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authorPatrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz>2023-05-04 05:37:45 +0300
committerPatrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz>2023-05-04 05:38:27 +0300
commit841583d6ba5918b60868b708ff0b89cf0409efa7 (patch)
tree49e155d7d6c2ea5a7081fc4dcbc51cb0a522e120 /meta-openembedded/meta-oe
parent61a2d43a172b70aa34fd7ec33fc048a211fa5c4c (diff)
downloadopenbmc-841583d6ba5918b60868b708ff0b89cf0409efa7.tar.xz
subtree updates
poky: 90a6f6a110..a631bfc3a3: Alban Bedel (1): systemd: Fix systemd when used with busybox less Alex Kiernan (1): openssl: upgrade 1.1.1q to 1.1.1s Alexander Kanavin (12): tzdata: update to 2022d linux-firmware: upgrade 20220913 -> 20221012 tzdata: update 2022d -> 2022g linux-firmware: upgrade 20221109 -> 20221214 selftest/virgl: use pkg-config from the host oeqa/qemurunner: do not use Popen.poll() when terminating runqemu with a signal vim: update 9.0.1211 -> 9.0.1293 to resolve open CVEs linux-firmware: upgrade 20221214 -> 20230117 linux-firmware: upgrade 20230117 -> 20230210 wireless-regdb: upgrade 2022.08.12 -> 2023.02.13 apr: update 1.7.0 -> 1.7.2 apr-util: update 1.6.1 -> 1.6.3 Alexey Smirnov (1): classes: make TOOLCHAIN more permissive for kernel Andrej Valek (1): libarchive: fix CVE-2022-26280 Antonin Godard (2): busybox: always start do_compile with orig config files busybox: rm temporary files if do_compile was interrupted Bartosz Golaszewski (1): bluez5: add dbus to RDEPENDS Benoît Mauduit (1): lib/oe/reproducible: Use git log without gpg signature Bhabu Bindu (4): libxml2: Fix CVE-2022-40303 libxml2: Fix CVE-2022-40304 ffmpeg: Fix CVE-2022-3109 ffmpeg: fix for CVE-2022-3341 Bruce Ashfield (12): linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.216 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.219 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.221 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.224 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.225 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.228 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.229 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.230 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.231 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.233 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.234 linux-yocto/5.4: update to v5.4.237 Changqing Li (1): base.bbclass: Fix way to check ccache path Charlie Davies (1): bitbake: bitbake: fetch/git: use shlex.quote() to support spaces in SRC_URI url Chee Yang Lee (6): libksba: fix CVE-2022-47629 tiff: fix multiple CVEs ghostscript: add CVE tag for check-stack-limits-after-function-evalution.patch libksba: fix CVE-2022-3515 qemu: fix multple CVEs git: ignore CVE-2023-22743 Chen Qi (3): kernel.bbclass: make KERNEL_DEBUG_TIMESTAMPS work at rebuild psplash: consider the situation of psplash not exist for systemd bc: extend to nativesdk Christoph Lauer (1): populate_sdk_base: add zip options Daniel McGregor (1): coreutils: add openssl PACKAGECONFIG Dmitry Baryshkov (3): linux-firmware: upgrade 20221012 -> 20221109 linux-firmware: properly set license for all Qualcomm firmware linux-firmware: add yamato fw files to qcom-adreno-a2xx package Frank de Brabander (1): cve-update-db-native: add timeout to urlopen() calls Gaurav Gupta (1): qemu: fix build error introduced by CVE-2021-3929 fix Geoffrey GIRY (1): cve-check: Fix false negative version issue Harald Seiler (1): opkg: Set correct info_dir and status_file in opkg.conf Hitendra Prajapati (21): dhcp: Fix CVE-2022-2928 & CVE-2022-2929 qemu: CVE-2021-3750 hcd-ehci: DMA reentrancy issue leads to use-after-free golang: CVE-2022-2880 ReverseProxy should not forward unparseable query parameters libX11: CVE-2022-3554 Fix memory leak bluez: CVE-2022-3637 A DoS exists in monitor/jlink.c sudo: CVE-2022-43995 heap-based overflow with very small passwords libarchive: CVE-2022-36227 NULL pointer dereference in archive_write.c sysstat: fix CVE-2022-39377 golang: CVE-2022-41715 regexp/syntax: limit memory used by parsing regexps grub2: CVE-2022-28735 shim_lock verifier allows non-kernel files to be loaded grub2: Fix CVE-2022-2601 & CVE-2022-3775 xserver-xorg: Fix Multiple CVEs git: CVE-2022-23521 gitattributes parsing integer overflow curl: fix CVE-2022-43552 Use-after-free triggered by an HTTP proxy deny response QEMU: CVE-2022-4144 QXL: qxl_phys2virt unsafe address translation can lead to out-of-bounds read curl: CVE-2023-23916 HTTP multi-header compression denial of service qemu: fix compile error which imported by CVE-2022-4144 ruby: CVE-2023-28756 ReDoS vulnerability in Time curl: CVE-2023-27534 SFTP path ~ resolving discrepancy curl: CVE-2023-27538 fix SSH connection too eager reuse screen: CVE-2023-24626 allows sending SIGHUP to arbitrary PIDs Hugo SIMELIERE (2): bluez5: Exclude CVE-2022-39177 from cve-check openssl: upgrade 1.1.1s to 1.1.1t Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa (1): qemuboot.bbclass: make sure runqemu boots bundled initramfs kernel image Jan Kircher (1): toolchain-scripts: compatibility with unbound variable protection Jermain Horsman (1): cve-check: write the cve manifest to IMGDEPLOYDIR John Edward Broadbent (1): externalsrc: git submodule--helper list unsupported Joshua Watt (6): sudo: Use specific BSD license variant classes/create-spdx: Backport classes/package: Add extended packaged data licenses: Add GPL+ licenses to map create-spdx: Use gzip for compression classes/package: Use gzip for extended package data Kenfe-Mickael Laventure (3): buildtools-tarball: Handle spaces within user $PATH toolchain-scripts: Handle spaces within user $PATH populate_sdk_ext: Handle spaces within user $PATH Khem Raj (3): libtirpc: Check if file exists before operating on it apr: Use correct strerror_r implementation based on libc type apr: Cache configure tests which use AC_TRY_RUN Lee Chee Yang (1): dropbear: fix CVE-2021-36369 Luis (1): rm_work.bbclass: use HOSTTOOLS 'rm' binary exclusively Manuel Leonhardt (1): sstate: Account for reserved characters when shortening sstate filenames Marek Vasut (2): bitbake: fetch2/git: Prevent git fetcher from fetching gitlab repository metadata bitbake: fetch2/git: Clarify the meaning of namespace Marta Rybczynska (1): cve-update-db-native: avoid incomplete updates Martin Jansa (3): externalsrc.bbclass: fix git repo detection meta: remove True option to getVar and getVarFlag calls (again) bmap-tools: switch to main branch Mathieu Dubois-Briand (1): curl: Fix CVE CVE-2022-35260 Mauro Queiros (1): image.bbclass: print all QA functions exceptions Michael Halstead (1): uninative: Upgrade to 3.7 to work with glibc 2.36 Michael Opdenacker (4): dev-manual: update session about multiconfig ref-manual: document SSTATE_EXCLUDEDEPS_SYSROOT profile-manual: update WireShark hyperlinks overview-manual: update patchwork instance URL Mike Crowe (1): kernel: improve transformation from KERNEL_IMAGETYPE_FOR_MAKE Mikko Rapeli (2): oeqa context.py: fix --target-ip comment to include ssh port number oeqa rtc.py: skip if read-only-rootfs Ming Liu (1): linux: inherit pkgconfig in kernel.bbclass Minjae Kim (2): xserver-xorg: backport fixes for CVE-2022-3550, CVE-2022-3551 and CVE-2022-3553 ppp: fix CVE-2022-4603 Nikhil R (1): openssl: Fix CVE-2023-0464 Niko Mauno (2): systemd: Consider PACKAGECONFIG in RRECOMMENDS Fix missing leading whitespace with ':append' Omkar (2): dbus: upgrade 1.12.22 -> 1.12.24 python3: Fix CVE-2022-45061 Omkar Patil (3): sudo: Fix CVE-2023-22809 openssl: Fix CVE-2023-0465 openssl: Fix CVE-2023-0466 Paul Eggleton (1): classes/kernel-fitimage: add ability to add additional signing options Pavel Zhukov (1): oeqa/rpm.py: Increase timeout and add debug output Pawan Badganchi (1): python3: Fix CVE-2022-37454 Pawel Zalewski (1): classes/fs-uuid: Fix command output decoding issue Peter Kjellerstedt (2): externalsrc.bbclass: Remove a trailing slash from ${B} devshell: Do not add scripts/git-intercept to PATH Peter Marko (2): externalsrc: fix lookup for .gitmodules go: ignore CVE-2022-41716 Piotr Łobacz (1): systemd: fix wrong nobody-group assignment Qiu, Zheng (1): vim: upgrade 9.0.0820 -> 9.0.0947 Quentin Schulz (2): cairo: update patch for CVE-2019-6461 with upstream solution cairo: fix CVE patches assigned wrong CVE number Ralph Siemsen (11): golang: fix CVE-2021-33195 golang: fix CVE-2021-33198 golang: fix CVE-2021-44716 golang: fix CVE-2022-24291 golang: fix CVE-2022-28131 golang: fix CVE-2022-28327 golang: ignore CVE-2022-29804 golang: ignore CVE-2021-33194 golang: ignore CVE-2021-41772 golang: ignore CVE-2022-30580 golang: ignore CVE-2022-30630 Randy MacLeod (2): vim: upgrade 9.0.0947 -> 9.0.1211 vim: upgrade 9.0.1403 -> 9.0.1429 Ranjitsinh Rathod (3): expat: Fix CVE-2022-43680 for expat systemd: Fix CVE-2022-3821 issue libsdl2: Add fix for CVE-2022-4743 Ravula Adhitya Siddartha (1): linux-yocto/5.4: update genericx86* machines to v5.4.219 Richard Purdie (28): bitbake: tests/fetch: Allow handling of a file:// url within a submodule qemu: Avoid accidental librdmacm linkage build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision bitbake: utils: Handle lockfile filenames that are too long for filesystems bitbake: utils: Fix lockfile path length issues build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision oeqa/selftest/tinfoil: Add test for separate config_data with recipe_parse_file() build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision bitbake: runqueue: Fix multiconfig deferred task sstate validity caching issue bitbake: runqueue: Handle deferred task rehashing in multiconfig builds bitbake: runqueue: Improve multiconfig deferred task issues bitbake: runqueue: Avoid deadlock avoidance task graph corruption bitbake: runqueue: Fix issues with multiconfig deferred task deadlock messages bitbake: runqueue: Ensure deferred tasks are sorted by multiconfig bitbake: cooker: Drop sre_constants usage nativesdk: Handle chown/chgrp calls in nativesdk do_install tasks make-mod-scripts: Ensure kernel build output is deterministic libc-locale: Fix on target locale generation apr: Fix to work with autoconf 2.70 apr-util: Fix CFLAGS used in build oeqa/selftest/prservice: Improve debug output for failure build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision staging: Separate out different multiconfig manifests staging/multilib: Fix manifest corruption glibc: Add missing binutils dependency base-files: Drop localhost.localdomain from hosts file pybootchartui: Fix python syntax issue Riyaz Khan (1): rpm: Fix rpm CVE CVE-2021-3521 Robert Andersson (1): go-crosssdk: avoid host contamination by GOCACHE Rodolfo Quesada Zumbado (1): tar: CVE-2022-48303 Ross Burton (14): sanity: check for GNU tar specifically pixman: backport fix for CVE-2022-44638 lib/buildstats: fix parsing of trees with reduced_proc_pressure directories bitbake: bb/utils: include SSL certificate paths in export_proxies cve-update-db-native: add more logging when fetching cve-update-db-native: show IP on failure quilt: fix intermittent failure in faildiff.test quilt: use upstreamed faildiff.test fix git: ignore CVE-2022-41953 shadow: ignore CVE-2016-15024 vim: add missing pkgconfig inherit vim: upgrade to 9.0.1403 vim: set modified-by to the recipe MAINTAINER lib/resulttool: fix typo breaking resulttool log --ptest Shubham Kulkarni (5): glibc: Security fix for CVE-2023-0687 go-runtime: Security fix for CVE-2022-41723 go-runtime: Security fix for CVE-2022-41722 go: Security fix for CVE-2020-29510 go: Ignore CVE-2022-1705 Siddharth Doshi (1): harfbuzz: Security fix for CVE-2023-25193 Steve Sakoman (30): selftest: skip virgl test on ubuntu 22.04 qemu: Avoid accidental libvdeplug linkage qemu: Add PACKAGECONFIG for rbd devtool: add HostKeyAlgorithms option to ssh and scp commands selftest: skip virgl test on all Alma Linux documentation: update for 3.1.21 poky.conf: bump version for 3.1.21 maintainers: update gcc version to 9.5 documentation: update for 3.1.22 poky.conf: bump version for 3.1.22 ovmf: fix gcc12 warning in GenFfs ovmf: fix gcc12 warning in LzmaEnc ovmf: fix gcc12 warning for device path handling documentation: update for 3.1.23 python3: fix packaging of Windows distutils installer stubs lttng-modules: update 2.11.6 -> 2.11.7 lttng-modules: update 2.11.7 -> 2.11.8 lttng-modules: update 2.11.8 -> 2.11.9 lttng-modules: fix build with 5.4.229 kernel poky.conf: bump version for 3.1.23 poky.conf: Update SANITY_TESTED_DISTROS to match autobuilder ref-system-requirements.rst: add Fedora 35, Fedora 36, and Ubuntu 22.04 to list of supported distros ref-system-requirements.rst: add AlmaLinux 8.7 to list of supported distros qemu: Fix slirp determinism issue documentation: update for 3.1.24 poky.conf: bump version for 3.1.24 bitbake: tests/fetch.py: fix link to project documentation documentation: update for 3.1.25 poky.conf: bump version for 3.1.25 build-appliance-image: Update to dunfell head revision Sundeep KOKKONDA (3): binutils: stable 2.34 branch updates glibc : stable 2.31 branch updates. gcc: upgrade to v9.5 Sunil Kumar (1): go: Security Fix for CVE-2022-2879 Teoh Jay Shen (1): vim: Upgrade 9.0.0598 -> 9.0.0614 Thomas Roos (1): devtool: fix devtool finish when gitmodules file is empty Tim Orling (2): python3: upgrade 3.8.13 -> 3.8.14 vim: upgrade 9.0.0614 -> 9.0.0820 Ulrich Ölmann (1): kernel-yocto: fix kernel-meta data detection Vijay Anusuri (4): git: Security fix for CVE-2022-41903 git: Security fix for CVE-2023-22490 and CVE-2023-23946 sudo: Security fix for CVE-2023-28486 and CVE-2023-28487 curl: Security fix CVE-2023-27533, CVE-2023-27535 and CVE-2023-27536 Virendra Thakur (2): gcc: Fix inconsistent noexcept specifier for valarray in libstdc++ qemu: Whitelist CVE-2023-0664 Vivek Kumbhar (13): curl: fix CVE-2022-32221 POST following PUT qemu: fix CVE-2021-3638 ati-vga: inconsistent check in ati_2d_blt() may lead to out-of-bounds write libtasn1: fix CVE-2021-46848 off-by-one in asn1_encode_simple_der qemu: fix CVE-2021-20196 block fdc null pointer dereference may lead to guest crash go: fix CVE-2022-41717 Excessive memory use in got server rsync: fix CVE-2022-29154 remote arbitrary files write inside the directories of connecting peers libx11: fix CVE-2022-3555 memory leak in _XFreeX11XCBStructure() of xcb_disp.c qemu: fix CVE-2021-3507 fdc heap buffer overflow in DMA read data transfers go: fix CVE-2022-1962 go/parser stack exhaustion in all Parse* functions qemu: fix CVE-2021-3929 nvme DMA reentrancy issue leads to use-after-free gnutls: fix CVE-2023-0361 timing side-channel in the TLS RSA key exchange code go: fix CVE-2023-24537 Infinite loop in parsing go: fix CVE-2023-24534 denial of service from excessive memory allocation Wang Mingyu (1): mobile-broadband-provider-info: upgrade 20220725 -> 20221107 Xiaobing Luo (1): devtool: Fix _copy_file() TypeError ciarancourtney (1): wic: swap partitions are not added to fstab jan (1): cve-update-db-native: Allow to overrule the URL in a bbappend. rajmohan r (1): systemd: Fix CVE-2023-26604 wangmy (1): dbus: upgrade 1.12.20 -> 1.12.22 meta-openembedded: 6792ebdd96..7007d14c25: Armin Kuster (1): mariadb: Update to latest lts 10.4.28 Chris Rogers (1): xterm: Remove undeclared variables introduced by backport Colin Finck (1): [dunfell] wireguard: Upgrade to 1.0.20220627 (module) and 1.0.20210914 (tools) Hitendra Prajapati (9): postgresql: CVE-2022-1552 Autovacuum, REINDEX, and others omit "security restricted operation" sandbox dnsmasq: CVE-2022-0934 Heap use after free in dhcp6_no_relay nginx: CVE-2022-41741, CVE-2022-41742 Memory corruption in the ngx_http_mp4_module postgresql: Fix CVE-2022-2625 proftpd: CVE-2021-46854 memory disclosure to radius server net-snmp: CVE-2022-44792 & CVE-2022-44793 Fix NULL Pointer Exception krb5: CVE-2022-42898 integer overflow vulnerabilities in PAC parsing postgresql: CVE-2022-41862 Client memory disclosure when connecting with Kerberos to modified server syslog-ng: CVE-2022-38725 An integer overflow in the RFC3164 parser Ivan Stepic (1): flatbuffers: adapt for cross-compilation environments Mathieu Dubois-Briand (4): networkmanager: Update to 1.22.16 nss: Add missing CVE product nss: Whitelist CVEs related to libnssdbm nss: Fix CVE-2020-25648 Omkar Patil (1): ntfs-3g-ntfsprogs: Upgrade 2022.5.17 to 2022.10.3 Poonam Jadhav (4): nodejs: Fix CVE-2022-32212 nodejs: Fix CVE-2022-35255 nodejs: Fix CVE-2022-43548 nodejs: Fix CVEs for nodejs Priyal Doshi (1): open-vm-tools: Security fix for CVE-2022-31676 Ranjitsinh Rathod (1): strongswan: Fix CVE-2022-40617 Roger Knecht (1): zeromq: 4.3.2 -> 4.3.4 Shubham Kulkarni (1): python3-pillow: Security fix for CVE-2022-45198 Siddharth Doshi (1): xterm : Fix CVE-2022-45063 code execution via OSC 50 input sequences] CVE-2022-45063 Valeria Petrov (1): php: update 7.4.28 -> 7.4.33 Virendra Thakur (2): capnproto: Fix CVE-2022-46149 nss: Fix CVE CVE-2023-0767 Wang Mingyu (2): apache2: upgrade 2.4.54 -> 2.4.55 apache2: upgrade 2.4.55 -> 2.4.56 Yi Zhao (1): postfix: upgrade 3.4.23 -> 3.4.27 vkumbhar (2): dnsmasq: fix CVE-2023-28450 default maximum EDNS.0 UDP packet size was set to 4096 but should be 1232 mariadb: fix CVE-2022-47015 NULL pointer dereference in spider_db_mbase::print_warnings() wangmy (1): apache2: upgrade 2.4.53 -> 2.4.54 meta-security: c62970fda8..eb631c12be: Hitendra Prajapati (1): sssd: CVE-2022-4254 libsss_certmap fails to sanitise certificate data used in LDAP filters Signed-off-by: Patrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz> Change-Id: I0ebec73eb7e68d1ca95866bc758e49990731c8bf
