.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1dcb66ad1d --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2021-3995.patch @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +From f3db9bd609494099f0c1b95231c5dfe383346929 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> +Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 13:53:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] libmount: fix UID check for FUSE umount [CVE-2021-3995] + +Improper UID check allows an unprivileged user to unmount FUSE +filesystems of users with similar UID. + +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> + +CVE: CVE-2021-3995 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/f3db9bd609494099f0c1b95231c5dfe383346929] +Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com> + +--- + include/strutils.h | 2 +- + libmount/src/context_umount.c | 14 +++--------- + libmount/src/mountP.h | 1 + + libmount/src/optstr.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/strutils.h b/include/strutils.h +index 6e95707ea9..a84d29594d 100644 +--- a/include/strutils.h ++++ b/include/strutils.h +@@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ static inline char *mem2strcpy(char *dest, const void *src, size_t n, size_t nma + if (n + 1 > nmax) + n = nmax - 1; + ++ memset(dest, '\0', nmax); + memcpy(dest, src, n); +- dest[nmax-1] = '\0'; + return dest; + } + +diff --git a/libmount/src/context_umount.c b/libmount/src/context_umount.c +index 173637a15a..8773c65ffa 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/context_umount.c ++++ b/libmount/src/context_umount.c +@@ -393,10 +393,7 @@ static int is_fuse_usermount(struct libmnt_context *cxt, int *errsv) + struct libmnt_ns *ns_old; + const char *type = mnt_fs_get_fstype(cxt->fs); + const char *optstr; +- char *user_id = NULL; +- size_t sz; +- uid_t uid; +- char uidstr[sizeof(stringify_value(ULONG_MAX))]; ++ uid_t uid, entry_uid; + + *errsv = 0; + +@@ -413,11 +410,7 @@ static int is_fuse_usermount(struct libmnt_context *cxt, int *errsv) + optstr = mnt_fs_get_fs_options(cxt->fs); + if (!optstr) + return 0; +- +- if (mnt_optstr_get_option(optstr, "user_id", &user_id, &sz) != 0) +- return 0; +- +- if (sz == 0 || user_id == NULL) ++ if (mnt_optstr_get_uid(optstr, "user_id", &entry_uid) != 0) + return 0; + + /* get current user */ +@@ -434,8 +427,7 @@ static int is_fuse_usermount(struct libmnt_context *cxt, int *errsv) + return 0; + } + +- snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%lu", (unsigned long) uid); +- return strncmp(user_id, uidstr, sz) == 0; ++ return uid == entry_uid; + } + + /* +diff --git a/libmount/src/mountP.h b/libmount/src/mountP.h +index d43a835418..22442ec55e 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/mountP.h ++++ b/libmount/src/mountP.h +@@ -400,6 +400,7 @@ extern const struct libmnt_optmap *mnt_optmap_get_entry( + const struct libmnt_optmap **mapent); + + /* optstr.c */ ++extern int mnt_optstr_get_uid(const char *optstr, const char *name, uid_t *uid); + extern int mnt_optstr_remove_option_at(char **optstr, char *begin, char *end); + extern int mnt_optstr_fix_gid(char **optstr, char *value, size_t valsz, char **next); + extern int mnt_optstr_fix_uid(char **optstr, char *value, size_t valsz, char **next); +diff --git a/libmount/src/optstr.c b/libmount/src/optstr.c +index 921b9318e7..16800f571c 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/optstr.c ++++ b/libmount/src/optstr.c +@@ -1090,6 +1090,48 @@ int mnt_optstr_fix_user(char **optstr) + return rc; + } + ++/* ++ * Converts value from @optstr addressed by @name to uid. ++ * ++ * Returns: 0 on success, 1 if not found, <0 on error ++ */ ++int mnt_optstr_get_uid(const char *optstr, const char *name, uid_t *uid) ++{ ++ char *value = NULL; ++ size_t valsz = 0; ++ char buf[sizeof(stringify_value(UINT64_MAX))]; ++ int rc; ++ uint64_t num; ++ ++ assert(optstr); ++ assert(name); ++ assert(uid); ++ ++ rc = mnt_optstr_get_option(optstr, name, &value, &valsz); ++ if (rc != 0) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ if (valsz > sizeof(buf) - 1) { ++ rc = -ERANGE; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ mem2strcpy(buf, value, valsz, sizeof(buf)); ++ ++ rc = ul_strtou64(buf, &num, 10); ++ if (rc != 0) ++ goto fail; ++ if (num > ULONG_MAX || (uid_t) num != num) { ++ rc = -ERANGE; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ *uid = (uid_t) num; ++ ++ return 0; ++fail: ++ DBG(UTILS, ul_debug("failed to convert '%s'= to number [rc=%d]", name, rc)); ++ return rc; ++} ++ + /** + * mnt_match_options: + * @optstr: options string diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2021-3996.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2021-3996.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1610b5a0fe --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2021-3996.patch @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +From 018a10907fa9885093f6d87401556932c2d8bd2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2022 10:54:20 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] libmount: fix (deleted) suffix issue [CVE-2021-3996] + +This issue is related to parsing the /proc/self/mountinfo file allows an +unprivileged user to unmount other user's filesystems that are either +world-writable themselves or mounted in a world-writable directory. + +The support for "(deleted)" is no more necessary as the Linux kernel does +not use it in /proc/self/mountinfo and /proc/self/mount files anymore. + +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> + +CVE: CVE-2021-3996 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/018a10907fa9885093f6d87401556932c2d8bd2b] +Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com> + +--- + libmount/src/tab_parse.c | 5 ----- + tests/expected/findmnt/filter-options | 1 - + tests/expected/findmnt/filter-options-nameval-neg | 3 +-- + tests/expected/findmnt/filter-types-neg | 1 - + tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-default | 3 +-- + tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-force-tree | 3 +-- + tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-kernel | 3 +-- + tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-mount | 1 - + tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-move | 1 - + tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-remount | 1 - + tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-umount | 1 - + tests/expected/libmount/tabfiles-parse-mountinfo | 11 ----------- + tests/expected/libmount/tabfiles-py-parse-mountinfo | 11 ----------- + tests/ts/findmnt/files/mountinfo | 1 - + tests/ts/findmnt/files/mountinfo-nonroot | 1 - + tests/ts/libmount/files/mountinfo | 1 - + 16 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libmount/src/tab_parse.c b/libmount/src/tab_parse.c +index 917779ab6d..4407f9c9c7 100644 +--- a/libmount/src/tab_parse.c ++++ b/libmount/src/tab_parse.c +@@ -225,11 +225,6 @@ static int mnt_parse_mountinfo_line(struct libmnt_fs *fs, const char *s) + goto fail; + } + +- /* remove "\040(deleted)" suffix */ +- p = (char *) endswith(fs->target, PATH_DELETED_SUFFIX); +- if (p && *p) +- *p = '\0'; +- + s = skip_separator(s); + + /* (6) vfs options (fs-independent) */ +diff --git a/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-options b/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-options +index 2606bce76b..97b0ead0ad 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-options ++++ b/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-options +@@ -28,5 +28,4 @@ TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE OPTIONS + /home/kzak/.gvfs gvfs-fuse-daemon fuse.gvfs-fuse-daemon rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=500,group_id=500 + /var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs sunrpc rpc_pipefs rw,relatime + /mnt/sounds //foo.home/bar/ cifs rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 +-/mnt/foo /fooooo bar rw,relatime + rc=0 +diff --git a/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-options-nameval-neg b/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-options-nameval-neg +index 5471d65af1..f0467ef755 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-options-nameval-neg ++++ b/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-options-nameval-neg +@@ -29,6 +29,5 @@ TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE OPTIO + |-/home/kzak /dev/mapper/kzak-home ext4 rw,noatime,barrier=1,data=ordered + | `-/home/kzak/.gvfs gvfs-fuse-daemon fuse.gvfs-fuse-daemon rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=500,group_id=500 + |-/var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs sunrpc rpc_pipefs rw,relatime +-|-/mnt/sounds //foo.home/bar/ cifs rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 +-`-/mnt/foo /fooooo bar rw,relatime ++`-/mnt/sounds //foo.home/bar/ cifs rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 + rc=0 +diff --git a/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-types-neg b/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-types-neg +index 2606bce76b..97b0ead0ad 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-types-neg ++++ b/tests/expected/findmnt/filter-types-neg +@@ -28,5 +28,4 @@ TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE OPTIONS + /home/kzak/.gvfs gvfs-fuse-daemon fuse.gvfs-fuse-daemon rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=500,group_id=500 + /var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs sunrpc rpc_pipefs rw,relatime + /mnt/sounds //foo.home/bar/ cifs rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 +-/mnt/foo /fooooo bar rw,relatime + rc=0 +diff --git a/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-default b/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-default +index 59495797bd..01599355ec 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-default ++++ b/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-default +@@ -30,6 +30,5 @@ TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE OPTIO + |-/home/kzak /dev/mapper/kzak-home ext4 rw,noatime,barrier=1,data=ordered + | `-/home/kzak/.gvfs gvfs-fuse-daemon fuse.gvfs-fuse-daemon rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=500,group_id=500 + |-/var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs sunrpc rpc_pipefs rw,relatime +-|-/mnt/sounds //foo.home/bar/ cifs rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 +-`-/mnt/foo /fooooo bar rw,relatime ++`-/mnt/sounds //foo.home/bar/ cifs rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 + rc=0 +diff --git a/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-force-tree b/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-force-tree +index 59495797bd..01599355ec 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-force-tree ++++ b/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-force-tree +@@ -30,6 +30,5 @@ TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE OPTIO + |-/home/kzak /dev/mapper/kzak-home ext4 rw,noatime,barrier=1,data=ordered + | `-/home/kzak/.gvfs gvfs-fuse-daemon fuse.gvfs-fuse-daemon rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=500,group_id=500 + |-/var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs sunrpc rpc_pipefs rw,relatime +-|-/mnt/sounds //foo.home/bar/ cifs rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 +-`-/mnt/foo /fooooo bar rw,relatime ++`-/mnt/sounds //foo.home/bar/ cifs rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 + rc=0 +diff --git a/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-kernel b/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-kernel +index 59495797bd..01599355ec 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-kernel ++++ b/tests/expected/findmnt/outputs-kernel +@@ -30,6 +30,5 @@ TARGET SOURCE FSTYPE OPTIO + |-/home/kzak /dev/mapper/kzak-home ext4 rw,noatime,barrier=1,data=ordered + | `-/home/kzak/.gvfs gvfs-fuse-daemon fuse.gvfs-fuse-daemon rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=500,group_id=500 + |-/var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs sunrpc rpc_pipefs rw,relatime +-|-/mnt/sounds //foo.home/bar/ cifs rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 +-`-/mnt/foo /fooooo bar rw,relatime ++`-/mnt/sounds //foo.home/bar/ cifs rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 + rc=0 +diff --git a/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-mount b/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-mount +index 420aeacd5e..3c18f8dc4f 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-mount ++++ b/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-mount +@@ -1,3 +1,2 @@ + /dev/mapper/kzak-home on /home/kzak: MOUNTED +-/fooooo on /mnt/foo: MOUNTED + tmpfs on /mnt/test/foo
bar: MOUNTED +diff --git a/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-move b/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-move +index 24f9bc791b..95820d93ef 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-move ++++ b/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-move +@@ -1,3 +1,2 @@ + //foo.home/bar/ on /mnt/music: MOVED to /mnt/music +-/fooooo on /mnt/foo: UMOUNTED + tmpfs on /mnt/test/foo
bar: UMOUNTED +diff --git a/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-remount b/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-remount +index 82ebeab390..876bfd9539 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-remount ++++ b/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-remount +@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ + /dev/mapper/kzak-home on /home/kzak: REMOUNTED from 'rw,noatime,barrier=1,data=ordered' to 'ro,noatime,barrier=1,data=ordered' + //foo.home/bar/ on /mnt/sounds: REMOUNTED from 'rw,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344' to 'ro,relatime,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344' +-/fooooo on /mnt/foo: UMOUNTED + tmpfs on /mnt/test/foo
bar: UMOUNTED +diff --git a/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-umount b/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-umount +index a3e0fe48a1..c7be725b92 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-umount ++++ b/tests/expected/libmount/tabdiff-umount +@@ -1,3 +1,2 @@ + /dev/mapper/kzak-home on /home/kzak: UMOUNTED +-/fooooo on /mnt/foo: UMOUNTED + tmpfs on /mnt/test/foo
bar: UMOUNTED +diff --git a/tests/expected/libmount/tabfiles-parse-mountinfo b/tests/expected/libmount/tabfiles-parse-mountinfo +index 47eb770061..d5ba5248e4 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/libmount/tabfiles-parse-mountinfo ++++ b/tests/expected/libmount/tabfiles-parse-mountinfo +@@ -351,17 +351,6 @@ id: 47 + parent: 20 + devno: 0:38 + ------ fs: +-source: /fooooo +-target: /mnt/foo +-fstype: bar +-optstr: rw,relatime +-VFS-optstr: rw,relatime +-FS-opstr: rw +-root: / +-id: 48 +-parent: 20 +-devno: 0:39 +------- fs: + source: tmpfs + target: /mnt/test/foo
bar + fstype: tmpfs +diff --git a/tests/expected/libmount/tabfiles-py-parse-mountinfo b/tests/expected/libmount/tabfiles-py-parse-mountinfo +index 47eb770061..d5ba5248e4 100644 +--- a/tests/expected/libmount/tabfiles-py-parse-mountinfo ++++ b/tests/expected/libmount/tabfiles-py-parse-mountinfo +@@ -351,17 +351,6 @@ id: 47 + parent: 20 + devno: 0:38 + ------ fs: +-source: /fooooo +-target: /mnt/foo +-fstype: bar +-optstr: rw,relatime +-VFS-optstr: rw,relatime +-FS-opstr: rw +-root: / +-id: 48 +-parent: 20 +-devno: 0:39 +------- fs: + source: tmpfs + target: /mnt/test/foo
bar + fstype: tmpfs +diff --git a/tests/ts/findmnt/files/mountinfo b/tests/ts/findmnt/files/mountinfo +index 475ea1a337..ff1e664a84 100644 +--- a/tests/ts/findmnt/files/mountinfo ++++ b/tests/ts/findmnt/files/mountinfo +@@ -30,4 +30,3 @@ + 44 41 0:36 / /home/kzak/.gvfs rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime - fuse.gvfs-fuse-daemon gvfs-fuse-daemon rw,user_id=500,group_id=500 + 45 20 0:37 / /var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs rw,relatime - rpc_pipefs sunrpc rw + 47 20 0:38 / /mnt/sounds rw,relatime - cifs //foo.home/bar/ rw,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 +-48 20 0:39 / /mnt/foo\040(deleted) rw,relatime - bar /fooooo rw +diff --git a/tests/ts/findmnt/files/mountinfo-nonroot b/tests/ts/findmnt/files/mountinfo-nonroot +index e15b467016..87b421d2ef 100644 +--- a/tests/ts/findmnt/files/mountinfo-nonroot ++++ b/tests/ts/findmnt/files/mountinfo-nonroot +@@ -29,4 +29,3 @@ + 44 41 0:36 / /home/kzak/.gvfs rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime - fuse.gvfs-fuse-daemon gvfs-fuse-daemon rw,user_id=500,group_id=500 + 45 20 0:37 / /var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs rw,relatime - rpc_pipefs sunrpc rw + 47 20 0:38 / /mnt/sounds rw,relatime - cifs //foo.home/bar/ rw,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 +-48 20 0:39 / /mnt/foo\040(deleted) rw,relatime - bar /fooooo rw +diff --git a/tests/ts/libmount/files/mountinfo b/tests/ts/libmount/files/mountinfo +index c063071833..2b01740481 100644 +--- a/tests/ts/libmount/files/mountinfo ++++ b/tests/ts/libmount/files/mountinfo +@@ -30,5 +30,4 @@ + 44 41 0:36 / /home/kzak/.gvfs rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime - fuse.gvfs-fuse-daemon gvfs-fuse-daemon rw,user_id=500,group_id=500 + 45 20 0:37 / /var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs rw,relatime - rpc_pipefs sunrpc rw + 47 20 0:38 / /mnt/sounds rw,relatime - cifs //foo.home/bar/ rw,unc=\\foo.home\bar,username=kzak,domain=SRGROUP,uid=0,noforceuid,gid=0,noforcegid,addr=192.168.111.1,posixpaths,serverino,acl,rsize=16384,wsize=57344 +-48 20 0:39 / /mnt/foo\040(deleted) rw,relatime - bar /fooooo rw + 49 20 0:56 / /mnt/test/foo
bar rw,relatime shared:323 - tmpfs tmpfs rw diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2022-0563.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2022-0563.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..54b496ea3f --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2022-0563.patch @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +From faa5a3a83ad0cb5e2c303edbfd8cd823c9d94c17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 12:03:17 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] chsh, chfn: remove readline support [CVE-2022-0563] + +The readline library uses INPUTRC= environment variable to get a path +to the library config file. When the library cannot parse the +specified file, it prints an error message containing data from the +file. + +Unfortunately, the library does not use secure_getenv() (or a similar +concept) to avoid vulnerabilities that could occur if set-user-ID or +set-group-ID programs. + +Reported-by: Rory Mackie <rory.mackie@trailofbits.com> +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> + +Upstream-status: Backport +https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/faa5a3a83ad0cb5e2c303edbfd8cd823c9d94c17 + +CVE: CVE-2022-0563 + +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> + +--- + login-utils/Makemodule.am | 2 +- + login-utils/chfn.c | 16 +++------------ + login-utils/chsh.c | 42 ++------------------------------------- + 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/login-utils/Makemodule.am b/login-utils/Makemodule.am +index fac5bfc..73636af 100644 +--- a/login-utils/Makemodule.am ++++ b/login-utils/Makemodule.am +@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ chfn_chsh_sources = \ + login-utils/ch-common.c + chfn_chsh_cflags = $(SUID_CFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) + chfn_chsh_ldflags = $(SUID_LDFLAGS) $(AM_LDFLAGS) +-chfn_chsh_ldadd = libcommon.la $(READLINE_LIBS) ++chfn_chsh_ldadd = libcommon.la + + if CHFN_CHSH_PASSWORD + chfn_chsh_ldadd += -lpam +diff --git a/login-utils/chfn.c b/login-utils/chfn.c +index b739555..2f8e44a 100644 +--- a/login-utils/chfn.c ++++ b/login-utils/chfn.c +@@ -56,11 +56,6 @@ + # include "auth.h" + #endif + +-#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE +-# define _FUNCTION_DEF +-# include <readline/readline.h> +-#endif +- + struct finfo { + char *full_name; + char *office; +@@ -229,22 +224,17 @@ static char *ask_new_field(struct chfn_control *ctl, const char *question, + { + int len; + char *buf; +-#ifndef HAVE_LIBREADLINE +- size_t dummy = 0; +-#endif + + if (!def_val) + def_val = ""; ++ + while (true) { + printf("%s [%s]: ", question, def_val); + __fpurge(stdin); +-#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE +- rl_bind_key('\t', rl_insert); +- if ((buf = readline(NULL)) == NULL) +-#else ++ + if (getline(&buf, &dummy, stdin) < 0) +-#endif + errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("Aborted.")); ++ + /* remove white spaces from string end */ + ltrim_whitespace((unsigned char *) buf); + len = rtrim_whitespace((unsigned char *) buf); +diff --git a/login-utils/chsh.c b/login-utils/chsh.c +index a9ebec8..ee6ff87 100644 +--- a/login-utils/chsh.c ++++ b/login-utils/chsh.c +@@ -58,11 +58,6 @@ + # include "auth.h" + #endif + +-#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE +-# define _FUNCTION_DEF +-# include <readline/readline.h> +-#endif +- + struct sinfo { + char *username; + char *shell; +@@ -121,33 +116,6 @@ static void print_shells(void) + endusershell(); + } + +-#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE +-static char *shell_name_generator(const char *text, int state) +-{ +- static size_t len; +- char *s; +- +- if (!state) { +- setusershell(); +- len = strlen(text); +- } +- +- while ((s = getusershell())) { +- if (strncmp(s, text, len) == 0) +- return xstrdup(s); +- } +- return NULL; +-} +- +-static char **shell_name_completion(const char *text, +- int start __attribute__((__unused__)), +- int end __attribute__((__unused__))) +-{ +- rl_attempted_completion_over = 1; +- return rl_completion_matches(text, shell_name_generator); +-} +-#endif +- + /* + * parse_argv () -- + * parse the command line arguments, and fill in "pinfo" with any +@@ -198,20 +166,14 @@ static char *ask_new_shell(char *question, char *oldshell) + { + int len; + char *ans = NULL; +-#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE +- rl_attempted_completion_function = shell_name_completion; +-#else + size_t dummy = 0; +-#endif ++ + if (!oldshell) + oldshell = ""; + printf("%s [%s]\n", question, oldshell); +-#ifdef HAVE_LIBREADLINE +- if ((ans = readline("> ")) == NULL) +-#else + if (getline(&ans, &dummy, stdin) < 0) +-#endif + return NULL; ++ + /* remove the newline at the end of ans. */ + ltrim_whitespace((unsigned char *) ans); + len = rtrim_whitespace((unsigned char *) ans); +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/include-strutils-cleanup-strto-functions.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/include-strutils-cleanup-strto-functions.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5d5a370821 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/include-strutils-cleanup-strto-functions.patch @@ -0,0 +1,270 @@ +From 84825b161ba5d18da4142893b9789b3fc71284d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 14:20:42 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] include/strutils: cleanup strto..() functions + +* add ul_strtos64() and ul_strtou64() +* add simple test + +Addresses: https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/issues/1358 +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> + +Upstream-Backport: [https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/84825b161ba5d18da4142893b9789b3fc71284d9] +Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com> + +--- + include/strutils.h | 3 + + lib/strutils.c | 174 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- + 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/strutils.h b/include/strutils.h +index e75a2f0e17..389e849905 100644 +--- a/include/strutils.h ++++ b/include/strutils.h +@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ extern int parse_size(const char *str, uintmax_t *res, int *power); + extern int strtosize(const char *str, uintmax_t *res); + extern uintmax_t strtosize_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg); + ++extern int ul_strtos64(const char *str, int64_t *num, int base); ++extern int ul_strtou64(const char *str, uint64_t *num, int base); ++ + extern int16_t strtos16_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg); + extern uint16_t strtou16_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg); + extern uint16_t strtox16_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg); +diff --git a/lib/strutils.c b/lib/strutils.c +index ee2c835495..d9976dca70 100644 +--- a/lib/strutils.c ++++ b/lib/strutils.c +@@ -319,39 +319,80 @@ char *strndup(const char *s, size_t n) + } + #endif + +-static uint32_t _strtou32_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg, int base); +-static uint64_t _strtou64_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg, int base); ++/* ++ * convert strings to numbers; returns <0 on error, and 0 on success ++ */ ++int ul_strtos64(const char *str, int64_t *num, int base) ++{ ++ char *end = NULL; + +-int16_t strtos16_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) ++ errno = 0; ++ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') ++ return -EINVAL; ++ *num = (int64_t) strtoimax(str, &end, base); ++ ++ if (errno || str == end || (end && *end)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ul_strtou64(const char *str, uint64_t *num, int base) + { +- int32_t num = strtos32_or_err(str, errmesg); ++ char *end = NULL; + +- if (num < INT16_MIN || num > INT16_MAX) { +- errno = ERANGE; +- err(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); +- } +- return num; ++ errno = 0; ++ if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') ++ return -EINVAL; ++ *num = (uint64_t) strtoumax(str, &end, base); ++ ++ if (errno || str == end || (end && *end)) ++ return -EINVAL; ++ return 0; + } + +-static uint16_t _strtou16_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg, int base) ++/* ++ * Covert strings to numbers and print message on error. ++ * ++ * Note that hex functions (strtox..()) returns unsigned numbers, if you need ++ * something else then use ul_strtos64(s, &n, 16). ++ */ ++int64_t strtos64_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) + { +- uint32_t num = _strtou32_or_err(str, errmesg, base); ++ int64_t num = 0; + +- if (num > UINT16_MAX) { +- errno = ERANGE; +- err(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); ++ if (ul_strtos64(str, &num, 10) != 0) { ++ if (errno == ERANGE) ++ err(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); ++ ++ errx(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); + } + return num; + } + +-uint16_t strtou16_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) ++uint64_t strtou64_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) + { +- return _strtou16_or_err(str, errmesg, 10); ++ uint64_t num = 0; ++ ++ if (ul_strtou64(str, &num, 10)) { ++ if (errno == ERANGE) ++ err(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); ++ ++ errx(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); ++ } ++ return num; + } + +-uint16_t strtox16_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) ++uint64_t strtox64_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) + { +- return _strtou16_or_err(str, errmesg, 16); ++ uint64_t num = 0; ++ ++ if (ul_strtou64(str, &num, 16)) { ++ if (errno == ERANGE) ++ err(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); ++ ++ errx(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); ++ } ++ return num; + } + + int32_t strtos32_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) +@@ -365,9 +406,9 @@ int32_t strtos32_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) + return num; + } + +-static uint32_t _strtou32_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg, int base) ++uint32_t strtou32_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) + { +- uint64_t num = _strtou64_or_err(str, errmesg, base); ++ uint64_t num = strtou64_or_err(str, errmesg); + + if (num > UINT32_MAX) { + errno = ERANGE; +@@ -376,66 +417,48 @@ static uint32_t _strtou32_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg, int base) + return num; + } + +-uint32_t strtou32_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) +-{ +- return _strtou32_or_err(str, errmesg, 10); +-} +- + uint32_t strtox32_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) + { +- return _strtou32_or_err(str, errmesg, 16); ++ uint64_t num = strtox64_or_err(str, errmesg); ++ ++ if (num > UINT32_MAX) { ++ errno = ERANGE; ++ err(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); ++ } ++ return num; + } + +-int64_t strtos64_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) ++int16_t strtos16_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) + { +- int64_t num; +- char *end = NULL; +- +- errno = 0; +- if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') +- goto err; +- num = strtoimax(str, &end, 10); +- +- if (errno || str == end || (end && *end)) +- goto err; ++ int64_t num = strtos64_or_err(str, errmesg); + +- return num; +-err: +- if (errno == ERANGE) ++ if (num < INT16_MIN || num > INT16_MAX) { ++ errno = ERANGE; + err(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); +- +- errx(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); ++ } ++ return num; + } + +-static uint64_t _strtou64_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg, int base) ++uint16_t strtou16_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) + { +- uintmax_t num; +- char *end = NULL; +- +- errno = 0; +- if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') +- goto err; +- num = strtoumax(str, &end, base); +- +- if (errno || str == end || (end && *end)) +- goto err; ++ uint64_t num = strtou64_or_err(str, errmesg); + +- return num; +-err: +- if (errno == ERANGE) ++ if (num > UINT16_MAX) { ++ errno = ERANGE; + err(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); +- +- errx(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); ++ } ++ return num; + } + +-uint64_t strtou64_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) ++uint16_t strtox16_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) + { +- return _strtou64_or_err(str, errmesg, 10); +-} ++ uint64_t num = strtox64_or_err(str, errmesg); + +-uint64_t strtox64_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) +-{ +- return _strtou64_or_err(str, errmesg, 16); ++ if (num > UINT16_MAX) { ++ errno = ERANGE; ++ err(STRTOXX_EXIT_CODE, "%s: '%s'", errmesg, str); ++ } ++ return num; + } + + double strtod_or_err(const char *str, const char *errmesg) +@@ -1051,15 +1051,25 @@ static int test_strutils_cmp_paths(int a + + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) + { +- if (argc == 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "--size") == 0) ++ if (argc == 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "--size") == 0) { + return test_strutils_sizes(argc - 1, argv + 1); + +- else if (argc == 4 && strcmp(argv[1], "--cmp-paths") == 0) ++ } else if (argc == 4 && strcmp(argv[1], "--cmp-paths") == 0) { + return test_strutils_cmp_paths(argc - 1, argv + 1); + ++ } else if (argc == 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "--str2num") == 0) { ++ uint64_t n; ++ ++ if (ul_strtou64(argv[2], &n, 10) == 0) { ++ printf("'%s' --> %ju\n", argv[2], (uintmax_t) n); ++ return EXIT_SUCCESS; ++ } ++ } ++ + else { + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %1$s --size <number>[suffix]\n" +- " %1$s --cmp-paths <path> <path>\n", ++ " %1$s --cmp-paths <path> <path>\n" ++ " %1$s --num2num <str>\n", + argv[0]); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux_2.35.1.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux_2.35.1.bb index 731f0618eb..89dc564ecb 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux_2.35.1.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux_2.35.1.bb @@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-sbindir.patch \ file://0001-kill-include-sys-types.h-before-checking-SYS_pidfd_s.patch \ file://0001-include-cleanup-pidfd-inckudes.patch \ file://CVE-2021-37600.patch \ + file://include-strutils-cleanup-strto-functions.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3995.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3996.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-0563.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7f64882f631225f0295ca05080cee1bf" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d9de3edd287366cd908e77677514b9387b22bc7b88f45b83e1922c3597f1d7f9" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt.inc index 3c4fc6df07..ba827848a7 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt.inc @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/${BPN}/${P file://0001-environment.mak-musl-based-systems-can-generate-shar.patch \ file://0001-apt-1.2.12-Fix-musl-build.patch \ file://0001-Include-array.h-for-std-array.