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-openembedded/meta-oe')
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/CVE-2022-42898.patch110
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.17.1.bb1
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/files/0001-CMakeLists-txt-Avoid-host-specific-path-to-libsodium.patch8
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.3.4.bb (renamed from meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.3.2.bb)4
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb-native_10.4.28.bb (renamed from meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb-native_10.4.25.bb)0
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb.inc3
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb/CVE-2022-47015.patch269
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb_10.4.28.bb (renamed from meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb_10.4.25.bb)0
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-1552.patch947
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-2625.patch904
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-41862.patch48
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_12.9.bb3
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/capnproto/capnproto_0.7.0.bb4
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/capnproto/files/CVE-2022-46149.patch49
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/flatbuffers/flatbuffers_1.12.0.bb7
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-32212.patch133
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-35255.patch237
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-43548.patch214
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-llhttp.patch4348
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_12.22.12.bb4
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/php/php_7.4.33.bb (renamed from meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/php/php_7.4.28.bb)2
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/xorg-app/xterm/CVE-2022-45063.patch776
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/xorg-app/xterm_353.bb1
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2020-25648.patch163
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2023-0767.patch124
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.51.1.bb8
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools/0001-Properly-check-authorization-on-incoming-guestOps-re.patch39
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools_11.0.1.bb1
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/syslog-ng/files/CVE-2022-38725.patch629
-rw-r--r--meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/syslog-ng/syslog-ng_3.24.1.bb1
30 files changed, 9027 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/CVE-2022-42898.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/CVE-2022-42898.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6d04bf8980
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5/CVE-2022-42898.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+From 4e661f0085ec5f969c76c0896a34322c6c432de4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
+Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 20:25:11 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflows in PAC parsing
+
+In krb5_parse_pac(), check for buffer counts large enough to threaten
+integer overflow in the header length and memory length calculations.
+Avoid potential integer overflows when checking the length of each
+buffer. Credit to OSS-Fuzz for discovering one of the issues.
+
+CVE-2022-42898:
+
+In MIT krb5 releases 1.8 and later, an authenticated attacker may be
+able to cause a KDC or kadmind process to crash by reading beyond the
+bounds of allocated memory, creating a denial of service. A
+privileged attacker may similarly be able to cause a Kerberos or GSS
+application service to crash. On 32-bit platforms, an attacker can
+also cause insufficient memory to be allocated for the result,
+potentially leading to remote code execution in a KDC, kadmind, or GSS
+or Kerberos application server process. An attacker with the
+privileges of a cross-realm KDC may be able to extract secrets from a
+KDC process's memory by having them copied into the PAC of a new
+ticket.
+
+(cherry picked from commit ea92d2f0fcceb54a70910fa32e9a0d7a5afc3583)
+
+ticket: 9074
+version_fixed: 1.19.4
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/4e661f0085ec5f969c76c0896a34322c6c432de4]
+CVE: CVE-2022-42898
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c | 9 +++++++--
+ src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
+index cc74f37..70428a1 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/pac.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
+ #include "k5-int.h"
+ #include "authdata.h"
+
++#define MAX_BUFFERS 4096
++
+ /* draft-brezak-win2k-krb-authz-00 */
+
+ /*
+@@ -316,6 +318,9 @@ krb5_pac_parse(krb5_context context,
+ if (version != 0)
+ return EINVAL;
+
++ if (cbuffers < 1 || cbuffers > MAX_BUFFERS)
++ return ERANGE;
++
+ header_len = PACTYPE_LENGTH + (cbuffers * PAC_INFO_BUFFER_LENGTH);
+ if (len < header_len)
+ return ERANGE;
+@@ -348,8 +353,8 @@ krb5_pac_parse(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+- if (buffer->Offset < header_len ||
+- buffer->Offset + buffer->cbBufferSize > len) {
++ if (buffer->Offset < header_len || buffer->Offset > len ||
++ buffer->cbBufferSize > len - buffer->Offset) {
+ krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
+ return ERANGE;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
+index 7b756a2..2353e9f 100644
+--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
++++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/t_pac.c
+@@ -431,6 +431,16 @@ static const unsigned char s4u_pac_ent_xrealm[] = {
+ 0x8a, 0x81, 0x9c, 0x9c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+ };
+
++static const unsigned char fuzz1[] = {
++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
++ 0x06, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf5
++};
++
++static const unsigned char fuzz2[] = {
++ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
++ 0x20, 0x20
++};
++
+ static const char *s4u_principal = "w2k8u@ACME.COM";
+ static const char *s4u_enterprise = "w2k8u@abc@ACME.COM";
+
+@@ -646,6 +656,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ krb5_free_principal(context, sep);
+ }
+
++ /* Check problematic PACs found by fuzzing. */
++ ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, fuzz1, sizeof(fuzz1), &pac);
++ if (!ret)
++ err(context, ret, "krb5_pac_parse should have failed");
++ ret = krb5_pac_parse(context, fuzz2, sizeof(fuzz2), &pac);
++ if (!ret)
++ err(context, ret, "krb5_pac_parse should have failed");
++
+ /*
+ * Test empty free
+ */
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.17.1.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.17.1.bb
index ae58e2df35..ebcfbc524c 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.17.1.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/krb5/krb5_1.17.1.bb
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/${BPN}/${SHRT_VER}/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://krb5-kdc.service \
file://krb5-admin-server.service \
file://CVE-2021-36222.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-42898.patch;striplevel=2 \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "417d654c72526ac51466e7fe84608878"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "3706d7ec2eaa773e0e32d3a87bf742ebaecae7d064e190443a3acddfd8afb181"
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/files/0001-CMakeLists-txt-Avoid-host-specific-path-to-libsodium.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/files/0001-CMakeLists-txt-Avoid-host-specific-path-to-libsodium.patch
index eb3dee4d31..31f6529225 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/files/0001-CMakeLists-txt-Avoid-host-specific-path-to-libsodium.patch
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/files/0001-CMakeLists-txt-Avoid-host-specific-path-to-libsodium.patch
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ Signed-off-by: Niko Mauno <niko.mauno@vaisala.com>
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
-@@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@
- target_link_libraries(libzmq ${OPTIONAL_LIBRARIES} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT})
+@@ -1440,7 +1440,7 @@ if(BUILD_SHARED)
+ endif()
if(SODIUM_FOUND)
- target_link_libraries(libzmq ${SODIUM_LIBRARIES})
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ Signed-off-by: Niko Mauno <niko.mauno@vaisala.com>
# On Solaris, libsodium depends on libssp
if(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES "SunOS")
target_link_libraries(libzmq ssp)
-@@ -1240,7 +1240,7 @@
- target_link_libraries(libzmq-static ${OPTIONAL_LIBRARIES} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT})
+@@ -1485,7 +1485,7 @@ if(BUILD_STATIC)
+ endif()
if(SODIUM_FOUND)
- target_link_libraries(libzmq-static ${SODIUM_LIBRARIES})
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.3.2.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.3.4.bb
index 02a4c04fd7..4381f2d6d6 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.3.2.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/zeromq/zeromq_4.3.4.bb
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://github.com/zeromq/libzmq/releases/download/v${PV}/zeromq-${PV}
file://0001-CMakeLists-txt-Avoid-host-specific-path-to-libsodium.patch \
file://run-ptest \
"
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "2047e917c2cc93505e2579bcba67a573"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ebd7b5c830d6428956b67a0454a7f8cbed1de74b3b01e5c33c5378e22740f763"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "c897d4005a3f0b8276b00b7921412379"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c593001a89f5a85dd2ddf564805deb860e02471171b3f204944857336295c3e5"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/${BPN}/libzmq/releases"
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb-native_10.4.25.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb-native_10.4.28.bb
index e1a038dfa3..e1a038dfa3 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb-native_10.4.25.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb-native_10.4.28.bb
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb.inc b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb.inc
index 565f4d5613..e4eb48492a 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb.inc
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb.inc
@@ -16,9 +16,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://downloads.mariadb.org/interstitial/${BP}/source/${BP}.tar.gz
file://sql-CMakeLists.txt-fix-gen_lex_hash-not-found.patch \
file://0001-disable-ucontext-on-musl.patch \
file://fix-arm-atomic.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-47015.patch \
"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ff963c4e11bc06b775f66f2b1ddef184996208fb4b23cfdb50d95fb02eaa7ef8"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "003fd23f3c6ee516176e1b62b0b43cdb6cdd3dcd4e30f855c1c5ab2baaf5a86c"
UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/MariaDB/server/releases"
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb/CVE-2022-47015.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb/CVE-2022-47015.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ddcdc028c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb/CVE-2022-47015.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+From be0a46b3d52b58956fd0d47d040b9f4514406954 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nayuta Yanagisawa <nayuta.yanagisawa@hey.com>
+Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2022 15:22:57 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] MDEV-29644 a potential bug of null pointer dereference in
+ spider_db_mbase::print_warnings()
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/MariaDB/server/commit/be0a46b3d52b58956fd0d47d040b9f4514406954]
+CVE: CVE-2022-47015
+Signed-off-by: Vivek Kumbhar <vkumbhar@mvista.com>
+---
+ .../spider/bugfix/r/mdev_29644.result | 44 ++++++++++
+ .../mysql-test/spider/bugfix/t/mdev_29644.cnf | 3 +
+ .../spider/bugfix/t/mdev_29644.test | 58 ++++++++++++
+ storage/spider/spd_db_mysql.cc | 88 ++++++++-----------
+ storage/spider/spd_db_mysql.h | 4 +-
+ 5 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/r/mdev_29644.result
+ create mode 100644 spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/t/mdev_29644.cnf
+ create mode 100644 spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/t/mdev_29644.test
+
+diff --git a/spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/r/mdev_29644.result b/spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/r/mdev_29644.result
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..eb725602
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/r/mdev_29644.result
+@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
++#
++# MDEV-29644 a potential bug of null pointer dereference in spider_db_mbase::print_warnings()
++#
++for master_1
++for child2
++child2_1
++child2_2
++child2_3
++for child3
++connection child2_1;
++CREATE DATABASE auto_test_remote;
++USE auto_test_remote;
++CREATE TABLE tbl_a (
++a CHAR(5)
++) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8;
++set @orig_sql_mode=@@global.sql_mode;
++SET GLOBAL sql_mode='';
++connection master_1;
++CREATE DATABASE auto_test_local;
++USE auto_test_local;
++CREATE TABLE tbl_a (
++a CHAR(255)
++) ENGINE=Spider DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8 COMMENT='table "tbl_a", srv "s_2_1"';
++SET @orig_sql_mode=@@global.sql_mode;
++SET GLOBAL sql_mode='';
++INSERT INTO tbl_a VALUES ("this will be truncated");
++NOT FOUND /\[WARN SPIDER RESULT\].* Warning 1265 Data truncated for column 'a' at row 1.*/ in mysqld.1.1.err
++SET @orig_log_result_errors=@@global.spider_log_result_errors;
++SET GLOBAL spider_log_result_errors=4;
++INSERT INTO tbl_a VALUES ("this will be truncated");
++FOUND 1 /\[WARN SPIDER RESULT\].* Warning 1265 Data truncated for column 'a' at row 1.*/ in mysqld.1.1.err
++connection master_1;
++SET GLOBAL spider_log_result_errors=@orig_log_result_errors;
++SET GLOBAL sql_mode=@orig_sql_mode;
++DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS auto_test_local;
++connection child2_1;
++SET GLOBAL sql_mode=@orig_sql_mode;
++DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS auto_test_remote;
++for master_1
++for child2
++child2_1
++child2_2
++child2_3
++for child3
+diff --git a/spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/t/mdev_29644.cnf b/spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/t/mdev_29644.cnf
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..05dfd8a0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/t/mdev_29644.cnf
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++!include include/default_mysqld.cnf
++!include ../my_1_1.cnf
++!include ../my_2_1.cnf
+diff --git a/spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/t/mdev_29644.test b/spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/t/mdev_29644.test
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..4ebdf317
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/spider/mysql-test/spider/bugfix/t/mdev_29644.test
+@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
++--echo #
++--echo # MDEV-29644 a potential bug of null pointer dereference in spider_db_mbase::print_warnings()
++--echo #
++
++# The test case below does not cause the potential null pointer dereference.
++# It is just for checking spider_db_mbase::fetch_and_print_warnings() works.
++
++--disable_query_log
++--disable_result_log
++--source ../../t/test_init.inc
++--enable_result_log
++--enable_query_log
++
++--connection child2_1
++CREATE DATABASE auto_test_remote;
++USE auto_test_remote;
++eval CREATE TABLE tbl_a (
++ a CHAR(5)
++) $CHILD2_1_ENGINE $CHILD2_1_CHARSET;
++set @orig_sql_mode=@@global.sql_mode;
++SET GLOBAL sql_mode='';
++
++--connection master_1
++CREATE DATABASE auto_test_local;
++USE auto_test_local;
++eval CREATE TABLE tbl_a (
++ a CHAR(255)
++) $MASTER_1_ENGINE $MASTER_1_CHARSET COMMENT='table "tbl_a", srv "s_2_1"';
++
++SET @orig_sql_mode=@@global.sql_mode;
++SET GLOBAL sql_mode='';
++
++let SEARCH_FILE= $MYSQLTEST_VARDIR/log/mysqld.1.1.err;
++let SEARCH_PATTERN= \[WARN SPIDER RESULT\].* Warning 1265 Data truncated for column 'a' at row 1.*;
++
++INSERT INTO tbl_a VALUES ("this will be truncated");
++--source include/search_pattern_in_file.inc # should not find
++
++SET @orig_log_result_errors=@@global.spider_log_result_errors;
++SET GLOBAL spider_log_result_errors=4;
++
++INSERT INTO tbl_a VALUES ("this will be truncated");
++--source include/search_pattern_in_file.inc # should find
++
++--connection master_1
++SET GLOBAL spider_log_result_errors=@orig_log_result_errors;
++SET GLOBAL sql_mode=@orig_sql_mode;
++DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS auto_test_local;
++
++--connection child2_1
++SET GLOBAL sql_mode=@orig_sql_mode;
++DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS auto_test_remote;
++
++--disable_query_log
++--disable_result_log
++--source ../t/test_deinit.inc
++--enable_query_log
++--enable_result_log
+diff --git a/storage/spider/spd_db_mysql.cc b/storage/spider/spd_db_mysql.cc
+index 85f910aa..7d6bd599 100644
+--- a/storage/spider/spd_db_mysql.cc
++++ b/storage/spider/spd_db_mysql.cc
+@@ -2197,7 +2197,7 @@ int spider_db_mbase::exec_query(
+ db_conn->affected_rows, db_conn->insert_id,
+ db_conn->server_status, db_conn->warning_count);
+ if (spider_param_log_result_errors() >= 3)
+- print_warnings(l_time);
++ fetch_and_print_warnings(l_time);
+ } else if (log_result_errors >= 4)
+ {
+ time_t cur_time = (time_t) time((time_t*) 0);
+@@ -2279,61 +2279,43 @@ bool spider_db_mbase::is_xa_nota_error(
+ DBUG_RETURN(xa_nota);
+ }
+
+-void spider_db_mbase::print_warnings(
+- struct tm *l_time
+-) {
+- DBUG_ENTER("spider_db_mbase::print_warnings");
+- DBUG_PRINT("info",("spider this=%p", this));
+- if (db_conn->status == MYSQL_STATUS_READY)
++void spider_db_mbase::fetch_and_print_warnings(struct tm *l_time)
++{
++ DBUG_ENTER("spider_db_mbase::fetch_and_print_warnings");
++
++ if (spider_param_dry_access() || db_conn->status != MYSQL_STATUS_READY ||
++ db_conn->server_status & SERVER_MORE_RESULTS_EXISTS)
++ DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
++
++ if (mysql_real_query(db_conn, SPIDER_SQL_SHOW_WARNINGS_STR,
++ SPIDER_SQL_SHOW_WARNINGS_LEN))
++ DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
++
++ MYSQL_RES *res= mysql_store_result(db_conn);
++ if (!res)
++ DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
++
++ uint num_fields= mysql_num_fields(res);
++ if (num_fields != 3)
+ {
+-#if MYSQL_VERSION_ID < 50500
+- if (!(db_conn->last_used_con->server_status & SERVER_MORE_RESULTS_EXISTS))
+-#else
+- if (!(db_conn->server_status & SERVER_MORE_RESULTS_EXISTS))
+-#endif
+- {
+- if (
+- spider_param_dry_access() ||
+- !mysql_real_query(db_conn, SPIDER_SQL_SHOW_WARNINGS_STR,
+- SPIDER_SQL_SHOW_WARNINGS_LEN)
+- ) {
+- MYSQL_RES *res = NULL;
+- MYSQL_ROW row = NULL;
+- uint num_fields;
+- if (
+- spider_param_dry_access() ||
+- !(res = mysql_store_result(db_conn)) ||
+- !(row = mysql_fetch_row(res))
+- ) {
+- if (mysql_errno(db_conn))
+- {
+- if (res)
+- mysql_free_result(res);
+- DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
+- }
+- /* no record is ok */
+- }
+- num_fields = mysql_num_fields(res);
+- if (num_fields != 3)
+- {
+- mysql_free_result(res);
+- DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
+- }
+- while (row)
+- {
+- fprintf(stderr, "%04d%02d%02d %02d:%02d:%02d [WARN SPIDER RESULT] "
+- "from [%s] %ld to %ld: %s %s %s\n",
++ mysql_free_result(res);
++ DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
++ }
++
++ MYSQL_ROW row= mysql_fetch_row(res);
++ while (row)
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%04d%02d%02d %02d:%02d:%02d [WARN SPIDER RESULT] from [%s] %ld "
++ "to %ld: %s %s %s\n",
+ l_time->tm_year + 1900, l_time->tm_mon + 1, l_time->tm_mday,
+- l_time->tm_hour, l_time->tm_min, l_time->tm_sec,
+- conn->tgt_host, (ulong) db_conn->thread_id,
+- (ulong) current_thd->thread_id, row[0], row[1], row[2]);
+- row = mysql_fetch_row(res);
+- }
+- if (res)
+- mysql_free_result(res);
+- }
+- }
++ l_time->tm_hour, l_time->tm_min, l_time->tm_sec, conn->tgt_host,
++ (ulong) db_conn->thread_id, (ulong) current_thd->thread_id, row[0],
++ row[1], row[2]);
++ row= mysql_fetch_row(res);
+ }
++ mysql_free_result(res);
++
+ DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/storage/spider/spd_db_mysql.h b/storage/spider/spd_db_mysql.h
+index 626bb4d5..82c7c0ec 100644
+--- a/storage/spider/spd_db_mysql.h
++++ b/storage/spider/spd_db_mysql.h
+@@ -439,9 +439,7 @@ class spider_db_mbase: public spider_db_conn
+ bool is_xa_nota_error(
+ int error_num
+ );
+- void print_warnings(
+- struct tm *l_time
+- );
++ void fetch_and_print_warnings(struct tm *l_time);
+ spider_db_result *store_result(
+ spider_db_result_buffer **spider_res_buf,
+ st_spider_db_request_key *request_key,
+--
+2.25.1
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb_10.4.25.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb_10.4.28.bb
index c0b53379d9..c0b53379d9 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb_10.4.25.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/mysql/mariadb_10.4.28.bb
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-1552.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-1552.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f0d5ac06f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-1552.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,947 @@
+From 31eefa1efc8eecb6ab91c8835d2952d44a3b1ae1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2022 11:20:41 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-1552
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=commit;h=ab49ce7c3414ac19e4afb386d7843ce2d2fb8bda && https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=commit;h=677a494789062ca88e0142a17bedd5415f6ab0aa]
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-1552
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ contrib/amcheck/expected/check_btree.out | 23 ++++++
+ contrib/amcheck/sql/check_btree.sql | 21 +++++
+ contrib/amcheck/verify_nbtree.c | 27 +++++++
+ src/backend/access/brin/brin.c | 29 ++++++-
+ src/backend/catalog/index.c | 65 ++++++++++++----
+ src/backend/commands/cluster.c | 37 ++++++---
+ src/backend/commands/indexcmds.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++----
+ src/backend/commands/matview.c | 30 +++-----
+ src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c | 24 +++---
+ src/test/regress/expected/privileges.out | 71 +++++++++++++++++
+ src/test/regress/sql/privileges.sql | 64 ++++++++++++++++
+ 11 files changed, 422 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/amcheck/expected/check_btree.out b/contrib/amcheck/expected/check_btree.out
+index 59a805d..0fd6ea0 100644
+--- a/contrib/amcheck/expected/check_btree.out
++++ b/contrib/amcheck/expected/check_btree.out
+@@ -168,11 +168,34 @@ SELECT bt_index_check('toasty', true);
+
+ (1 row)
+
++--
++-- Check that index expressions and predicates are run as the table's owner
++--
++TRUNCATE bttest_a;
++INSERT INTO bttest_a SELECT * FROM generate_series(1, 1000);
++ALTER TABLE bttest_a OWNER TO regress_bttest_role;
++-- A dummy index function checking current_user
++CREATE FUNCTION ifun(int8) RETURNS int8 AS $$
++BEGIN
++ ASSERT current_user = 'regress_bttest_role',
++ format('ifun(%s) called by %s', $1, current_user);
++ RETURN $1;
++END;
++$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql IMMUTABLE;
++CREATE INDEX bttest_a_expr_idx ON bttest_a ((ifun(id) + ifun(0)))
++ WHERE ifun(id + 10) > ifun(10);
++SELECT bt_index_check('bttest_a_expr_idx', true);
++ bt_index_check
++----------------
++
++(1 row)
++
+ -- cleanup
+ DROP TABLE bttest_a;
+ DROP TABLE bttest_b;
+ DROP TABLE bttest_multi;
+ DROP TABLE delete_test_table;
+ DROP TABLE toast_bug;
++DROP FUNCTION ifun(int8);
+ DROP OWNED BY regress_bttest_role; -- permissions
+ DROP ROLE regress_bttest_role;
+diff --git a/contrib/amcheck/sql/check_btree.sql b/contrib/amcheck/sql/check_btree.sql
+index 99acbc8..3248187 100644
+--- a/contrib/amcheck/sql/check_btree.sql
++++ b/contrib/amcheck/sql/check_btree.sql
+@@ -110,11 +110,32 @@ INSERT INTO toast_bug SELECT repeat('a', 2200);
+ -- Should not get false positive report of corruption:
+ SELECT bt_index_check('toasty', true);
+
++--
++-- Check that index expressions and predicates are run as the table's owner
++--
++TRUNCATE bttest_a;
++INSERT INTO bttest_a SELECT * FROM generate_series(1, 1000);
++ALTER TABLE bttest_a OWNER TO regress_bttest_role;
++-- A dummy index function checking current_user
++CREATE FUNCTION ifun(int8) RETURNS int8 AS $$
++BEGIN
++ ASSERT current_user = 'regress_bttest_role',
++ format('ifun(%s) called by %s', $1, current_user);
++ RETURN $1;
++END;
++$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql IMMUTABLE;
++
++CREATE INDEX bttest_a_expr_idx ON bttest_a ((ifun(id) + ifun(0)))
++ WHERE ifun(id + 10) > ifun(10);
++
++SELECT bt_index_check('bttest_a_expr_idx', true);
++
+ -- cleanup
+ DROP TABLE bttest_a;
+ DROP TABLE bttest_b;
+ DROP TABLE bttest_multi;
+ DROP TABLE delete_test_table;
+ DROP TABLE toast_bug;
++DROP FUNCTION ifun(int8);
+ DROP OWNED BY regress_bttest_role; -- permissions
+ DROP ROLE regress_bttest_role;
+diff --git a/contrib/amcheck/verify_nbtree.c b/contrib/amcheck/verify_nbtree.c
+index 700a02f..cb6475d 100644
+--- a/contrib/amcheck/verify_nbtree.c
++++ b/contrib/amcheck/verify_nbtree.c
+@@ -228,6 +228,9 @@ bt_index_check_internal(Oid indrelid, bool parentcheck, bool heapallindexed,
+ Relation indrel;
+ Relation heaprel;
+ LOCKMODE lockmode;
++ Oid save_userid;
++ int save_sec_context;
++ int save_nestlevel;
+
+ if (parentcheck)
+ lockmode = ShareLock;
+@@ -244,9 +247,27 @@ bt_index_check_internal(Oid indrelid, bool parentcheck, bool heapallindexed,
+ */
+ heapid = IndexGetRelation(indrelid, true);
+ if (OidIsValid(heapid))
++ {
+ heaprel = table_open(heapid, lockmode);
++
++ /*
++ * Switch to the table owner's userid, so that any index functions are
++ * run as that user. Also lock down security-restricted operations
++ * and arrange to make GUC variable changes local to this command.