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-3810.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d30eed9304e82ea8238c854b5c5a34d9" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "03ded4f5e9b8d43ecec083704b2dcabf20c182ed382db9ac7251da0b0b038059" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt/CVE-2020-3810.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt/CVE-2020-3810.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cf1206a3fa --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt/CVE-2020-3810.patch @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +From dceb1e49e4b8e4dadaf056be34088b415939cda6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@canonical.com> +Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 11:49:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] SECURITY UPDATE: Fix out of bounds read in .ar and .tar + implementation (CVE-2020-3810) + +When normalizing ar member names by removing trailing whitespace +and slashes, an out-out-bound read can be caused if the ar member +name consists only of such characters, because the code did not +stop at 0, but would wrap around and continue reading from the +stack, without any limit. + +Add a check to abort if we reached the first character in the +name, effectively rejecting the use of names consisting just +of slashes and spaces. + +Furthermore, certain error cases in arfile.cc and extracttar.cc have +included member names in the output that were not checked at all and +might hence not be nul terminated, leading to further out of bound reads. + +Fixes Debian/apt#111 +LP: #1878177 + +CVE: CVE-2020-3810 + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://salsa.debian.org/apt-team/apt/-/commit/dceb1e49e4b8e4dadaf056be34088b415939cda6 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- +apt-inst/contrib/arfile.cc | 11 ++- +apt-inst/contrib/extracttar.cc | 2 +- +.../test-github-111-invalid-armember | 88 +++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + create mode 100755 test/integration/test-github-111-invalid-armember + +diff --git a/apt-inst/contrib/arfile.cc b/st/contrib/arfile.cc +index 3fc3afedb..5cb43c690 100644 +--- a/apt-inst/contrib/arfile.cc ++++ b/apt-inst/contrib/arfile.cc +@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ bool ARArchive::LoadHeaders() + StrToNum(Head.Size,Memb->Size,sizeof(Head.Size)) == false) + { + delete Memb; +- return _error->Error(_("Invalid archive member header %s"), Head.Name); ++ return _error->Error(_("Invalid archive member header")); + } + + // Check for an extra long name string +@@ -119,7 +119,14 @@ bool ARArchive::LoadHeaders() + else + { + unsigned int I = sizeof(Head.Name) - 1; +- for (; Head.Name[I] == ' ' || Head.Name[I] == '/'; I--); ++ for (; Head.Name[I] == ' ' || Head.Name[I] == '/'; I--) ++ { ++ if (I == 0) ++ { ++ delete Memb; ++ return _error->Error(_("Invalid archive member header")); ++ } ++ } + Memb->Name = std::string(Head.Name,I+1); + } + +diff --git a/apt-inst/contrib/extracttar.cc b/apt-inst/contrib/extracttar.cc +index 9bb0a55c0..b22f59dbc 100644 +--- a/apt-inst/contrib/extracttar.cc ++++ b/apt-inst/contrib/extracttar.cc +@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ bool ExtractTar::Go(pkgDirStream &Stream) + + default: + BadRecord = true; +- _error->Warning(_("Unknown TAR header type %u, member %s"),(unsigned)Tar->LinkFlag,Tar->Name); ++ _error->Warning(_("Unknown TAR header type %u"), (unsigned)Tar->LinkFlag); + break; + } + +diff --git a/test/integration/test-github-111-invalid-armember b/test/integration/test-github-111-invalid-armember +new file mode 100755 +index 000000000..ec2163bf6 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/test/integration/test-github-111-invalid-armember +@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ ++#!/bin/sh ++set -e ++ ++TESTDIR="$(readlink -f "$(dirname "$0")")" ++. "$TESTDIR/framework" ++setupenvironment ++configarchitecture "amd64" ++setupaptarchive ++ ++# this used to crash, but it should treat it as an invalid member header ++touch ' ' ++ar -q test.deb ' ' ++testsuccessequal "E: Invalid archive member header" ${BUILDDIRECTORY}/../test/interactive-helper/testdeb test.deb ++ ++ ++rm test.deb ++touch 'x' ++ar -q test.deb 'x' ++testsuccessequal "E: This is not a valid DEB archive, missing 'debian-binary' member" ${BUILDDIRECTORY}/../test/interactive-helper/testdeb test.deb ++ ++ ++# <name><size> [ other fields] - name is not nul terminated here, it ends in . ++msgmsg "Unterminated ar member name" ++printf '!<arch>\0120123456789ABCDE.A123456789A.01234.01234.0123456.012345678.0.' > test.deb ++testsuccessequal "E: Invalid archive member header" ${BUILDDIRECTORY}/../test/interactive-helper/testdeb test.deb ++ ++ ++# unused source code for generating $tar below ++maketar() { ++ cat > maketar.c << EOF ++ #include <stdio.h> ++ #include <string.h> ++ struct tar { ++ char Name[100]; ++ char Mode[8]; ++ char UserID[8]; ++ char GroupID[8]; ++ char Size[12]; ++ char MTime[12]; ++ char Checksum[8]; ++ char LinkFlag; ++ char LinkName[100]; ++ char MagicNumber[8]; ++ char UserName[32]; ++ char GroupName[32]; ++ char Major[8]; ++ char Minor[8]; ++ }; ++ ++ int main(void) ++ { ++ union { ++ struct tar t; ++ char buf[512]; ++ } t; ++ for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(t.buf); i++) ++ t.buf[i] = '7'; ++ memcpy(t.t.Name, "unterminatedName", 16); ++ memcpy(t.t.UserName, "userName", 8); ++ memcpy(t.t.GroupName, "thisIsAGroupNamethisIsAGroupName", 32); ++ t.t.LinkFlag = 'X'; // I AM BROKEN ++ memcpy(t.t.Size, "000000000000", sizeof(t.t.Size)); ++ memset(t.t.Checksum,' ',sizeof(t.t.Checksum)); ++ ++ unsigned long sum = 0; ++ for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(t.buf); i++) ++ sum += t.buf[i]; ++ ++ int written = sprintf(t.t.Checksum, "%lo", sum); ++ for (int i = written; i < sizeof(t.t.Checksum); i++) ++ t.t.Checksum[i] = ' '; ++ fwrite(t.buf, sizeof(t.buf), 1, stdout); ++ } ++EOF ++ ++ gcc maketar.c -o maketar -Wall ++ ./maketar ++} ++ ++ ++# ++tar="unterminatedName77777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777700000000000077777777777773544 X777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777userName777777777777777777777777thisIsAGroupNamethisIsAGroupName777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777" ++printf '%s' "$tar" | gzip > control.tar.gz ++cp control.tar.gz data.tar.gz ++touch debian-binary ++rm test.deb ++ar -q test.deb debian-binary control.tar.gz data.tar.gz ++testsuccessequal "W: Unknown TAR header type 88" ${BUILDDIRECTORY}/../test/interactive-helper/testdeb test.deb +-- +GitLab diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.34.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.34.inc index 6104bec591..6a55de2d45 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.34.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.34.inc @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://0015-sync-with-OE-libtool-changes.patch \ file://0016-Check-for-clang-before-checking-gcc-version.patch \ file://0017-binutils-drop-redundant-program_name-definition-fno-.patch \ + file://0018-Include-members-in-the-variable-table-used-when-reso.patch \ file://CVE-2020-0551.patch \ file://0001-gas-improve-reproducibility-for-stabs-debugging-data.patch \ file://CVE-2020-16592.patch \ @@ -50,5 +51,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://CVE-2021-3487.patch \ file://CVE-2021-3549.patch \ file://CVE-2020-16593.patch \ + file://0001-CVE-2021-45078.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0001-CVE-2021-45078.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0001-CVE-2021-45078.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2af82477ac --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0001-CVE-2021-45078.patch @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +From 161e87d12167b1e36193385485c1f6ce92f74f02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com> +Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2021 11:48:42 +1030 +Subject: [PATCH] PR28694, Out-of-bounds write in stab_xcoff_builtin_type + + PR 28694 + * stabs.c (stab_xcoff_builtin_type): Make typenum unsigned. + Negate typenum earlier, simplifying bounds checking. Correct + off-by-one indexing. Adjust switch cases. + + +CVE: CVE-2021-45078 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=161e87d12167b1e36193385485c1f6ce92f74f02] + +Signed-off-by: Sundeep KOKKONDA <sundeep.kokkonda@gmail.com> +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <purushottam.choudhary@kpit.com> +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <purushottamchoudhary29@gmail.com> +--- + binutils/stabs.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ + 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) + + +diff --git a/binutils/stabs.c b/binutils/stabs.c +index 274bfb0e7fa..83ee3ea5fa4 100644 +--- a/binutils/stabs.c ++++ b/binutils/stabs.c +@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static debug_type stab_find_type (void *, struct stab_handle *, const int *); + static bfd_boolean stab_record_type + (void *, struct stab_handle *, const int *, debug_type); + static debug_type stab_xcoff_builtin_type +- (void *, struct stab_handle *, int); ++ (void *, struct stab_handle *, unsigned int); + static debug_type stab_find_tagged_type + (void *, struct stab_handle *, const char *, int, enum debug_type_kind); + static debug_type *stab_demangle_argtypes +@@ -3496,166 +3496,167 @@ stab_record_type (void *dhandle ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, struct stab_handle *info, + + static debug_type + stab_xcoff_builtin_type (void *dhandle, struct stab_handle *info, +- int typenum) ++ unsigned int typenum) + { + debug_type rettype; + const char *name; + +- if (typenum >= 0 || typenum < -XCOFF_TYPE_COUNT) ++ typenum = -typenum - 1; ++ if (typenum >= XCOFF_TYPE_COUNT) + { +- fprintf (stderr, _("Unrecognized XCOFF type %d\n"), typenum); ++ fprintf (stderr, _("Unrecognized XCOFF type %d\n"), -typenum - 1); + return DEBUG_TYPE_NULL; + } +- if (info->xcoff_types[-typenum] != NULL) +- return info->xcoff_types[-typenum]; ++ if (info->xcoff_types[typenum] != NULL) ++ return info->xcoff_types[typenum]; + +- switch (-typenum) ++ switch (typenum) + { +- case 1: ++ case 0: + /* The size of this and all the other types are fixed, defined + by the debugging format. */ + name = "int"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 4, FALSE); + break; +- case 2: ++ case 1: + name = "char"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 1, FALSE); + break; +- case 3: ++ case 2: + name = "short"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 2, FALSE); + break; +- case 4: ++ case 3: + name = "long"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 4, FALSE); + break; +- case 5: ++ case 4: + name = "unsigned char"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 1, TRUE); + break; +- case 6: ++ case 5: + name = "signed char"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 1, FALSE); + break; +- case 7: ++ case 6: + name = "unsigned short"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 2, TRUE); + break; +- case 8: ++ case 7: + name = "unsigned int"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 4, TRUE); + break; +- case 9: ++ case 8: + name = "unsigned"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 4, TRUE); + break; +- case 10: ++ case 9: + name = "unsigned long"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 4, TRUE); + break; +- case 11: ++ case 10: + name = "void"; + rettype = debug_make_void_type (dhandle); + break; +- case 12: ++ case 11: + /* IEEE single precision (32 bit). */ + name = "float"; + rettype = debug_make_float_type (dhandle, 4); + break; +- case 13: ++ case 12: + /* IEEE double precision (64 bit). */ + name = "double"; + rettype = debug_make_float_type (dhandle, 8); + break; +- case 14: ++ case 13: + /* This is an IEEE double on the RS/6000, and different machines + with different sizes for "long double" should use different + negative type numbers. See stabs.texinfo. */ + name = "long double"; + rettype = debug_make_float_type (dhandle, 8); + break; +- case 15: ++ case 14: + name = "integer"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 4, FALSE); + break; +- case 16: ++ case 15: + name = "boolean"; + rettype = debug_make_bool_type (dhandle, 4); + break; +- case 17: ++ case 16: + name = "short real"; + rettype = debug_make_float_type (dhandle, 4); + break; +- case 18: ++ case 17: + name = "real"; + rettype = debug_make_float_type (dhandle, 8); + break; +- case 19: ++ case 18: + /* FIXME */ + name = "stringptr"; + rettype = NULL; + break; +- case 20: ++ case 19: + /* FIXME */ + name = "character"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 1, TRUE); + break; +- case 21: ++ case 20: + name = "logical*1"; + rettype = debug_make_bool_type (dhandle, 1); + break; +- case 22: ++ case 21: + name = "logical*2"; + rettype = debug_make_bool_type (dhandle, 2); + break; +- case 23: ++ case 22: + name = "logical*4"; + rettype = debug_make_bool_type (dhandle, 4); + break; +- case 24: ++ case 23: + name = "logical"; + rettype = debug_make_bool_type (dhandle, 4); + break; +- case 25: ++ case 24: + /* Complex type consisting of two IEEE single precision values. */ + name = "complex"; + rettype = debug_make_complex_type (dhandle, 8); + break; +- case 26: ++ case 25: + /* Complex type consisting of two IEEE double precision values. */ + name = "double complex"; + rettype = debug_make_complex_type (dhandle, 16); + break; +- case 27: ++ case 26: + name = "integer*1"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 1, FALSE); + break; +- case 28: ++ case 27: + name = "integer*2"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 2, FALSE); + break; +- case 29: ++ case 28: + name = "integer*4"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 4, FALSE); + break; +- case 30: ++ case 29: + /* FIXME */ + name = "wchar"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 2, FALSE); + break; +- case 31: ++ case 30: + name = "long long"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 8, FALSE); + break; +- case 32: ++ case 31: + name = "unsigned long long"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 8, TRUE); + break; +- case 33: ++ case 32: + name = "logical*8"; + rettype = debug_make_bool_type (dhandle, 8); + break; +- case 34: ++ case 33: + name = "integer*8"; + rettype = debug_make_int_type (dhandle, 8, FALSE); + break; +@@ -3664,9 +3665,7 @@ stab_xcoff_builtin_type (void *dhandle, struct stab_handle *info, + } + + rettype = debug_name_type (dhandle, name, rettype); +- +- info->xcoff_types[-typenum] = rettype; +- ++ info->xcoff_types[typenum] = rettype; + return rettype; + } + +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0018-Include-members-in-the-variable-table-used-when-reso.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0018-Include-members-in-the-variable-table-used-when-reso.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dc1e09d46b --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0018-Include-members-in-the-variable-table-used-when-reso.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From bf2252dca8c76e4c1f1c2dbf98dab7ffc9f5e5af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com> +Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2020 08:03:15 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Include members in the variable table used when resolving + DW_AT_specification tags. + + PR 26520 + * dwarf2.c (scan_unit_for_symbols): Add member entries to the + variable table. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=e6f04d55f681149a69102a73937d0987719c3f16] +--- + bfd/dwarf2.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/bfd/dwarf2.c b/bfd/dwarf2.c +index dd3568a8532..ef2f6a3c63c 100644 +--- a/bfd/dwarf2.c ++++ b/bfd/dwarf2.c +@@ -3248,7 +3248,8 @@ scan_unit_for_symbols (struct comp_unit *unit) + else + { + func = NULL; +- if (abbrev->tag == DW_TAG_variable) ++ if (abbrev->tag == DW_TAG_variable ++ || abbrev->tag == DW_TAG_member) + { + bfd_size_type amt = sizeof (struct varinfo); + var = (struct varinfo *) bfd_zalloc (abfd, amt); +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/bootchart2/bootchart2_0.14.9.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/bootchart2/bootchart2_0.14.9.bb index 66bd897a9a..7f05bd1b0b 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/bootchart2/bootchart2_0.14.9.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/bootchart2/bootchart2_0.14.9.bb @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ do_install () { PACKAGES =+ "pybootchartgui" FILES_pybootchartgui += "${PYTHON_SITEPACKAGES_DIR}/pybootchartgui ${bindir}/pybootchartgui" -RDEPENDS_pybootchartgui = "python3-pycairo python3-compression python3-image python3-shell python3-compression python3-codecs" +RDEPENDS_pybootchartgui = "python3-pycairo python3-compression python3-image python3-math python3-shell python3-compression python3-codecs" RDEPENDS_${PN}_class-target += "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'sysvinit', 'sysvinit-pidof', 'procps', d)}" RDEPENDS_${PN}_class-target += "lsb-release" DEPENDS_append_class-native = " python3-pycairo-native" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake/OEToolchainConfig.cmake b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake/OEToolchainConfig.cmake index 398069eef2..f8af79ddd5 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake/OEToolchainConfig.cmake +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake/OEToolchainConfig.cmake @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ set( CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME Linux ) set( CMAKE_C_FLAGS $ENV{CFLAGS} CACHE STRING "" FORCE ) set( CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS $ENV{CXXFLAGS} CACHE STRING "" FORCE ) set( CMAKE_ASM_FLAGS ${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} CACHE STRING "" FORCE ) -set( CMAKE_LDFLAGS_FLAGS ${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} CACHE STRING "" FORCE ) set( CMAKE_SYSROOT $ENV{OECORE_TARGET_SYSROOT} ) set( CMAKE_FIND_ROOT_PATH $ENV{OECORE_TARGET_SYSROOT} ) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/e2fsprogs/e2fsprogs.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/e2fsprogs/e2fsprogs.inc index 45fb9720ee..57e4665a34 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/e2fsprogs/e2fsprogs.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/e2fsprogs/e2fsprogs.inc @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ DESCRIPTION = "The Ext2 Filesystem Utilities (e2fsprogs) contain all of the stan fixing, configuring , and debugging ext2 filesystems." HOMEPAGE = "http://e2fsprogs.sourceforge.net/" -LICENSE = "GPLv2 & LGPLv2 & BSD & MIT" +LICENSE = "GPLv2 & LGPLv2 & BSD-3-Clause & MIT" LICENSE_e2fsprogs-dumpe2fs = "GPLv2" LICENSE_e2fsprogs-e2fsck = "GPLv2" LICENSE_e2fsprogs-mke2fs = "GPLv2" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/gnu-config/gnu-config_git.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/gnu-config/gnu-config_git.bb index df8947e425..05cd6a1e63 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/gnu-config/gnu-config_git.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/gnu-config/gnu-config_git.bb @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ INHIBIT_DEFAULT_DEPS = "1" SRCREV = "5256817ace8493502ec88501a19e4051c2e220b0" PV = "20200117+git${SRCPV}" -SRC_URI = "git://git.savannah.gnu.org/config.git;branch=master \ +SRC_URI = "git://git.savannah.gnu.org/git/config.git;protocol=https;branch=master \ file://gnu-configize.in" S = "${WORKDIR}/git" UPSTREAM_CHECK_COMMITS = "1" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc index abc6f42184..08d547a837 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc @@ -19,7 +19,11 @@ SRC_URI += "\ file://CVE-2021-34558.patch \ file://CVE-2021-33196.patch \ file://CVE-2021-33197.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-38297.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-23806.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-23772.patch \ " + SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0009-ld-replace-glibc-dynamic-linker-with-musl.patch" SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "7ed13b2209e54a451835997f78035530b331c5b6943cdcd68a3d815fdc009149" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2021-38297.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2021-38297.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..24ceabf808 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2021-38297.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +From 4548fcc8dfd933c237f29bba6f90040a85922564 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com> +Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2021 16:51:59 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.16] misc/wasm, cmd/link: do not let + command line args overwrite global data + +On Wasm, wasm_exec.js puts command line arguments at the beginning +of the linear memory (following the "zero page"). Currently there +is no limit for this, and a very long command line can overwrite +the program's data section. Prevent this by limiting the command +line to 4096 bytes, and in the linker ensuring the data section +starts at a high enough address (8192). + +(Arguably our address assignment on Wasm is a bit confusing. This +is the minimum fix I can come up with.) + +Thanks to Ben Lubar for reporting this issue. + +Change by Cherry Mui <cherryyz@google.com>. + +For #48797 +Fixes #48799 +Fixes CVE-2021-38297 + +Change-Id: I0f50fbb2a5b6d0d047e3c134a88988d9133e4ab3 +Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1205933 +Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com> +Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com> +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/354591 +Trust: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com> +Reviewed-by: Heschi Kreinick <heschi@google.com> + +CVE: CVE-2021-38297 + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://github.com/golang/go/commit/4548fcc8dfd933c237f29bba6f90040a85922564 + +Inline of ctxt.isWAsm followin this implemetation: +https://github.com/golang/go/blob/4548fcc8dfd933c237f29bba6f90040a85922564/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/target.go#L127 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- + misc/wasm/wasm_exec.js | 7 +++++++ + src/cmd/link/internal/ld/data.go | 11 ++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/misc/wasm/wasm_exec.js b/misc/wasm/wasm_exec.js +index 82041e6bb901..a0a264278b1b 100644 +--- a/misc/wasm/wasm_exec.js ++++ b/misc/wasm/wasm_exec.js +@@ -564,6 +564,13 @@ + offset += 8; + }); + ++ // The linker guarantees global data starts from at least wasmMinDataAddr. ++ // Keep in sync with cmd/link/internal/ld/data.go:wasmMinDataAddr. ++ const wasmMinDataAddr = 4096 + 4096; ++ if (offset >= wasmMinDataAddr) { ++ throw new Error("command line too long"); ++ } ++ + this._inst.exports.run(argc, argv); + if (this.exited) { + this._resolveExitPromise(); +diff --git a/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/data.go b/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/data.go +index 52035e96301c..54a1d188cdb9 100644 +--- a/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/data.go ++++ b/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/data.go +@@ -2330,6 +2330,11 @@ func assignAddress(ctxt *Link, sect *sym.Section, n int, s loader.Sym, va uint64 + return sect, n, va + } + ++// On Wasm, we reserve 4096 bytes for zero page, then 4096 bytes for wasm_exec.js ++// to store command line args. Data sections starts from at least address 8192. ++// Keep in sync with wasm_exec.js. ++const wasmMinDataAddr = 4096 + 4096 ++ + // address assigns virtual addresses to all segments and sections and + // returns all segments in file order. + func (ctxt *Link) address() []*sym.Segment { +@@ -2339,10 +2344,14 @@ func (ctxt *Link) address() []*sym.Segment { + order = append(order, &Segtext) + Segtext.Rwx = 05 + Segtext.Vaddr = va +- for _, s := range Segtext.Sections { ++ for i, s := range Segtext.Sections { + va = uint64(Rnd(int64(va), int64(s.Align))) + s.Vaddr = va + va += s.Length ++ ++ if ctxt.Arch.Family == sys.Wasm && i == 0 && va < wasmMinDataAddr { ++ va = wasmMinDataAddr ++ } + } + + Segtext.Length = va - uint64(*FlagTextAddr) +
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-23772.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-23772.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f0daee3624 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-23772.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 70882eedccac803ddcf1c3215e0ae8fd59847e39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org> +Date: Sat, 26 Feb 2022 20:03:38 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.16] math/big: prevent overflow in + (*Rat).SetString + +Credit to rsc@ for the original patch. + +Thanks to the OSS-Fuzz project for discovering this +issue and to Emmanuel Odeke (@odeke_et) for reporting it. + +Updates #50699 +Fixes #50700 +Fixes CVE-2022-23772 +--- + src/math/big/ratconv.go | 5 +++++ + src/math/big/ratconv_test.go | 1 + + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/math/big/ratconv.go b/src/math/big/ratconv.go +index 941139e..e8cbdbe 100644 +--- a/src/math/big/ratconv.go ++++ b/src/math/big/ratconv.go +@@ -168,6 +168,11 @@ func (z *Rat) SetString(s string) (*Rat, bool) { + n := exp5 + if n < 0 { + n = -n ++ if n < 0 { ++ // This can occur if -n overflows. -(-1 << 63) would become ++ // -1 << 63, which is still negative. ++ return nil, false ++ } + } + pow5 := z.b.abs.expNN(natFive, nat(nil).setWord(Word(n)), nil) // use underlying array of z.b.abs + if exp5 > 0 { +diff --git a/src/math/big/ratconv_test.go b/src/math/big/ratconv_test.go +index ba0d1ba..b820df4 100644 +--- a/src/math/big/ratconv_test.go ++++ b/src/math/big/ratconv_test.go +@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ var setStringTests = []StringTest{ + {in: "4/3/"}, + {in: "4/3."}, + {in: "4/"}, ++ {in: "13e-9223372036854775808"}, // CVE-2022-23772 + + // valid + {"0", "0", true}, +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-23806.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-23806.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..772acdcbf6 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2022-23806.patch @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +From 5b376a209d1c61e10847e062d78c4b1aa90dff0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> +Date: Sat, 26 Feb 2022 10:40:57 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] crypto/elliptic: make IsOnCurve return false for invalid + + field elements + +Updates #50974 +Fixes #50977 +Fixes CVE-2022-23806 + +Signed-off-by: Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com> + +--- + src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go | 6 +++ + src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic_test.go | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + src/crypto/elliptic/p224.go | 6 +++ + 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go b/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go +index e2f71cd..bd574a4 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go ++++ b/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go +@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ func (curve *CurveParams) Params() *CurveParams { + } + + func (curve *CurveParams) IsOnCurve(x, y *big.Int) bool { ++ ++ if x.Sign() < 0 || x.Cmp(curve.P) >= 0 || ++ y.Sign() < 0 || y.Cmp(curve.P) >= 0 { ++ return false ++ } ++ + // y² = x³ - 3x + b + y2 := new(big.Int).Mul(y, y) + y2.Mod(y2, curve.P) +diff --git a/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic_test.go b/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic_test.go +index 09c5483..b13a620 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic_test.go ++++ b/src/crypto/elliptic/elliptic_test.go +@@ -628,3 +628,84 @@ func TestUnmarshalToLargeCoordinates(t *testing.T) { + t.Errorf("Unmarshal accepts invalid Y coordinate") + } + } ++ ++func testAllCurves(t *testing.T, f func(*testing.T, Curve)) { ++ tests := []struct { ++ name string ++ curve Curve ++ }{ ++ {"P256", P256()}, ++ {"P256/Params", P256().Params()}, ++ {"P224", P224()}, ++ {"P224/Params", P224().Params()}, ++ {"P384", P384()}, ++ {"P384/Params", P384().Params()}, ++ {"P521", P521()}, ++ {"P521/Params", P521().Params()}, ++ } ++ if testing.Short() { ++ tests = tests[:1] ++ } ++ for _, test := range tests { ++ curve := test.curve ++ t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) { ++ t.Parallel() ++ f(t, curve) ++ }) ++ } ++} ++ ++// TestInvalidCoordinates tests big.Int values that are not valid field elements ++// (negative or bigger than P). They are expected to return false from ++// IsOnCurve, all other behavior is undefined. ++func TestInvalidCoordinates(t *testing.T) { ++ testAllCurves(t, testInvalidCoordinates) ++} ++ ++func testInvalidCoordinates(t *testing.T, curve Curve) { ++ checkIsOnCurveFalse := func(name string, x, y *big.Int) { ++ if curve.IsOnCurve(x, y) { ++ t.Errorf("IsOnCurve(%s) unexpectedly returned true", name) ++ } ++ } ++ ++ p := curve.Params().P ++ _, x, y, _ := GenerateKey(curve, rand.Reader) ++ xx, yy := new(big.Int), new(big.Int) ++ ++ // Check if the sign is getting dropped. ++ xx.Neg(x) ++ checkIsOnCurveFalse("-x, y", xx, y) ++ yy.Neg(y) ++ checkIsOnCurveFalse("x, -y", x, yy) ++ ++ // Check if negative values are reduced modulo P. ++ xx.Sub(x, p) ++ checkIsOnCurveFalse("x-P, y", xx, y) ++ yy.Sub(y, p) ++ checkIsOnCurveFalse("x, y-P", x, yy) ++ ++ // Check if positive values are reduced modulo P. ++ xx.Add(x, p) ++ checkIsOnCurveFalse("x+P, y", xx, y) ++ yy.Add(y, p) ++ checkIsOnCurveFalse("x, y+P", x, yy) ++ ++ // Check if the overflow is dropped. ++ xx.Add(x, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 535)) ++ checkIsOnCurveFalse("x+2⁵³⁵, y", xx, y) ++ yy.Add(y, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 535)) ++ checkIsOnCurveFalse("x, y+2⁵³⁵", x, yy) ++ ++ // Check if P is treated like zero (if possible). ++ // y^2 = x^3 - 3x + B ++ // y = mod_sqrt(x^3 - 3x + B) ++ // y = mod_sqrt(B) if x = 0 ++ // If there is no modsqrt, there is no point with x = 0, can't test x = P. ++ if yy := new(big.Int).ModSqrt(curve.Params().B, p); yy != nil { ++ if !curve.IsOnCurve(big.NewInt(0), yy) { ++ t.Fatal("(0, mod_sqrt(B)) is not on the curve?") ++ } ++ checkIsOnCurveFalse("P, y", p, yy) ++ } ++} +diff --git a/src/crypto/elliptic/p224.go b/src/crypto/elliptic/p224.go +index 8c76021..f1bfd7e 100644 +--- a/src/crypto/elliptic/p224.go ++++ b/src/crypto/elliptic/p224.go +@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ func (curve p224Curve) Params() *CurveParams { + } + + func (curve p224Curve) IsOnCurve(bigX, bigY *big.Int) bool { ++ ++ if bigX.Sign() < 0 || bigX.Cmp(curve.P) >= 0 || ++ bigY.Sign() < 0 || bigY.Cmp(curve.P) >= 0 { ++ return false ++ } ++ + var x, y p224FieldElement + p224FromBig(&x, bigX) + p224FromBig(&y, bigY) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/libxml-parser-perl_2.46.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/libxml-parser-perl_2.46.bb index bc154bbdc5..ef2b292352 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/libxml-parser-perl_2.46.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/libxml-parser-perl_2.46.bb @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ do_install_ptest() { chown -R root:root ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/samples } +RDEPENDS_${PN} += "perl-module-carp perl-module-file-spec" RDEPENDS_${PN}-ptest += "perl-module-filehandle perl-module-if perl-module-test perl-module-test-more" BBCLASSEXTEND="native nativesdk" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-jinja2_2.11.3.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-jinja2_2.11.3.bb index dbdf563f87..9f054c6024 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-jinja2_2.11.3.