++ */
++ GetUserIdAndSecContext(&save_userid, &save_sec_context);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(heaprel->rd_rel->relowner,
++ save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
++ save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
++ }
+ else
++ {
+ heaprel = NULL;
++ /* for "gcc -Og" https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=78394 */
++ save_userid = InvalidOid;
++ save_sec_context = -1;
++ save_nestlevel = -1;
++ }
+
+ /*
+ * Open the target index relations separately (like relation_openrv(), but
+@@ -293,6 +314,12 @@ bt_index_check_internal(Oid indrelid, bool parentcheck, bool heapallindexed,
+ heapallindexed, rootdescend);
+ }
+
++ /* Roll back any GUC changes executed by index functions */
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, save_nestlevel);
++
++ /* Restore userid and security context */
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(save_userid, save_sec_context);
++
+ /*
+ * Release locks early. That's ok here because nothing in the called
+ * routines will trigger shared cache invalidations to be sent, so we can
+diff --git a/src/backend/access/brin/brin.c b/src/backend/access/brin/brin.c
+index c7b403b..781cac2 100644
+--- a/src/backend/access/brin/brin.c
++++ b/src/backend/access/brin/brin.c
+@@ -873,6 +873,9 @@ brin_summarize_range(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+ Oid heapoid;
+ Relation indexRel;
+ Relation heapRel;
++ Oid save_userid;
++ int save_sec_context;
++ int save_nestlevel;
+ double numSummarized = 0;
+
+ if (RecoveryInProgress())
+@@ -899,7 +902,22 @@ brin_summarize_range(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+ */
+ heapoid = IndexGetRelation(indexoid, true);
+ if (OidIsValid(heapoid))
++ {
+ heapRel = table_open(heapoid, ShareUpdateExclusiveLock);
++
++ /*
++ * Autovacuum calls us. For its benefit, switch to the table owner's
++ * userid, so that any index functions are run as that user. Also
++ * lock down security-restricted operations and arrange to make GUC
++ * variable changes local to this command. This is harmless, albeit
++ * unnecessary, when called from SQL, because we fail shortly if the
++ * user does not own the index.
++ */
++ GetUserIdAndSecContext(&save_userid, &save_sec_context);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(heapRel->rd_rel->relowner,
++ save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
++ save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
++ }
+ else
+ heapRel = NULL;
+
+@@ -914,7 +932,7 @@ brin_summarize_range(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+ RelationGetRelationName(indexRel))));
+
+ /* User must own the index (comparable to privileges needed for VACUUM) */
+- if (!pg_class_ownercheck(indexoid, GetUserId()))
++ if (heapRel != NULL && !pg_class_ownercheck(indexoid, save_userid))
+ aclcheck_error(ACLCHECK_NOT_OWNER, OBJECT_INDEX,
+ RelationGetRelationName(indexRel));
+
+@@ -932,6 +950,12 @@ brin_summarize_range(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+ /* OK, do it */
+ brinsummarize(indexRel, heapRel, heapBlk, true, &numSummarized, NULL);
+
++ /* Roll back any GUC changes executed by index functions */
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, save_nestlevel);
++
++ /* Restore userid and security context */
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(save_userid, save_sec_context);
++
+ relation_close(indexRel, ShareUpdateExclusiveLock);
+ relation_close(heapRel, ShareUpdateExclusiveLock);
+
+@@ -973,6 +997,9 @@ brin_desummarize_range(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
+ * passed indexoid isn't an index then IndexGetRelation() will fail.
+ * Rather than emitting a not-very-helpful error message, postpone
+ * complaining, expecting that the is-it-an-index test below will fail.
++ *
++ * Unlike brin_summarize_range(), autovacuum never calls this. Hence, we
++ * don't switch userid.
+ */
+ heapoid = IndexGetRelation(indexoid, true);
+ if (OidIsValid(heapoid))
+diff --git a/src/backend/catalog/index.c b/src/backend/catalog/index.c
+index 3ece136..0333bfd 100644
+--- a/src/backend/catalog/index.c
++++ b/src/backend/catalog/index.c
+@@ -1400,6 +1400,9 @@ index_concurrently_build(Oid heapRelationId,
+ Oid indexRelationId)
+ {
+ Relation heapRel;
++ Oid save_userid;
++ int save_sec_context;
++ int save_nestlevel;
+ Relation indexRelation;
+ IndexInfo *indexInfo;
+
+@@ -1409,7 +1412,16 @@ index_concurrently_build(Oid heapRelationId,
+ /* Open and lock the parent heap relation */
+ heapRel = table_open(heapRelationId, ShareUpdateExclusiveLock);
+
+- /* And the target index relation */
++ /*
++ * Switch to the table owner's userid, so that any index functions are run
++ * as that user. Also lock down security-restricted operations and
++ * arrange to make GUC variable changes local to this command.
++ */
++ GetUserIdAndSecContext(&save_userid, &save_sec_context);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(heapRel->rd_rel->relowner,
++ save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
++ save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
++
+ indexRelation = index_open(indexRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
+
+ /*
+@@ -1425,6 +1437,12 @@ index_concurrently_build(Oid heapRelationId,
+ /* Now build the index */
+ index_build(heapRel, indexRelation, indexInfo, false, true);
+
++ /* Roll back any GUC changes executed by index functions */
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, save_nestlevel);
++
++ /* Restore userid and security context */
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(save_userid, save_sec_context);
++
+ /* Close both the relations, but keep the locks */
+ table_close(heapRel, NoLock);
+ index_close(indexRelation, NoLock);
+@@ -3271,7 +3289,17 @@ validate_index(Oid heapId, Oid indexId, Snapshot snapshot)
+
+ /* Open and lock the parent heap relation */
+ heapRelation = table_open(heapId, ShareUpdateExclusiveLock);
+- /* And the target index relation */
++
++ /*
++ * Switch to the table owner's userid, so that any index functions are run
++ * as that user. Also lock down security-restricted operations and
++ * arrange to make GUC variable changes local to this command.
++ */
++ GetUserIdAndSecContext(&save_userid, &save_sec_context);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(heapRelation->rd_rel->relowner,
++ save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
++ save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
++
+ indexRelation = index_open(indexId, RowExclusiveLock);
+
+ /*
+@@ -3284,16 +3312,6 @@ validate_index(Oid heapId, Oid indexId, Snapshot snapshot)
+ /* mark build is concurrent just for consistency */
+ indexInfo->ii_Concurrent = true;
+
+- /*
+- * Switch to the table owner's userid, so that any index functions are run
+- * as that user. Also lock down security-restricted operations and
+- * arrange to make GUC variable changes local to this command.
+- */
+- GetUserIdAndSecContext(&save_userid, &save_sec_context);
+- SetUserIdAndSecContext(heapRelation->rd_rel->relowner,
+- save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
+- save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
+-
+ /*
+ * Scan the index and gather up all the TIDs into a tuplesort object.
+ */
+@@ -3497,6 +3515,9 @@ reindex_index(Oid indexId, bool skip_constraint_checks, char persistence,
+ Relation iRel,
+ heapRelation;
+ Oid heapId;
++ Oid save_userid;
++ int save_sec_context;
++ int save_nestlevel;
+ IndexInfo *indexInfo;
+ volatile bool skipped_constraint = false;
+ PGRUsage ru0;
+@@ -3527,6 +3548,16 @@ reindex_index(Oid indexId, bool skip_constraint_checks, char persistence,
+ */
+ iRel = index_open(indexId, AccessExclusiveLock);
+
++ /*
++ * Switch to the table owner's userid, so that any index functions are run
++ * as that user. Also lock down security-restricted operations and
++ * arrange to make GUC variable changes local to this command.
++ */
++ GetUserIdAndSecContext(&save_userid, &save_sec_context);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(heapRelation->rd_rel->relowner,
++ save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
++ save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
++
+ if (progress)
+ pgstat_progress_update_param(PROGRESS_CREATEIDX_ACCESS_METHOD_OID,
+ iRel->rd_rel->relam);
+@@ -3684,12 +3715,18 @@ reindex_index(Oid indexId, bool skip_constraint_checks, char persistence,
+ errdetail_internal("%s",
+ pg_rusage_show(&ru0))));
+
+- if (progress)
+- pgstat_progress_end_command();
++ /* Roll back any GUC changes executed by index functions */
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, save_nestlevel);
++
++ /* Restore userid and security context */
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(save_userid, save_sec_context);
+
+ /* Close rels, but keep locks */
+ index_close(iRel, NoLock);
+ table_close(heapRelation, NoLock);
++
++ if (progress)
++ pgstat_progress_end_command();
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/src/backend/commands/cluster.c b/src/backend/commands/cluster.c
+index bd6f408..74db03e 100644
+--- a/src/backend/commands/cluster.c
++++ b/src/backend/commands/cluster.c
+@@ -266,6 +266,9 @@ void
+ cluster_rel(Oid tableOid, Oid indexOid, int options)
+ {
+ Relation OldHeap;
++ Oid save_userid;
++ int save_sec_context;
++ int save_nestlevel;
+ bool verbose = ((options & CLUOPT_VERBOSE) != 0);
+ bool recheck = ((options & CLUOPT_RECHECK) != 0);
+
+@@ -295,6 +298,16 @@ cluster_rel(Oid tableOid, Oid indexOid, int options)
+ return;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * Switch to the table owner's userid, so that any index functions are run
++ * as that user. Also lock down security-restricted operations and
++ * arrange to make GUC variable changes local to this command.
++ */
++ GetUserIdAndSecContext(&save_userid, &save_sec_context);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(OldHeap->rd_rel->relowner,
++ save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
++ save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
++
+ /*
+ * Since we may open a new transaction for each relation, we have to check
+ * that the relation still is what we think it is.
+@@ -309,11 +322,10 @@ cluster_rel(Oid tableOid, Oid indexOid, int options)
+ Form_pg_index indexForm;
+
+ /* Check that the user still owns the relation */
+- if (!pg_class_ownercheck(tableOid, GetUserId()))
++ if (!pg_class_ownercheck(tableOid, save_userid))
+ {
+ relation_close(OldHeap, AccessExclusiveLock);
+- pgstat_progress_end_command();
+- return;
++ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -327,8 +339,7 @@ cluster_rel(Oid tableOid, Oid indexOid, int options)
+ if (RELATION_IS_OTHER_TEMP(OldHeap))
+ {
+ relation_close(OldHeap, AccessExclusiveLock);
+- pgstat_progress_end_command();
+- return;
++ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (OidIsValid(indexOid))
+@@ -339,8 +350,7 @@ cluster_rel(Oid tableOid, Oid indexOid, int options)
+ if (!SearchSysCacheExists1(RELOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(indexOid)))
+ {
+ relation_close(OldHeap, AccessExclusiveLock);
+- pgstat_progress_end_command();
+- return;
++ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -350,8 +360,7 @@ cluster_rel(Oid tableOid, Oid indexOid, int options)
+ if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple)) /* probably can't happen */
+ {
+ relation_close(OldHeap, AccessExclusiveLock);
+- pgstat_progress_end_command();
+- return;
++ goto out;
+ }
+ indexForm = (Form_pg_index) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
+ if (!indexForm->indisclustered)
+@@ -413,8 +422,7 @@ cluster_rel(Oid tableOid, Oid indexOid, int options)
+ !RelationIsPopulated(OldHeap))
+ {
+ relation_close(OldHeap, AccessExclusiveLock);
+- pgstat_progress_end_command();
+- return;
++ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -430,6 +438,13 @@ cluster_rel(Oid tableOid, Oid indexOid, int options)
+
+ /* NB: rebuild_relation does table_close() on OldHeap */
+
++out:
++ /* Roll back any GUC changes executed by index functions */
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, save_nestlevel);
++
++ /* Restore userid and security context */
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(save_userid, save_sec_context);
++
+ pgstat_progress_end_command();
+ }
+
+diff --git a/src/backend/commands/indexcmds.c b/src/backend/commands/indexcmds.c
+index be1cf8c..167b377 100644
+--- a/src/backend/commands/indexcmds.c
++++ b/src/backend/commands/indexcmds.c
+@@ -470,21 +470,22 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+ LOCKTAG heaplocktag;
+ LOCKMODE lockmode;
+ Snapshot snapshot;
+- int save_nestlevel = -1;
++ Oid root_save_userid;
++ int root_save_sec_context;
++ int root_save_nestlevel;
+ int i;
+
++ root_save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
++
+ /*
+ * Some callers need us to run with an empty default_tablespace; this is a
+ * necessary hack to be able to reproduce catalog state accurately when
+ * recreating indexes after table-rewriting ALTER TABLE.
+ */
+ if (stmt->reset_default_tblspc)
+- {
+- save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
+ (void) set_config_option("default_tablespace", "",
+ PGC_USERSET, PGC_S_SESSION,
+ GUC_ACTION_SAVE, true, 0, false);
+- }
+
+ /*
+ * Force non-concurrent build on temporary relations, even if CONCURRENTLY
+@@ -563,6 +564,15 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+ lockmode = concurrent ? ShareUpdateExclusiveLock : ShareLock;
+ rel = table_open(relationId, lockmode);
+
++ /*
++ * Switch to the table owner's userid, so that any index functions are run
++ * as that user. Also lock down security-restricted operations. We
++ * already arranged to make GUC variable changes local to this command.
++ */
++ GetUserIdAndSecContext(&root_save_userid, &root_save_sec_context);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(rel->rd_rel->relowner,
++ root_save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
++
+ namespaceId = RelationGetNamespace(rel);
+
+ /* Ensure that it makes sense to index this kind of relation */
+@@ -648,7 +658,7 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+ {
+ AclResult aclresult;
+
+- aclresult = pg_namespace_aclcheck(namespaceId, GetUserId(),
++ aclresult = pg_namespace_aclcheck(namespaceId, root_save_userid,
+ ACL_CREATE);
+ if (aclresult != ACLCHECK_OK)
+ aclcheck_error(aclresult, OBJECT_SCHEMA,
+@@ -680,7 +690,7 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+ {
+ AclResult aclresult;
+
+- aclresult = pg_tablespace_aclcheck(tablespaceId, GetUserId(),
++ aclresult = pg_tablespace_aclcheck(tablespaceId, root_save_userid,
+ ACL_CREATE);
+ if (aclresult != ACLCHECK_OK)
+ aclcheck_error(aclresult, OBJECT_TABLESPACE,
+@@ -1066,15 +1076,17 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+
+ ObjectAddressSet(address, RelationRelationId, indexRelationId);
+
+- /*
+- * Revert to original default_tablespace. Must do this before any return
+- * from this function, but after index_create, so this is a good time.
+- */
+- if (save_nestlevel >= 0)
+- AtEOXact_GUC(true, save_nestlevel);
+-
+ if (!OidIsValid(indexRelationId))
+ {
++ /*
++ * Roll back any GUC changes executed by index functions. Also revert
++ * to original default_tablespace if we changed it above.
++ */
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, root_save_nestlevel);
++
++ /* Restore userid and security context */
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(root_save_userid, root_save_sec_context);
++
+ table_close(rel, NoLock);
+
+ /* If this is the top-level index, we're done */
+@@ -1084,6 +1096,17 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+ return address;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * Roll back any GUC changes executed by index functions, and keep
++ * subsequent changes local to this command. It's barely possible that
++ * some index function changed a behavior-affecting GUC, e.g. xmloption,
++ * that affects subsequent steps. This improves bug-compatibility with
++ * older PostgreSQL versions. They did the AtEOXact_GUC() here for the
++ * purpose of clearing the above default_tablespace change.
++ */
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, root_save_nestlevel);
++ root_save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
++
+ /* Add any requested comment */
+ if (stmt->idxcomment != NULL)
+ CreateComments(indexRelationId, RelationRelationId, 0,
+@@ -1130,6 +1153,9 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+ {
+ Oid childRelid = part_oids[i];
+ Relation childrel;
++ Oid child_save_userid;
++ int child_save_sec_context;
++ int child_save_nestlevel;
+ List *childidxs;
+ ListCell *cell;
+ AttrNumber *attmap;
+@@ -1138,6 +1164,12 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+
+ childrel = table_open(childRelid, lockmode);
+
++ GetUserIdAndSecContext(&child_save_userid,
++ &child_save_sec_context);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(childrel->rd_rel->relowner,
++ child_save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
++ child_save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
++
+ /*
+ * Don't try to create indexes on foreign tables, though. Skip
+ * those if a regular index, or fail if trying to create a
+@@ -1153,6 +1185,9 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+ errdetail("Table \"%s\" contains partitions that are foreign tables.",
+ RelationGetRelationName(rel))));
+
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, child_save_nestlevel);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(child_save_userid,
++ child_save_sec_context);
+ table_close(childrel, lockmode);
+ continue;
+ }
+@@ -1226,6 +1261,9 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+ }
+
+ list_free(childidxs);
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, child_save_nestlevel);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(child_save_userid,
++ child_save_sec_context);
+ table_close(childrel, NoLock);
+
+ /*
+@@ -1280,12 +1318,21 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+ if (found_whole_row)
+ elog(ERROR, "cannot convert whole-row table reference");
+
++ /*
++ * Recurse as the starting user ID. Callee will use that
++ * for permission checks, then switch again.
++ */
++ Assert(GetUserId() == child_save_userid);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(root_save_userid,
++ root_save_sec_context);
+ DefineIndex(childRelid, childStmt,
+ InvalidOid, /* no predefined OID */
+ indexRelationId, /* this is our child */
+ createdConstraintId,
+ is_alter_table, check_rights, check_not_in_use,
+ skip_build, quiet);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(child_save_userid,
++ child_save_sec_context);
+ }
+
+ pgstat_progress_update_param(PROGRESS_CREATEIDX_PARTITIONS_DONE,
+@@ -1322,12 +1369,17 @@ DefineIndex(Oid relationId,
+ * Indexes on partitioned tables are not themselves built, so we're
+ * done here.
+ */
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, root_save_nestlevel);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(root_save_userid, root_save_sec_context);
+ table_close(rel, NoLock);
+ if (!OidIsValid(parentIndexId))
+ pgstat_progress_end_command();
+ return address;
+ }
+
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, root_save_nestlevel);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(root_save_userid, root_save_sec_context);
++
+ if (!concurrent)
+ {
+ /* Close the heap and we're done, in the non-concurrent case */
+@@ -3040,6 +3092,9 @@ ReindexRelationConcurrently(Oid relationOid, int options)
+ Oid newIndexId;
+ Relation indexRel;
+ Relation heapRel;
++ Oid save_userid;
++ int save_sec_context;
++ int save_nestlevel;
+ Relation newIndexRel;
+ LockRelId *lockrelid;
+
+@@ -3047,6 +3102,16 @@ ReindexRelationConcurrently(Oid relationOid, int options)
+ heapRel = table_open(indexRel->rd_index->indrelid,
+ ShareUpdateExclusiveLock);
+
++ /*
++ * Switch to the table owner's userid, so that any index functions are
++ * run as that user. Also lock down security-restricted operations
++ * and arrange to make GUC variable changes local to this command.
++ */
++ GetUserIdAndSecContext(&save_userid, &save_sec_context);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(heapRel->rd_rel->relowner,
++ save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
++ save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
++
+ /* This function shouldn't be called for temporary relations. */
+ if (indexRel->rd_rel->relpersistence == RELPERSISTENCE_TEMP)
+ elog(ERROR, "cannot reindex a temporary table concurrently");
+@@ -3101,6 +3166,13 @@ ReindexRelationConcurrently(Oid relationOid, int options)
+
+ index_close(indexRel, NoLock);
+ index_close(newIndexRel, NoLock);
++
++ /* Roll back any GUC changes executed by index functions */
++ AtEOXact_GUC(false, save_nestlevel);
++
++ /* Restore userid and security context */
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(save_userid, save_sec_context);
++
+ table_close(heapRel, NoLock);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/src/backend/commands/matview.c b/src/backend/commands/matview.c
+index 80e9ec0..e485661 100644
+--- a/src/backend/commands/matview.c
++++ b/src/backend/commands/matview.c
+@@ -167,6 +167,17 @@ ExecRefreshMatView(RefreshMatViewStmt *stmt, const char *queryString,
+ lockmode, 0,
+ RangeVarCallbackOwnsTable, NULL);
+ matviewRel = table_open(matviewOid, NoLock);
++ relowner = matviewRel->rd_rel->relowner;
++
++ /*
++ * Switch to the owner's userid, so that any functions are run as that
++ * user. Also lock down security-restricted operations and arrange to
++ * make GUC variable changes local to this command.
++ */
++ GetUserIdAndSecContext(&save_userid, &save_sec_context);
++ SetUserIdAndSecContext(relowner,
++ save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
++ save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
+
+ /* Make sure it is a materialized view. */
+ if (matviewRel->rd_rel->relkind != RELKIND_MATVIEW)
+@@ -268,19 +279,6 @@ ExecRefreshMatView(RefreshMatViewStmt *stmt, const char *queryString,
+ */
+ SetMatViewPopulatedState(matviewRel, !stmt->skipData);
+
+- relowner = matviewRel->rd_rel->relowner;
+-
+- /*
+- * Switch to the owner's userid, so that any functions are run as that
+- * user. Also arrange to make GUC variable changes local to this command.
+- * Don't lock it down too tight to create a temporary table just yet. We
+- * will switch modes when we are about to execute user code.
+- */
+- GetUserIdAndSecContext(&save_userid, &save_sec_context);
+- SetUserIdAndSecContext(relowner,
+- save_sec_context | SECURITY_LOCAL_USERID_CHANGE);
+- save_nestlevel = NewGUCNestLevel();
+-
+ /* Concurrent refresh builds new data in temp tablespace, and does diff. */
+ if (concurrent)
+ {
+@@ -303,12 +301,6 @@ ExecRefreshMatView(RefreshMatViewStmt *stmt, const char *queryString,
+ LockRelationOid(OIDNewHeap, AccessExclusiveLock);
+ dest = CreateTransientRelDestReceiver(OIDNewHeap);
+
+- /*
+- * Now lock down security-restricted operations.
+- */
+- SetUserIdAndSecContext(relowner,
+- save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
+-
+ /* Generate the data, if wanted. */
+ if (!stmt->skipData)
+ processed = refresh_matview_datafill(dest, dataQuery, queryString);
+diff --git a/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c b/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c
+index de554e2..c9f858e 100644
+--- a/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c
++++ b/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c
+@@ -455,15 +455,21 @@ GetAuthenticatedUserId(void)
+ * with guc.c's internal state, so SET ROLE has to be disallowed.
+ *
+ * SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION indicates that we are inside an operation
+- * that does not wish to trust called user-defined functions at all. This
+- * bit prevents not only SET ROLE, but various other changes of session state
+- * that normally is unprotected but might possibly be used to subvert the
+- * calling session later. An example is replacing an existing prepared
+- * statement with new code, which will then be executed with the outer
+- * session's permissions when the prepared statement is next used. Since
+- * these restrictions are fairly draconian, we apply them only in contexts
+- * where the called functions are really supposed to be side-effect-free
+- * anyway, such as VACUUM/ANALYZE/REINDEX.
++ * that does not wish to trust called user-defined functions at all. The
++ * policy is to use this before operations, e.g. autovacuum and REINDEX, that
++ * enumerate relations of a database or schema and run functions associated
++ * with each found relation. The relation owner is the new user ID. Set this
++ * as soon as possible after locking the relation. Restore the old user ID as
++ * late as possible before closing the relation; restoring it shortly after
++ * close is also tolerable. If a command has both relation-enumerating and
++ * non-enumerating modes, e.g. ANALYZE, both modes set this bit. This bit
++ * prevents not only SET ROLE, but various other changes of session state that
++ * normally is unprotected but might possibly be used to subvert the calling
++ * session later. An example is replacing an existing prepared statement with
++ * new code, which will then be executed with the outer session's permissions
++ * when the prepared statement is next used. These restrictions are fairly
++ * draconian, but the functions called in relation-enumerating operations are
++ * really supposed to be side-effect-free anyway.