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-jinja2_2.11.3.bb @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ DESCRIPTION = "Python Jinja2: A small but fast and easy to use stand-alone template engine written in pure python." -HOMEPAGE = "https://pypi.org/project/Jinja/" +HOMEPAGE = "https://pypi.org/project/Jinja2/" LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE.rst;md5=5dc88300786f1c214c1e9827a5229462" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/0001-bpo-36852-proper-detection-of-mips-architecture-for-.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/0001-bpo-36852-proper-detection-of-mips-architecture-for-.patch index c4fae09a5b..4ac0e140cc 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/0001-bpo-36852-proper-detection-of-mips-architecture-for-.patch +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/0001-bpo-36852-proper-detection-of-mips-architecture-for-.patch @@ -14,17 +14,21 @@ Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/13196] Signed-off-by: Matthias Schoepfer <matthias.schoepfer@ithinx.io> %% original patch: 0001-bpo-36852-proper-detection-of-mips-architecture-for-.patch + +Updated to apply after dea270a2a80214de22afadaaca2043d0d782eb7d + +Signed-off-by: Tim Orling <tim.orling@konsulko.com> --- configure.ac | 175 +++++++-------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index ede710e..bc81b0b 100644 +index de83332dd3..16b02d0798 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac -@@ -710,160 +710,27 @@ fi - MULTIARCH=$($CC --print-multiarch 2>/dev/null) - AC_SUBST(MULTIARCH) +@@ -719,160 +719,27 @@ then + fi + -AC_MSG_CHECKING([for the platform triplet based on compiler characteristics]) -cat >> conftest.c <<EOF @@ -185,25 +189,25 @@ index ede710e..bc81b0b 100644 +## Need to handle macos, vxworks and hurd special (?) :-/ +case ${target_os} in + darwin*) -+ PLATFORM_TRIPLET=darwin -+ ;; ++ PLATFORM_TRIPLET=darwin ++ ;; + hurd*) -+ PLATFORM_TRIPLET=i386-gnu -+ ;; ++ PLATFORM_TRIPLET=i386-gnu ++ ;; + vxworks*) -+ PLATFORM_TRIPLET=vxworks -+ ;; ++ PLATFORM_TRIPLET=vxworks ++ ;; + *) + if test "${target_cpu}" != "i686"; then -+ PLATFORM_TRIPLET=${target_cpu}-${target_os} -+ else -+ PLATFORM_TRIPLET=i386-${target_os} -+ fi -+ ;; -+esac ++ PLATFORM_TRIPLET=${target_cpu}-${target_os} ++ else ++ PLATFORM_TRIPLET=i386-${target_os} ++ fi ++ ;; ++esac - if test x$PLATFORM_TRIPLET != x && test x$MULTIARCH != x; then - if test x$PLATFORM_TRIPLET != x$MULTIARCH; then + if test x$PLATFORM_TRIPLET != xdarwin; then + MULTIARCH=$($CC --print-multiarch 2>/dev/null) -- -2.24.1 +2.32.0 diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.12.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.13.bb index cfcc91b396..d7f6e9155d 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.12.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.13.bb @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ DESCRIPTION = "Python is a programming language that lets you work more quickly LICENSE = "PSF-2.0 & BSD-0-Clause" SECTION = "devel/python" -LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=c22d2438294c784731bf9dd224a467b7" +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=c84eccf626bb6fde43e6ea5e28d8feb5" SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://run-ptest \ @@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ SRC_URI_append_class-native = " \ file://0001-Don-t-search-system-for-headers-libraries.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9dd8f82e586b776383c82e27923f8795" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b1d3a76420375343b5e8a22fceb1ac65b77193e9ed27146524f0a9db058728ea" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "c4b7100dcaace9d33ab1fda9a3a038d6" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6f309077012040aa39fe8f0c61db8c0fa1c45136763299d375c9e5756f09cf57" # exclude pre-releases for both python 2.x and 3.x UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "[Pp]ython-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+).tar" @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2007-4559" CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2019-18348" # This is windows only issue. -CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-15523" +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-15523 CVE-2022-26488" PYTHON_MAJMIN = "3.8" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc index ef9bc3f64a..25c2cdef3a 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc @@ -92,6 +92,12 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2020-27617.patch \ file://CVE-2020-28916.patch \ file://CVE-2021-3682.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-13253_1.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-13253_2.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-13253_3.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-13253_4.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-13253_5.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-13791.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_1.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7f8383987c --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 6dd3a164f5b31c703c7d8372841ad3bd6a57de6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?utf8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <f4bug@amsat.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:28:51 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH 1/1] hw/sd/sdcard: Simplify realize() a bit +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +We don't need to check if sd->blk is set twice. + +Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> +Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com> +Message-Id: <20200630133912.9428-18-f4bug@amsat.org> + +Upstram-Status: Backport: +https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;f=hw/sd/sd.c;h=6dd3a164f5b31c703c7d8372841ad3bd6a57de6d + +CVE: CVE-2020-13253 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- + hw/sd/sd.c | 10 +++++----- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/sd/sd.c b/hw/sd/sd.c +index 1cc16bf..edd60a0 100644 +--- a/hw/sd/sd.c ++++ b/hw/sd/sd.c +@@ -2105,12 +2105,12 @@ static void sd_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp) + return; + } + +- if (sd->blk && blk_is_read_only(sd->blk)) { +- error_setg(errp, "Cannot use read-only drive as SD card"); +- return; +- } +- + if (sd->blk) { ++ if (blk_is_read_only(sd->blk)) { ++ error_setg(errp, "Cannot use read-only drive as SD card"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + ret = blk_set_perm(sd->blk, BLK_PERM_CONSISTENT_READ | BLK_PERM_WRITE, + BLK_PERM_ALL, errp); + if (ret < 0) { +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_2.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..53145d059f --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From a9bcedd15a5834ca9ae6c3a97933e85ac7edbd36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <f4bug@amsat.org> +Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 13:02:34 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] hw/sd/sdcard: Do not allow invalid SD card sizes +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +QEMU allows to create SD card with unrealistic sizes. This could +work, but some guests (at least Linux) consider sizes that are not +a power of 2 as a firmware bug and fix the card size to the next +power of 2. + +While the possibility to use small SD card images has been seen as +a feature, it became a bug with CVE-2020-13253, where the guest is +able to do OOB read/write accesses past the image size end. + +In a pair of commits we will fix CVE-2020-13253 as: + + Read command is rejected if BLOCK_LEN_ERROR or ADDRESS_ERROR + occurred and no data transfer is performed. + + Write command is rejected if BLOCK_LEN_ERROR or ADDRESS_ERROR + occurred and no data transfer is performed. + + WP_VIOLATION errors are not modified: the error bit is set, we + stay in receive-data state, wait for a stop command. All further + data transfer is ignored. See the check on sd->card_status at the + beginning of sd_read_data() and sd_write_data(). + +While this is the correct behavior, in case QEMU create smaller SD +cards, guests still try to access past the image size end, and QEMU +considers this is an invalid address, thus "all further data transfer +is ignored". This is wrong and make the guest looping until +eventually timeouts. + +Fix by not allowing invalid SD card sizes (suggesting the expected +size as a hint): + + $ qemu-system-arm -M orangepi-pc -drive file=rootfs.ext2,if=sd,format=raw + qemu-system-arm: Invalid SD card size: 60 MiB + SD card size has to be a power of 2, e.g. 64 MiB. + You can resize disk images with 'qemu-img resize <imagefile> <new-size>' + (note that this will lose data if you make the image smaller than it currently is). + +Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> +Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com> +Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> +Message-Id: <20200713183209.26308-8-f4bug@amsat.org> + +Upstram-Status: Backport: +https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=a9bcedd15a5834ca9ae6c3a97933e85ac7edbd36 + +CVE: CVE-2020-13253 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- + hw/sd/sd.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/hw/sd/sd.c b/hw/sd/sd.c +index edd60a09c0..76d68359a4 100644 +--- a/hw/sd/sd.c ++++ b/hw/sd/sd.c +@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ + + #include "qemu/osdep.h" + #include "qemu/units.h" ++#include "qemu/cutils.h" + #include "hw/irq.h" + #include "hw/registerfields.h" + #include "sysemu/block-backend.h" +@@ -2106,11 +2107,35 @@ static void sd_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp) + } + + if (sd->blk) { ++ int64_t blk_size; ++ + if (blk_is_read_only(sd->blk)) { + error_setg(errp, "Cannot use read-only drive as SD card"); + return; + } + ++ blk_size = blk_getlength(sd->blk); ++ if (blk_size > 0 && !is_power_of_2(blk_size)) { ++ int64_t blk_size_aligned = pow2ceil(blk_size); ++ char *blk_size_str; ++ ++ blk_size_str = size_to_str(blk_size); ++ error_setg(errp, "Invalid SD card size: %s", blk_size_str); ++ g_free(blk_size_str); ++ ++ blk_size_str = size_to_str(blk_size_aligned); ++ error_append_hint(errp, ++ "SD card size has to be a power of 2, e.g. %s.\n" ++ "You can resize disk images with" ++ " 'qemu-img resize <imagefile> <new-size>'\n" ++ "(note that this will lose data if you make the" ++ " image smaller than it currently is).\n", ++ blk_size_str); ++ g_free(blk_size_str); ++ ++ return; ++ } ++ + ret = blk_set_perm(sd->blk, BLK_PERM_CONSISTENT_READ | BLK_PERM_WRITE, + BLK_PERM_ALL, errp); + if (ret < 0) { +-- +2.32.0 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_3.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b512b2bd7f --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From 794d68de2f021a6d3874df41d6bbe8590ec05207 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?utf8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <f4bug@amsat.org> +Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 09:27:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] hw/sd/sdcard: Update coding style to make checkpatch.pl happy +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +To make the next commit easier to review, clean this code first. + +Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> +Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com> +Reviewed-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu> +Message-Id: <20200630133912.9428-3-f4bug@amsat.org> + +Upstram-Status: Backport: +https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;f=hw/sd/sd.c;h=794d68de2f021a6d3874df41d6bbe8590ec05207 + +CVE: CVE-2020-13253 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- +diff --git a/hw/sd/sd.c b/hw/sd/sd.c +--- a/hw/sd/sd.c (revision b0ca999a43a22b38158a222233d3f5881648bb4f) ++++ b/hw/sd/sd.c (date 1647514442924) +@@ -1154,8 +1154,9 @@ + sd->data_start = addr; + sd->data_offset = 0; + +- if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) ++ if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { + sd->card_status |= ADDRESS_ERROR; ++ } + return sd_r1; + + default: +@@ -1170,8 +1171,9 @@ + sd->data_start = addr; + sd->data_offset = 0; + +- if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) ++ if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { + sd->card_status |= ADDRESS_ERROR; ++ } + return sd_r1; + + default: +@@ -1216,12 +1218,15 @@ + sd->data_offset = 0; + sd->blk_written = 0; + +- if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) ++ if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { + sd->card_status |= ADDRESS_ERROR; +- if (sd_wp_addr(sd, sd->data_start)) ++ } ++ if (sd_wp_addr(sd, sd->data_start)) { + sd->card_status |= WP_VIOLATION; +- if (sd->csd[14] & 0x30) ++ } ++ if (sd->csd[14] & 0x30) { + sd->card_status |= WP_VIOLATION; ++ } + return sd_r1; + + default: +@@ -1240,12 +1245,15 @@ + sd->data_offset = 0; + sd->blk_written = 0; + +- if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) ++ if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { + sd->card_status |= ADDRESS_ERROR; +- if (sd_wp_addr(sd, sd->data_start)) ++ } ++ if (sd_wp_addr(sd, sd->data_start)) { + sd->card_status |= WP_VIOLATION; +- if (sd->csd[14] & 0x30) ++ } ++ if (sd->csd[14] & 0x30) { + sd->card_status |= WP_VIOLATION; ++ } + return sd_r1; + + default: diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_4.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b4c1ec050 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +From 790762e5487114341cccc5bffcec4cb3c022c3cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <f4bug@amsat.org> +Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 19:22:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] hw/sd/sdcard: Do not switch to ReceivingData if address is + invalid +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Only move the state machine to ReceivingData if there is no +pending error. This avoids later OOB access while processing +commands queued. + + "SD Specifications Part 1 Physical Layer Simplified Spec. v3.01" + + 4.3.3 Data Read + + Read command is rejected if BLOCK_LEN_ERROR or ADDRESS_ERROR + occurred and no data transfer is performed. + + 4.3.4 Data Write + + Write command is rejected if BLOCK_LEN_ERROR or ADDRESS_ERROR + occurred and no data transfer is performed. + +WP_VIOLATION errors are not modified: the error bit is set, we +stay in receive-data state, wait for a stop command. All further +data transfer is ignored. See the check on sd->card_status at the +beginning of sd_read_data() and sd_write_data(). + +Fixes: CVE-2020-13253 + +Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org +Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu> +Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1880822 +Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> +Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com> +Message-Id: <20200630133912.9428-6-f4bug@amsat.org> + +Upstram-Status: Backport: +https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=790762e5487114341cccc5bffcec4cb3c022c3cd + +CVE: CVE-2020-13253 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- + hw/sd/sd.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/sd/sd.c b/hw/sd/sd.c +index f4f76f8fd2..fad9cf1ee7 100644 +--- a/hw/sd/sd.c ++++ b/hw/sd/sd.c +@@ -1171,13 +1171,15 @@ static sd_rsp_type_t sd_normal_command(SDState *sd, SDRequest req) + case 17: /* CMD17: READ_SINGLE_BLOCK */ + switch (sd->state) { + case sd_transfer_state: +- sd->state = sd_sendingdata_state; +- sd->data_start = addr; +- sd->data_offset = 0; + +- if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { ++ if (addr + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { + sd->card_status |= ADDRESS_ERROR; ++ return sd_r1; + } ++ ++ sd->state = sd_sendingdata_state; ++ sd->data_start = addr; ++ sd->data_offset = 0; + return sd_r1; + + default: +@@ -1188,13 +1190,15 @@ static sd_rsp_type_t sd_normal_command(SDState *sd, SDRequest req) + case 18: /* CMD18: READ_MULTIPLE_BLOCK */ + switch (sd->state) { + case sd_transfer_state: +- sd->state = sd_sendingdata_state; +- sd->data_start = addr; +- sd->data_offset = 0; + +- if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { ++ if (addr + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { + sd->card_status |= ADDRESS_ERROR; ++ return sd_r1; + } ++ ++ sd->state = sd_sendingdata_state; ++ sd->data_start = addr; ++ sd->data_offset = 0; + return sd_r1; + + default: +@@ -1234,14 +1238,17 @@ static sd_rsp_type_t sd_normal_command(SDState *sd, SDRequest req) + /* Writing in SPI mode not implemented. */ + if (sd->spi) + break; ++ ++ if (addr + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { ++ sd->card_status |= ADDRESS_ERROR; ++ return sd_r1; ++ } ++ + sd->state = sd_receivingdata_state; + sd->data_start = addr; + sd->data_offset = 0; + sd->blk_written = 0; + +- if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { +- sd->card_status |= ADDRESS_ERROR; +- } + if (sd_wp_addr(sd, sd->data_start)) { + sd->card_status |= WP_VIOLATION; + } +@@ -1261,14 +1268,17 @@ static sd_rsp_type_t sd_normal_command(SDState *sd, SDRequest req) + /* Writing in SPI mode not implemented. */ + if (sd->spi) + break; ++ ++ if (addr + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { ++ sd->card_status |= ADDRESS_ERROR; ++ return sd_r1; ++ } ++ + sd->state = sd_receivingdata_state; + sd->data_start = addr; + sd->data_offset = 0; + sd->blk_written = 0; + +- if (sd->data_start + sd->blk_len > sd->size) { +- sd->card_status |= ADDRESS_ERROR; +- } + if (sd_wp_addr(sd, sd->data_start)) { + sd->card_status |= WP_VIOLATION; + } +-- +2.32.0 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_5.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_5.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ffce610f79 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13253_5.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 9157dd597d293ab7f599f4d96c3fe8a6e07c633d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?utf8?q?Philippe=20Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= <f4bug@amsat.org> +Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2020 19:59:16 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] hw/sd/sdcard: Restrict Class 6 commands to SCSD cards +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Only SCSD cards support Class 6 (Block Oriented Write Protection) +commands. + + "SD Specifications Part 1 Physical Layer Simplified Spec. v3.01" + + 4.3.14 Command Functional Difference in Card Capacity Types + + * Write Protected Group + + SDHC and SDXC do not support write-protected groups. Issuing + CMD28, CMD29 and CMD30 generates the ILLEGAL_COMMAND error. + +Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org +Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> +Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> +Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com> +Message-Id: <20200630133912.9428-7-f4bug@amsat.org> + +Upstram-Status: Backport: +https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=9157dd597d293ab7f599f4d96c3fe8a6e07c633d + +CVE: CVE-2020-13253 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- + hw/sd/sd.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/hw/sd/sd.c b/hw/sd/sd.c +index 5137168..1cc16bf 100644 +--- a/hw/sd/sd.c ++++ b/hw/sd/sd.c +@@ -920,6 +920,11 @@ static sd_rsp_type_t sd_normal_command(SDState *sd, SDRequest req) + sd->multi_blk_cnt = 0; + } + ++ if (sd_cmd_class[req.cmd] == 6 && FIELD_EX32(sd->ocr, OCR, CARD_CAPACITY)) { ++ /* Only Standard Capacity cards support class 6 commands */ ++ return sd_illegal; ++ } ++ + switch (req.cmd) { + /* Basic commands (Class 0 and Class 1) */ + case 0: /* CMD0: GO_IDLE_STATE */ +-- +1.8.3.1 diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13791.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13791.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1e8278f7b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2020-13791.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 16:25:24 +0530 +From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org> +Subject: [PATCH v3] ati-vga: check address before reading configuration bytes (CVE-2020-13791) + +While reading PCI configuration bytes, a guest may send an +address towards the end of the configuration space. It may lead +to an OOB access issue. Add check to ensure 'address + size' is +within PCI configuration space. + +CVE: CVE-2020-13791 + +Upstream-Status: Submitted +https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-06/msg00979.html + +Reported-by: Ren Ding <rding@gatech.edu> +Reported-by: Hanqing Zhao <hanqing@gatech.edu> +Reported-by: Yi Ren <c4tren@gmail.com> +Suggested-by: BALATON Zoltan <balaton@eik.bme.hu> +Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org> +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- + hw/display/ati.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +Update v3: avoid modifying 'addr' variable + -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-06/msg00834.html + +diff --git a/hw/display/ati.c b/hw/display/ati.c +index 67604e68de..b4d0fd88b7 100644 +--- a/hw/display/ati.c ++++ b/hw/display/ati.c +@@ -387,7 +387,9 @@ static uint64_t ati_mm_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size) + val = s->regs.crtc_pitch; + break; + case 0xf00 ... 0xfff: +- val = pci_default_read_config(&s->dev, addr - 0xf00, size); ++ if ((addr - 0xf00) + size <= pci_config_size(&s->dev)) { ++ val = pci_default_read_config(&s->dev, addr - 0xf00, size); ++ } + break; + case CUR_OFFSET: + val = s->regs.cur_offset; +-- +2.26.2 diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/files/0001-rpmio-Fix-lzopen_internal-mode-parsing-when-Tn-is-us.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/files/0001-rpmio-Fix-lzopen_internal-mode-parsing-when-Tn-is-us.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a5ebb9115 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/files/0001-rpmio-Fix-lzopen_internal-mode-parsing-when-Tn-is-us.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 405fc8998181353bd510864ca251dc233afec276 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> +Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2021 23:43:41 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] rpmio: Fix lzopen_internal mode parsing when 'Tn' is used + +When there is number after "T" (suggested number of threads or "0" for +getncpus), lzopen_internal() mode parser would skip one byte, and when +it's at the end of the string it would then parse undesired garbage from +the memory, making intermittent compression failures. + +Fixes: 7740d1098 ("Add support for multithreaded xz compression") +Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/commit/405fc8998181353bd510864ca251dc233afec276] + +--- + rpmio/rpmio.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/rpmio/rpmio.c b/rpmio/rpmio.c +index ed1e25140..9d32ec6d9 100644 +--- a/rpmio/rpmio.c ++++ b/rpmio/rpmio.c +@@ -798,6 +798,7 @@ static LZFILE *lzopen_internal(const char *mode, int fd, int xz) + * should've processed + * */ + while (isdigit(*++mode)); ++ --mode; + } + #ifdef HAVE_LZMA_MT + else +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm_4.14.2.1.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm_4.14.2.1.bb index c39a5208e5..376021d913 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm_4.14.2.1.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/rpm/rpm_4.14.2.1.bb @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm;branch=rpm-4.14.x;protoc file://0001-mono-find-provides-requires-do-not-use-monodis-from-.patch \ file://0001-Rip-out-partial-support-for-unused-MD2-and-RIPEMD160.patch \ file://0001-rpmplugins.c-call-dlerror-prior-to-dlsym.patch \ + file://0001-rpmio-Fix-lzopen_internal-mode-parsing-when-Tn-is-us.patch \ file://CVE-2021-3421.patch \ file://CVE-2021-20266.patch \ " diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/ruby/ruby.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/ruby/ruby.inc index 7b6d4edc61..a9f4240932 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/ruby/ruby.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/ruby/ruby.inc @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "\ file://LEGAL;md5=2b6d62dc0d608f34d510ca3f428110ec \ " -DEPENDS = "ruby-native zlib openssl libyaml gdbm readline libffi" -DEPENDS_class-native = "openssl-native libyaml-native readline-native zlib-native" +DEPENDS = "zlib openssl libyaml gdbm readline libffi" +DEPENDS_append_class-target = " ruby-native" SHRT_VER = "${@oe.utils.trim_version("${PV}", 2)}" SRC_URI = "http://cache.ruby-lang.org/pub/ruby/${SHRT_VER}/ruby-${PV}.tar.gz \ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/ruby/ruby_2.7.4.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/ruby/ruby_2.7.5.bb index dafa7d2f6b..44a2527ee7 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/ruby/ruby_2.7.4.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-devtools/ruby/ruby_2.7.5.bb @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ SRC_URI += " \ file://0001-template-Makefile.in-do-not-write-host-cross-cc-item.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "823cd21d93c69e4168b03dd127369343" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "3043099089608859fc8cce7f9fdccaa1f53a462457e3838ec3b25a7d609fbc5b" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ede247b56fb862f1f67f9471189b04d4" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2755b900a21235b443bb16dadd9032f784d4a88f143d852bc5d154f22b8781f1" PACKAGECONFIG ??= "" PACKAGECONFIG += "${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'ipv6', d)}" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/asciidoc/asciidoc_8.6.9.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/asciidoc/asciidoc_8.6.9.bb index 62738dc8d9..325ff9aa15 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/asciidoc/asciidoc_8.6.9.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/asciidoc/asciidoc_8.6.9.bb @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ LICENSE = "GPLv2" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=8ca43cbc842c2336e835926c2166c28b \ file://COPYRIGHT;md5=029ad5428ba5efa20176b396222d4069" -SRC_URI = "git://github.com/asciidoc/asciidoc-py3;protocol=https;branch=main \ +SRC_URI = "git://github.com/asciidoc/asciidoc-py;protocol=https;branch=main \ file://auto-catalogs.patch \ file://detect-python-version.patch" SRCREV = "618f6e6f6b558ed1e5f2588cd60a5a6b4f881ca0" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_1.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..033ba77f9a --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From 3920a727fb19e19f597e518610ce2416d08cb75f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Liddell <chris.liddell@artifex.com> +Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 17:19:09 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix pdfwrite "%d" mode with file permissions + +Firstly, in gx_device_delete_output_file the iodev pointer was being passed +to the delete_method incorrectly (passing a pointer to that pointer). Thus +when we attempted to use that to confirm permission to delete the file, it +crashed. Credit to Ken for finding that. + +Secondly, due to the way pdfwrite works, when running with an output file per +page, it creates the current output file immediately it has completed writing +the previous one. Thus, it has to delete that partial file on exit. + +Previously, the output file was not added to the "control" permission list, +so an attempt to delete it would result in an error. So add the output file +to the "control" as well as "write" list. + +CVE: CVE-2021-3781 + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;f=base/gslibctx.c;h=3920a727fb19e19f597e518610ce2416d08cb75f + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- + base/gsdevice.c | 2 +- + base/gslibctx.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/base/gsdevice.c b/base/gsdevice.c +index 913119495..ac78af93f 100644 +--- a/base/gsdevice.c ++++ b/base/gsdevice.c +@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ int gx_device_delete_output_file(const gx_device * dev, const char *fname) + parsed.len = strlen(parsed.fname); + } + if (parsed.iodev) +- code = parsed.iodev->procs.delete_file((gx_io_device *)(&parsed.iodev), (const char *)parsed.fname); ++ code = parsed.iodev->procs.delete_file((gx_io_device *)(parsed.iodev), (const char *)parsed.fname); + else + code = gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess); + +diff --git a/base/gslibctx.c b/base/gslibctx.c +index d726c58b5..ff8fc895e 100644 +--- a/base/gslibctx.c ++++ b/base/gslibctx.c +@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ gs_add_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + char *fp, f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; + const int pipe = 124; /* ASCII code for '|' */ + const int len = strlen(fname); +- int i; ++ int i, code; + + /* Be sure the string copy will fit */ + if (len >= gp_file_name_sizeof) +@@ -658,8 +658,6 @@ gs_add_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + rewrite_percent_specifiers(f); + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (f[i] == pipe) { +- int code; +- + fp = &f[i + 1]; + /* Because we potentially have to check file permissions at two levels + for the output file (gx_device_open_output_file and the low level +@@ -671,10 +669,16 @@ gs_add_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + if (code < 0) + return code; + break; ++ code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); ++ if (code < 0) ++ return code; + } + if (!IS_WHITESPACE(f[i])) + break; + } ++ code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, fp); ++ if (code < 0) ++ return code; + return gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, fp); + } + +@@ -684,7 +688,7 @@ gs_remove_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + char *fp, f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; + const int pipe = 124; /* ASCII code for '|' */ + const int len = strlen(fname); +- int i; ++ int i, code; + + /* Be sure the string copy will fit */ + if (len >= gp_file_name_sizeof) +@@ -694,8 +698,6 @@ gs_remove_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + /* Try to rewrite any %d (or similar) in the string */ + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (f[i] == pipe) { +- int code; +- + fp = &f[i + 1]; + /* Because we potentially have to check file permissions at two levels + for the output file (gx_device_open_output_file and the low level +@@ -704,6 +706,9 @@ gs_remove_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + the pipe_fopen(), the leading '|' has been stripped. + */ + code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); ++ if (code < 0) ++ return code; ++ code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); + if (code < 0) + return code; + break; +@@ -711,6 +716,9 @@ gs_remove_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + if (!IS_WHITESPACE(f[i])) + break; + } ++ code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, fp); ++ if (code < 0) ++ return code; + return gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, fp); + } + +-- +2.25.1 diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_2.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..beade79eef --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 9daf042fd7bb19e93388d89d9686a2fa4496f382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Liddell <chris.liddell@artifex.com> +Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 09:24:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Coverity 361429: move "break" to correct place. + +We had to add the outputfile to the "control" file permission list (as well +as write), but for the "pipe" case, I accidentally added the call after the +break out of loop that checks for a pipe. + +CVE: CVE-2021-3781 + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;f=base/gslibctx.c;h=9daf042fd7bb19e93388d89d9686a2fa4496f382 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- + base/gslibctx.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/base/gslibctx.c b/base/gslibctx.c +index ff8fc895e..63dfbe2e0 100644 +--- a/base/gslibctx.c ++++ b/base/gslibctx.c +@@ -668,10 +668,10 @@ gs_add_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); + if (code < 0) + return code; +- break; + code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); + if (code < 0) + return code; ++ break; + } + if (!IS_WHITESPACE(f[i])) + break; +-- +2.25.1 diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_3.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e3f9e81c45 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-3781_3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +From a9bd3dec9fde03327a4a2c69dad1036bf9632e20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Liddell <chris.liddell@artifex.com> +Date: Tue, 7 Sep 2021 20:36:12 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Bug 704342: Include device specifier strings in access + validation + +for the "%pipe%", %handle%" and %printer% io devices. + +We previously validated only the part after the "%pipe%" Postscript device +specifier, but this proved insufficient. + +This rebuilds the original file name string, and validates it complete. The +slight complication for "%pipe%" is it can be reached implicitly using +"|" so we have to check both prefixes. + +Addresses CVE-2021-3781 + +CVE: CVE-2021-3781 + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commitdiff;h=a9bd3dec9fde + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- + base/gdevpipe.c | 22 +++++++++++++++- + base/gp_mshdl.c | 11 +++++++- + base/gp_msprn.c | 10 ++++++- + base/gp_os2pr.c | 13 +++++++++- + base/gslibctx.c | 69 ++++++++++--------------------------------------- + 5 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/base/gdevpipe.c b/base/gdevpipe.c +index 96d71f5d8..5bdc485be 100644 +--- a/base/gdevpipe.c ++++ b/base/gdevpipe.c +@@ -72,8 +72,28 @@ pipe_fopen(gx_io_device * iodev, const char *fname, const char *access, + #else + gs_lib_ctx_t *ctx = mem->gs_lib_ctx; + gs_fs_list_t *fs = ctx->core->fs; ++ /* The pipe device can be reached in two ways, explicltly with %pipe% ++ or implicitly with "|", so we have to check for both ++ */ ++ char f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; ++ const char *pipestr = "|"; ++ const size_t pipestrlen = strlen(pipestr); ++ const size_t preflen = strlen(iodev->dname); ++ const size_t nlen = strlen(fname); ++ int code1; ++ ++ if (preflen + nlen >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess); ++ ++ memcpy(f, iodev->dname, preflen); ++ memcpy(f + preflen, fname, nlen + 1); ++ ++ code1 = gp_validate_path(mem, f, access); ++ ++ memcpy(f, pipestr, pipestrlen); ++ memcpy(f + pipestrlen, fname, nlen + 1); + +- if (gp_validate_path(mem, fname, access) != 0) ++ if (code1 != 0 && gp_validate_path(mem, f, access) != 0 ) + return gs_error_invalidfileaccess; + + /* +diff --git a/base/gp_mshdl.c b/base/gp_mshdl.c +index 2b964ed74..8d87ceadc 100644 +--- a/base/gp_mshdl.c ++++ b/base/gp_mshdl.c +@@ -95,8 +95,17 @@ mswin_handle_fopen(gx_io_device * iodev, const char *fname, const char *access, + long hfile; /* Correct for Win32, may be wrong for Win64 */ + gs_lib_ctx_t *ctx = mem->gs_lib_ctx; + gs_fs_list_t *fs = ctx->core->fs; ++ char f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; ++ const size_t preflen = strlen(iodev->dname); ++ const size_t nlen = strlen(fname); + +- if (gp_validate_path(mem, fname, access) != 0) ++ if (preflen + nlen >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess); ++ ++ memcpy(f, iodev->dname, preflen); ++ memcpy(f + preflen, fname, nlen + 1); ++ ++ if (gp_validate_path(mem, f, access) != 0) + return gs_error_invalidfileaccess; + + /* First we try the open_handle method. */ +diff --git a/base/gp_msprn.c b/base/gp_msprn.c +index ed4827968..746a974f7 100644 +--- a/base/gp_msprn.c ++++ b/base/gp_msprn.c +@@ -168,8 +168,16 @@ mswin_printer_fopen(gx_io_device * iodev, const char *fname, const char *access, + unsigned long *ptid = &((tid_t *)(iodev->state))->tid; + gs_lib_ctx_t *ctx = mem->gs_lib_ctx; + gs_fs_list_t *fs = ctx->core->fs; ++ const size_t preflen = strlen(iodev->dname); ++ const size_t nlen = strlen(fname); + +- if (gp_validate_path(mem, fname, access) != 0) ++ if (preflen + nlen >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess); ++ ++ memcpy(pname, iodev->dname, preflen); ++ memcpy(pname + preflen, fname, nlen + 1); ++ ++ if (gp_validate_path(mem, pname, access) != 0) + return gs_error_invalidfileaccess; + + /* First we try the open_printer method. */ +diff --git a/base/gp_os2pr.c b/base/gp_os2pr.c +index f852c71fc..ba54cde66 100644 +--- a/base/gp_os2pr.c ++++ b/base/gp_os2pr.c +@@ -107,9 +107,20 @@ os2_printer_fopen(gx_io_device * iodev, const char *fname, const char *access, + FILE ** pfile, char *rfname, uint rnamelen) + { + os2_printer_t *pr = (os2_printer_t *)iodev->state; +- char driver_name[256]; ++ char driver_name[gp_file_name_sizeof]; + gs_lib_ctx_t *ctx = mem->gs_lib_ctx; + gs_fs_list_t *fs = ctx->core->fs; ++ const size_t preflen = strlen(iodev->dname); ++ const int size_t = strlen(fname); ++ ++ if (preflen + nlen >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess); ++ ++ memcpy(driver_name, iodev->dname, preflen); ++ memcpy(driver_name + preflen, fname, nlen + 1); ++ ++ if (gp_validate_path(mem, driver_name, access) != 0) ++ return gs_error_invalidfileaccess; + + /* First we try the open_printer method. */ + /* Note that the loop condition here ensures we don't +diff --git a/base/gslibctx.c b/base/gslibctx.c +index 6dfed6cd5..318039fad 100644 +--- a/base/gslibctx.c ++++ b/base/gslibctx.c +@@ -655,82 +655,39 @@ rewrite_percent_specifiers(char *s) + int + gs_add_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + { +- char *fp, f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; +- const int pipe = 124; /* ASCII code for '|' */ +- const int len = strlen(fname); +- int i, code; ++ char f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; ++ int code; + + /* Be sure the string copy will fit */ +- if (len >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ if (strlen(fname) >= gp_file_name_sizeof) + return gs_error_rangecheck; + strcpy(f, fname); +- fp = f; + /* Try to rewrite any %d (or similar) in the string */ + rewrite_percent_specifiers(f); +- for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { +- if (f[i] == pipe) { +- fp = &f[i + 1]; +- /* Because we potentially have to check file permissions at two levels +- for the output file (gx_device_open_output_file and the low level +- fopen API, if we're using a pipe, we have to add both the full string, +- (including the '|', and just the command to which we pipe - since at +- the pipe_fopen(), the leading '|' has been stripped. +- */ +- code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); +- if (code < 0) +- return code; +- code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); +- if (code < 0) +- return code; +- break; +- } +- if (!IS_WHITESPACE(f[i])) +- break; +- } +- code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, fp); ++ ++ code = gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); + if (code < 0) + return code; +- return gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, fp); ++ return gs_add_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); + } + + int + gs_remove_outputfile_control_path(gs_memory_t *mem, const char *fname) + { +- char *fp, f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; +- const int pipe = 124; /* ASCII code for '|' */ +- const int len = strlen(fname); +- int i, code; ++ char f[gp_file_name_sizeof]; ++ int code; + + /* Be sure the string copy will fit */ +- if (len >= gp_file_name_sizeof) ++ if (strlen(fname) >= gp_file_name_sizeof) + return gs_error_rangecheck; + strcpy(f, fname); +- fp = f; + /* Try to rewrite any %d (or similar) in the string */ +- for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { +- if (f[i] == pipe) { +- fp = &f[i + 1]; +- /* Because we potentially have to check file permissions at two levels +- for the output file (gx_device_open_output_file and the low level +- fopen API, if we're using a pipe, we have to add both the full string, +- (including the '|', and just the command to which we pipe - since at +- the pipe_fopen(), the leading '|' has been stripped. +- */ +- code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); +- if (code < 0) +- return code; +- code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); +- if (code < 0) +- return code; +- break; +- } +- if (!IS_WHITESPACE(f[i])) +- break; +- } +- code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, fp); ++ rewrite_percent_specifiers(f); ++ ++ code = gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_control, f); + if (code < 0) + return code; +- return gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, fp); ++ return gs_remove_control_path(mem, gs_permit_file_writing, f); + } + + int +-- +2.25.1 diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-45949.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-45949.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f312f89e04 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2021-45949.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From 6643ff0cb837db3eade489ffff21e3e92eee2ae0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Liddell <chris.liddell@artifex.com> +Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 08:21:19 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] [PATCH] Bug 703902: Fix op stack management in + sampled_data_continue() + +Replace pop() (which does no checking, and doesn't handle stack extension +blocks) with ref_stack_pop() which does do all that. + +We still use pop() in one case (it's faster), but we have to later use +ref_stack_pop() before calling sampled_data_sample() which also accesses the +op stack. + +Fixes: +https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=34675 + +Upstream-Status: Backported [https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=2a3129365d3bc0d4a41f107ef175920d1505d1f7] +CVE: CVE-2021-45949 +Signed-off-by: Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com> +--- + psi/zfsample.c | 13 ++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/psi/zfsample.c b/psi/zfsample.c +index 0023fa4..f84671f 100644 +--- a/psi/zfsample.c ++++ b/psi/zfsample.c +@@ -534,14 +534,17 @@ sampled_data_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p) + data_ptr[bps * i + j] = (byte)(cv >> ((bps - 1 - j) * 8)); /* MSB first */ + } + pop(num_out); /* Move op to base of result values */ +- ++ /* From here on, we have to use ref_stack_pop() rather than pop() ++ so that it handles stack extension blocks properly, before calling ++ sampled_data_sample() which also uses the op stack. ++ */ + /* Check if we are done collecting data. */ + + if (increment_cube_indexes(params, penum->indexes)) { + if (stack_depth_adjust == 0) +- pop(O_STACK_PAD); /* Remove spare stack space */ ++ ref_stack_pop(&o_stack, O_STACK_PAD); /* Remove spare stack space */ + else +- pop(stack_depth_adjust - num_out); ++ ref_stack_pop(&o_stack, stack_depth_adjust - num_out); + /* Execute the closing procedure, if given */ + code = 0; + if (esp_finish_proc != 0) +@@ -554,11 +557,11 @@ sampled_data_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p) + if ((O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust) < 0) { + stack_depth_adjust = -(O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust); + check_op(stack_depth_adjust); +- pop(stack_depth_adjust); ++ ref_stack_pop(&o_stack, stack_depth_adjust); + } + else { + check_ostack(O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust); +- push(O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust); ++ ref_stack_push(&o_stack, O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust); + for (i=0;i<O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust;i++) + make_null(op - i); + } +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/check-stack-limits-after-function-evalution.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/check-stack-limits-after-function-evalution.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..722bab4ddb --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/check-stack-limits-after-function-evalution.patch @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From 7861fcad13c497728189feafb41cd57b5b50ea25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Liddell <chris.liddell@artifex.com> +Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 10:34:23 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] oss-fuzz 30715: Check stack limits after function evaluation. + +During function result sampling, after the callout to the Postscript +interpreter, make sure there is enough stack space available before pushing +or popping entries. + +In thise case, the Postscript procedure for the "function" is totally invalid +(as a function), and leaves the op stack in an unrecoverable state (as far as +function evaluation is concerned). We end up popping more entries off the +stack than are available. + +To cope, add in stack limit checking to throw an appropriate error when this +happens. + +Upstream-Status: Backported [https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=patch;h=7861fcad13c497728189feafb41cd57b5b50ea25] +Signed-off-by: Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com> +--- + psi/zfsample.c | 14 +++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/psi/zfsample.c b/psi/zfsample.c +index 290809405..652ae02c6 100644 +--- a/psi/zfsample.c ++++ b/psi/zfsample.c +@@ -551,9 +551,17 @@ sampled_data_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p) + } else { + if (stack_depth_adjust) { + stack_depth_adjust -= num_out; +- push(O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust); +- for (i=0;i<O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust;i++) +- make_null(op - i); ++ if ((O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust) < 0) { ++ stack_depth_adjust = -(O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust); ++ check_op(stack_depth_adjust); ++ pop(stack_depth_adjust); ++ } ++ else { ++ check_ostack(O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust); ++ push(O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust); ++ for (i=0;i<O_STACK_PAD - stack_depth_adjust;i++) ++ make_null(op - i); ++ } + } + } + +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb index 32346e6811..a829d4b4ae 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.52.bb @@ -33,12 +33,17 @@ SRC_URI_BASE = "https://github.com/ArtifexSoftware/ghostpdl-downloads/releases/d file://do-not-check-local-libpng-source.patch \ file://avoid-host-contamination.patch \ file://mkdir-p.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-15900.patch \ + file://check-stack-limits-after-function-evalution.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-45949.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3781_1.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3781_2.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-3781_3.patch \ " SRC_URI = "${SRC_URI_BASE} \ file://ghostscript-9.21-prevent_recompiling.patch \ file://cups-no-gcrypt.patch \ - file://CVE-2020-15900.patch \ " SRC_URI_class-native = "${SRC_URI_BASE} \ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-36976-1.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-36976-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fca53fc9b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-36976-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +From 05ebb55896d10a9737dad9ae0303f7f45489ba6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Grzegorz Antoniak <ga@anadoxin.org> +Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2021 09:08:13 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] RAR5 reader: fixed out of bounds read in some files + +Added more range checks in the bit stream reading functions +(read_bits_16 and read_bits_32) in order to better guard against out of +memory reads. + +This commit contains a test with OSSFuzz sample #30448. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libarchive/plain/debian/patches/CVE-2021-36976-1.patch?h=applied/3.4.3-2ubuntu0.1] +CVE: CVE-2021-36976 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> +--- + Makefile.am | 1 + + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar5.c | 108 ++++++++++-------- + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c | 16 +++ + ...r5_decode_number_out_of_bounds_read.rar.uu | 10 ++ + 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_decode_number_out_of_bounds_read.rar.uu + +--- a/Makefile.am ++++ b/Makefile.am +@@ -883,6 +883,7 @@ libarchive_test_EXTRA_DIST=\ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_arm_filter_on_window_boundary.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_different_winsize_on_merge.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_block_size_is_too_small.rar.uu \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_decode_number_out_of_bounds_read.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.bufr.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.data.gz.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.data.Z.uu \ +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar5.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar5.c +@@ -1012,7 +1012,16 @@ static int read_var_sized(struct archive + return ret; + } + +-static int read_bits_32(struct rar5* rar, const uint8_t* p, uint32_t* value) { ++static int read_bits_32(struct archive_read* a, struct rar5* rar, ++ const uint8_t* p, uint32_t* value) ++{ ++ if(rar->bits.in_addr >= rar->cstate.cur_block_size) { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ++ ARCHIVE_ERRNO_PROGRAMMER, ++ "Premature end of stream during extraction of data (#1)"); ++ return ARCHIVE_FATAL; ++ } ++ + uint32_t bits = ((uint32_t) p[rar->bits.in_addr]) << 24; + bits |= p[rar->bits.in_addr + 1] << 16; + bits |= p[rar->bits.in_addr + 2] << 8; +@@ -1023,7 +1032,16 @@ static int read_bits_32(struct rar5* rar + return ARCHIVE_OK; + } + +-static int read_bits_16(struct rar5* rar, const uint8_t* p, uint16_t* value) { ++static int read_bits_16(struct archive_read* a, struct rar5* rar, ++ const uint8_t* p, uint16_t* value) ++{ ++ if(rar->bits.in_addr >= rar->cstate.cur_block_size) { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ++ ARCHIVE_ERRNO_PROGRAMMER, ++ "Premature end of stream during extraction of data (#2)"); ++ return ARCHIVE_FATAL; ++ } ++ + int bits = (int) ((uint32_t) p[rar->bits.in_addr]) << 16; + bits |= (int) p[rar->bits.in_addr + 1] << 8; + bits |= (int) p[rar->bits.in_addr + 2]; +@@ -1039,8 +1057,8 @@ static void skip_bits(struct rar5* rar, + } + + /* n = up to 16 */ +-static int read_consume_bits(struct rar5* rar, const uint8_t* p, int n, +- int* value) ++static int read_consume_bits(struct archive_read* a, struct rar5* rar, ++ const uint8_t* p, int n, int* value) + { + uint16_t v; + int ret, num; +@@ -1051,7 +1069,7 @@ static int read_consume_bits(struct rar5 + return ARCHIVE_FATAL; + } + +- ret = read_bits_16(rar, p, &v); ++ ret = read_bits_16(a, rar, p, &v); + if(ret != ARCHIVE_OK) + return ret; + +@@ -2425,13 +2443,13 @@ static int create_decode_tables(uint8_t* + static int decode_number(struct archive_read* a, struct decode_table* table, + const uint8_t* p, uint16_t* num) + { +- int i, bits, dist; ++ int i, bits, dist, ret; + uint16_t bitfield; + uint32_t pos; + struct rar5* rar = get_context(a); + +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_bits_16(rar, p, &bitfield)) { +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = read_bits_16(a, rar, p, &bitfield))) { ++ return ret; + } + + bitfield &= 0xfffe; +@@ -2537,14 +2555,6 @@ static int parse_tables(struct archive_r + for(i = 0; i < HUFF_TABLE_SIZE;) { + uint16_t num; + +- if((rar->bits.in_addr + 6) >= rar->cstate.cur_block_size) { +- /* Truncated data, can't continue. */ +- archive_set_error(&a->archive, +- ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, +- "Truncated data in huffman tables (#2)"); +- return ARCHIVE_FATAL; +- } +- + ret = decode_number(a, &rar->cstate.bd, p, &num); + if(ret != ARCHIVE_OK) { + archive_set_error(&a->archive, +@@ -2561,8 +2571,8 @@ static int parse_tables(struct archive_r + /* 16..17: repeat previous code */ + uint16_t n; + +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_bits_16(rar, p, &n)) +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = read_bits_16(a, rar, p, &n))) ++ return ret; + + if(num == 16) { + n >>= 13; +@@ -2590,8 +2600,8 @@ static int parse_tables(struct archive_r + /* other codes: fill with zeroes `n` times */ + uint16_t n; + +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_bits_16(rar, p, &n)) +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = read_bits_16(a, rar, p, &n))) ++ return ret; + + if(num == 18) { + n >>= 13; +@@ -2707,22 +2717,22 @@ static int parse_block_header(struct arc + } + + /* Convenience function used during filter processing. */ +-static int parse_filter_data(struct rar5* rar, const uint8_t* p, +- uint32_t* filter_data) ++static int parse_filter_data(struct archive_read* a, struct rar5* rar, ++ const uint8_t* p, uint32_t* filter_data) + { +- int i, bytes; ++ int i, bytes, ret; + uint32_t data = 0; + +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_consume_bits(rar, p, 2, &bytes)) +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = read_consume_bits(a, rar, p, 2, &bytes))) ++ return ret; + + bytes++; + + for(i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { + uint16_t byte; + +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_bits_16(rar, p, &byte)) { +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = read_bits_16(a, rar, p, &byte))) { ++ return ret; + } + + /* Cast to uint32_t will ensure the shift operation will not +@@ -2765,16 +2775,17 @@ static int parse_filter(struct archive_r + uint16_t filter_type; + struct filter_info* filt = NULL; + struct rar5* rar = get_context(ar); ++ int ret; + + /* Read the parameters from the input stream. */ +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != parse_filter_data(rar, p, &block_start)) +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = parse_filter_data(ar, rar, p, &block_start))) ++ return ret; + +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != parse_filter_data(rar, p, &block_length)) +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = parse_filter_data(ar, rar, p, &block_length))) ++ return ret; + +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_bits_16(rar, p, &filter_type)) +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = read_bits_16(ar, rar, p, &filter_type))) ++ return ret; + + filter_type >>= 13; + skip_bits(rar, 3); +@@ -2814,8 +2825,8 @@ static int parse_filter(struct archive_r + if(filter_type == FILTER_DELTA) { + int channels; + +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_consume_bits(rar, p, 5, &channels)) +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = read_consume_bits(ar, rar, p, 5, &channels))) ++ return ret; + + filt->channels = channels + 1; + } +@@ -2823,10 +2834,11 @@ static int parse_filter(struct archive_r + return ARCHIVE_OK; + } + +-static int decode_code_length(struct rar5* rar, const uint8_t* p, +- uint16_t code) ++static int decode_code_length(struct archive_read* a, struct rar5* rar, ++ const uint8_t* p, uint16_t code) + { + int lbits, length = 2; ++ + if(code < 8) { + lbits = 0; + length += code; +@@ -2838,7 +2850,7 @@ static int decode_code_length(struct rar + if(lbits > 0) { + int add; + +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_consume_bits(rar, p, lbits, &add)) ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_consume_bits(a, rar, p, lbits, &add)) + return -1; + + length += add; +@@ -2933,7 +2945,7 @@ static int do_uncompress_block(struct ar + continue; + } else if(num >= 262) { + uint16_t dist_slot; +- int len = decode_code_length(rar, p, num - 262), ++ int len = decode_code_length(a, rar, p, num - 262), + dbits, + dist = 1; + +@@ -2975,12 +2987,12 @@ static int do_uncompress_block(struct ar + uint16_t low_dist; + + if(dbits > 4) { +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_bits_32( +- rar, p, &add)) { ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = read_bits_32( ++ a, rar, p, &add))) { + /* Return EOF if we + * can't read more + * data. */ +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ return ret; + } + + skip_bits(rar, dbits - 4); +@@ -3015,11 +3027,11 @@ static int do_uncompress_block(struct ar + /* dbits is one of [0,1,2,3] */ + int add; + +- if(ARCHIVE_OK != read_consume_bits(rar, +- p, dbits, &add)) { ++ if(ARCHIVE_OK != (ret = read_consume_bits(a, rar, ++ p, dbits, &add))) { + /* Return EOF if we can't read + * more data. */ +- return ARCHIVE_EOF; ++ return ret; + } + + dist += add; +@@ -3076,7 +3088,11 @@ static int do_uncompress_block(struct ar + return ARCHIVE_FATAL; + } + +- len = decode_code_length(rar, p, len_slot); ++ len = decode_code_length(a, rar, p, len_slot); ++ if (len == -1) { ++ return ARCHIVE_FATAL; ++ } ++ + rar->cstate.last_len = len; + + if(ARCHIVE_OK != copy_string(a, len, dist)) +--- a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c +@@ -1271,3 +1271,20 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar5_block_ + + EPILOGUE(); + } ++ ++DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar5_decode_number_out_of_bounds_read) ++{ ++ /* oss fuzz 30448 */ ++ ++ char buf[4096]; ++ PROLOGUE("test_read_format_rar5_decode_number_out_of_bounds_read.rar"); ++ ++ /* Return codes of those calls are ignored, because this sample file ++ * is invalid. However, the unpacker shouldn't produce any SIGSEGV ++ * errors during processing. */ ++ ++ (void) archive_read_next_header(a, &ae); ++ while(0 < archive_read_data(a, buf, sizeof(buf))) {} ++ ++ EPILOGUE(); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_decode_number_out_of_bounds_read.rar.uu +@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ ++begin 644 test_read_format_rar5_decode_number_out_of_bounds_read.rar ++M4F%R(1H'`0!3@"KT`P+G(@(0("`@@`L!!"`@("`@(($D_[BJ2"!::7!)210V ++M+0#ZF#)Q!`+>YPW_("`@("``_R````````````````````````````!__P`` ++M``````!T72`@/EW_(/\@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@(/\@("`@ ++M("`@("#_("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("#_("`@("`@("`@_R`@ ++M("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@_R`@("`@("`@(/\@("`@("`@("`@ ++M("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@(/\@("`@("`@("#_("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@ ++E("`@("`@("#_("`@("`@("`@_R`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@(``` ++` ++end diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-36976-2.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-36976-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b5da44ec7b --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-36976-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From 17f4e83c0f0fc3bacf4b2bbacb01f987bb5aff5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Grzegorz Antoniak <ga@anadoxin.org> +Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 20:18:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] RAR5 reader: fix invalid memory access in some files + +RAR5 reader uses several variables to manage the window buffer during +extraction: the buffer itself (`window_buf`), the current size of the +window buffer (`window_size`), and a helper variable (`window_mask`) +that is used to constrain read and write offsets to the window buffer. + +Some specially crafted files can force the unpacker to update the +`window_mask` variable to a value that is out of sync with current +buffer size. If the `window_mask` will be bigger than the actual buffer +size, then an invalid access operation can happen (SIGSEGV). + +This commit ensures that if the `window_size` and `window_mask` will be +changed, the window buffer will be reallocated to the proper size, so no +invalid memory operation should be possible. + +This commit contains a test file from OSSFuzz #30442. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libarchive/plain/debian/patches/CVE-2021-36976-2.patch?h=applied/3.4.3-2ubuntu0.1] +CVE: CVE-2021-36976 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> + +--- + Makefile.am | 1 + + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar5.c | 27 ++++++++++++++----- + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c | 17 ++++++++++++ + ...mat_rar5_window_buf_and_size_desync.rar.uu | 11 ++++++++ + 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_window_buf_and_size_desync.rar.uu + +--- a/Makefile.am ++++ b/Makefile.am +@@ -884,6 +884,7 @@ libarchive_test_EXTRA_DIST=\ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_different_winsize_on_merge.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_block_size_is_too_small.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_decode_number_out_of_bounds_read.rar.uu \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_window_buf_and_size_desync.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.bufr.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.data.gz.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.data.Z.uu \ +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar5.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar5.c +@@ -1730,14 +1730,29 @@ static int process_head_file(struct arch + } + } + +- /* If we're currently switching volumes, ignore the new definition of +- * window_size. */ +- if(rar->cstate.switch_multivolume == 0) { +- /* Values up to 64M should fit into ssize_t on every +- * architecture. */ +- rar->cstate.window_size = (ssize_t) window_size; ++ if(rar->cstate.window_size < (ssize_t) window_size && ++ rar->cstate.window_buf) ++ { ++ /* If window_buf has been allocated before, reallocate it, so ++ * that its size will match new window_size. */ ++ ++ uint8_t* new_window_buf = ++ realloc(rar->cstate.window_buf, window_size); ++ ++ if(!new_window_buf) { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_PROGRAMMER, ++ "Not enough memory when trying to realloc the window " ++ "buffer."); ++ return ARCHIVE_FATAL; ++ } ++ ++ rar->cstate.window_buf = new_window_buf; + } + ++ /* Values up to 64M should fit into ssize_t on every ++ * architecture. */ ++ rar->cstate.window_size = (ssize_t) window_size; ++ + if(rar->file.solid > 0 && rar->file.solid_window_size == 0) { + /* Solid files have to have the same window_size across + whole archive. Remember the window_size parameter +--- a/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c +@@ -1206,6 +1206,23 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar5_differ + EPILOGUE(); + } + ++DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar5_window_buf_and_size_desync) ++{ ++ /* oss fuzz 30442 */ ++ ++ char buf[4096]; ++ PROLOGUE("test_read_format_rar5_window_buf_and_size_desync.rar"); ++ ++ /* Return codes of those calls are ignored, because this sample file ++ * is invalid. However, the unpacker shouldn't produce any SIGSEGV ++ * errors during processing. */ ++ ++ (void) archive_read_next_header(a, &ae); ++ while(0 < archive_read_data(a, buf, 46)) {} ++ ++ EPILOGUE(); ++} ++ + DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar5_arm_filter_on_window_boundary) + { + char buf[4096]; +--- /dev/null ++++ b/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_window_buf_and_size_desync.rar.uu +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++begin 644 test_read_format_rar5_window_buf_and_size_desync.rar ++M4F%R(1H'`0`]/-[E`@$`_P$`1#[Z5P("`PL``BXB"?\`!(@B@0`)6.-AF?_1 ++M^0DI&0GG(F%R(0<:)`!3@"KT`P+G(@O_X[\``#&``(?!!0$$[:L``$.M*E)A ++M<B$`O<\>P0";/P1%``A*2DI*2DYQ<6TN9'%*2DI*2DI*``!D<F--``````"Z ++MNC*ZNKJZNFYO=&%I;+JZNKJZNKJZOKJZ.KJZNKJZNKKZU@4%````0$!`0$!` ++M0$!`0$!`0$!`0$#_________/T#`0$!`0$!`-UM`0$!`0$!`0$!`0$!`0$!` ++M0$!`0'!,J+:O!IZ-WN4'@`!3*F0````````````````````````````````` ++M``````````````#T`P)287(A&@<!`%.`*O0#`N<B`_,F@`'[__\``(`4`01S ++J'`/H/O\H@?\D`#O9GIZ>GN<B"_]%``(``&1RGIZ>GIZ>8_^>GE/_``!. ++` ++end diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-36976-3.