+ *
+ * SECURITY_NOFORCE_RLS indicates that we are inside an operation which should
+ * ignore the FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY per-table indication. This is used to
+diff --git a/src/test/regress/expected/privileges.out b/src/test/regress/expected/privileges.out
+index 186d2fb..0f0c1b3 100644
+--- a/src/test/regress/expected/privileges.out
++++ b/src/test/regress/expected/privileges.out
+@@ -1336,6 +1336,61 @@ SELECT has_table_privilege('regress_priv_user1', 'atest4', 'SELECT WITH GRANT OP
+ -- security-restricted operations
+ \c -
+ CREATE ROLE regress_sro_user;
++-- Check that index expressions and predicates are run as the table's owner
++-- A dummy index function checking current_user
++CREATE FUNCTION sro_ifun(int) RETURNS int AS $$
++BEGIN
++ -- Below we set the table's owner to regress_sro_user
++ ASSERT current_user = 'regress_sro_user',
++ format('sro_ifun(%s) called by %s', $1, current_user);
++ RETURN $1;
++END;
++$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql IMMUTABLE;
++-- Create a table owned by regress_sro_user
++CREATE TABLE sro_tab (a int);
++ALTER TABLE sro_tab OWNER TO regress_sro_user;
++INSERT INTO sro_tab VALUES (1), (2), (3);
++-- Create an expression index with a predicate
++CREATE INDEX sro_idx ON sro_tab ((sro_ifun(a) + sro_ifun(0)))
++ WHERE sro_ifun(a + 10) > sro_ifun(10);
++DROP INDEX sro_idx;
++-- Do the same concurrently
++CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY sro_idx ON sro_tab ((sro_ifun(a) + sro_ifun(0)))
++ WHERE sro_ifun(a + 10) > sro_ifun(10);
++-- REINDEX
++REINDEX TABLE sro_tab;
++REINDEX INDEX sro_idx;
++REINDEX TABLE CONCURRENTLY sro_tab;
++DROP INDEX sro_idx;
++-- CLUSTER
++CREATE INDEX sro_cluster_idx ON sro_tab ((sro_ifun(a) + sro_ifun(0)));
++CLUSTER sro_tab USING sro_cluster_idx;
++DROP INDEX sro_cluster_idx;
++-- BRIN index
++CREATE INDEX sro_brin ON sro_tab USING brin ((sro_ifun(a) + sro_ifun(0)));
++SELECT brin_desummarize_range('sro_brin', 0);
++ brin_desummarize_range
++------------------------
++
++(1 row)
++
++SELECT brin_summarize_range('sro_brin', 0);
++ brin_summarize_range
++----------------------
++ 1
++(1 row)
++
++DROP TABLE sro_tab;
++-- Check with a partitioned table
++CREATE TABLE sro_ptab (a int) PARTITION BY RANGE (a);
++ALTER TABLE sro_ptab OWNER TO regress_sro_user;
++CREATE TABLE sro_part PARTITION OF sro_ptab FOR VALUES FROM (1) TO (10);
++ALTER TABLE sro_part OWNER TO regress_sro_user;
++INSERT INTO sro_ptab VALUES (1), (2), (3);
++CREATE INDEX sro_pidx ON sro_ptab ((sro_ifun(a) + sro_ifun(0)))
++ WHERE sro_ifun(a + 10) > sro_ifun(10);
++REINDEX TABLE sro_ptab;
++REINDEX INDEX CONCURRENTLY sro_pidx;
+ SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION regress_sro_user;
+ CREATE FUNCTION unwanted_grant() RETURNS void LANGUAGE sql AS
+ 'GRANT regress_priv_group2 TO regress_sro_user';
+@@ -1373,6 +1428,22 @@ CONTEXT: SQL function "unwanted_grant" statement 1
+ SQL statement "SELECT unwanted_grant()"
+ PL/pgSQL function sro_trojan() line 1 at PERFORM
+ SQL function "mv_action" statement 1
++-- REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW CONCURRENTLY use of eval_const_expressions()
++SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION regress_sro_user;
++CREATE FUNCTION unwanted_grant_nofail(int) RETURNS int
++ IMMUTABLE LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $$
++BEGIN
++ PERFORM unwanted_grant();
++ RAISE WARNING 'owned';
++ RETURN 1;
++EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN
++ RETURN 2;
++END$$;
++CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW sro_index_mv AS SELECT 1 AS c;
++CREATE UNIQUE INDEX ON sro_index_mv (c) WHERE unwanted_grant_nofail(1) > 0;
++\c -
++REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW CONCURRENTLY sro_index_mv;
++REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW sro_index_mv;
+ DROP OWNED BY regress_sro_user;
+ DROP ROLE regress_sro_user;
+ -- Admin options
+diff --git a/src/test/regress/sql/privileges.sql b/src/test/regress/sql/privileges.sql
+index 34fbf0e..c0b88a6 100644
+--- a/src/test/regress/sql/privileges.sql
++++ b/src/test/regress/sql/privileges.sql
+@@ -826,6 +826,53 @@ SELECT has_table_privilege('regress_priv_user1', 'atest4', 'SELECT WITH GRANT OP
+ \c -
+ CREATE ROLE regress_sro_user;
+
++-- Check that index expressions and predicates are run as the table's owner
++
++-- A dummy index function checking current_user
++CREATE FUNCTION sro_ifun(int) RETURNS int AS $$
++BEGIN
++ -- Below we set the table's owner to regress_sro_user
++ ASSERT current_user = 'regress_sro_user',
++ format('sro_ifun(%s) called by %s', $1, current_user);
++ RETURN $1;
++END;
++$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql IMMUTABLE;
++-- Create a table owned by regress_sro_user
++CREATE TABLE sro_tab (a int);
++ALTER TABLE sro_tab OWNER TO regress_sro_user;
++INSERT INTO sro_tab VALUES (1), (2), (3);
++-- Create an expression index with a predicate
++CREATE INDEX sro_idx ON sro_tab ((sro_ifun(a) + sro_ifun(0)))
++ WHERE sro_ifun(a + 10) > sro_ifun(10);
++DROP INDEX sro_idx;
++-- Do the same concurrently
++CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY sro_idx ON sro_tab ((sro_ifun(a) + sro_ifun(0)))
++ WHERE sro_ifun(a + 10) > sro_ifun(10);
++-- REINDEX
++REINDEX TABLE sro_tab;
++REINDEX INDEX sro_idx;
++REINDEX TABLE CONCURRENTLY sro_tab;
++DROP INDEX sro_idx;
++-- CLUSTER
++CREATE INDEX sro_cluster_idx ON sro_tab ((sro_ifun(a) + sro_ifun(0)));
++CLUSTER sro_tab USING sro_cluster_idx;
++DROP INDEX sro_cluster_idx;
++-- BRIN index
++CREATE INDEX sro_brin ON sro_tab USING brin ((sro_ifun(a) + sro_ifun(0)));
++SELECT brin_desummarize_range('sro_brin', 0);
++SELECT brin_summarize_range('sro_brin', 0);
++DROP TABLE sro_tab;
++-- Check with a partitioned table
++CREATE TABLE sro_ptab (a int) PARTITION BY RANGE (a);
++ALTER TABLE sro_ptab OWNER TO regress_sro_user;
++CREATE TABLE sro_part PARTITION OF sro_ptab FOR VALUES FROM (1) TO (10);
++ALTER TABLE sro_part OWNER TO regress_sro_user;
++INSERT INTO sro_ptab VALUES (1), (2), (3);
++CREATE INDEX sro_pidx ON sro_ptab ((sro_ifun(a) + sro_ifun(0)))
++ WHERE sro_ifun(a + 10) > sro_ifun(10);
++REINDEX TABLE sro_ptab;
++REINDEX INDEX CONCURRENTLY sro_pidx;
++
+ SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION regress_sro_user;
+ CREATE FUNCTION unwanted_grant() RETURNS void LANGUAGE sql AS
+ 'GRANT regress_priv_group2 TO regress_sro_user';
+@@ -852,6 +899,23 @@ REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW sro_mv;
+ REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW sro_mv;
+ BEGIN; SET CONSTRAINTS ALL IMMEDIATE; REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW sro_mv; COMMIT;
+
++-- REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW CONCURRENTLY use of eval_const_expressions()
++SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION regress_sro_user;
++CREATE FUNCTION unwanted_grant_nofail(int) RETURNS int
++ IMMUTABLE LANGUAGE plpgsql AS $$
++BEGIN
++ PERFORM unwanted_grant();
++ RAISE WARNING 'owned';
++ RETURN 1;
++EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN
++ RETURN 2;
++END$$;
++CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW sro_index_mv AS SELECT 1 AS c;
++CREATE UNIQUE INDEX ON sro_index_mv (c) WHERE unwanted_grant_nofail(1) > 0;
++\c -
++REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW CONCURRENTLY sro_index_mv;
++REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW sro_index_mv;
++
+ DROP OWNED BY regress_sro_user;
+ DROP ROLE regress_sro_user;
+
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-2625.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-2625.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6417d8a2b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-2625.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,904 @@
+From 84375c1db25ef650902cf80712495fc514b0ff63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+Date: Thu, 13 Oct 2022 10:35:32 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-2625
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=commit;h=5579726bd60a6e7afb04a3548bced348cd5ffd89]
+CVE: CVE-2022-2625
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ doc/src/sgml/extend.sgml | 11 --
+ src/backend/catalog/pg_collation.c | 49 ++++--
+ src/backend/catalog/pg_depend.c | 74 ++++++++-
+ src/backend/catalog/pg_operator.c | 2 +-
+ src/backend/catalog/pg_type.c | 7 +-
+ src/backend/commands/createas.c | 18 ++-
+ src/backend/commands/foreigncmds.c | 19 ++-
+ src/backend/commands/schemacmds.c | 25 ++-
+ src/backend/commands/sequence.c | 8 +
+ src/backend/commands/statscmds.c | 4 +
+ src/backend/commands/view.c | 16 +-
+ src/backend/parser/parse_utilcmd.c | 10 ++
+ src/include/catalog/dependency.h | 2 +
+ src/test/modules/test_extensions/Makefile | 5 +-
+ .../expected/test_extensions.out | 153 ++++++++++++++++++
+ .../test_extensions/sql/test_extensions.sql | 110 +++++++++++++
+ .../test_ext_cine--1.0--1.1.sql | 26 +++
+ .../test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0.sql | 25 +++
+ .../test_extensions/test_ext_cine.control | 3 +
+ .../test_extensions/test_ext_cor--1.0.sql | 20 +++
+ .../test_extensions/test_ext_cor.control | 3 +
+ 21 files changed, 540 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0--1.1.sql
+ create mode 100644 src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0.sql
+ create mode 100644 src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine.control
+ create mode 100644 src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cor--1.0.sql
+ create mode 100644 src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cor.control
+
+diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/extend.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/extend.sgml
+index 53f2638..bcc7a80 100644
+--- a/doc/src/sgml/extend.sgml
++++ b/doc/src/sgml/extend.sgml
+@@ -1109,17 +1109,6 @@ SELECT * FROM pg_extension_update_paths('<replaceable>extension_name</replaceabl
+ <varname>search_path</varname>. However, no mechanism currently exists
+ to require that.
+ </para>
+-
+- <para>
+- Do <emphasis>not</emphasis> use <command>CREATE OR REPLACE
+- FUNCTION</command>, except in an update script that must change the
+- definition of a function that is known to be an extension member
+- already. (Likewise for other <literal>OR REPLACE</literal> options.)
+- Using <literal>OR REPLACE</literal> unnecessarily not only has a risk
+- of accidentally overwriting someone else's function, but it creates a
+- security hazard since the overwritten function would still be owned by
+- its original owner, who could modify it.
+- </para>
+ </sect3>
+ </sect2>
+
+diff --git a/src/backend/catalog/pg_collation.c b/src/backend/catalog/pg_collation.c
+index dd99d53..ba4c3ef 100644
+--- a/src/backend/catalog/pg_collation.c
++++ b/src/backend/catalog/pg_collation.c
+@@ -78,15 +78,25 @@ CollationCreate(const char *collname, Oid collnamespace,
+ * friendlier error message. The unique index provides a backstop against
+ * race conditions.
+ */
+- if (SearchSysCacheExists3(COLLNAMEENCNSP,
+- PointerGetDatum(collname),
+- Int32GetDatum(collencoding),
+- ObjectIdGetDatum(collnamespace)))
++ oid = GetSysCacheOid3(COLLNAMEENCNSP,
++ Anum_pg_collation_oid,
++ PointerGetDatum(collname),
++ Int32GetDatum(collencoding),
++ ObjectIdGetDatum(collnamespace));
++ if (OidIsValid(oid))
+ {
+ if (quiet)
+ return InvalidOid;
+ else if (if_not_exists)
+ {
++ /*
++ * If we are in an extension script, insist that the pre-existing
++ * object be a member of the extension, to avoid security risks.
++ */
++ ObjectAddressSet(myself, CollationRelationId, oid);
++ checkMembershipInCurrentExtension(&myself);
++
++ /* OK to skip */
+ ereport(NOTICE,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
+ collencoding == -1
+@@ -116,16 +126,19 @@ CollationCreate(const char *collname, Oid collnamespace,
+ * so we take a ShareRowExclusiveLock earlier, to protect against
+ * concurrent changes fooling this check.
+ */
+- if ((collencoding == -1 &&
+- SearchSysCacheExists3(COLLNAMEENCNSP,
+- PointerGetDatum(collname),
+- Int32GetDatum(GetDatabaseEncoding()),
+- ObjectIdGetDatum(collnamespace))) ||
+- (collencoding != -1 &&
+- SearchSysCacheExists3(COLLNAMEENCNSP,
+- PointerGetDatum(collname),
+- Int32GetDatum(-1),
+- ObjectIdGetDatum(collnamespace))))
++ if (collencoding == -1)
++ oid = GetSysCacheOid3(COLLNAMEENCNSP,
++ Anum_pg_collation_oid,
++ PointerGetDatum(collname),
++ Int32GetDatum(GetDatabaseEncoding()),
++ ObjectIdGetDatum(collnamespace));
++ else
++ oid = GetSysCacheOid3(COLLNAMEENCNSP,
++ Anum_pg_collation_oid,
++ PointerGetDatum(collname),
++ Int32GetDatum(-1),
++ ObjectIdGetDatum(collnamespace));
++ if (OidIsValid(oid))
+ {
+ if (quiet)
+ {
+@@ -134,6 +147,14 @@ CollationCreate(const char *collname, Oid collnamespace,
+ }
+ else if (if_not_exists)
+ {
++ /*
++ * If we are in an extension script, insist that the pre-existing
++ * object be a member of the extension, to avoid security risks.
++ */
++ ObjectAddressSet(myself, CollationRelationId, oid);
++ checkMembershipInCurrentExtension(&myself);
++
++ /* OK to skip */
+ table_close(rel, NoLock);
+ ereport(NOTICE,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
+diff --git a/src/backend/catalog/pg_depend.c b/src/backend/catalog/pg_depend.c
+index 9ffadbb..71c7cef 100644
+--- a/src/backend/catalog/pg_depend.c
++++ b/src/backend/catalog/pg_depend.c
+@@ -124,15 +124,23 @@ recordMultipleDependencies(const ObjectAddress *depender,
+
+ /*
+ * If we are executing a CREATE EXTENSION operation, mark the given object
+- * as being a member of the extension. Otherwise, do nothing.
++ * as being a member of the extension, or check that it already is one.
++ * Otherwise, do nothing.
+ *
+ * This must be called during creation of any user-definable object type
+ * that could be a member of an extension.
+ *
+- * If isReplace is true, the object already existed (or might have already
+- * existed), so we must check for a pre-existing extension membership entry.
+- * Passing false is a guarantee that the object is newly created, and so
+- * could not already be a member of any extension.
++ * isReplace must be true if the object already existed, and false if it is
++ * newly created. In the former case we insist that it already be a member
++ * of the current extension. In the latter case we can skip checking whether
++ * it is already a member of any extension.
++ *
++ * Note: isReplace = true is typically used when updating a object in
++ * CREATE OR REPLACE and similar commands. We used to allow the target
++ * object to not already be an extension member, instead silently absorbing
++ * it into the current extension. However, this was both error-prone
++ * (extensions might accidentally overwrite free-standing objects) and
++ * a security hazard (since the object would retain its previous ownership).
+ */
+ void
+ recordDependencyOnCurrentExtension(const ObjectAddress *object,
+@@ -150,6 +158,12 @@ recordDependencyOnCurrentExtension(const ObjectAddress *object,
+ {
+ Oid oldext;
+
++ /*
++ * Side note: these catalog lookups are safe only because the
++ * object is a pre-existing one. In the not-isReplace case, the
++ * caller has most likely not yet done a CommandCounterIncrement
++ * that would make the new object visible.
++ */
+ oldext = getExtensionOfObject(object->classId, object->objectId);
+ if (OidIsValid(oldext))
+ {
+@@ -163,6 +177,13 @@ recordDependencyOnCurrentExtension(const ObjectAddress *object,
+ getObjectDescription(object),
+ get_extension_name(oldext))));
+ }
++ /* It's a free-standing object, so reject */
++ ereport(ERROR,
++ (errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_NOT_IN_PREREQUISITE_STATE),
++ errmsg("%s is not a member of extension \"%s\"",
++ getObjectDescription(object),
++ get_extension_name(CurrentExtensionObject)),
++ errdetail("An extension is not allowed to replace an object that it does not own.")));
+ }
+
+ /* OK, record it as a member of CurrentExtensionObject */
+@@ -174,6 +195,49 @@ recordDependencyOnCurrentExtension(const ObjectAddress *object,
+ }
+ }
+
++/*
++ * If we are executing a CREATE EXTENSION operation, check that the given
++ * object is a member of the extension, and throw an error if it isn't.