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-36976-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e1549f229 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2021-36976-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From 313bcd7ac547f7cc25945831f63507420c0874d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Grzegorz Antoniak <ga@anadoxin.org> +Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2021 10:13:22 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] RAR5 reader: add more checks for invalid extraction + parameters + +Some specially crafted files declare invalid extraction parameters that +can confuse the RAR5 reader. + +One of the arguments is the declared window size parameter that the +archive file can declare for each file stored in the archive. Some +crafted files declare window size equal to 0, which is clearly wrong. + +This commit adds additional safety checks decreasing the tolerance of +the RAR5 format. + +This commit also contains OSSFuzz sample #30459. +--- + Makefile.am | 1 + + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar5.c | 10 ++++++++++ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ + ...t_rar5_bad_window_sz_in_mltarc_file.rar.uu | 7 +++++++ + 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_bad_window_sz_in_mltarc_file.rar.uu + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/1493/commits/313bcd7ac547f7cc25945831f63507420c0874d7] +CVE: CVE-2021-36976 +Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com> + +--- libarchive-3.4.2.orig/Makefile.am ++++ libarchive-3.4.2/Makefile.am +@@ -882,6 +882,7 @@ libarchive_test_EXTRA_DIST=\ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_block_size_is_too_small.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_decode_number_out_of_bounds_read.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_window_buf_and_size_desync.rar.uu \ ++ libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_bad_window_sz_in_mltarc_file.rar.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.bufr.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.data.gz.uu \ + libarchive/test/test_read_format_raw.data.Z.uu \ +--- libarchive-3.4.2.orig/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar5.c ++++ libarchive-3.4.2/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar5.c +@@ -3637,6 +3637,16 @@ static int do_uncompress_file(struct arc + rar->cstate.initialized = 1; + } + ++ /* Don't allow extraction if window_size is invalid. */ ++ if(rar->cstate.window_size == 0) { ++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ++ ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, ++ "Invalid window size declaration in this file"); ++ ++ /* This should never happen in valid files. */ ++ return ARCHIVE_FATAL; ++ } ++ + if(rar->cstate.all_filters_applied == 1) { + /* We use while(1) here, but standard case allows for just 1 + * iteration. The loop will iterate if process_block() didn't +--- libarchive-3.4.2.orig/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c ++++ libarchive-3.4.2/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5.c +@@ -1305,3 +1305,22 @@ DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar5_decode + + EPILOGUE(); + } ++ ++DEFINE_TEST(test_read_format_rar5_bad_window_size_in_multiarchive_file) ++{ ++ /* oss fuzz 30459 */ ++ ++ char buf[4096]; ++ PROLOGUE("test_read_format_rar5_bad_window_sz_in_mltarc_file.rar"); ++ ++ /* This file is damaged, so those functions should return failure. ++ * Additionally, SIGSEGV shouldn't be raised during execution ++ * of those functions. */ ++ ++ (void) archive_read_next_header(a, &ae); ++ while(0 < archive_read_data(a, buf, sizeof(buf))) {} ++ (void) archive_read_next_header(a, &ae); ++ while(0 < archive_read_data(a, buf, sizeof(buf))) {} ++ ++ EPILOGUE(); ++} +--- /dev/null ++++ libarchive-3.4.2/libarchive/test/test_read_format_rar5_bad_window_sz_in_mltarc_file.rar.uu +@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ ++begin 644 test_read_format_rar5_bad_window_size_in_multiarchive_file.rar ++M4F%R(1H'`0`]/-[E`@$`_R`@1#[Z5P("`PL`("`@@"(`"?\@("#___\@("`@ ++M("`@("`@("`@4X`J]`,"YR(#$($@("`@``$@("`@@<L0("`@("`@("`@("`@ ++M("`@(""LCTJA`P$%`B`@`2!3@"KT`P+G(@,@("`@_P,!!B`@(/___R`@(('+ ++5$"`OX2`@[.SL[.S_("`@("`@("`@ ++` ++end diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.4.2.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.4.2.bb index 0ab40fc096..b7426a1be8 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.4.2.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.4.2.bb @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[mbedtls] = "--with-mbedtls,--without-mbedtls,mbedtls," EXTRA_OECONF += "--enable-largefile" -SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz" +SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ + file://CVE-2021-36976-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-36976-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-36976-3.patch \ +" SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d953ed6b47694dadf0e6042f8f9ff451" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b60d58d12632ecf1e8fad7316dc82c6b9738a35625746b47ecdcaf4aed176176" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/files/CVE-2021-3200.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/files/CVE-2021-3200.patch index cc8f53cefd..fa577fd533 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/files/CVE-2021-3200.patch +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/files/CVE-2021-3200.patch @@ -17,9 +17,19 @@ CVE: CVE-2021-33928 CVE: CVE-2021-33929 CVE: CVE-2021-33930 CVE: CVE-2021-33938 +CVE: CVE-2021-44568 +CVE: CVE-2021-44569 +CVE: CVE-2021-44570 +CVE: CVE-2021-44571 +CVE: CVE-2021-44573 +CVE: CVE-2021-44574 +CVE: CVE-2021-44575 +CVE: CVE-2021-44576 +CVE: CVE-2021-44577 Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com> Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com> +Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com> --- ext/testcase.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lighttpd/lighttpd/0001-mod_extforward-fix-out-of-bounds-OOB-write-fixes-313.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lighttpd/lighttpd/0001-mod_extforward-fix-out-of-bounds-OOB-write-fixes-313.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..da59b7297a --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lighttpd/lighttpd/0001-mod_extforward-fix-out-of-bounds-OOB-write-fixes-313.patch @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +From 27103f3f8b1a2857aa45b889e775435f7daf141f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: povcfe <povcfe@qq.com> +Date: Wed, 5 Jan 2022 11:11:09 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] [mod_extforward] fix out-of-bounds (OOB) write (fixes #3134) + +(thx povcfe) + +(edited: gstrauss) + +There is a potential remote denial of service in lighttpd mod_extforward +under specific, non-default and uncommon 32-bit lighttpd mod_extforward +configurations. + +Under specific, non-default and uncommon lighttpd mod_extforward +configurations, a remote attacker can trigger a 4-byte out-of-bounds +write of value '-1' to the stack. This is not believed to be exploitable +in any way beyond triggering a crash of the lighttpd server on systems +where the lighttpd server has been built 32-bit and with compiler flags +which enable a stack canary -- gcc/clang -fstack-protector-strong or +-fstack-protector-all, but bug not visible with only -fstack-protector. + +With standard lighttpd builds using -O2 optimization on 64-bit x86_64, +this bug has not been observed to cause adverse behavior, even with +gcc/clang -fstack-protector-strong. + +For the bug to be reachable, the user must be using a non-default +lighttpd configuration which enables mod_extforward and configures +mod_extforward to accept and parse the "Forwarded" header from a trusted +proxy. At this time, support for RFC7239 Forwarded is not common in CDN +providers or popular web server reverse proxies. It bears repeating that +for the user to desire to configure lighttpd mod_extforward to accept +"Forwarded", the user must also be using a trusted proxy (in front of +lighttpd) which understands and actively modifies the "Forwarded" header +sent to lighttpd. + +lighttpd natively supports RFC7239 "Forwarded" +hiawatha natively supports RFC7239 "Forwarded" + +nginx can be manually configured to add a "Forwarded" header +https://www.nginx.com/resources/wiki/start/topics/examples/forwarded/ + +A 64-bit build of lighttpd on x86_64 (not known to be affected by bug) +in front of another 32-bit lighttpd will detect and reject a malicious +"Forwarded" request header, thereby thwarting an attempt to trigger +this bug in an upstream 32-bit lighttpd. + +The following servers currently do not natively support RFC7239 Forwarded: +nginx +apache2 +caddy +node.js +haproxy +squid +varnish-cache +litespeed + +Given the general dearth of support for RFC7239 Forwarded in popular +CDNs and web server reverse proxies, and given the prerequisites in +lighttpd mod_extforward needed to reach this bug, the number of lighttpd +servers vulnerable to this bug is estimated to be vanishingly small. +Large systems using reverse proxies are likely running 64-bit lighttpd, +which is not known to be adversely affected by this bug. + +In the future, it is desirable for more servers to implement RFC7239 +Forwarded. lighttpd developers would like to thank povcfe for reporting +this bug so that it can be fixed before more CDNs and web servers +implement RFC7239 Forwarded. + +x-ref: + "mod_extforward plugin has out-of-bounds (OOB) write of 4-byte -1" + https://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/3134 + (not yet written or published) + CVE-2022-22707 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2022-22707 +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> + +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <purushottam.choudhary@kpit.com> +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <purushottamchoudhary29@gmail.com> +--- + src/mod_extforward.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/mod_extforward.c b/src/mod_extforward.c +index ba957e04..fdaef7f6 100644 +--- a/src/mod_extforward.c ++++ b/src/mod_extforward.c +@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ static handler_t mod_extforward_Forwarded (request_st * const r, plugin_data * c + while (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t') ++i; + if (s[i] == ';') { ++i; continue; } + if (s[i] == ',') { +- if (j >= (int)(sizeof(offsets)/sizeof(int))) break; ++ if (j >= (int)(sizeof(offsets)/sizeof(int))-1) break; + offsets[++j] = -1; /*("offset" separating params from next proxy)*/ + ++i; + continue; +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lighttpd/lighttpd_1.4.55.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lighttpd/lighttpd_1.4.55.bb index 737d6ebf7c..357a269015 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lighttpd/lighttpd_1.4.55.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lighttpd/lighttpd_1.4.55.bb @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ RRECOMMENDS_${PN} = "lighttpd-module-access \ lighttpd-module-accesslog" SRC_URI = "http://download.lighttpd.net/lighttpd/releases-1.4.x/lighttpd-${PV}.tar.xz \ + file://0001-mod_extforward-fix-out-of-bounds-OOB-write-fixes-313.patch \ file://index.html.lighttpd \ file://lighttpd.conf \ file://lighttpd \ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lsof/lsof_4.91.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lsof/lsof_4.91.bb index b3adfd57af..7c85bf23fc 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lsof/lsof_4.91.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/lsof/lsof_4.91.bb @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ DESCRIPTION = "Lsof is a Unix-specific diagnostic tool. \ Its name stands for LiSt Open Files, and it does just that." HOMEPAGE = "http://people.freebsd.org/~abe/" SECTION = "devel" -LICENSE = "BSD" +LICENSE = "Spencer-94" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://00README;beginline=645;endline=679;md5=964df275d26429ba3b39dbb9f205172a" # Upstream lsof releases are hosted on an ftp server which times out download diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow-sysroot_4.6.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow-sysroot_4.6.bb index 5f7ea00bf1..4e68f826c6 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow-sysroot_4.6.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow-sysroot_4.6.bb @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ SUMMARY = "Shadow utils requirements for useradd.bbclass" HOMEPAGE = "http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow" BUGTRACKER = "http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues" SECTION = "base utils" -LICENSE = "BSD | Artistic-1.0" +LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause | Artistic-1.0" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://login.defs_shadow-sysroot;md5=25e2f2de4dfc8f966ac5cdfce45cd7d5" DEPENDS = "base-passwd" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc index 7061dc7505..bfe50c18f6 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow" DESCRIPTION = "${SUMMARY}" BUGTRACKER = "http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues" SECTION = "base/utils" -LICENSE = "BSD | Artistic-1.0" +LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause | Artistic-1.0" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=ed80ff1c2b40843cf5768e5229cf16e5 \ file://src/passwd.c;beginline=2;endline=30;md5=5720ff729a6ff39ecc9f64555d75f4af" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc index e9eb249afe..cdd1a2ac3c 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc @@ -3,10 +3,10 @@ DESCRIPTION = "The Time Zone Database contains code and data that represent \ the history of local time for many representative locations around the globe." HOMEPAGE = "http://www.iana.org/time-zones" SECTION = "base" -LICENSE = "PD & BSD & BSD-3-Clause" +LICENSE = "PD & BSD-3-Clause" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=c679c9d6b02bc2757b3eaf8f53c43fba" -PV = "2021e" +PV = "2022a" SRC_URI =" http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzcode${PV}.tar.gz;name=tzcode \ http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzdata${PV}.tar.gz;name=tzdata \ @@ -14,6 +14,6 @@ SRC_URI =" http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzcode${PV}.tar.gz UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://www.iana.org/time-zones" -SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "584666393a5424d13d27ec01183da17703273664742e049d4f62f62dab631775" -SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "07ec42b737d0d3c6be9c337f8abb5f00554a0f9cc4fcf01a703d69403b6bb2b1" +SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "f8575e7e33be9ee265df2081092526b81c80abac3f4a04399ae9d4d91cdadac7" +SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "ef7fffd9f4f50f4f58328b35022a32a5a056b245c5cb3d6791dddb342f871664" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/freetype/freetype/0001-sfnt-Fix-heap-buffer-overflow-59308.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/freetype/freetype/0001-sfnt-Fix-heap-buffer-overflow-59308.patch index fa8a29b798..31f9e32dc2 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/freetype/freetype/0001-sfnt-Fix-heap-buffer-overflow-59308.patch +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/freetype/freetype/0001-sfnt-Fix-heap-buffer-overflow-59308.patch @@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ Subject: [PATCH] [sfnt] Fix heap buffer overflow (#59308). This is CVE-2020-15999. * src/sfnt/pngshim.c (Load_SBit_Png): Test bitmap size earlier. +CVE: CVE-2020-15999 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=a3bab162b2ae616074c8877a04556932998aeacd] Signed-off-by: Diego Santa Cruz <Diego.SantaCruz@spinetix.com> +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <purushottam.choudhary@kpit.com> +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <purushottamchoudhary29@gmail.com> --- src/sfnt/pngshim.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/virglrenderer/virglrenderer_0.8.2.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/virglrenderer/virglrenderer_0.8.2.bb index 772db5bbaf..31c45ef89c 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/virglrenderer/virglrenderer_0.8.2.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/virglrenderer/virglrenderer_0.8.2.bb @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=c81c08eeefd9418fca8f88309a76db10" DEPENDS = "libdrm mesa libepoxy" SRCREV = "7d204f3927be65fb3365dce01dbcd04d447a4985" -SRC_URI = "git://anongit.freedesktop.org/virglrenderer;branch=master \ +SRC_URI = "git://anongit.freedesktop.org/git/virglrenderer;branch=master \ file://0001-gallium-Expand-libc-check-to-be-platform-OS-check.patch \ file://0001-meson.build-use-python3-directly-for-python.patch \ " diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg.inc index c891211c40..ce57982a7d 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg.inc @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ PE = "2" INC_PR = "r8" XORG_PN = "xorg-server" -SRC_URI = "${XORG_MIRROR}/individual/xserver/${XORG_PN}-${PV}.tar.bz2" +SRC_URI = "${XORG_MIRROR}/individual/xserver/${XORG_PN}-${PV}.tar.gz" CVE_PRODUCT = "xorg-server x_server" # This is specific to Debian's xserver-wrapper.c diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14345.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14345.patch deleted file mode 100644 index fb3a37c474..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14345.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,182 +0,0 @@ -From f7cd1276bbd4fe3a9700096dec33b52b8440788d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> -Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:46:32 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Correct bounds checking in XkbSetNames() - -CVE-2020-14345 / ZDI 11428 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -CVE: CVE-2020-14345 -Affects < 1.20.9 - -Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> - ---- - xkb/xkb.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+) - -Index: xorg-server-1.20.8/xkb/xkb.c -=================================================================== ---- xorg-server-1.20.8.orig/xkb/xkb.c -+++ xorg-server-1.20.8/xkb/xkb.c -@@ -152,6 +152,19 @@ static RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT; - #define CHK_REQ_KEY_RANGE(err,first,num,r) \ - CHK_REQ_KEY_RANGE2(err,first,num,r,client->errorValue,BadValue) - -+static Bool -+_XkbCheckRequestBounds(ClientPtr client, void *stuff, void *from, void *to) { -+ char *cstuff = (char *)stuff; -+ char *cfrom = (char *)from; -+ char *cto = (char *)to; -+ -+ return cfrom < cto && -+ cfrom >= cstuff && -+ cfrom < cstuff + ((size_t)client->req_len << 2) && -+ cto >= cstuff && -+ cto <= cstuff + ((size_t)client->req_len << 2); -+} -+ - /***====================================================================***/ - - int -@@ -4045,6 +4058,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi - client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(0x04, stuff->firstType); - return BadAccess; - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + stuff->nTypes)) -+ return BadLength; - old = tmp; - tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, stuff->nTypes, client->swapped, &bad); - if (!tmp) { -@@ -4074,6 +4089,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi - } - width = (CARD8 *) tmp; - tmp = (CARD32 *) (((char *) tmp) + XkbPaddedSize(stuff->nKTLevels)); -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, width, tmp)) -+ return BadLength; - type = &xkb->map->types[stuff->firstKTLevel]; - for (i = 0; i < stuff->nKTLevels; i++, type++) { - if (width[i] == 0) -@@ -4083,6 +4100,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi - type->num_levels, width[i]); - return BadMatch; - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + width[i])) -+ return BadLength; - tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, width[i], client->swapped, &bad); - if (!tmp) { - client->errorValue = bad; -@@ -4095,6 +4114,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi - client->errorValue = 0x08; - return BadMatch; - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, -+ tmp + Ones(stuff->indicators))) -+ return BadLength; - tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumIndicators, stuff->indicators, - client->swapped, &bad); - if (!tmp) { -@@ -4107,6 +4129,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi - client->errorValue = 0x09; - return BadMatch; - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, -+ tmp + Ones(stuff->virtualMods))) -+ return BadLength; - tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumVirtualMods, - (CARD32) stuff->virtualMods, - client->swapped, &bad); -@@ -4120,6 +4145,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi - client->errorValue = 0x0a; - return BadMatch; - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, -+ tmp + Ones(stuff->groupNames))) -+ return BadLength; - tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumKbdGroups, - (CARD32) stuff->groupNames, - client->swapped, &bad); -@@ -4141,9 +4169,14 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi - stuff->nKeys); - return BadValue; - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + stuff->nKeys)) -+ return BadLength; - tmp += stuff->nKeys; - } - if ((stuff->which & XkbKeyAliasesMask) && (stuff->nKeyAliases > 0)) { -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, -+ tmp + (stuff->nKeyAliases * 2))) -+ return BadLength; - tmp += stuff->nKeyAliases * 2; - } - if (stuff->which & XkbRGNamesMask) { -@@ -4151,6 +4184,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi - client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(0x0d, stuff->nRadioGroups); - return BadValue; - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, -+ tmp + stuff->nRadioGroups)) -+ return BadLength; - tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, stuff->nRadioGroups, client->swapped, &bad); - if (!tmp) { - client->errorValue = bad; -@@ -4344,6 +4380,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client) - /* check device-independent stuff */ - tmp = (CARD32 *) &stuff[1]; - -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1)) -+ return BadLength; - if (stuff->which & XkbKeycodesNameMask) { - tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad); - if (!tmp) { -@@ -4351,6 +4389,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client) - return BadAtom; - } - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1)) -+ return BadLength; - if (stuff->which & XkbGeometryNameMask) { - tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad); - if (!tmp) { -@@ -4358,6 +4398,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client) - return BadAtom; - } - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1)) -+ return BadLength; - if (stuff->which & XkbSymbolsNameMask) { - tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad); - if (!tmp) { -@@ -4365,6 +4407,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client) - return BadAtom; - } - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1)) -+ return BadLength; - if (stuff->which & XkbPhysSymbolsNameMask) { - tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad); - if (!tmp) { -@@ -4372,6 +4416,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client) - return BadAtom; - } - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1)) -+ return BadLength; - if (stuff->which & XkbTypesNameMask) { - tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad); - if (!tmp) { -@@ -4379,6 +4425,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client) - return BadAtom; - } - } -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1)) -+ return BadLength; - if (stuff->which & XkbCompatNameMask) { - tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad); - if (!tmp) { diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14346.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14346.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4994a21d33..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14346.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -From c940cc8b6c0a2983c1ec974f1b3f019795dd4cff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> -Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:49:04 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix XIChangeHierarchy() integer underflow - -CVE-2020-14346 / ZDI-CAN-11429 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -[https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/c940cc8b6c0a2983c1ec974f1b3f019795dd4cff] -CVE: CVE-2020-14346 -Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com> ---- - Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c -index cbdd91258..504defe56 100644 ---- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c -+++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c -@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client) - if (!stuff->num_changes) - return rc; - -- len = ((size_t)stuff->length << 2) - sizeof(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); -+ len = ((size_t)client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xXIChangeHierarchyReq); - - any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) &stuff[1]; - while (stuff->num_changes--) { --- -2.17.1 - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14347.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14347.patch deleted file mode 100644 index cf3f5f9417..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14347.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -From aac28e162e5108510065ad4c323affd6deffd816 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> -Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 19:33:50 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] fix for ZDI-11426 - -Avoid leaking un-initalized memory to clients by zeroing the -whole pixmap on initial allocation. - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> -Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com> - - -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/aac28e162e5108510065ad4c323affd6deffd816] -CVE: CVE-2020-14347 -Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com> ---- - dix/pixmap.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/dix/pixmap.c b/dix/pixmap.c -index 1186d7dbbf..5a0146bbb6 100644 ---- a/dix/pixmap.c -+++ b/dix/pixmap.c -@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ AllocatePixmap(ScreenPtr pScreen, int pixDataSize) - if (pScreen->totalPixmapSize > ((size_t) - 1) - pixDataSize) - return NullPixmap; - -- pPixmap = malloc(pScreen->totalPixmapSize + pixDataSize); -+ pPixmap = calloc(1, pScreen->totalPixmapSize + pixDataSize); - if (!pPixmap) - return NullPixmap; - --- -GitLab - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14360.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14360.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e9ab42742e..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14360.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -From 446ff2d3177087b8173fa779fa5b77a2a128988b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> -Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 19:15:07 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Check SetMap request length carefully. - -Avoid out of bounds memory accesses on too short request. - -ZDI-CAN 11572 / CVE-2020-14360 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/446ff2d3177087b8173fa779fa5b77a2a128988b -CVE: CVE-2020-14360 -Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> ---- - xkb/xkb.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+) - -Index: xorg-server-1.20.8/xkb/xkb.c -=================================================================== ---- xorg-server-1.20.8.orig/xkb/xkb.c -+++ xorg-server-1.20.8/xkb/xkb.c -@@ -2382,6 +2382,93 @@ SetVirtualModMap(XkbSrvInfoPtr xkbi, - return (char *) wire; - } - -+#define _add_check_len(new) \ -+ if (len > UINT32_MAX - (new) || len > req_len - (new)) goto bad; \ -+ else len += new -+ -+/** -+ * Check the length of the SetMap request -+ */ -+static int -+_XkbSetMapCheckLength(xkbSetMapReq *req) -+{ -+ size_t len = sz_xkbSetMapReq, req_len = req->length << 2; -+ xkbKeyTypeWireDesc *keytype; -+ xkbSymMapWireDesc *symmap; -+ BOOL preserve; -+ int i, map_count, nSyms; -+ -+ if (req_len < len) -+ goto bad; -+ /* types */ -+ if (req->present & XkbKeyTypesMask) { -+ keytype = (xkbKeyTypeWireDesc *)(req + 1); -+ for (i = 0; i < req->nTypes; i++) { -+ _add_check_len(XkbPaddedSize(sz_xkbKeyTypeWireDesc)); -+ if (req->flags & XkbSetMapResizeTypes) { -+ _add_check_len(keytype->nMapEntries -+ * sz_xkbKTSetMapEntryWireDesc); -+ preserve = keytype->preserve; -+ map_count = keytype->nMapEntries; -+ if (preserve) { -+ _add_check_len(map_count * sz_xkbModsWireDesc); -+ } -+ keytype += 1; -+ keytype = (xkbKeyTypeWireDesc *) -+ ((xkbKTSetMapEntryWireDesc *)keytype + map_count); -+ if (preserve) -+ keytype = (xkbKeyTypeWireDesc *) -+ ((xkbModsWireDesc *)keytype + map_count); -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ /* syms */ -+ if (req->present & XkbKeySymsMask) { -+ symmap = (xkbSymMapWireDesc *)((char *)req + len); -+ for (i = 0; i < req->nKeySyms; i++) { -+ _add_check_len(sz_xkbSymMapWireDesc); -+ nSyms = symmap->nSyms; -+ _add_check_len(nSyms*sizeof(CARD32)); -+ symmap += 1; -+ symmap = (xkbSymMapWireDesc *)((CARD32 *)symmap + nSyms); -+ } -+ } -+ /* actions */ -+ if (req->present & XkbKeyActionsMask) { -+ _add_check_len(req->totalActs * sz_xkbActionWireDesc -+ + XkbPaddedSize(req->nKeyActs)); -+ } -+ /* behaviours */ -+ if (req->present & XkbKeyBehaviorsMask) { -+ _add_check_len(req->totalKeyBehaviors * sz_xkbBehaviorWireDesc); -+ } -+ /* vmods */ -+ if (req->present & XkbVirtualModsMask) { -+ _add_check_len(XkbPaddedSize(Ones(req->virtualMods))); -+ } -+ /* explicit */ -+ if (req->present & XkbExplicitComponentsMask) { -+ /* two bytes per non-zero explicit componen */ -+ _add_check_len(XkbPaddedSize(req->totalKeyExplicit * sizeof(CARD16))); -+ } -+ /* modmap */ -+ if (req->present & XkbModifierMapMask) { -+ /* two bytes per non-zero modmap component */ -+ _add_check_len(XkbPaddedSize(req->totalModMapKeys * sizeof(CARD16))); -+ } -+ /* vmodmap */ -+ if (req->present & XkbVirtualModMapMask) { -+ _add_check_len(req->totalVModMapKeys * sz_xkbVModMapWireDesc); -+ } -+ if (len == req_len) -+ return Success; -+bad: -+ ErrorF("[xkb] BOGUS LENGTH in SetMap: expected %ld got %ld\n", -+ len, req_len); -+ return BadLength; -+} -+ -+ - /** - * Check if the given request can be applied to the given device but don't - * actually do anything.. -@@ -2639,6 +2726,11 @@ ProcXkbSetMap(ClientPtr client) - CHK_KBD_DEVICE(dev, stuff->deviceSpec, client, DixManageAccess); - CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->present, XkbAllMapComponentsMask); - -+ /* first verify the request length carefully */ -+ rc = _XkbSetMapCheckLength(stuff); -+ if (rc != Success) -+ return rc; -+ - tmp = (char *) &stuff[1]; - - /* Check if we can to the SetMap on the requested device. If this diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14361.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14361.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 710cc3873c..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14361.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -From 144849ea27230962227e62a943b399e2ab304787 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> -Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:52:29 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix XkbSelectEvents() integer underflow - -CVE-2020-14361 ZDI-CAN 11573 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -[https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/144849ea27230962227e62a943b399e2ab304787] -CVE: CVE-2020-14361 -Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com> ---- - xkb/xkbSwap.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/xkb/xkbSwap.c b/xkb/xkbSwap.c -index 1c1ed5ff4..50cabb90e 100644 ---- a/xkb/xkbSwap.c -+++ b/xkb/xkbSwap.c -@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ SProcXkbSelectEvents(ClientPtr client) - register unsigned bit, ndx, maskLeft, dataLeft, size; - - from.c8 = (CARD8 *) &stuff[1]; -- dataLeft = (stuff->length * 4) - SIZEOF(xkbSelectEventsReq); -+ dataLeft = (client->req_len * 4) - SIZEOF(xkbSelectEventsReq); - maskLeft = (stuff->affectWhich & (~XkbMapNotifyMask)); - for (ndx = 0, bit = 1; (maskLeft != 0); ndx++, bit <<= 1) { - if (((bit & maskLeft) == 0) || (ndx == XkbMapNotify)) --- -2.17.1 - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14362.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14362.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2103e9c198..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-14362.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -From 2902b78535ecc6821cc027351818b28a5c7fdbdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> -Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:55:01 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix XRecordRegisterClients() Integer underflow - -CVE-2020-14362 ZDI-CAN-11574 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -[https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/2902b78535ecc6821cc027351818b28a5c7fdbdc] -CVE: CVE-2020-14362 -Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com> ---- - record/record.c | 10 +++++----- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/record/record.c b/record/record.c -index f2d38c877..be154525d 100644 ---- a/record/record.c -+++ b/record/record.c -@@ -2500,7 +2500,7 @@ SProcRecordQueryVersion(ClientPtr client) - } /* SProcRecordQueryVersion */ - - static int _X_COLD --SwapCreateRegister(xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff) -+SwapCreateRegister(ClientPtr client, xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff) - { - int i; - XID *pClientID; -@@ -2510,13 +2510,13 @@ SwapCreateRegister(xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff) - swapl(&stuff->nRanges); - pClientID = (XID *) &stuff[1]; - if (stuff->nClients > -- stuff->length - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq)) -+ client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq)) - return BadLength; - for (i = 0; i < stuff->nClients; i++, pClientID++) { - swapl(pClientID); - } - if (stuff->nRanges > -- stuff->length - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq) -+ client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq) - - stuff->nClients) - return BadLength; - RecordSwapRanges((xRecordRange *) pClientID, stuff->nRanges); -@@ -2531,7 +2531,7 @@ SProcRecordCreateContext(ClientPtr client) - - swaps(&stuff->length); - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRecordCreateContextReq); -- if ((status = SwapCreateRegister((void *) stuff)) != Success) -+ if ((status = SwapCreateRegister(client, (void *) stuff)) != Success) - return status; - return ProcRecordCreateContext(client); - } /* SProcRecordCreateContext */ -@@ -2544,7 +2544,7 @@ SProcRecordRegisterClients(ClientPtr client) - - swaps(&stuff->length); - REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRecordRegisterClientsReq); -- if ((status = SwapCreateRegister((void *) stuff)) != Success) -+ if ((status = SwapCreateRegister(client, (void *) stuff)) != Success) - return status; - return ProcRecordRegisterClients(client); - } /* SProcRecordRegisterClients */ --- -2.17.1 - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-25712.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-25712.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f39f6b32b1..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/CVE-2020-25712.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,102 +0,0 @@ -From 87c64fc5b0db9f62f4e361444f4b60501ebf67b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> -Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2020 17:05:09 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix XkbSetDeviceInfo() and SetDeviceIndicators() heap - overflows - -ZDI-CAN 11389 / CVE-2020-25712 - -This vulnerability was discovered by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/87c64fc5b0db9f62f4e361444f4b60501ebf67b9 -CVE: CVE-2020-25712 -Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> - ---- - xkb/xkb.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- - 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -Index: xorg-server-1.20.8/xkb/xkb.c -=================================================================== ---- xorg-server-1.20.8.orig/xkb/xkb.c -+++ xorg-server-1.20.8/xkb/xkb.c -@@ -6625,7 +6625,9 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - unsigned changed, - int num, - int *status_rtrn, -- ClientPtr client, xkbExtensionDeviceNotify * ev) -+ ClientPtr client, -+ xkbExtensionDeviceNotify * ev, -+ xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff) - { - xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *ledWire; - int i; -@@ -6646,6 +6648,11 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *mapWire; - XkbSrvLedInfoPtr sli; - -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) { -+ *status_rtrn = BadLength; -+ return (char *) ledWire; -+ } -+ - namec = mapc = statec = 0; - sli = XkbFindSrvLedInfo(dev, ledWire->ledClass, ledWire->ledID, - XkbXI_IndicatorMapsMask); -@@ -6664,6 +6671,10 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - memset((char *) sli->names, 0, XkbNumIndicators * sizeof(Atom)); - for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) { - if (ledWire->namesPresent & bit) { -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) { -+ *status_rtrn = BadLength; -+ return (char *) atomWire; -+ } - sli->names[n] = (Atom) *atomWire; - if (sli->names[n] == None) - ledWire->namesPresent &= ~bit; -@@ -6681,6 +6692,10 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, - if (ledWire->mapsPresent) { - for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) { - if (ledWire->mapsPresent & bit) { -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) { -+ *status_rtrn = BadLength; -+ return (char *) mapWire; -+ } - sli->maps[n].flags = mapWire->flags; - sli->maps[n].which_groups = mapWire->whichGroups; - sli->maps[n].groups = mapWire->groups; -@@ -6760,7 +6775,7 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, - ed.deviceID = dev->id; - wire = (char *) &stuff[1]; - if (stuff->change & XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask) { -- int nBtns, sz, i; -+ int nBtns, sz, i; - XkbAction *acts; - DeviceIntPtr kbd; - -@@ -6772,7 +6787,11 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, - return BadAlloc; - dev->button->xkb_acts = acts; - } -+ if (stuff->firstBtn + stuff->nBtns > nBtns) -+ return BadValue; - sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc); -+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz)) -+ return BadLength; - memcpy((char *) &acts[stuff->firstBtn], (char *) wire, sz); - wire += sz; - ed.reason |= XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask; -@@ -6793,7 +6812,8 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, - int status = Success; - - wire = SetDeviceIndicators(wire, dev, stuff->change, -- stuff->nDeviceLedFBs, &status, client, &ed); -+ stuff->nDeviceLedFBs, &status, client, &ed, -+ stuff); - if (status != Success) - return status; - } diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.8.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.14.bb index 8c77c3756b..d176f390a4 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.8.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_1.20.14.bb @@ -5,16 +5,9 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.pat file://0001-test-xtest-Initialize-array-with-braces.patch \ file://sdksyms-no-build-path.patch \ file://0001-drmmode_display.c-add-missing-mi.h-include.patch \ - file://CVE-2020-14347.patch \ - file://CVE-2020-14346.patch \ - file://CVE-2020-14361.patch \ - file://CVE-2020-14362.patch \ - file://CVE-2020-14345.patch \ - file://CVE-2020-14360.patch \ - file://CVE-2020-25712.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "a770aec600116444a953ff632f51f839" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d17b646bee4ba0fb7850c1cc55b18e3e8513ed5c02bdf38da7e107f84e2d0146" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "453fc86aac8c629b3a5b77e8dcca30bf" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "54b199c9280ff8bf0f73a54a759645bd0eeeda7255d1c99310d5b7595f3ac066" CFLAGS += "-fcommon" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_20211216.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_20220310.bb index 92b6ff5157..7a6cb1903b 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_20211216.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_20220310.bb @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ LICENSE = "\ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.Abilis;md5=b5ee3f410780e56711ad48eadc22b8bc \ file://LICENCE.adsp_sst;md5=615c45b91a5a4a9fe046d6ab9a2df728 \ file://LICENCE.agere;md5=af0133de6b4a9b2522defd5f188afd31 \ - file://LICENSE.amdgpu;md5=d357524f5099e2a3db3c1838921c593f \ + file://LICENSE.amdgpu;md5=44c1166d052226cb2d6c8d7400090203 \ file://LICENSE.amd-ucode;md5=3c5399dc9148d7f0e1f41e34b69cf14f \ file://LICENSE.amlogic_vdec;md5=dc44f59bf64a81643e500ad3f39a468a \ file://LICENCE.atheros_firmware;md5=30a14c7823beedac9fa39c64fdd01a13 \ @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.Abilis;md5=b5ee3f410780e56711ad48eadc22b8bc \ file://LICENCE.xc4000;md5=0ff51d2dc49fce04814c9155081092f0 \ file://LICENCE.xc5000;md5=1e170c13175323c32c7f4d0998d53f66 \ file://LICENCE.xc5000c;md5=12b02efa3049db65d524aeb418dd87ca \ - file://WHENCE;md5=79f477f9d53eedee5a65b45193785963 \ + file://WHENCE;md5=45a9c4a92d152e9495db81e1192f2bdc \ " # These are not common licenses, set NO_GENERIC_LICENSE for them @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ PE = "1" SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/kernel/firmware/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "eeddb4e6bef31fd1a3757f12ccc324929bbad97855c0b9ec5ed780f74de1837d" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5938ee717b2023b48f6bfcf344b40ddc947e3e22c0bc36d4c3418f90fea68182" inherit allarch @@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ FILES_${PN}-bcm4356-pcie = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/brcm/brcmfmac4356-pc FILES_${PN}-bcm4373 = "${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/brcm/brcmfmac4373-sdio.bin \ ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/brcm/brcmfmac4373.bin \ ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/cypress/cyfmac4373-sdio.bin \ + ${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/brcm/brcmfmac4373-sdio.clm_blob \ " LICENSE_${PN}-bcm-0bb4-0306 = "Firmware-cypress" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-rt_5.4.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-rt_5.4.bb index 9e8281c7a1..523ace3e14 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-rt_5.4.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-rt_5.4.bb @@ -11,13 +11,13 @@ python () { raise bb.parse.SkipRecipe("Set PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel to linux-yocto-rt to enable it") } -SRCREV_machine ?= "e92d76afe6d8592917c0e7b948912c085e661df2" -SRCREV_meta ?= "98cce1c95fcc9a26965cbc5f038fd71d53c387c8" +SRCREV_machine ?= "40423bc7ab2cc609f955a3dc16a0d854c1504ce3" +SRCREV_meta ?= "e8c675c7e11fbd96cd812dfb9f4f6fb6f92b6abb" SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;branch=${KBRANCH};name=machine \ git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-5.4;destsuffix=${KMETA}" -LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.172" +LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.178" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=bbea815ee2795b2f4230826c0c6b8814" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-tiny_5.4.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-tiny_5.4.bb index a75570df93..35177d4f6c 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-tiny_5.4.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-tiny_5.4.bb @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ KCONFIG_MODE = "--allnoconfig" require recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto.inc -LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.172" +LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.178" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=bbea815ee2795b2f4230826c0c6b8814" DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('ARCH', 'x86', 'elfutils-native', '', d)}" @@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ DEPENDS += "openssl-native util-linux-native" KMETA = "kernel-meta" KCONF_BSP_AUDIT_LEVEL = "2" -SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "10b4756eee78aa43ff9ed64da700ec6e8d97ff22" -SRCREV_machine ?= "6ab93fdc53b64e146e4f16363375c1beb37b82e4" -SRCREV_meta ?= "98cce1c95fcc9a26965cbc5f038fd71d53c387c8" +SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "f6e09845d8bf3c307da395497b21c1ff17ef575c" +SRCREV_machine ?= "a7ba52065be4401b5d73b6b020770f7d260b7bf1" +SRCREV_meta ?= "e8c675c7e11fbd96cd812dfb9f4f6fb6f92b6abb" PV = "${LINUX_VERSION}+git${SRCPV}" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bb index 2d7f7559e5..081052d87c 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_5.4.bb @@ -12,16 +12,16 @@ KBRANCH_qemux86 ?= "v5.4/standard/base" KBRANCH_qemux86-64 ?= "v5.4/standard/base" KBRANCH_qemumips64 ?= "v5.4/standard/mti-malta64" -SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "8de1da3dc354dedef2e435e694eec6d6e72c9822" -SRCREV_machine_qemuarm64 ?= "eed7c0a64f3a7a91a130bc2e507304dc8b446a31" -SRCREV_machine_qemumips ?= "996a9660e4fab70db5cecec9c831141cd03c3d36" -SRCREV_machine_qemuppc ?= "0197cf5754b1bd4eb035c342af9cc27e8c3339ca" -SRCREV_machine_qemuriscv64 ?= "c6b015510134942076c0e111e56357656acf3dd5" -SRCREV_machine_qemux86 ?= "c6b015510134942076c0e111e56357656acf3dd5" -SRCREV_machine_qemux86-64 ?= "c6b015510134942076c0e111e56357656acf3dd5" -SRCREV_machine_qemumips64 ?= "fe2769a7c268ed224ec70fd2aaab850e4eef70dc" -SRCREV_machine ?= "c6b015510134942076c0e111e56357656acf3dd5" -SRCREV_meta ?= "98cce1c95fcc9a26965cbc5f038fd71d53c387c8" +SRCREV_machine_qemuarm ?= "b3ee7c62bf5a5ce3c7e30aff6c3dd9f70a847a28" +SRCREV_machine_qemuarm64 ?= "bf6581eba15cb43af60fda7053edaf66990c18ac" +SRCREV_machine_qemumips ?= "05580fff716df568dc3f737b288e0e514a908572" +SRCREV_machine_qemuppc ?= "0a016b0775980f67d686e47cc8637adec46856dc" +SRCREV_machine_qemuriscv64 ?= "e2020dbe2ccaef50d7e8f37a5bf08c68a006a064" +SRCREV_machine_qemux86 ?= "e2020dbe2ccaef50d7e8f37a5bf08c68a006a064" +SRCREV_machine_qemux86-64 ?= "e2020dbe2ccaef50d7e8f37a5bf08c68a006a064" +SRCREV_machine_qemumips64 ?= "68f35eeca08d2a681495fd3a7b823ac34d9a97bc" +SRCREV_machine ?= "e2020dbe2ccaef50d7e8f37a5bf08c68a006a064" +SRCREV_meta ?= "e8c675c7e11fbd96cd812dfb9f4f6fb6f92b6abb" # remap qemuarm to qemuarma15 for the 5.4 kernel # KMACHINE_qemuarm ?= "qemuarma15" @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;name=machine;branch=${KBRA git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-5.4;destsuffix=${KMETA}" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=bbea815ee2795b2f4230826c0c6b8814" -LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.172" +LINUX_VERSION ?= "5.4.178" DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('ARCH', 'x86', 'elfutils-native', '', d)}" DEPENDS += "openssl-native util-linux-native" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/perf/perf.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/perf/perf.bb index e04047e85a..9c9bf1647f 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/perf/perf.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/perf/perf.bb @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ RDEPENDS_${PN} += "elfutils bash" RDEPENDS_${PN}-archive =+ "bash" RDEPENDS_${PN}-python =+ "bash python3 python3-modules ${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'audit', 'audit-python', '', d)}" RDEPENDS_${PN}-perl =+ "bash perl perl-modules" -RDEPENDS_${PN}-tests =+ "python3" +RDEPENDS_${PN}-tests =+ "python3 bash" RSUGGESTS_SCRIPTING = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'scripting', '${PN}-perl ${PN}-python', '',d)}" RSUGGESTS_${PN} += "${PN}-archive ${PN}-tests ${RSUGGESTS_SCRIPTING}" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2021.08.28.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2022.02.18.bb index 376311804e..4e6da4cbe1 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2021.08.28.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2022.02.18.bb @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ LICENSE = "ISC" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=07c4f6dea3845b02a18dc00c8c87699c" SRC_URI = "https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "cff370c410d1e6d316ae0a7fa8ac6278fdf1efca5d3d664aca7cfd2aafa54446" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8828c25a4ee25020044004f57374bb9deac852809fad70f8d3d01770bf9ac97f" inherit bin_package allarch diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/0001-tiffset-fix-global-buffer-overflow-for-ASCII-tags-wh.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/0001-tiffset-fix-global-buffer-overflow-for-ASCII-tags-wh.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..31f867e000 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/0001-tiffset-fix-global-buffer-overflow-for-ASCII-tags-wh.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From b12a0326e6064b6e0b051d1184a219877472f69b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: 4ugustus <wangdw.augustus@qq.com> +Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 16:25:28 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] tiffset: fix global-buffer-overflow for ASCII tags where + count is required (fixes #355) + +CVE: CVE-2022-22844 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/commit/03047a26952a82daaa0792957ce211e0aa51bc64] +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <purushottam.choudhary@kpit.com> +Signed-off-by: Purushottam Choudhary <purushottamchoudhary29@gmail.com> +Comments: Add header stdint.h in tiffset.c explicitly for UINT16_MAX +--- + tools/tiffset.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/tools/tiffset.c b/tools/tiffset.c +index 8c9e23c5..e7a88c09 100644 +--- a/tools/tiffset.c ++++ b/tools/tiffset.c +@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ + #include <string.h> + #include <stdlib.h> + ++#include <stdint.h> + #include "tiffio.h" + + static char* usageMsg[] = { +@@ -146,9 +146,19 @@ main(int argc, char* argv[]) + + arg_index++; + if (TIFFFieldDataType(fip) == TIFF_ASCII) { +- if (TIFFSetField(tiff, TIFFFieldTag(fip), argv[arg_index]) != 1) +- fprintf( stderr, "Failed to set %s=%s\n", +- TIFFFieldName(fip), argv[arg_index] ); ++ if(TIFFFieldPassCount( fip )) { ++ size_t len; ++ len = strlen(argv[arg_index]) + 1; ++ if (len > UINT16_MAX || TIFFSetField(tiff, TIFFFieldTag(fip), ++ (uint16_t)len, argv[arg_index]) != 1) ++ fprintf( stderr, "Failed to set %s=%s\n", ++ TIFFFieldName(fip), argv[arg_index] ); ++ } else { ++ if (TIFFSetField(tiff, TIFFFieldTag(fip), ++ argv[arg_index]) != 1) ++ fprintf( stderr, "Failed to set %s=%s\n", ++ TIFFFieldName(fip), argv[arg_index] ); ++ } + } else if (TIFFFieldWriteCount(fip) > 0 + || TIFFFieldWriteCount(fip) == TIFF_VARIABLE) { + int ret = 1; +-- +GitLab diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/561599c99f987dc32ae110370cfdd7df7975586b.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/561599c99f987dc32ae110370cfdd7df7975586b.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01ed5dcd24 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/561599c99f987dc32ae110370cfdd7df7975586b.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 561599c99f987dc32ae110370cfdd7df7975586b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2022 20:36:41 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] TIFFReadDirectory(): avoid calling memcpy() with a null + source pointer and size of zero (fixes #362) + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2022-0562 +Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> +Comment: Refreshed patch +--- + libtiff/tif_dirread.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/libtiff/tif_dirread.c b/libtiff/tif_dirread.c +index 2bbc4585..23194ced 100644 +--- a/libtiff/tif_dirread.c ++++ b/libtiff/tif_dirread.c +@@ -4126,7 +4126,8 @@ + goto bad; + } + +- memcpy(new_sampleinfo, tif->tif_dir.td_sampleinfo, old_extrasamples * sizeof(uint16)); ++ if (old_extrasamples > 0) ++ memcpy(new_sampleinfo, tif->tif_dir.td_sampleinfo, old_extrasamples * sizeof(uint16)); + _TIFFsetShortArray(&tif->tif_dir.td_sampleinfo, new_sampleinfo, tif->tif_dir.td_extrasamples); + _TIFFfree(new_sampleinfo); + } diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/eecb0712f4c3a5b449f70c57988260a667ddbdef.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/eecb0712f4c3a5b449f70c57988260a667ddbdef.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fc5d0ab5f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff/eecb0712f4c3a5b449f70c57988260a667ddbdef.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From eecb0712f4c3a5b449f70c57988260a667ddbdef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2022 13:08:38 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] TIFFFetchStripThing(): avoid calling memcpy() with a null + source pointer and size of zero (fixes #362) + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2022-0561 +Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <Sana.Kazi@kpit.com> +Comment: Refreshed patch +--- + libtiff/tif_dirread.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libtiff/tif_dirread.c b/libtiff/tif_dirread.c +index 23194ced..50ebf8ac 100644 +--- a/libtiff/tif_dirread.c ++++ b/libtiff/tif_dirread.c +@@ -5683,8 +5682,9 @@ + _TIFFfree(data); + return(0); + } +- _TIFFmemcpy(resizeddata,data,(uint32)dir->tdir_count*sizeof(uint64)); +- _TIFFmemset(resizeddata+(uint32)dir->tdir_count,0,(nstrips-(uint32)dir->tdir_count)*sizeof(uint64)); ++ if( dir->tdir_count ) ++ _TIFFmemcpy(resizeddata,data, (uint32)dir->tdir_count * sizeof(uint64)); ++ _TIFFmemset(resizeddata+(uint32)dir->tdir_count, 0, (nstrips - (uint32)dir->tdir_count) * sizeof(uint64)); + _TIFFfree(data); + data=resizeddata; + } diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb index 43f210111d..9db247ecc7 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.1.0.bb @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://001_support_patch_for_CVE-2020-35521_and_CVE-2020-35522.patch \ file://002_support_patch_for_CVE-2020-35521_and_CVE-2020-35522.patch \ file://CVE-2020-35521_and_CVE-2020-35522.patch \ + file://0001-tiffset-fix-global-buffer-overflow-for-ASCII-tags-wh.patch \ + file://561599c99f987dc32ae110370cfdd7df7975586b.patch \ + file://eecb0712f4c3a5b449f70c57988260a667ddbdef.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2165e7aba557463acc0664e71a3ed424" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5d29f32517dadb6dbcd1255ea5bbc93a2b54b94fbf83653b4d65c7d6775b8634" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-sato/puzzles/puzzles_git.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-sato/puzzles/puzzles_git.bb index 2edc9ada2e..3ee441998d 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-sato/puzzles/puzzles_git.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-sato/puzzles/puzzles_git.bb @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ DEPENDS = "libxt" # The libxt requires x11 in DISTRO_FEATURES REQUIRED_DISTRO_FEATURES = "x11" -SRC_URI = "git://git.tartarus.org/simon/puzzles.git;branch=master \ +SRC_URI = "git://git.tartarus.org/simon/puzzles.git;branch=main \ file://fix-compiling-failure-with-option-g-O.patch \ file://0001-palisade-Fix-warnings-with-clang-on-arm.patch \ file://0001-Use-Wno-error-format-overflow-if-the-compiler-suppor.patch \ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Fix-Wsign-compare-warning-with-glibc-2.34-on-Linux-p.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Fix-Wsign-compare-warning-with-glibc-2.34-on-Linux-p.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..46c706931b --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Fix-Wsign-compare-warning-with-glibc-2.34-on-Linux-p.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From f9d0e594d43afcb4ab0043117249feb266ba4515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Romain Geissler <romain.geissler@amadeus.com> +Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2021 14:22:28 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix -Wsign-compare warning with glibc 2.34 on Linux + platforms. + +In file included from /data/mwrep/res/osp/Boost/21-0-0-0/include/boost/thread/thread_only.hpp:17, + from /data/mwrep/res/osp/Boost/21-0-0-0/include/boost/thread/thread.hpp:12, + from src/GetTest.cpp:12: +/data/mwrep/res/osp/Boost/21-0-0-0/include/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp: In member function 'void boost::thread_attributes::set_stack_size(std::size_t)': +/data/mwrep/res/osp/Boost/21-0-0-0/include/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp:61:19: error: comparison of integer expressions of different signedness: 'std::size_t' {aka 'long unsigned int'} and 'long int' [-Werror=sign-compare] + 61 | if (size<PTHREAD_STACK_MIN) size=PTHREAD_STACK_MIN; + | ^ + +Upstream-Status: Backport [1.78.0 https://github.com/boostorg/thread/commit/f9d0e594d43afcb4ab0043117249feb266ba4515] +--- + boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp b/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp +index bc9b1367..c43b276d 100644 +--- a/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp ++++ b/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp +@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ namespace boost + std::size_t page_size = ::sysconf( _SC_PAGESIZE); + #endif + #ifdef PTHREAD_STACK_MIN +- if (size<PTHREAD_STACK_MIN) size=PTHREAD_STACK_MIN; ++ if (size<static_cast<std::size_t>(PTHREAD_STACK_MIN)) size=PTHREAD_STACK_MIN; + #endif + size = ((size+page_size-1)/page_size)*page_size; + int res = pthread_attr_setstacksize(&val_, size); diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Revert-change-to-elide-a-warning-that-caused-Solaris.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Revert-change-to-elide-a-warning-that-caused-Solaris.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3784cf9165 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost/0001-Revert-change-to-elide-a-warning-that-caused-Solaris.patch @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +From 74fb0a26099bc51d717f5f154b37231ce7df3e98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Rob Boehne <robb@datalogics.com> +Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 11:25:20 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] Revert change to elide a warning that caused Solaris builds + to fail. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [1.73.0 https://github.com/boostorg/thread/commit/74fb0a26099bc51d717f5f154b37231ce7df3e98] +--- + boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp b/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp +index aefbeb43..bc9b1367 100644 +--- a/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp ++++ b/boost/thread/pthread/thread_data.hpp +@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ namespace boost + #else + std::size_t page_size = ::sysconf( _SC_PAGESIZE); + #endif +-#if PTHREAD_STACK_MIN > 0 ++#ifdef PTHREAD_STACK_MIN + if (size<PTHREAD_STACK_MIN) size=PTHREAD_STACK_MIN; + #endif + size = ((size+page_size-1)/page_size)*page_size; diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost_1.72.0.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost_1.72.0.bb index df1cc16937..b3ec11933c 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost_1.72.0.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/boost/boost_1.72.0.bb @@ -9,4 +9,6 @@ SRC_URI += " \ file://0001-dont-setup-compiler-flags-m32-m64.patch \ file://0001-revert-cease-dependence-on-range.patch \ file://0001-added-typedef-executor_type.patch \ + file://0001-Revert-change-to-elide-a-warning-that-caused-Solaris.patch \ + file://0001-Fix-Wsign-compare-warning-with-glibc-2.34-on-Linux-p.patch \ " diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.32.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.32.bb index 325fa87a1b..d67babb5e9 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.32.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/libcap/libcap_2.32.bb @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ These allow giving various kinds of specific privileges to individual \ users, without giving them full root permissions." HOMEPAGE = "http://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/" # no specific GPL version required -LICENSE = "BSD | GPLv2" +LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause | GPLv2" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://License;md5=3f84fd6f29d453a56514cb7e4ead25f1" DEPENDS = "hostperl-runtime-native gperf-native" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1_1.0.22.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1_1.0.22.bb index a4fe4de2cb..ffa8f0320c 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1_1.0.22.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1_1.0.22.bb @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ SUMMARY = "Userspace library to access USB (version 1.0)" DESCRIPTION = "A cross-platform library to access USB devices from Linux, \ macOS, Windows, OpenBSD/NetBSD, Haiku and Solaris userspace." -HOMEPAGE = "http://libusb.sf.net" +HOMEPAGE = "https://libusb.info" BUGTRACKER = "http://www.libusb.org/report" SECTION = "libs" @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=fbc093901857fcd118f065f900982c24" BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk" -SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/libusb/libusb-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ +SRC_URI = "https://github.com/libusb/libusb/releases/download/v${PV}/libusb-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://no-dll.patch \ file://run-ptest \ " diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-1.