++ * Otherwise, do nothing.
++ *
++ * This must be called whenever a CREATE IF NOT EXISTS operation (for an
++ * object type that can be an extension member) has found that an object of
++ * the desired name already exists. It is insecure for an extension to use
++ * IF NOT EXISTS except when the conflicting object is already an extension
++ * member; otherwise a hostile user could substitute an object with arbitrary
++ * properties.
++ */
++void
++checkMembershipInCurrentExtension(const ObjectAddress *object)
++{
++ /*
++ * This is actually the same condition tested in
++ * recordDependencyOnCurrentExtension; but we want to issue a
++ * differently-worded error, and anyway it would be pretty confusing to
++ * call recordDependencyOnCurrentExtension in these circumstances.
++ */
++
++ /* Only whole objects can be extension members */
++ Assert(object->objectSubId == 0);
++
++ if (creating_extension)
++ {
++ Oid oldext;
++
++ oldext = getExtensionOfObject(object->classId, object->objectId);
++ /* If already a member of this extension, OK */
++ if (oldext == CurrentExtensionObject)
++ return;
++ /* Else complain */
++ ereport(ERROR,
++ (errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_NOT_IN_PREREQUISITE_STATE),
++ errmsg("%s is not a member of extension \"%s\"",
++ getObjectDescription(object),
++ get_extension_name(CurrentExtensionObject)),
++ errdetail("An extension may only use CREATE ... IF NOT EXISTS to skip object creation if the conflicting object is one that it already owns.")));
++ }
++}
++
+ /*
+ * deleteDependencyRecordsFor -- delete all records with given depender
+ * classId/objectId. Returns the number of records deleted.
+diff --git a/src/backend/catalog/pg_operator.c b/src/backend/catalog/pg_operator.c
+index bcaa26c..84784e6 100644
+--- a/src/backend/catalog/pg_operator.c
++++ b/src/backend/catalog/pg_operator.c
+@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ makeOperatorDependencies(HeapTuple tuple, bool isUpdate)
+ oper->oprowner);
+
+ /* Dependency on extension */
+- recordDependencyOnCurrentExtension(&myself, true);
++ recordDependencyOnCurrentExtension(&myself, isUpdate);
+
+ return myself;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/backend/catalog/pg_type.c b/src/backend/catalog/pg_type.c
+index 2a51501..3ff017f 100644
+--- a/src/backend/catalog/pg_type.c
++++ b/src/backend/catalog/pg_type.c
+@@ -528,10 +528,9 @@ TypeCreate(Oid newTypeOid,
+ * If rebuild is true, we remove existing dependencies and rebuild them
+ * from scratch. This is needed for ALTER TYPE, and also when replacing
+ * a shell type. We don't remove an existing extension dependency, though.
+- * (That means an extension can't absorb a shell type created in another
+- * extension, nor ALTER a type created by another extension. Also, if it
+- * replaces a free-standing shell type or ALTERs a free-standing type,
+- * that type will become a member of the extension.)
++ * That means an extension can't absorb a shell type that is free-standing
++ * or belongs to another extension, nor ALTER a type that is free-standing or
++ * belongs to another extension.
+ */
+ void
+ GenerateTypeDependencies(Oid typeObjectId,
+diff --git a/src/backend/commands/createas.c b/src/backend/commands/createas.c
+index 4c1d909..a68d945 100644
+--- a/src/backend/commands/createas.c
++++ b/src/backend/commands/createas.c
+@@ -243,15 +243,27 @@ ExecCreateTableAs(CreateTableAsStmt *stmt, const char *queryString,
+ if (stmt->if_not_exists)
+ {
+ Oid nspid;
++ Oid oldrelid;
+
+- nspid = RangeVarGetCreationNamespace(stmt->into->rel);
++ nspid = RangeVarGetCreationNamespace(into->rel);
+
+- if (get_relname_relid(stmt->into->rel->relname, nspid))
++ oldrelid = get_relname_relid(into->rel->relname, nspid);
++ if (OidIsValid(oldrelid))
+ {
++ /*
++ * The relation exists and IF NOT EXISTS has been specified.
++ *
++ * If we are in an extension script, insist that the pre-existing
++ * object be a member of the extension, to avoid security risks.
++ */
++ ObjectAddressSet(address, RelationRelationId, oldrelid);
++ checkMembershipInCurrentExtension(&address);
++
++ /* OK to skip */
+ ereport(NOTICE,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_TABLE),
+ errmsg("relation \"%s\" already exists, skipping",
+- stmt->into->rel->relname)));
++ into->rel->relname)));
+ return InvalidObjectAddress;
+ }
+ }
+diff --git a/src/backend/commands/foreigncmds.c b/src/backend/commands/foreigncmds.c
+index d7bc6e3..bc583c6 100644
+--- a/src/backend/commands/foreigncmds.c
++++ b/src/backend/commands/foreigncmds.c
+@@ -887,13 +887,22 @@ CreateForeignServer(CreateForeignServerStmt *stmt)
+ ownerId = GetUserId();
+
+ /*
+- * Check that there is no other foreign server by this name. Do nothing if
+- * IF NOT EXISTS was enforced.
++ * Check that there is no other foreign server by this name. If there is
++ * one, do nothing if IF NOT EXISTS was specified.
+ */
+- if (GetForeignServerByName(stmt->servername, true) != NULL)
++ srvId = get_foreign_server_oid(stmt->servername, true);
++ if (OidIsValid(srvId))
+ {
+ if (stmt->if_not_exists)
+ {
++ /*
++ * If we are in an extension script, insist that the pre-existing
++ * object be a member of the extension, to avoid security risks.
++ */
++ ObjectAddressSet(myself, ForeignServerRelationId, srvId);
++ checkMembershipInCurrentExtension(&myself);
++
++ /* OK to skip */
+ ereport(NOTICE,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
+ errmsg("server \"%s\" already exists, skipping",
+@@ -1182,6 +1191,10 @@ CreateUserMapping(CreateUserMappingStmt *stmt)
+ {
+ if (stmt->if_not_exists)
+ {
++ /*
++ * Since user mappings aren't members of extensions (see comments
++ * below), no need for checkMembershipInCurrentExtension here.
++ */
+ ereport(NOTICE,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
+ errmsg("user mapping for \"%s\" already exists for server \"%s\", skipping",
+diff --git a/src/backend/commands/schemacmds.c b/src/backend/commands/schemacmds.c
+index 6cf94a3..6bc4edc 100644
+--- a/src/backend/commands/schemacmds.c
++++ b/src/backend/commands/schemacmds.c
+@@ -113,14 +113,25 @@ CreateSchemaCommand(CreateSchemaStmt *stmt, const char *queryString,
+ * the permissions checks, but since CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS makes its
+ * creation-permission check first, we do likewise.
+ */
+- if (stmt->if_not_exists &&
+- SearchSysCacheExists1(NAMESPACENAME, PointerGetDatum(schemaName)))
++ if (stmt->if_not_exists)
+ {
+- ereport(NOTICE,
+- (errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_SCHEMA),
+- errmsg("schema \"%s\" already exists, skipping",
+- schemaName)));
+- return InvalidOid;
++ namespaceId = get_namespace_oid(schemaName, true);
++ if (OidIsValid(namespaceId))
++ {
++ /*
++ * If we are in an extension script, insist that the pre-existing
++ * object be a member of the extension, to avoid security risks.
++ */
++ ObjectAddressSet(address, NamespaceRelationId, namespaceId);
++ checkMembershipInCurrentExtension(&address);
++
++ /* OK to skip */
++ ereport(NOTICE,
++ (errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_SCHEMA),
++ errmsg("schema \"%s\" already exists, skipping",
++ schemaName)));
++ return InvalidOid;
++ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/src/backend/commands/sequence.c b/src/backend/commands/sequence.c
+index 0960b33..0577184 100644
+--- a/src/backend/commands/sequence.c
++++ b/src/backend/commands/sequence.c
+@@ -149,6 +149,14 @@ DefineSequence(ParseState *pstate, CreateSeqStmt *seq)
+ RangeVarGetAndCheckCreationNamespace(seq->sequence, NoLock, &seqoid);
+ if (OidIsValid(seqoid))
+ {
++ /*
++ * If we are in an extension script, insist that the pre-existing
++ * object be a member of the extension, to avoid security risks.
++ */
++ ObjectAddressSet(address, RelationRelationId, seqoid);
++ checkMembershipInCurrentExtension(&address);
++
++ /* OK to skip */
+ ereport(NOTICE,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_TABLE),
+ errmsg("relation \"%s\" already exists, skipping",
+diff --git a/src/backend/commands/statscmds.c b/src/backend/commands/statscmds.c
+index 5678d31..409cf28 100644
+--- a/src/backend/commands/statscmds.c
++++ b/src/backend/commands/statscmds.c
+@@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ CreateStatistics(CreateStatsStmt *stmt)
+ {
+ if (stmt->if_not_exists)
+ {
++ /*
++ * Since stats objects aren't members of extensions (see comments
++ * below), no need for checkMembershipInCurrentExtension here.
++ */
+ ereport(NOTICE,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
+ errmsg("statistics object \"%s\" already exists, skipping",
+diff --git a/src/backend/commands/view.c b/src/backend/commands/view.c
+index 87ed453..dd7cc97 100644
+--- a/src/backend/commands/view.c
++++ b/src/backend/commands/view.c
+@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ DefineVirtualRelation(RangeVar *relation, List *tlist, bool replace,
+ CommandCounterIncrement();
+
+ /*
+- * Finally update the view options.
++ * Update the view's options.
+ *
+ * The new options list replaces the existing options list, even if
+ * it's empty.
+@@ -218,8 +218,22 @@ DefineVirtualRelation(RangeVar *relation, List *tlist, bool replace,
+ /* EventTriggerAlterTableStart called by ProcessUtilitySlow */
+ AlterTableInternal(viewOid, atcmds, true);
+
++ /*
++ * There is very little to do here to update the view's dependencies.
++ * Most view-level dependency relationships, such as those on the
++ * owner, schema, and associated composite type, aren't changing.
++ * Because we don't allow changing type or collation of an existing
++ * view column, those dependencies of the existing columns don't
++ * change either, while the AT_AddColumnToView machinery took care of
++ * adding such dependencies for new view columns. The dependencies of
++ * the view's query could have changed arbitrarily, but that was dealt
++ * with inside StoreViewQuery. What remains is only to check that
++ * view replacement is allowed when we're creating an extension.
++ */
+ ObjectAddressSet(address, RelationRelationId, viewOid);
+
++ recordDependencyOnCurrentExtension(&address, true);
++
+ /*
+ * Seems okay, so return the OID of the pre-existing view.
+ */
+diff --git a/src/backend/parser/parse_utilcmd.c b/src/backend/parser/parse_utilcmd.c
+index 44aa38a..8f4d940 100644
+--- a/src/backend/parser/parse_utilcmd.c
++++ b/src/backend/parser/parse_utilcmd.c
+@@ -206,6 +206,16 @@ transformCreateStmt(CreateStmt *stmt, const char *queryString)
+ */
+ if (stmt->if_not_exists && OidIsValid(existing_relid))
+ {
++ /*
++ * If we are in an extension script, insist that the pre-existing
++ * object be a member of the extension, to avoid security risks.
++ */
++ ObjectAddress address;
++
++ ObjectAddressSet(address, RelationRelationId, existing_relid);
++ checkMembershipInCurrentExtension(&address);
++
++ /* OK to skip */
+ ereport(NOTICE,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_TABLE),
+ errmsg("relation \"%s\" already exists, skipping",
+diff --git a/src/include/catalog/dependency.h b/src/include/catalog/dependency.h
+index 8b1e3aa..27c7509 100644
+--- a/src/include/catalog/dependency.h
++++ b/src/include/catalog/dependency.h
+@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ extern void recordMultipleDependencies(const ObjectAddress *depender,
+ extern void recordDependencyOnCurrentExtension(const ObjectAddress *object,
+ bool isReplace);
+
++extern void checkMembershipInCurrentExtension(const ObjectAddress *object);
++
+ extern long deleteDependencyRecordsFor(Oid classId, Oid objectId,
+ bool skipExtensionDeps);
+
+diff --git a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/Makefile b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/Makefile
+index d18108e..7428f15 100644
+--- a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/Makefile
++++ b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/Makefile
+@@ -4,10 +4,13 @@ MODULE = test_extensions
+ PGFILEDESC = "test_extensions - regression testing for EXTENSION support"
+
+ EXTENSION = test_ext1 test_ext2 test_ext3 test_ext4 test_ext5 test_ext6 \
+- test_ext7 test_ext8 test_ext_cyclic1 test_ext_cyclic2
++ test_ext7 test_ext8 test_ext_cine test_ext_cor \
++ test_ext_cyclic1 test_ext_cyclic2
+ DATA = test_ext1--1.0.sql test_ext2--1.0.sql test_ext3--1.0.sql \
+ test_ext4--1.0.sql test_ext5--1.0.sql test_ext6--1.0.sql \
+ test_ext7--1.0.sql test_ext7--1.0--2.0.sql test_ext8--1.0.sql \
++ test_ext_cine--1.0.sql test_ext_cine--1.0--1.1.sql \
++ test_ext_cor--1.0.sql \
+ test_ext_cyclic1--1.0.sql test_ext_cyclic2--1.0.sql
+
+ REGRESS = test_extensions test_extdepend
+diff --git a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/expected/test_extensions.out b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/expected/test_extensions.out
+index b5cbdfc..1e91640 100644
+--- a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/expected/test_extensions.out
++++ b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/expected/test_extensions.out
+@@ -154,3 +154,156 @@ DROP TABLE test_ext4_tab;
+ DROP FUNCTION create_extension_with_temp_schema();
+ RESET client_min_messages;
+ \unset SHOW_CONTEXT
++-- It's generally bad style to use CREATE OR REPLACE unnecessarily.
++-- Test what happens if an extension does it anyway.
++-- Replacing a shell type or operator is sort of like CREATE OR REPLACE;
++-- check that too.