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b7dcaefad3 --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,347 @@ +From fd634998f813340768c333cdad638498602856e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ulya Trofimovich <skvadrik@gmail.com> +Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 21:28:32 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite recursion into iteration (Tarjan's SCC algorithm and + YYFILL states). + +This is to avoid stack overflow on large RE (especially on instrumented +builds that have larger stack frames, like AddressSanitizer). + +Stack overflow reported by Agostino Sarubbo. +Related to #219 "overflow-1.re test fails on system with small stack". + +Upstram-Status: Backport: +https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/commit/fd634998f813340768c333cdad638498602856e5 + +CVE: CVE-2018-21232 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- +diff --git a/src/dfa/fillpoints.cc b/src/dfa/fillpoints.cc +--- a/src/dfa/fillpoints.cc (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e) ++++ b/src/dfa/fillpoints.cc (date 1646929180243) +@@ -5,151 +5,186 @@ + + #include "src/dfa/dfa.h" + +-namespace re2c +-{ ++ ++/* ++ * note [finding strongly connected components of DFA] ++ * ++ * A slight modification of Tarjan's algorithm. ++ * ++ * The algorithm traverses the DFA in depth-first order. It maintains a stack ++ * of states that have already been visited but haven't been assigned to an SCC ++ * yet. For each state the algorithm calculates 'lowlink': index of the highest ++ * ancestor state reachable in one step from a descendant of this state. ++ * Lowlink is used to determine when a set of states should be popped off stack ++ * into a new SCC. ++ * ++ * We use lowlink to hold different kinds of information: ++ * - values in range [0 .. stack size] mean that the state is on stack (a ++ * link to a state with the smallest index reachable from this one) ++ * - SCC_UND means that this state has not been visited yet ++ * - SCC_INF means that this state has already been popped off stack ++ * ++ * We use stack size (rather than topological sort index) as a unique index of ++ * the state on stack. This is safe because the indices of states on stack are ++ * unique and less than the indices of states that have been popped off stack ++ * (SCC_INF). ++ */ ++ ++namespace re2c { ++ namespace { + +-static const size_t SCC_INF = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max(); +-static const size_t SCC_UND = SCC_INF - 1; ++ static const size_t SCC_INF = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max(); ++ static const size_t SCC_UND = SCC_INF - 1; + +-static bool loopback(size_t node, size_t narcs, const size_t *arcs) +-{ +- for (size_t i = 0; i < narcs; ++i) +- { +- if (arcs[i] == node) +- { +- return true; +- } +- } +- return false; +-} ++ static bool loopback(size_t state, size_t narcs, const size_t *arcs) ++ { ++ for (size_t i = 0; i < narcs; ++i) { ++ if (arcs[i] == state) return true; ++ } ++ return false; ++ } + +-/* +- * node [finding strongly connected components of DFA] +- * +- * A slight modification of Tarjan's algorithm. +- * +- * The algorithm walks graph in deep-first order. It maintains a stack +- * of nodes that have already been visited but haven't been assigned to +- * SCC yet. For each node the algorithm calculates 'lowlink': index of +- * the highest ancestor node reachable in one step from a descendant of +- * the node. Lowlink is used to determine when a set of nodes should be +- * popped off the stack into a new SCC. +- * +- * We use lowlink to hold different kinds of information: +- * - values in range [0 .. stack size] mean that this node is on stack +- * (link to a node with the smallest index reachable from this one) +- * - SCC_UND means that this node has not been visited yet +- * - SCC_INF means that this node has already been popped off stack +- * +- * We use stack size (rather than topological sort index) as unique index +- * of a node on stack. This is safe because indices of nodes on stack are +- * still unique and less than indices of nodes that have been popped off +- * stack (SCC_INF). +- * +- */ +-static void scc( +- const dfa_t &dfa, +- std::stack<size_t> &stack, +- std::vector<size_t> &lowlink, +- std::vector<bool> &trivial, +- size_t i) +-{ +- const size_t link = stack.size(); +- lowlink[i] = link; +- stack.push(i); ++ struct StackItem { ++ size_t state; // current state ++ size_t symbol; // next arc to be visited in this state ++ size_t link; // Tarjan's "lowlink" ++ }; ++ ++// Tarjan's algorithm ++ static void scc(const dfa_t &dfa, std::vector<bool> &trivial, ++ std::vector<StackItem> &stack_dfs) ++ { ++ std::vector<size_t> lowlink(dfa.states.size(), SCC_UND); ++ std::stack<size_t> stack; ++ ++ StackItem x0 = {0, 0, 0}; ++ stack_dfs.push_back(x0); ++ ++ while (!stack_dfs.empty()) { ++ const size_t i = stack_dfs.back().state; ++ size_t c = stack_dfs.back().symbol; ++ size_t link = stack_dfs.back().link; ++ stack_dfs.pop_back(); ++ ++ const size_t *arcs = dfa.states[i]->arcs; ++ ++ if (c == 0) { ++ // DFS recursive enter ++ //DASSERT(lowlink[i] == SCC_UND); ++ link = lowlink[i] = stack.size(); ++ stack.push(i); ++ } ++ else { ++ // DFS recursive return (from one of successor states) ++ const size_t j = arcs[c - 1]; ++ //DASSERT(lowlink[j] != SCC_UND); ++ lowlink[i] = std::min(lowlink[i], lowlink[j]); ++ } + +- const size_t *arcs = dfa.states[i]->arcs; +- for (size_t c = 0; c < dfa.nchars; ++c) +- { +- const size_t j = arcs[c]; +- if (j != dfa_t::NIL) +- { +- if (lowlink[j] == SCC_UND) +- { +- scc(dfa, stack, lowlink, trivial, j); +- } +- if (lowlink[j] < lowlink[i]) +- { +- lowlink[i] = lowlink[j]; +- } +- } +- } ++ // find the next successor state that hasn't been visited yet ++ for (; c < dfa.nchars; ++c) { ++ const size_t j = arcs[c]; ++ if (j != dfa_t::NIL) { ++ if (lowlink[j] == SCC_UND) { ++ break; ++ } ++ lowlink[i] = std::min(lowlink[i], lowlink[j]); ++ } ++ } + +- if (lowlink[i] == link) +- { +- // SCC is non-trivial (has loops) iff it either: +- // - consists of multiple nodes (they all must be interconnected) +- // - consists of single node which loops back to itself +- trivial[i] = i == stack.top() +- && !loopback(i, dfa.nchars, arcs); ++ if (c < dfa.nchars) { ++ // recurse into the next successor state ++ StackItem x1 = {i, c + 1, link}; ++ stack_dfs.push_back(x1); ++ StackItem x2 = {arcs[c], 0, SCC_UND}; ++ stack_dfs.push_back(x2); ++ } ++ else if (lowlink[i] == link) { ++ // all successors have been visited ++ // SCC is non-trivial (has loops) if either: ++ // - it contains multiple interconnected states ++ // - it contains a single self-looping state ++ trivial[i] = i == stack.top() && !loopback(i, dfa.nchars, arcs); + +- size_t j; +- do +- { +- j = stack.top(); +- stack.pop(); +- lowlink[j] = SCC_INF; +- } +- while (j != i); +- } +-} ++ for (;;) { ++ const size_t j = stack.top(); ++ stack.pop(); ++ lowlink[j] = SCC_INF; ++ if (i == j) break; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ } + +-static void calc_fill( +- const dfa_t &dfa, +- const std::vector<bool> &trivial, +- std::vector<size_t> &fill, +- size_t i) +-{ +- if (fill[i] == SCC_UND) +- { +- fill[i] = 0; +- const size_t *arcs = dfa.states[i]->arcs; +- for (size_t c = 0; c < dfa.nchars; ++c) +- { +- const size_t j = arcs[c]; +- if (j != dfa_t::NIL) +- { +- calc_fill(dfa, trivial, fill, j); +- size_t max = 1; +- if (trivial[j]) +- { +- max += fill[j]; +- } +- if (max > fill[i]) +- { +- fill[i] = max; +- } +- } +- } +- } +-} +- +-void fillpoints(const dfa_t &dfa, std::vector<size_t> &fill) +-{ +- const size_t size = dfa.states.size(); +- +- // find DFA states that belong to non-trivial SCC +- std::stack<size_t> stack; +- std::vector<size_t> lowlink(size, SCC_UND); +- std::vector<bool> trivial(size, false); +- scc(dfa, stack, lowlink, trivial, 0); +- +- // for each DFA state, calculate YYFILL argument: +- // maximal path length to the next YYFILL state +- fill.resize(size, SCC_UND); +- calc_fill(dfa, trivial, fill, 0); ++ static void calc_fill(const dfa_t &dfa, const std::vector<bool> &trivial, ++ std::vector<StackItem> &stack_dfs, std::vector<size_t> &fill) ++ { ++ const size_t nstates = dfa.states.size(); ++ fill.resize(nstates, SCC_UND); ++ ++ StackItem x0 = {0, 0, SCC_INF}; ++ stack_dfs.push_back(x0); ++ ++ while (!stack_dfs.empty()) { ++ const size_t i = stack_dfs.back().state; ++ size_t c = stack_dfs.back().symbol; ++ stack_dfs.pop_back(); ++ ++ const size_t *arcs = dfa.states[i]->arcs; ++ ++ if (c == 0) { ++ // DFS recursive enter ++ if (fill[i] != SCC_UND) continue; ++ fill[i] = 0; ++ } ++ else { ++ // DFS recursive return (from one of successor states) ++ const size_t j = arcs[c - 1]; ++ //DASSERT(fill[i] != SCC_UND && fill[j] != SCC_UND); ++ fill[i] = std::max(fill[i], 1 + (trivial[j] ? fill[j] : 0)); ++ } ++ ++ // find the next successor state that hasn't been visited yet ++ for (; c < dfa.nchars; ++c) { ++ const size_t j = arcs[c]; ++ if (j != dfa_t::NIL) break; ++ } ++ ++ if (c < dfa.nchars) { ++ // recurse into the next successor state ++ StackItem x1 = {i, c + 1, SCC_INF}; ++ stack_dfs.push_back(x1); ++ StackItem x2 = {arcs[c], 0, SCC_INF}; ++ stack_dfs.push_back(x2); ++ } ++ } + +- // The following states must trigger YYFILL: +- // - inital state +- // - all states in non-trivial SCCs +- // for other states, reset YYFILL argument to zero +- for (size_t i = 1; i < size; ++i) +- { +- if (trivial[i]) +- { +- fill[i] = 0; +- } +- } +-} ++ // The following states must trigger YYFILL: ++ // - inital state ++ // - all states in non-trivial SCCs ++ // for other states, reset YYFILL argument to zero ++ for (size_t i = 1; i < nstates; ++i) { ++ if (trivial[i]) { ++ fill[i] = 0; ++ } ++ } ++ } + ++ } // anonymous namespace ++ ++ void fillpoints(const dfa_t &dfa, std::vector<size_t> &fill) ++ { ++ const size_t nstates = dfa.states.size(); ++ std::vector<bool> trivial(nstates, false); ++ std::vector<StackItem> stack_dfs; ++ stack_dfs.reserve(nstates); ++ ++ // find DFA states that belong to non-trivial SCC ++ scc(dfa, trivial, stack_dfs); ++ ++ // for each DFA state, calculate YYFILL argument: ++ // maximal path length to the next YYFILL state ++ calc_fill(dfa, trivial, stack_dfs, fill); ++ } ++ + } // namespace re2c diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-2.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..820a6decbc --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +From 7b5643476bd99c994c4f51b8143f942982d85521 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ulya Trofimovich <skvadrik@gmail.com> +Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 22:37:24 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite recursion into iteration (fixed tags computation). + +This is to avoid stack overflow on large RE (especially on instrumented +builds that have larger stack frames, like AddressSanitizer). + +Partial fix for #219 "overflow-1.re test fails on system with small stack". + +Upstream-Stauts: Backport: +https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/commit/7b5643476bd99c994c4f51b8143f942982d85521 + +CVE: CVE-2018-21232 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- +diff --git a/src/re/tag.cc b/src/re/tag.cc +--- a/src/re/tag.cc (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e) ++++ b/src/re/tag.cc (date 1646986908580) +@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ + { + + const size_t Tag::RIGHTMOST = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max(); +-const size_t Tag::VARDIST = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max(); ++const uint32_t Tag::VARDIST = std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max(); + const size_t Tag::FICTIVE = Tag::RIGHTMOST - 1; + + } // namespace re2c + + +diff --git a/src/re/tag.h b/src/re/tag.h +--- a/src/re/tag.h (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e) ++++ b/src/re/tag.h (date 1646986922376) +@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ + struct Tag + { + static const size_t RIGHTMOST; +- static const size_t VARDIST; ++ static const uint32_t VARDIST; + static const size_t FICTIVE; + + const std::string *name; + + +diff --git a/src/re/fixed_tags.cc b/src/re/fixed_tags.cc +--- a/src/re/fixed_tags.cc (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e) ++++ b/src/re/fixed_tags.cc (date 1646991137317) +@@ -7,78 +7,131 @@ + #include "src/re/tag.h" + + namespace re2c { ++namespace { + + /* note [fixed and variable tags] + * +- * If distance between two tags is constant (equal for all strings that +- * match the given regexp), then lexer only needs to track one of them: +- * the second tag equals the first tag plus static offset. ++ * If distance between two tags is constant (equal for all strings that match ++ * the given regexp), then lexer only needs to track one of them: the second ++ * tag equals the first tag plus static offset. + * +- * However, this optimization is applied only to tags in top-level +- * concatenation, because other tags may be uninitialized and we don't +- * want to mess with conditional calculation of fixed tags. +- * ++ * This optimization is applied only to tags in top-level concatenation, ++ * because in other cases the base tag may be NULL, and the calculation of ++ * the fixed tag value is not as simple as substracting a fixed offset. + * Furthermore, fixed tags are fobidden with generic API because it cannot +- * express fixed offsets. +- * +- * Tags with history also cannot be fixed. ++ * express fixed offsets. M-tags (with history) also cannot be fixed. + * + * Another special case is fictive tags (those that exist only to impose +- * hierarchical laws of POSIX disambiguation). We treat them as fixed +- * in order to suppress code generation. ++ * hierarchical laws of POSIX disambiguation). We treat them as fixed in order ++ * to suppress code generation. + */ + +-static void find_fixed_tags(RE *re, std::vector<Tag> &tags, +- size_t &dist, size_t &base, bool toplevel) ++struct StackItem { ++ RE *re; // current sub-RE ++ uint32_t dist; // distance backup for alternative, unused for other RE ++ uint8_t succ; // index of the next successor to be visited ++ bool toplevel; // if this sub-RE is in top-level concatenation ++}; ++ ++static void find_fixed_tags(RESpec &spec, std::vector<StackItem> &stack, RE *re0) + { +- switch (re->type) { +- case RE::NIL: break; +- case RE::SYM: +- if (dist != Tag::VARDIST) ++dist; +- break; +- case RE::ALT: { +- size_t d1 = dist, d2 = dist; +- find_fixed_tags(re->alt.re1, tags, d1, base, false); +- find_fixed_tags(re->alt.re2, tags, d2, base, false); +- dist = (d1 == d2) ? d1 : Tag::VARDIST; +- break; +- } +- case RE::CAT: +- find_fixed_tags(re->cat.re2, tags, dist, base, toplevel); +- find_fixed_tags(re->cat.re1, tags, dist, base, toplevel); +- break; +- case RE::ITER: +- find_fixed_tags(re->iter.re, tags, dist, base, false); +- dist = Tag::VARDIST; +- break; +- case RE::TAG: { +- // see note [fixed and variable tags] +- Tag &tag = tags[re->tag.idx]; +- if (fictive(tag)) { +- tag.base = tag.dist = 0; +- } else if (toplevel && dist != Tag::VARDIST && !history(tag)) { +- tag.base = base; +- tag.dist = dist; +- } else if (toplevel) { +- base = re->tag.idx; +- dist = 0; +- } +- if (trailing(tag)) dist = 0; +- break; +- } +- } ++ static const uint32_t VARDIST = Tag::VARDIST; ++ bool toplevel = spec.opts->input_api != INPUT_CUSTOM; ++ ++ // base tag, intially the fake "rightmost tag" (the end of RE) ++ size_t base = Tag::RIGHTMOST; ++ ++ // the distance to the nearest top-level tag to the right (base tag) ++ uint32_t dist = 0; ++ ++ const StackItem i0 = {re0, VARDIST, 0, toplevel}; ++ stack.push_back(i0); ++ ++ while (!stack.empty()) { ++ const StackItem i = stack.back(); ++ stack.pop_back(); ++ RE *re = i.re; ++ ++ if (re->type == RE::SYM) { ++ if (dist != VARDIST) ++dist; ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::ALT) { ++ if (i.succ == 0) { ++ // save the current distance on stack (from the alternative end ++ // to base) and recurse into the left sub-RE ++ StackItem k = {re, dist, 1, i.toplevel}; ++ stack.push_back(k); ++ StackItem j = {re->alt.re1, VARDIST, 0, false}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ else if (i.succ == 1) { ++ // save the current distance on stack (from the left sub-RE to ++ // base), reset distance to the distance popped from stack (from ++ // the alternative end to base), recurse into the right sub-RE ++ StackItem k = {re, dist, 2, i.toplevel}; ++ stack.push_back(k); ++ StackItem j = {re->alt.re2, VARDIST, 0, false}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ dist = i.dist; ++ } ++ else { ++ // both sub-RE visited, compare the distance on stack (from the ++ // left sub-RE to base) to the current distance (from the right ++ // sub-RE to base), if not equal set variable distance ++ dist = (i.dist == dist) ? i.dist : VARDIST; ++ } ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::ITER) { ++ if (i.succ == 0) { ++ // recurse into the sub-RE ++ StackItem k = {re, VARDIST, 1, i.toplevel}; ++ stack.push_back(k); ++ StackItem j = {re->iter.re, VARDIST, 0, false}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ else { ++ // sub-RE visited, assume unknown number of iterations ++ // TODO: find precise distance for fixed repetition counter ++ dist = VARDIST; ++ } ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::CAT) { ++ // the right sub-RE is pushed on stack after the left sub-RE and ++ // visited earlier (because distance is computed from right to left) ++ StackItem j1 = {re->cat.re1, VARDIST, 0, i.toplevel}; ++ stack.push_back(j1); ++ StackItem j2 = {re->cat.re2, VARDIST, 0, i.toplevel}; ++ stack.push_back(j2); ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::TAG) { ++ // see note [fixed and variable tags] ++ Tag &tag = spec.tags[re->tag.idx]; ++ if (fictive(tag)) { ++ tag.base = tag.dist = 0; ++ } ++ else if (i.toplevel && dist != VARDIST && !history(tag)) { ++ tag.base = base; ++ tag.dist = dist; ++ } ++ else if (i.toplevel) { ++ base = re->tag.idx; ++ dist = 0; ++ } ++ if (trailing(tag)) { ++ dist = 0; ++ } ++ } ++ } + } ++ ++} // anonymous namespace + +-void find_fixed_tags(RESpec &spec) +-{ +- const bool generic = spec.opts->input_api == INPUT_CUSTOM; +- std::vector<RE*>::iterator +- i = spec.res.begin(), +- e = spec.res.end(); +- for (; i != e; ++i) { +- size_t base = Tag::RIGHTMOST, dist = 0; +- find_fixed_tags(*i, spec.tags, dist, base, !generic); +- } +-} ++ void find_fixed_tags(RESpec &spec) ++ { ++ std::vector<StackItem> stack; ++ for (std::vector<RE*>::iterator i = spec.res.begin(); i != spec.res.end(); ++i) { ++ find_fixed_tags(spec, stack, *i); ++ } ++ } + +-} // namespace re2c ++} // namespace re2c +\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-3.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f942e21cba --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +From 4d9c809355b574f2a58eac119f5e076c48e4d1e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ulya Trofimovich <skvadrik@gmail.com> +Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 22:16:51 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite recursion into iteration (nullable RE). + +This is to avoid stack overflow on large RE (especially on instrumented +builds that have larger stack frames, like AddressSanitizer). + +Partial fix for #219 "overflow-1.re test fails on system with small stack". + +Upstream-Status: Backport: +https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/commit/4d9c809355b574f2a58eac119f5e076c48e4d1e2 + +CVE: CVE-2018-21232 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- +diff --git a/src/re/nullable.cc b/src/re/nullable.cc +--- a/src/re/nullable.cc (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e) ++++ b/src/re/nullable.cc (date 1647253886226) +@@ -9,43 +9,100 @@ + #include "src/re/tag.h" + + namespace re2c { ++ namespace { ++ ++ struct StackItem { ++ const RE *re; // current sub-RE ++ uint8_t succ; // index of the next sucessor to be visited ++ }; + +-static bool nullable(const RESpec &spec, const RE *re, bool &trail) +-{ +- if (trail) return true; ++ static bool nullable(const RESpec &spec, std::vector<StackItem> &stack, const RE *re0) ++ { ++ // the "nullable" status of the last sub-RE visited by DFS ++ bool null = false; + +- switch (re->type) { +- case RE::NIL: return true; +- case RE::SYM: return false; +- case RE::ITER: +- return nullable(spec, re->iter.re, trail); +- case RE::TAG: +- trail |= trailing(spec.tags[re->tag.idx]); +- return true; +- case RE::ALT: +- return nullable(spec, re->alt.re1, trail) +- || nullable(spec, re->alt.re2, trail); +- case RE::CAT: +- return nullable(spec, re->cat.re1, trail) +- && nullable(spec, re->cat.re2, trail); +- } +- return false; /* unreachable */ +-} ++ const StackItem i0 = {re0, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(i0); ++ ++ while (!stack.empty()) { ++ const StackItem i = stack.back(); ++ stack.pop_back(); ++ ++ const RE *re = i.re; ++ if (re->type == RE::NIL) { ++ null = true; ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::SYM) { ++ null = false; ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::TAG) { ++ null = true; + +-/* +- * warn about rules that match empty string +- * (including rules with nonempty trailing context) +- * false positives on partially self-shadowed rules like [^]? +- */ +-void warn_nullable(const RESpec &spec, const std::string &cond) +-{ +- const size_t nre = spec.res.size(); +- for (size_t i = 0; i < nre; ++i) { +- bool trail = false; +- if (nullable(spec, spec.res[i], trail)) { +- spec.warn.match_empty_string(spec.rules[i].code->fline, cond); +- } +- } +-} ++ // Trailing context is always in top-level concatenation, and sub-RE ++ // are visited from left to right. Since we are here, sub-RE to the ++ // left of the trailing context is nullable (otherwise we would not ++ // recurse into the right sub-RE), therefore the whole RE is nullable. ++ if (trailing(spec.tags[re->tag.idx])) { ++ //DASSERT(stack.size() == 1 && stack.back().re->type == RE::CAT); ++ stack.pop_back(); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::ALT) { ++ if (i.succ == 0) { ++ // recurse into the left sub-RE ++ StackItem k = {re, 1}; ++ stack.push_back(k); ++ StackItem j = {re->alt.re1, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ else if (!null) { ++ // if the left sub-RE is nullable, so is alternative, so stop ++ // recursion; otherwise recurse into the right sub-RE ++ StackItem j = {re->alt.re2, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::CAT) { ++ if (i.succ == 0) { ++ // recurse into the left sub-RE ++ StackItem k = {re, 1}; ++ stack.push_back(k); ++ StackItem j = {re->cat.re1, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ else if (null) { ++ // if the left sub-RE is not nullable, neither is concatenation, ++ // so stop recursion; otherwise recurse into the right sub-RE ++ StackItem j = {re->cat.re2, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::ITER) { ++ // iteration is nullable if the sub-RE is nullable ++ // (zero repetitions is represented with alternative) ++ StackItem j = {re->iter.re, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ //DASSERT(stack.empty()); ++ return null; ++ } ++ ++ } // anonymous namespace ++ ++// Warn about rules that match empty string (including rules with nonempty ++// trailing context). False positives on partially self-shadowed rules like [^]? ++ void warn_nullable(const RESpec &spec, const std::string &cond) ++ { ++ std::vector<StackItem> stack; ++ const size_t nre = spec.res.size(); ++ for (size_t i = 0; i < nre; ++i) { ++ if (nullable(spec, stack, spec.res[i])) { ++ spec.warn.match_empty_string(spec.rules[i].code->fline, cond); ++ } ++ } ++ } + + } // namespace re2c diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-4.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ee8d84b1bc --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c/CVE-2018-21232-4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +From 89be91f3df00657261870adbc590209fdb2bc405 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Ulya Trofimovich <skvadrik@gmail.com> +Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 23:02:21 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Rewrite recursion into iteration (estimation of NFA size for + RE). + +This is to avoid stack overflow on large RE (especially on instrumented +builds that have larger stack frames, like AddressSanitizer). + +Partial fix for #219 "overflow-1.re test fails on system with small stack". + +Upstram-Status: Backport: +https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/commit/89be91f3df00657261870adbc590209fdb2bc405 + +CVE: CVE-2018-21232 + +Signed-off-by: Davide Gardenal <davide.gardenal@huawei.com> +--- +diff --git a/src/nfa/estimate_size.cc b/src/nfa/estimate_size.cc +--- a/src/nfa/estimate_size.cc (revision e58939b34bb4c37cd990f82dc286f21cb405743e) ++++ b/src/nfa/estimate_size.cc (date 1647005399735) +@@ -6,41 +6,113 @@ + #include "src/re/re.h" + + namespace re2c { ++namespace { ++ ++struct StackItem { ++ const RE *re; // current sub-RE ++ uint32_t size; // size of the sub-RE (only for alternative and concatenation) ++ uint8_t succ; // index of the next sucessor to be visited ++}; + +-static size_t estimate(const RE *re) ++static uint32_t estimate_re_size(const RE *re0, std::vector<StackItem> &stack) + { +- switch (re->type) { +- case RE::NIL: return 0; +- case RE::SYM: return 1; +- case RE::TAG: return 1; +- case RE::ALT: +- return estimate(re->alt.re1) +- + estimate(re->alt.re2) +- + 1; +- case RE::CAT: +- return estimate(re->cat.re1) +- + estimate(re->cat.re2); +- case RE::ITER: { +- const size_t +- iter = estimate(re->iter.re), +- min = re->iter.min, +- max = re->iter.max; +- return max == AST::MANY +- ? iter * min + 1 +- : iter * max + (max - min); +- } +- } +- return 0; /* unreachable */ +-} ++ // the estimated size of the last sub-RE visited by DFS ++ uint32_t size = 0; ++ ++ const StackItem i0 = {re0, 0, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(i0); ++ ++ while (!stack.empty()) { ++ const StackItem i = stack.back(); ++ stack.pop_back(); ++ ++ const RE *re = i.re; ++ if (re->type == RE::NIL) { ++ size = 0; ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::SYM || re->type == RE::TAG) { ++ size = 1; ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::ALT) { ++ if (i.succ == 0) { ++ // recurse into the left sub-RE ++ StackItem k = {re, 0, 1}; ++ stack.push_back(k); ++ StackItem j = {re->alt.re1, 0, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ else if (i.succ == 1) { ++ // recurse into the right sub-RE ++ StackItem k = {re, size, 2}; ++ stack.push_back(k); ++ StackItem j = {re->alt.re2, 0, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ else { ++ // both sub-RE visited, recursive return ++ size = i.size // left sub-RE (saved on stack) ++ + size // right sub-RE (just visited by DFS) ++ + 1; // additional state for alternative ++ } ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::CAT) { ++ if (i.succ == 0) { ++ // recurse into the left sub-RE ++ StackItem k = {re, 0, 1}; ++ stack.push_back(k); ++ StackItem j = {re->cat.re1, 0, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ else if (i.succ == 1) { ++ // recurse into the right sub-RE ++ StackItem k = {re, size, 2}; ++ stack.push_back(k); ++ StackItem j = {re->cat.re2, 0, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ else { ++ // both sub-RE visited, recursive return ++ size = i.size // left sub-RE (saved on stack) ++ + size; // right sub-RE (just visited by DFS) ++ } ++ } ++ else if (re->type == RE::ITER) { ++ if (i.succ == 0) { ++ // recurse into the sub-RE ++ StackItem k = {re, 0, 1}; ++ stack.push_back(k); ++ StackItem j = {re->iter.re, 0, 0}; ++ stack.push_back(j); ++ } ++ else { ++ // sub-RE visited, recursive return ++ const uint32_t min = re->iter.min, max = re->iter.max; ++ size = max == AST::MANY ++ ? size * min + 1 ++ : size * max + (max - min); ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ //DASSERT(stack.empty()); ++ return size; ++} ++ ++} // anonymous namespace + + size_t estimate_size(const std::vector<RE*> &res) + { +- const size_t nre = res.size(); +- size_t size = nre - 1; +- for (size_t i = 0; i < nre; ++i) { +- size += estimate(res[i]) + 1; +- } +- return size; ++ std::vector<StackItem> stack; ++ ++ const size_t nre = res.size(); ++ //DASSERT(nre > 0); ++ size_t size = nre - 1; ++ ++ for (size_t i = 0; i < nre; ++i) { ++ size += estimate_re_size(res[i], stack) + 1; ++ } ++ ++ return size; + } + + } // namespace re2c + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c_1.0.1.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c_1.0.1.bb index faeb496a1a..ca5c33f151 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c_1.0.1.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/re2c/re2c_1.0.1.bb @@ -7,7 +7,11 @@ SECTION = "devel" LICENSE = "PD" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://README;beginline=146;md5=881056c9add17f8019ccd8c382ba963a" -SRC_URI = "https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/releases/download/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz" +SRC_URI = "https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/releases/download/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \ +file://CVE-2018-21232-1.patch \ +file://CVE-2018-21232-2.patch \ +file://CVE-2018-21232-3.patch \ +file://CVE-2018-21232-4.patch" SRC_URI[md5sum] = "e2c6cf52fc6a21595f21bc82db5324f8" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "605058d18a00e01bfc32aebf83af35ed5b13180b4e9f279c90843afab2c66c7c" UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/skvadrik/re2c/releases" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-patch-8.2.3581-reading-character-past-end-of-line.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-patch-8.2.3581-reading-character-past-end-of-line.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 28c61cd782..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-patch-8.2.3581-reading-character-past-end-of-line.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -CVE: CVE-2021-3927 -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> - -From 93b427c6e729260d0700c3b2804ec153bc8284fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org> -Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 15:10:11 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.3581: reading character past end of line - -Problem: Reading character past end of line. -Solution: Correct the cursor column. ---- - src/ex_docmd.c | 1 + - src/testdir/test_put.vim | 12 ++++++++++++ - src/version.c | 2 ++ - 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/ex_docmd.c b/src/ex_docmd.c -index fde726477..59e245bee 100644 ---- a/src/ex_docmd.c -+++ b/src/ex_docmd.c -@@ -6905,6 +6905,7 @@ ex_put(exarg_T *eap) - eap->forceit = TRUE; - } - curwin->w_cursor.lnum = eap->line2; -+ check_cursor_col(); - do_put(eap->regname, eap->forceit ? BACKWARD : FORWARD, 1L, - PUT_LINE|PUT_CURSLINE); - } -diff --git a/src/testdir/test_put.vim b/src/testdir/test_put.vim -index 225ebd1f3..922e5b269 100644 ---- a/src/testdir/test_put.vim -+++ b/src/testdir/test_put.vim -@@ -113,3 +113,15 @@ func Test_put_p_indent_visual() - call assert_equal('select that text', getline(2)) - bwipe! - endfunc -+ -+func Test_put_above_first_line() -+ new -+ let @" = 'text' -+ silent! normal 0o00 -+ 0put -+ call assert_equal('text', getline(1)) -+ bwipe! -+endfunc -+ -+ -+" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab -diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c -index a9e8be0e7..df4ec9a47 100644 ---- a/src/version.c -+++ b/src/version.c -@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static char *(features[]) = - - static int included_patches[] = - { /* Add new patch number below this line */ -+/**/ -+ 3581, - /**/ - 3564, - /**/ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch index 63a7b78f12..2fc11dbdc2 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch @@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <mingli.yu@windriver.com> src/Makefile | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) -diff --git a/src/Makefile b/src/Makefile -index f2fafa4dc..7148d4bd9 100644 ---- a/src/Makefile -+++ b/src/Makefile -@@ -2845,16 +2845,10 @@ auto/pathdef.c: Makefile auto/config.mk +Index: git/src/Makefile +=================================================================== +--- git.orig/src/Makefile ++++ git/src/Makefile +@@ -3101,16 +3101,10 @@ auto/pathdef.c: Makefile auto/config.mk -@echo '#include "vim.h"' >> $@ -@echo 'char_u *default_vim_dir = (char_u *)"$(VIMRCLOC)";' | $(QUOTESED) >> $@ -@echo 'char_u *default_vimruntime_dir = (char_u *)"$(VIMRUNTIMEDIR)";' | $(QUOTESED) >> $@ @@ -41,6 +41,3 @@ index f2fafa4dc..7148d4bd9 100644 -@sh $(srcdir)/pathdef.sh GUI_GTK_RES_INPUTS = \ --- -2.17.1 - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0002-patch-8.2.3428-using-freed-memory-when-replacing.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0002-patch-8.2.3428-using-freed-memory-when-replacing.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ecfae0301e..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0002-patch-8.2.3428-using-freed-memory-when-replacing.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,83 +0,0 @@ -CVE: CVE-2021-3796 -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> - -From 1160e5f74b229336502fc376416f21108d36cfc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org> -Date: Sat, 11 Sep 2021 21:14:20 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.3428: using freed memory when replacing - -Problem: Using freed memory when replacing. (Dhiraj Mishra) -Solution: Get the line pointer after calling ins_copychar(). ---- - src/normal.c | 10 +++++++--- - src/testdir/test_edit.vim | 14 ++++++++++++++ - src/version.c | 2 ++ - 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/normal.c b/src/normal.c -index c4963e621..d6333b948 100644 ---- a/src/normal.c -+++ b/src/normal.c -@@ -5009,19 +5009,23 @@ nv_replace(cmdarg_T *cap) - { - /* - * Get ptr again, because u_save and/or showmatch() will have -- * released the line. At the same time we let know that the -- * line will be changed. -+ * released the line. This may also happen in ins_copychar(). -+ * At the same time we let know that the line will be changed. - */ -- ptr = ml_get_buf(curbuf, curwin->w_cursor.lnum, TRUE); - if (cap->nchar == Ctrl_E || cap->nchar == Ctrl_Y) - { - int c = ins_copychar(curwin->w_cursor.lnum - + (cap->nchar == Ctrl_Y ? -1 : 1)); -+ -+ ptr = ml_get_buf(curbuf, curwin->w_cursor.lnum, TRUE); - if (c != NUL) - ptr[curwin->w_cursor.col] = c; - } - else -+ { -+ ptr = ml_get_buf(curbuf, curwin->w_cursor.lnum, TRUE); - ptr[curwin->w_cursor.col] = cap->nchar; -+ } - if (p_sm && msg_silent == 0) - showmatch(cap->nchar); - ++curwin->w_cursor.col; -diff --git a/src/testdir/test_edit.vim b/src/testdir/test_edit.vim -index 4e29e7fe1..f94e6c181 100644 ---- a/src/testdir/test_edit.vim -+++ b/src/testdir/test_edit.vim -@@ -1519,3 +1519,17 @@ func Test_edit_noesckeys() - bwipe! - set esckeys - endfunc -+ -+" Test for getting the character of the line below after "p" -+func Test_edit_put_CTRL_E() -+ set encoding=latin1 -+ new -+ let @" = '' -+ sil! norm orggRx -+ sil! norm pr -+ call assert_equal(['r', 'r'], getline(1, 2)) -+ bwipe! -+ set encoding=utf-8 -+endfunc -+ -+" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab -diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c -index 85bdfc601..1046993d6 100644 ---- a/src/version.c -+++ b/src/version.c -@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static char *(features[]) = - - static int included_patches[] = - { /* Add new patch number below this line */ -+/**/ -+ 3428, - /**/ - 3409, - /**/ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0002-patch-8.2.3582-reading-uninitialized-memory-when-giv.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0002-patch-8.2.3582-reading-uninitialized-memory-when-giv.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d117a98893..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0002-patch-8.2.3582-reading-uninitialized-memory-when-giv.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -CVE: CVE-2021-3928 -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> - -From ade0f0481969f1453c60e7c8354b00dfe4238739 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org> -Date: Thu, 4 Nov 2021 15:46:05 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.3582: reading uninitialized memory when giving - spell suggestions - -Problem: Reading uninitialized memory when giving spell suggestions. -Solution: Check that preword is not empty. ---- - src/spellsuggest.c | 2 +- - src/testdir/test_spell.vim | 8 ++++++++ - src/version.c | 2 ++ - 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/src/spellsuggest.c b/src/spellsuggest.c -index 9d6df7930..8615d5280 100644 ---- a/src/spellsuggest.c -+++ b/src/spellsuggest.c -@@ -1600,7 +1600,7 @@ suggest_trie_walk( - // char, e.g., "thes," -> "these". - p = fword + sp->ts_fidx; - MB_PTR_BACK(fword, p); -- if (!spell_iswordp(p, curwin)) -+ if (!spell_iswordp(p, curwin) && *preword != NUL) - { - p = preword + STRLEN(preword); - MB_PTR_BACK(preword, p); -diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spell.vim b/src/testdir/test_spell.vim -index 79fb8927c..e435e9172 100644 ---- a/src/testdir/test_spell.vim -+++ b/src/testdir/test_spell.vim -@@ -498,6 +498,14 @@ func Test_spell_screendump() - call delete('XtestSpell') - endfunc - -+func Test_spell_single_word() -+ new -+ silent! norm 0R00 -+ spell! ß -+ silent 0norm 0r$ Dvz= -+ bwipe! -+endfunc -+ - let g:test_data_aff1 = [ - \"SET ISO8859-1", - \"TRY esianrtolcdugmphbyfvkwjkqxz-\xEB\xE9\xE8\xEA\xEF\xEE\xE4\xE0\xE2\xF6\xFC\xFB'ESIANRTOLCDUGMPHBYFVKWJKQXZ", -diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c -index df4ec9a47..e1bc0d09b 100644 ---- a/src/version.c -+++ b/src/version.c -@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static char *(features[]) = - - static int included_patches[] = - { /* Add new patch number below this line */ -+/**/ -+ 3582, - /**/ - 3581, - /**/ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0002-patch-8.2.3611-crash-when-using-CTRL-W-f-without-fin.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0002-patch-8.2.3611-crash-when-using-CTRL-W-f-without-fin.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 58d3442677..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0002-patch-8.2.3611-crash-when-using-CTRL-W-f-without-fin.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -CVE: CVE-2021-3973 -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> - -From b6154e9f530544ddc3130d981caae0dabc053757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org> -Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 18:00:31 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.3611: crash when using CTRL-W f without finding a - file name Problem: Crash when using CTRL-W f without finding - a file name. Solution: Bail out when the file name length is zero. - ---- - src/findfile.c | 8 ++++++++ - src/normal.c | 6 ++++-- - src/testdir/test_visual.vim | 8 ++++++++ - src/version.c | 2 ++ - 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/findfile.c b/src/findfile.c -index dba547da1..5764fd7b8 100644 ---- a/src/findfile.c -+++ b/src/findfile.c -@@ -1727,6 +1727,9 @@ find_file_in_path_option( - proc->pr_WindowPtr = (APTR)-1L; - # endif - -+ if (len == 0) -+ return NULL; -+ - if (first == TRUE) - { - // copy file name into NameBuff, expanding environment variables -@@ -2094,7 +2097,12 @@ find_file_name_in_path( - int c; - # if defined(FEAT_FIND_ID) && defined(FEAT_EVAL) - char_u *tofree = NULL; -+# endif - -+ if (len == 0) -+ return NULL; -+ -+# if defined(FEAT_FIND_ID) && defined(FEAT_EVAL) - if ((options & FNAME_INCL) && *curbuf->b_p_inex != NUL) - { - tofree = eval_includeexpr(ptr, len); -diff --git a/src/normal.c b/src/normal.c -index 7cb959257..f0084f2ac 100644 ---- a/src/normal.c -+++ b/src/normal.c -@@ -3778,8 +3778,10 @@ get_visual_text( - *pp = ml_get_pos(&VIsual); - *lenp = curwin->w_cursor.col - VIsual.col + 1; - } -- if (has_mbyte) -- // Correct the length to include the whole last character. -+ if (**pp == NUL) -+ *lenp = 0; -+ if (has_mbyte && *lenp > 0) -+ // Correct the length to include all bytes of the last character. - *lenp += (*mb_ptr2len)(*pp + (*lenp - 1)) - 1; - } - reset_VIsual_and_resel(); -diff --git a/src/testdir/test_visual.vim b/src/testdir/test_visual.vim -index ae281238e..0705fdb57 100644 ---- a/src/testdir/test_visual.vim -+++ b/src/testdir/test_visual.vim -@@ -894,4 +894,12 @@ func Test_block_insert_replace_tabs() - bwipe! - endfunc - -+func Test_visual_block_ctrl_w_f() -+ " Emtpy block selected in new buffer should not result in an error. -+ au! BufNew foo sil norm f -+ edit foo -+ -+ au! BufNew -+endfunc -+ - " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab -diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c -index 52be3c39d..59a314b3a 100644 ---- a/src/version.c -+++ b/src/version.c -@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static char *(features[]) = - - static int included_patches[] = - { /* Add new patch number below this line */ -+/**/ -+ 3611, - /**/ - 3582, - /**/ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0003-patch-8.2.3487-illegal-memory-access-if-buffer-name-.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0003-patch-8.2.3487-illegal-memory-access-if-buffer-name-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 576664f436..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0003-patch-8.2.3487-illegal-memory-access-if-buffer-name-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -CVE: CVE-2021-3872 -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> - -From 61629ea24a2fff1f89c37479d3fb52f17c3480fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org> -Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 18:39:28 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.3487: illegal memory access if buffer name is very - long - -Problem: Illegal memory access if buffer name is very long. -Solution: Make sure not to go over the end of the buffer. ---- - src/drawscreen.c | 10 +++++----- - src/testdir/test_statusline.vim | 11 +++++++++++ - src/version.c | 2 ++ - 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/drawscreen.c b/src/drawscreen.c -index 3a88ee979..9acb70552 100644 ---- a/src/drawscreen.c -+++ b/src/drawscreen.c -@@ -446,13 +446,13 @@ win_redr_status(win_T *wp, int ignore_pum UNUSED) - *(p + len++) = ' '; - if (bt_help(wp->w_buffer)) - { -- STRCPY(p + len, _("[Help]")); -+ vim_snprintf((char *)p + len, MAXPATHL - len, "%s", _("[Help]")); - len += (int)STRLEN(p + len); - } - #ifdef FEAT_QUICKFIX - if (wp->w_p_pvw) - { -- STRCPY(p + len, _("[Preview]")); -+ vim_snprintf((char *)p + len, MAXPATHL - len, "%s", _("[Preview]")); - len += (int)STRLEN(p + len); - } - #endif -@@ -462,12 +462,12 @@ win_redr_status(win_T *wp, int ignore_pum UNUSED) - #endif - ) - { -- STRCPY(p + len, "[+]"); -- len += 3; -+ vim_snprintf((char *)p + len, MAXPATHL - len, "%s", "[+]"); -+ len += (int)STRLEN(p + len); - } - if (wp->w_buffer->b_p_ro) - { -- STRCPY(p + len, _("[RO]")); -+ vim_snprintf((char *)p + len, MAXPATHL - len, "%s", _("[RO]")); - len += (int)STRLEN(p + len); - } - -diff --git a/src/testdir/test_statusline.vim b/src/testdir/test_statusline.vim -index 1f705b847..91bce1407 100644 ---- a/src/testdir/test_statusline.vim -+++ b/src/testdir/test_statusline.vim -@@ -393,3 +393,14 @@ func Test_statusline_visual() - bwipe! x1 - bwipe! x2 - endfunc -+" Used to write beyond allocated memory. This assumes MAXPATHL is 4096 bytes. -+func Test_statusline_verylong_filename() -+ let fname = repeat('x', 4090) -+ exe "new " .. fname -+ set buftype=help -+ set previewwindow -+ redraw -+ bwipe! -+endfunc -+ -+" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab -diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c -index 1046993d6..2b5de5ccf 100644 ---- a/src/version.c -+++ b/src/version.c -@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static char *(features[]) = - - static int included_patches[] = - { /* Add new patch number below this line */ -+/**/ -+ 3487, - /**/ - 3428, - /**/ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0004-patch-8.2.3489-ml_get-error-after-search-with-range.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0004-patch-8.2.3489-ml_get-error-after-search-with-range.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 045081579c..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0004-patch-8.2.3489-ml_get-error-after-search-with-range.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,72 +0,0 @@ -CVE: CVE-2021-3875 -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> - -From b8968e26d7508e7d64bfc86808142818b0a9288c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org> -Date: Sat, 9 Oct 2021 13:58:55 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.3489: ml_get error after search with range - -Problem: ml_get error after search with range. -Solution: Limit the line number to the buffer line count. ---- - src/ex_docmd.c | 6 ++++-- - src/testdir/test_search.vim | 17 +++++++++++++++++ - src/version.c | 2 ++ - 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/ex_docmd.c b/src/ex_docmd.c -index fb07450f8..fde726477 100644 ---- a/src/ex_docmd.c -+++ b/src/ex_docmd.c -@@ -3586,8 +3586,10 @@ get_address( - - // When '/' or '?' follows another address, start from - // there. -- if (lnum != MAXLNUM) -- curwin->w_cursor.lnum = lnum; -+ if (lnum > 0 && lnum != MAXLNUM) -+ curwin->w_cursor.lnum = -+ lnum > curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count -+ ? curbuf->b_ml.ml_line_count : lnum; - - // Start a forward search at the end of the line (unless - // before the first line). -diff --git a/src/testdir/test_search.vim b/src/testdir/test_search.vim -index 187671305..e142c3547 100644 ---- a/src/testdir/test_search.vim -+++ b/src/testdir/test_search.vim -@@ -1366,3 +1366,20 @@ func Test_searchdecl() - - bwipe! - endfunc -+ -+func Test_search_with_invalid_range() -+ new -+ let lines =<< trim END -+ /\%.v -+ 5/ -+ c -+ END -+ call writefile(lines, 'Xrangesearch') -+ source Xrangesearch -+ -+ bwipe! -+ call delete('Xrangesearch') -+endfunc -+ -+ -+" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab -diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c -index 2b5de5ccf..092864bbb 100644 ---- a/src/version.c -+++ b/src/version.c -@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static char *(features[]) = - - static int included_patches[] = - { /* Add new patch number below this line */ -+/**/ -+ 3489, - /**/ - 3487, - /**/ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0005-patch-8.2.3564-invalid-memory-access-when-scrolling-.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0005-patch-8.2.3564-invalid-memory-access-when-scrolling-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7184b37cad..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/0005-patch-8.2.3564-invalid-memory-access-when-scrolling-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,97 +0,0 @@ -CVE: CVE-2021-3903 -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> - -From b15919c1fe0f7fc3d98ff5207ed2feb43c59009d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org> -Date: Mon, 25 Oct 2021 17:07:04 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.3564: invalid memory access when scrolling without - valid screen - -Problem: Invalid memory access when scrolling without a valid screen. -Solution: Do not set VALID_BOTLINE in w_valid. ---- - src/move.c | 1 - - src/testdir/test_normal.vim | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- - src/version.c | 2 ++ - 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/move.c b/src/move.c -index 8e53d8bcb..10165ef4d 100644 ---- a/src/move.c -+++ b/src/move.c -@@ -198,7 +198,6 @@ update_topline(void) - { - curwin->w_topline = curwin->w_cursor.lnum; - curwin->w_botline = curwin->w_topline; -- curwin->w_valid |= VALID_BOTLINE|VALID_BOTLINE_AP; - curwin->w_scbind_pos = 1; - return; - } -diff --git a/src/testdir/test_normal.vim b/src/testdir/test_normal.vim -index d45cf4159..ca87928f5 100644 ---- a/src/testdir/test_normal.vim -+++ b/src/testdir/test_normal.vim -@@ -33,14 +33,14 @@ func CountSpaces(type, ...) - else - silent exe "normal! `[v`]y" - endif -- let g:a=strlen(substitute(@@, '[^ ]', '', 'g')) -+ let g:a = strlen(substitute(@@, '[^ ]', '', 'g')) - let &selection = sel_save - let @@ = reg_save - endfunc - - func OpfuncDummy(type, ...) - " for testing operatorfunc -- let g:opt=&linebreak -+ let g:opt = &linebreak - - if a:0 " Invoked from Visual mode, use gv command. - silent exe "normal! gvy" -@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func OpfuncDummy(type, ...) - endif - " Create a new dummy window - new -- let g:bufnr=bufnr('%') -+ let g:bufnr = bufnr('%') - endfunc - - fun! Test_normal00_optrans() -@@ -718,6 +718,23 @@ func Test_normal17_z_scroll_hor2() - bw! - endfunc - -+ -+func Test_scroll_in_ex_mode() -+ " This was using invalid memory because w_botline was invalid. -+ let lines =<< trim END -+ diffsplit -+ norm os00( -+ call writefile(['done'], 'Xdone') -+ qa! -+ END -+ call writefile(lines, 'Xscript') -+ call assert_equal(1, RunVim([], [], '--clean -X -Z -e -s -S Xscript')) -+ call assert_equal(['done'], readfile('Xdone')) -+ -+ call delete('Xscript') -+ call delete('Xdone') -+endfunc -+ - func Test_normal18_z_fold() - " basic tests for foldopen/folddelete - if !has("folding") -diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c -index 092864bbb..a9e8be0e7 100644 ---- a/src/version.c -+++ b/src/version.c -@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static char *(features[]) = - - static int included_patches[] = - { /* Add new patch number below this line */ -+/**/ -+ 3564, - /**/ - 3489, - /**/ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2021-3778.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2021-3778.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5fa60f5340..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2021-3778.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,61 +0,0 @@ -From 6d351cec5b97cb72b226d03bd727e453a235ed8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com> -Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2021 23:48:00 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.3409: reading beyond end of line with invalid utf-8 - character - -Problem: Reading beyond end of line with invalid utf-8 character. -Solution: Check for NUL when advancing. - -Upstream-Status: Accepted [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/65b605665997fad54ef39a93199e305af2fe4d7f] -CVE: CVE-2021-3778 -Signed-off-by: Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com> - ---- - src/regexp_nfa.c | 3 ++- - src/testdir/test_regexp_utf8.vim | 7 +++++++ - src/version.c | 2 ++ - 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/src/regexp_nfa.c b/src/regexp_nfa.c -index fb512f961..ace83a1a3 100644 ---- a/src/regexp_nfa.c -+++ b/src/regexp_nfa.c -@@ -5455,7 +5455,8 @@ find_match_text(colnr_T startcol, int regstart, char_u *match_text) - match = FALSE; - break; - } -- len2 += MB_CHAR2LEN(c2); -+ len2 += enc_utf8 ? utf_ptr2len(rex.line + col + len2) -+ : MB_CHAR2LEN(c2); - } - if (match - // check that no composing char follows -diff --git a/src/testdir/test_regexp_utf8.vim b/src/testdir/test_regexp_utf8.vim -index 19ff882be..e0665818b 100644 ---- a/src/testdir/test_regexp_utf8.vim -+++ b/src/testdir/test_regexp_utf8.vim -@@ -215,3 +215,10 @@ func Test_optmatch_toolong() - set re=0 - endfunc - -+func Test_match_invalid_byte() -+ call writefile(0z630a.765d30aa0a.2e0a.790a.4030, 'Xinvalid') -+ new -+ source Xinvalid -+ bwipe! -+ call delete('Xinvalid') -+endfunc -diff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c -index 8912f6215..85bdfc601 100644 ---- a/src/version.c -+++ b/src/version.c -@@ -742,6 +742,8 @@ static char *(features[]) = - - static int included_patches[] = - { /* Add new patch number below this line */ -+/**/ -+ 3409, - /**/ - 3402, - /**/ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2021-4069.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2021-4069.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 6a67281907..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2021-4069.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -From cd2422ee2dab3f33b2dbd1271e17cdaf8762b6d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com> -Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2021 20:32:02 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH] using freed memory in open command - -Problem: Using freed memory in open command. -Solution: Make a copy of the current line. - -Upstream-Status: Backported [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/e031fe90cf2e375ce861ff5e5e281e4ad229ebb9] -CVE: CVE-2021-4069 -Signed-off-by: Minjae Kim <flowergom@gmail.com> ---- - src/ex_docmd.c | 10 +++++++--- - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/ex_docmd.c b/src/ex_docmd.c -index 59e245bee..ccd9e8bed 100644 ---- a/src/ex_docmd.c -+++ b/src/ex_docmd.c -@@ -6029,13 +6029,17 @@ ex_open(exarg_T *eap) - regmatch.regprog = vim_regcomp(eap->arg, p_magic ? RE_MAGIC : 0); - if (regmatch.regprog != NULL) - { -+ // make a copy of the line, when searching for a mark it might be -+ // flushed -+ char_u *line = vim_strsave(ml_get_curline()); -+ - regmatch.rm_ic = p_ic; -- p = ml_get_curline(); -- if (vim_regexec(®match, p, (colnr_T)0)) -- curwin->w_cursor.col = (colnr_T)(regmatch.startp[0] - p); -+ if (vim_regexec(®match, line, (colnr_T)0)) -+ curwin->w_cursor.col = (colnr_T)(regmatch.startp[0] - line); - else - emsg(_(e_nomatch)); - vim_regfree(regmatch.regprog); -+ vim_free(line); - } - // Move to the NUL, ignore any other arguments. - eap->arg += STRLEN(eap->arg); --- -2.25.1 - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/b7081e135a16091c93f6f5f7525a5c58fb7ca9f9.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/b7081e135a16091c93f6f5f7525a5c58fb7ca9f9.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1cee759502..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/b7081e135a16091c93f6f5f7525a5c58fb7ca9f9.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,207 +0,0 @@ -From b7081e135a16091c93f6f5f7525a5c58fb7ca9f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org> -Date: Sat, 4 Sep 2021 18:47:28 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.3402: invalid memory access when using :retab with - large value - -Problem: Invalid memory access when using :retab with large value. -Solution: Check the number is positive. - -CVE: CVE-2021-3770 -Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> -Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/b7081e135a16091c93f6f5f7525a5c58fb7ca9f9] ---- - src/indent.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++------------- - src/option.c | 12 ++++++------ - src/optionstr.c | 4 ++-- - src/testdir/test_retab.vim | 3 +++ - src/version.c | 2 ++ - 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) - -Index: git/src/indent.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/indent.c -+++ git/src/indent.c -@@ -18,18 +18,19 @@ - /* - * Set the integer values corresponding to the string setting of 'vartabstop'. - * "array" will be set, caller must free it if needed. -+ * Return FAIL for an error. - */ - int - tabstop_set(char_u *var, int **array) - { -- int valcount = 1; -- int t; -- char_u *cp; -+ int valcount = 1; -+ int t; -+ char_u *cp; - - if (var[0] == NUL || (var[0] == '0' && var[1] == NUL)) - { - *array = NULL; -- return TRUE; -+ return OK; - } - - for (cp = var; *cp != NUL; ++cp) -@@ -43,8 +44,8 @@ tabstop_set(char_u *var, int **array) - if (cp != end) - emsg(_(e_positive)); - else -- emsg(_(e_invarg)); -- return FALSE; -+ semsg(_(e_invarg2), cp); -+ return FAIL; - } - } - -@@ -55,26 +56,33 @@ tabstop_set(char_u *var, int **array) - ++valcount; - continue; - } -- emsg(_(e_invarg)); -- return FALSE; -+ semsg(_(e_invarg2), var); -+ return FAIL; - } - - *array = ALLOC_MULT(int, valcount + 1); - if (*array == NULL) -- return FALSE; -+ return FAIL; - (*array)[0] = valcount; - - t = 1; - for (cp = var; *cp != NUL;) - { -- (*array)[t++] = atoi((char *)cp); -- while (*cp != NUL && *cp != ',') -+ int n = atoi((char *)cp); -+ -+ if (n < 0 || n > 9999) -+ { -+ semsg(_(e_invarg2), cp); -+ return FAIL; -+ } -+ (*array)[t++] = n; -+ while (*cp != NUL && *cp != ',') - ++cp; - if (*cp != NUL) - ++cp; - } - -- return TRUE; -+ return OK; - } - - /* -@@ -1556,7 +1564,7 @@ ex_retab(exarg_T *eap) - - #ifdef FEAT_VARTABS - new_ts_str = eap->arg; -- if (!tabstop_set(eap->arg, &new_vts_array)) -+ if (tabstop_set(eap->arg, &new_vts_array) == FAIL) - return; - while (vim_isdigit(*(eap->arg)) || *(eap->arg) == ',') - ++(eap->arg); -Index: git/src/option.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/option.c -+++ git/src/option.c -@@ -2292,9 +2292,9 @@ didset_options2(void) - #endif - #ifdef FEAT_VARTABS - vim_free(curbuf->b_p_vsts_array); -- tabstop_set(curbuf->b_p_vsts, &curbuf->b_p_vsts_array); -+ (void)tabstop_set(curbuf->b_p_vsts, &curbuf->b_p_vsts_array); - vim_free(curbuf->b_p_vts_array); -- tabstop_set(curbuf->b_p_vts, &curbuf->b_p_vts_array); -+ (void)tabstop_set(curbuf->b_p_vts, &curbuf->b_p_vts_array); - #endif - } - -@@ -5756,7 +5756,7 @@ buf_copy_options(buf_T *buf, int flags) - buf->b_p_vsts = vim_strsave(p_vsts); - COPY_OPT_SCTX(buf, BV_VSTS); - if (p_vsts && p_vsts != empty_option) -- tabstop_set(p_vsts, &buf->b_p_vsts_array); -+ (void)tabstop_set(p_vsts, &buf->b_p_vsts_array); - else - buf->b_p_vsts_array = 0; - buf->b_p_vsts_nopaste = p_vsts_nopaste -@@ -5914,7 +5914,7 @@ buf_copy_options(buf_T *buf, int flags) - buf->b_p_isk = save_p_isk; - #ifdef FEAT_VARTABS - if (p_vts && p_vts != empty_option && !buf->b_p_vts_array) -- tabstop_set(p_vts, &buf->b_p_vts_array); -+ (void)tabstop_set(p_vts, &buf->b_p_vts_array); - else - buf->b_p_vts_array = NULL; - #endif -@@ -5929,7 +5929,7 @@ buf_copy_options(buf_T *buf, int flags) - buf->b_p_vts = vim_strsave(p_vts); - COPY_OPT_SCTX(buf, BV_VTS); - if (p_vts && p_vts != empty_option && !buf->b_p_vts_array) -- tabstop_set(p_vts, &buf->b_p_vts_array); -+ (void)tabstop_set(p_vts, &buf->b_p_vts_array); - else - buf->b_p_vts_array = NULL; - #endif -@@ -6634,7 +6634,7 @@ paste_option_changed(void) - if (buf->b_p_vsts_array) - vim_free(buf->b_p_vsts_array); - if (buf->b_p_vsts && buf->b_p_vsts != empty_option) -- tabstop_set(buf->b_p_vsts, &buf->b_p_vsts_array); -+ (void)tabstop_set(buf->b_p_vsts, &buf->b_p_vsts_array); - else - buf->b_p_vsts_array = 0; - #endif -Index: git/src/optionstr.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/optionstr.c -+++ git/src/optionstr.c -@@ -2166,7 +2166,7 @@ did_set_string_option( - if (errmsg == NULL) - { - int *oldarray = curbuf->b_p_vsts_array; -- if (tabstop_set(*varp, &(curbuf->b_p_vsts_array))) -+ if (tabstop_set(*varp, &(curbuf->b_p_vsts_array)) == OK) - { - if (oldarray) - vim_free(oldarray); -@@ -2205,7 +2205,7 @@ did_set_string_option( - { - int *oldarray = curbuf->b_p_vts_array; - -- if (tabstop_set(*varp, &(curbuf->b_p_vts_array))) -+ if (tabstop_set(*varp, &(curbuf->b_p_vts_array)) == OK) - { - vim_free(oldarray); - #ifdef FEAT_FOLDING -Index: git/src/testdir/test_retab.vim -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/testdir/test_retab.vim -+++ git/src/testdir/test_retab.vim -@@ -74,4 +74,7 @@ endfunc - func Test_retab_error() - call assert_fails('retab -1', 'E487:') - call assert_fails('retab! -1', 'E487:') -+ call assert_fails('ret -1000', 'E487:') -+ call assert_fails('ret 10000', 'E475:') -+ call assert_fails('ret 80000000000000000000', 'E475:') - endfunc -Index: git/src/version.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/version.c -+++ git/src/version.c -@@ -743,6 +743,8 @@ static char *(features[]) = - static int included_patches[] = - { /* Add new patch number below this line */ - /**/ -+ 3402, -+/**/ - 0 - }; - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch index 33089162b4..533138245d 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/disable_acl_header_check.patch @@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com> src/configure.ac | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac -index 2d409b3ca06a..dbcaf6140263 100644 ---- a/src/configure.ac -+++ b/src/configure.ac -@@ -3257,7 +3257,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(stdint.h stdlib.h string.h \ +Index: git/src/configure.ac +=================================================================== +--- git.orig/src/configure.ac ++++ git/src/configure.ac +@@ -3292,7 +3292,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(stdint.h stdlib.h strin sys/systeminfo.h locale.h sys/stream.h termios.h \ libc.h sys/statfs.h poll.h sys/poll.h pwd.h \ utime.h sys/param.h sys/ptms.h libintl.h libgen.h \ @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ index 2d409b3ca06a..dbcaf6140263 100644 sys/access.h sys/sysinfo.h wchar.h wctype.h) dnl sys/ptem.h depends on sys/stream.h on Solaris -@@ -3886,6 +3886,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(acl, +@@ -3974,6 +3974,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(acl, , [enable_acl="yes"]) if test "$enable_acl" = "yes"; then AC_MSG_RESULT(no) @@ -34,6 +34,3 @@ index 2d409b3ca06a..dbcaf6140263 100644 AC_CHECK_LIB(posix1e, acl_get_file, [LIBS="$LIBS -lposix1e"], AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, acl_get_file, [LIBS="$LIBS -lacl" AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, fgetxattr, LIBS="$LIBS -lattr",,)],,),) --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/no-path-adjust.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/no-path-adjust.patch index 05c2d803f6..9d6da80913 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/no-path-adjust.patch +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/no-path-adjust.patch @@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ Upstream-Status: Pending Signed-off-by: Joe Slater <joe.slater@windriver.com> ---- a/src/Makefile -+++ b/src/Makefile -@@ -2507,11 +2507,14 @@ installtools: $(TOOLS) $(DESTDIR)$(exec_ +Index: git/src/Makefile +=================================================================== +--- git.orig/src/Makefile ++++ git/src/Makefile +@@ -2565,11 +2565,14 @@ installtools: $(TOOLS) $(DESTDIR)$(exec_ rm -rf $$cvs; \ fi -chmod $(FILEMOD) $(DEST_TOOLS)/* diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/racefix.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/racefix.patch index 48dca44cad..1cb8fb442f 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/racefix.patch +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/racefix.patch @@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ Index: git/src/po/Makefile =================================================================== --- git.orig/src/po/Makefile +++ git/src/po/Makefile -@@ -165,17 +165,16 @@ $(PACKAGE).pot: ../*.c ../if_perl.xs ../ - po/gvim.desktop.in po/vim.desktop.in - mv -f ../$(PACKAGE).po $(PACKAGE).pot +@@ -207,17 +207,16 @@ $(PACKAGE).pot: $(PO_INPUTLIST) $(PO_VIM + # Delete the temporary files + rm *.js -vim.desktop: vim.desktop.in $(POFILES) +LINGUAS: diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch index 37914d4cd9..5284ba45b6 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/vim-add-knob-whether-elf.h-are-checked.patch @@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com> src/configure.ac | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) -diff --git a/src/configure.ac b/src/configure.ac -index 0ee86ad..64736f0 100644 ---- a/src/configure.ac -+++ b/src/configure.ac -@@ -3192,11 +3192,18 @@ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <stdio.h>], [int x __attribute__((unused));], +Index: git/src/configure.ac +=================================================================== +--- git.orig/src/configure.ac ++++ git/src/configure.ac +@@ -3264,11 +3264,18 @@ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <stdio.h>], [in AC_MSG_RESULT(no)) dnl Checks for header files. @@ -37,6 +37,3 @@ index 0ee86ad..64736f0 100644 AC_HEADER_DIRENT --- -2.7.4 - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc index 51a6861325..b3c471225e 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ BUGTRACKER = "https://github.com/vim/vim/issues" DEPENDS = "ncurses gettext-native" # vimdiff doesn't like busybox diff RSUGGESTS_${PN} = "diffutils" + LICENSE = "vim" -LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://runtime/doc/uganda.txt;endline=287;md5=a19edd7ec70d573a005d9e509375a99a" +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=6b30ea4fa660c483b619924bc709ef99 \ + file://runtime/doc/uganda.txt;md5=a3f193c20c6faff93c69185d5d070535" SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://disable_acl_header_check.patch \ @@ -17,26 +19,17 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch \ file://no-path-adjust.patch \ file://racefix.patch \ - file://b7081e135a16091c93f6f5f7525a5c58fb7ca9f9.patch \ - file://CVE-2021-3778.patch \ - file://0002-patch-8.2.3428-using-freed-memory-when-replacing.patch \ - file://0003-patch-8.2.3487-illegal-memory-access-if-buffer-name-.patch \ - file://0004-patch-8.2.3489-ml_get-error-after-search-with-range.patch \ - file://0005-patch-8.2.3564-invalid-memory-access-when-scrolling-.patch \ - file://0001-patch-8.2.3581-reading-character-past-end-of-line.patch \ - file://0002-patch-8.2.3582-reading-uninitialized-memory-when-giv.patch \ - file://0002-patch-8.2.3611-crash-when-using-CTRL-W-f-without-fin.patch \ - file://CVE-2021-4069.patch \ " -SRCREV = "98056533b96b6b5d8849641de93185dd7bcadc44" +PV .= ".4524" +SRCREV = "d8f8629b1bf566e1dada7515e9b146c69e5d9757" + +# Remove when 8.3 is out +UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1" # Do not consider .z in x.y.z, as that is updated with every commit UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+\.\d+)\.0" -# CVE-2021-3968 is related to an issue which was introduced after 8.2, this can be removed after 8.3. -CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2021-3968" - S = "${WORKDIR}/git" VIMDIR = "vim${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[0]}${@d.getVar('PV').split('.')[1]}" @@ -68,9 +61,7 @@ do_compile() { autotools_do_compile } -#Available PACKAGECONFIG options are gtkgui, acl, x11, tiny selinux, elfutils, nls -PACKAGECONFIG ??= "" -PACKAGECONFIG += " \ +PACKAGECONFIG ??= "\ ${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'acl selinux', d)} \ ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'x11', 'x11 gtkgui', '', d)} \ nls \ diff --git a/poky/scripts/lib/devtool/deploy.py b/poky/scripts/lib/devtool/deploy.py index d802b22e8f..e0f8e64b9c 100644 --- a/poky/scripts/lib/devtool/deploy.py +++ b/poky/scripts/lib/devtool/deploy.py @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ def deploy(args, config, basepath, workspace): srcdir = recipe_outdir recipe_outdir = os.path.join(rd.getVar('WORKDIR'), 'devtool-deploy-target-stripped') if os.path.isdir(recipe_outdir): - bb.utils.remove(recipe_outdir, True) + exec_fakeroot(rd, "rm -rf %s" % recipe_outdir, shell=True) exec_fakeroot(rd, "cp -af %s %s" % (os.path.join(srcdir, '.'), recipe_outdir), shell=True) os.environ['PATH'] = ':'.join([os.environ['PATH'], rd.getVar('PATH') or '']) oe.package.strip_execs(args.recipename, recipe_outdir, rd.getVar('STRIP'), rd.getVar('libdir'), diff --git a/poky/scripts/lib/recipetool/create.py b/poky/scripts/lib/recipetool/create.py index 5b6ac12a92..798cb0cefe 100644 --- a/poky/scripts/lib/recipetool/create.py +++ b/poky/scripts/lib/recipetool/create.py @@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ def create_recipe(args): if args.binary: # Assume the archive contains the directory structure verbatim # so we need to extract to a subdirectory - fetchuri += ';subdir=${BP}' + fetchuri += ';subdir=${BPN}' srcuri = fetchuri rev_re = re.compile(';rev=([^;]+)') res = rev_re.search(srcuri) |