++CREATE FUNCTION ext_cor_func() RETURNS text
++ AS $$ SELECT 'ext_cor_func: original'::text $$ LANGUAGE sql;
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor; -- fail
++ERROR: function ext_cor_func() is not a member of extension "test_ext_cor"
++DETAIL: An extension is not allowed to replace an object that it does not own.
++SELECT ext_cor_func();
++ ext_cor_func
++------------------------
++ ext_cor_func: original
++(1 row)
++
++DROP FUNCTION ext_cor_func();
++CREATE VIEW ext_cor_view AS
++ SELECT 'ext_cor_view: original'::text AS col;
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor; -- fail
++ERROR: view ext_cor_view is not a member of extension "test_ext_cor"
++DETAIL: An extension is not allowed to replace an object that it does not own.
++SELECT ext_cor_func();
++ERROR: function ext_cor_func() does not exist
++LINE 1: SELECT ext_cor_func();
++ ^
++HINT: No function matches the given name and argument types. You might need to add explicit type casts.
++SELECT * FROM ext_cor_view;
++ col
++------------------------
++ ext_cor_view: original
++(1 row)
++
++DROP VIEW ext_cor_view;
++CREATE TYPE test_ext_type;
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor; -- fail
++ERROR: type test_ext_type is not a member of extension "test_ext_cor"
++DETAIL: An extension is not allowed to replace an object that it does not own.
++DROP TYPE test_ext_type;
++-- this makes a shell "point <<@@ polygon" operator too
++CREATE OPERATOR @@>> ( PROCEDURE = poly_contain_pt,
++ LEFTARG = polygon, RIGHTARG = point,
++ COMMUTATOR = <<@@ );
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor; -- fail
++ERROR: operator <<@@(point,polygon) is not a member of extension "test_ext_cor"
++DETAIL: An extension is not allowed to replace an object that it does not own.
++DROP OPERATOR <<@@ (point, polygon);
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor; -- now it should work
++SELECT ext_cor_func();
++ ext_cor_func
++------------------------------
++ ext_cor_func: from extension
++(1 row)
++
++SELECT * FROM ext_cor_view;
++ col
++------------------------------
++ ext_cor_view: from extension
++(1 row)
++
++SELECT 'x'::test_ext_type;
++ test_ext_type
++---------------
++ x
++(1 row)
++
++SELECT point(0,0) <<@@ polygon(circle(point(0,0),1));
++ ?column?
++----------
++ t
++(1 row)
++
++\dx+ test_ext_cor
++Objects in extension "test_ext_cor"
++ Object description
++------------------------------
++ function ext_cor_func()
++ operator <<@@(point,polygon)
++ type test_ext_type
++ view ext_cor_view
++(4 rows)
++
++--
++-- CREATE IF NOT EXISTS is an entirely unsound thing for an extension
++-- to be doing, but let's at least plug the major security hole in it.
++--
++CREATE COLLATION ext_cine_coll
++ ( LC_COLLATE = "C", LC_CTYPE = "C" );
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++ERROR: collation ext_cine_coll is not a member of extension "test_ext_cine"
++DETAIL: An extension may only use CREATE ... IF NOT EXISTS to skip object creation if the conflicting object is one that it already owns.
++DROP COLLATION ext_cine_coll;
++CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW ext_cine_mv AS SELECT 11 AS f1;
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++ERROR: materialized view ext_cine_mv is not a member of extension "test_ext_cine"
++DETAIL: An extension may only use CREATE ... IF NOT EXISTS to skip object creation if the conflicting object is one that it already owns.
++DROP MATERIALIZED VIEW ext_cine_mv;
++CREATE FOREIGN DATA WRAPPER dummy;
++CREATE SERVER ext_cine_srv FOREIGN DATA WRAPPER dummy;
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++ERROR: server ext_cine_srv is not a member of extension "test_ext_cine"
++DETAIL: An extension may only use CREATE ... IF NOT EXISTS to skip object creation if the conflicting object is one that it already owns.
++DROP SERVER ext_cine_srv;
++CREATE SCHEMA ext_cine_schema;
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++ERROR: schema ext_cine_schema is not a member of extension "test_ext_cine"
++DETAIL: An extension may only use CREATE ... IF NOT EXISTS to skip object creation if the conflicting object is one that it already owns.
++DROP SCHEMA ext_cine_schema;
++CREATE SEQUENCE ext_cine_seq;
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++ERROR: sequence ext_cine_seq is not a member of extension "test_ext_cine"
++DETAIL: An extension may only use CREATE ... IF NOT EXISTS to skip object creation if the conflicting object is one that it already owns.
++DROP SEQUENCE ext_cine_seq;
++CREATE TABLE ext_cine_tab1 (x int);
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++ERROR: table ext_cine_tab1 is not a member of extension "test_ext_cine"
++DETAIL: An extension may only use CREATE ... IF NOT EXISTS to skip object creation if the conflicting object is one that it already owns.
++DROP TABLE ext_cine_tab1;
++CREATE TABLE ext_cine_tab2 AS SELECT 42 AS y;
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++ERROR: table ext_cine_tab2 is not a member of extension "test_ext_cine"
++DETAIL: An extension may only use CREATE ... IF NOT EXISTS to skip object creation if the conflicting object is one that it already owns.
++DROP TABLE ext_cine_tab2;
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine;
++\dx+ test_ext_cine
++Objects in extension "test_ext_cine"
++ Object description
++-----------------------------------
++ collation ext_cine_coll
++ foreign-data wrapper ext_cine_fdw
++ materialized view ext_cine_mv
++ schema ext_cine_schema
++ sequence ext_cine_seq
++ server ext_cine_srv
++ table ext_cine_tab1
++ table ext_cine_tab2
++(8 rows)
++
++ALTER EXTENSION test_ext_cine UPDATE TO '1.1';
++\dx+ test_ext_cine
++Objects in extension "test_ext_cine"
++ Object description
++-----------------------------------
++ collation ext_cine_coll
++ foreign-data wrapper ext_cine_fdw
++ materialized view ext_cine_mv
++ schema ext_cine_schema
++ sequence ext_cine_seq
++ server ext_cine_srv
++ table ext_cine_tab1
++ table ext_cine_tab2
++ table ext_cine_tab3
++(9 rows)
++
+diff --git a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/sql/test_extensions.sql b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/sql/test_extensions.sql
+index f505466..b3d4579 100644
+--- a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/sql/test_extensions.sql
++++ b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/sql/test_extensions.sql
+@@ -93,3 +93,113 @@ DROP TABLE test_ext4_tab;
+ DROP FUNCTION create_extension_with_temp_schema();
+ RESET client_min_messages;
+ \unset SHOW_CONTEXT
++
++-- It's generally bad style to use CREATE OR REPLACE unnecessarily.
++-- Test what happens if an extension does it anyway.
++-- Replacing a shell type or operator is sort of like CREATE OR REPLACE;
++-- check that too.
++
++CREATE FUNCTION ext_cor_func() RETURNS text
++ AS $$ SELECT 'ext_cor_func: original'::text $$ LANGUAGE sql;
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor; -- fail
++
++SELECT ext_cor_func();
++
++DROP FUNCTION ext_cor_func();
++
++CREATE VIEW ext_cor_view AS
++ SELECT 'ext_cor_view: original'::text AS col;
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor; -- fail
++
++SELECT ext_cor_func();
++
++SELECT * FROM ext_cor_view;
++
++DROP VIEW ext_cor_view;
++
++CREATE TYPE test_ext_type;
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor; -- fail
++
++DROP TYPE test_ext_type;
++
++-- this makes a shell "point <<@@ polygon" operator too
++CREATE OPERATOR @@>> ( PROCEDURE = poly_contain_pt,
++ LEFTARG = polygon, RIGHTARG = point,
++ COMMUTATOR = <<@@ );
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor; -- fail
++
++DROP OPERATOR <<@@ (point, polygon);
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor; -- now it should work
++
++SELECT ext_cor_func();
++
++SELECT * FROM ext_cor_view;
++
++SELECT 'x'::test_ext_type;
++
++SELECT point(0,0) <<@@ polygon(circle(point(0,0),1));
++
++\dx+ test_ext_cor
++
++--
++-- CREATE IF NOT EXISTS is an entirely unsound thing for an extension
++-- to be doing, but let's at least plug the major security hole in it.
++--
++
++CREATE COLLATION ext_cine_coll
++ ( LC_COLLATE = "C", LC_CTYPE = "C" );
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++
++DROP COLLATION ext_cine_coll;
++
++CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW ext_cine_mv AS SELECT 11 AS f1;
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++
++DROP MATERIALIZED VIEW ext_cine_mv;
++
++CREATE FOREIGN DATA WRAPPER dummy;
++
++CREATE SERVER ext_cine_srv FOREIGN DATA WRAPPER dummy;
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++
++DROP SERVER ext_cine_srv;
++
++CREATE SCHEMA ext_cine_schema;
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++
++DROP SCHEMA ext_cine_schema;
++
++CREATE SEQUENCE ext_cine_seq;
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++
++DROP SEQUENCE ext_cine_seq;
++
++CREATE TABLE ext_cine_tab1 (x int);
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++
++DROP TABLE ext_cine_tab1;
++
++CREATE TABLE ext_cine_tab2 AS SELECT 42 AS y;
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine; -- fail
++
++DROP TABLE ext_cine_tab2;
++
++CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine;
++
++\dx+ test_ext_cine
++
++ALTER EXTENSION test_ext_cine UPDATE TO '1.1';
++
++\dx+ test_ext_cine
+diff --git a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0--1.1.sql b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0--1.1.sql
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6dadfd2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0--1.1.sql
+@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
++/* src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0--1.1.sql */
++-- complain if script is sourced in psql, rather than via ALTER EXTENSION
++\echo Use "ALTER EXTENSION test_ext_cine UPDATE TO '1.1'" to load this file. \quit
++
++--
++-- These are the same commands as in the 1.0 script; we expect them
++-- to do nothing.
++--
++
++CREATE COLLATION IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_coll
++ ( LC_COLLATE = "POSIX", LC_CTYPE = "POSIX" );
++
++CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_mv AS SELECT 42 AS f1;
++
++CREATE SERVER IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_srv FOREIGN DATA WRAPPER ext_cine_fdw;
++
++CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_schema;
++
++CREATE SEQUENCE IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_seq;
++
++CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_tab1 (x int);
++
++CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_tab2 AS SELECT 42 AS y;
++
++-- just to verify the script ran
++CREATE TABLE ext_cine_tab3 (z int);
+diff --git a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0.sql b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0.sql
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..01408ff
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0.sql
+@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
++/* src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine--1.0.sql */
++-- complain if script is sourced in psql, rather than via CREATE EXTENSION
++\echo Use "CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cine" to load this file. \quit
++
++--
++-- CREATE IF NOT EXISTS is an entirely unsound thing for an extension
++-- to be doing, but let's at least plug the major security hole in it.
++--
++
++CREATE COLLATION IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_coll
++ ( LC_COLLATE = "POSIX", LC_CTYPE = "POSIX" );
++
++CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_mv AS SELECT 42 AS f1;
++
++CREATE FOREIGN DATA WRAPPER ext_cine_fdw;
++
++CREATE SERVER IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_srv FOREIGN DATA WRAPPER ext_cine_fdw;
++
++CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_schema;
++
++CREATE SEQUENCE IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_seq;
++
++CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_tab1 (x int);
++
++CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ext_cine_tab2 AS SELECT 42 AS y;
+diff --git a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine.control b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine.control
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ced713b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cine.control
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++comment = 'Test extension using CREATE IF NOT EXISTS'
++default_version = '1.0'
++relocatable = true
+diff --git a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cor--1.0.sql b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cor--1.0.sql
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2e8d89c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cor--1.0.sql
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++/* src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cor--1.0.sql */
++-- complain if script is sourced in psql, rather than via CREATE EXTENSION
++\echo Use "CREATE EXTENSION test_ext_cor" to load this file. \quit
++
++-- It's generally bad style to use CREATE OR REPLACE unnecessarily.
++-- Test what happens if an extension does it anyway.
++
++CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION ext_cor_func() RETURNS text
++ AS $$ SELECT 'ext_cor_func: from extension'::text $$ LANGUAGE sql;
++
++CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW ext_cor_view AS
++ SELECT 'ext_cor_view: from extension'::text AS col;
++
++-- These are for testing replacement of a shell type/operator, which works
++-- enough like an implicit OR REPLACE to be important to check.
++
++CREATE TYPE test_ext_type AS ENUM('x', 'y');
++
++CREATE OPERATOR <<@@ ( PROCEDURE = pt_contained_poly,
++ LEFTARG = point, RIGHTARG = polygon );
+diff --git a/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cor.control b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cor.control
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..0e972e5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/test/modules/test_extensions/test_ext_cor.control
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++comment = 'Test extension using CREATE OR REPLACE'
++default_version = '1.0'
++relocatable = true
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-41862.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-41862.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f4093f4ba7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2022-41862.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 3f7342671341a7a137f2d8b06ab3461cdb0e1d88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 11:20:31 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] Properly NULL-terminate GSS receive buffer on error packet
+ reception
+
+pqsecure_open_gss() includes a code path handling error messages with
+v2-style protocol messages coming from the server. The client-side
+buffer holding the error message does not force a NULL-termination, with
+the data of the server getting copied to the errorMessage of the
+connection. Hence, it would be possible for a server to send an
+unterminated string and copy arbitrary bytes in the buffer receiving the
+error message in the client, opening the door to a crash or even data
+exposure.
+
+As at this stage of the authentication process the exchange has not been
+completed yet, this could be abused by an attacker without Kerberos
+credentials. Clients that have a valid kerberos cache are vulnerable as
+libpq opportunistically requests for it except if gssencmode is
+disabled.
+
+Author: Jacob Champion
+Backpatch-through: 12
+Security: CVE-2022-41862
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-41862
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=commit;h=3f7342671341a7a137f2d8b06ab3461cdb0e1d88]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-gssapi.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-gssapi.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-gssapi.c
+index 7b5e383..aef201b 100644
+--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-gssapi.c
++++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-gssapi.c
+@@ -578,6 +578,8 @@ pqsecure_open_gss(PGconn *conn)
+
+ PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
+
++ Assert(PqGSSRecvLength < PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE);
++ PqGSSRecvBuffer[PqGSSRecvLength] = '\0';
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage, "%s\n", PqGSSRecvBuffer + 1);
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_12.9.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_12.9.bb
index 67bf2b9604..808c5d6e77 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_12.9.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_12.9.bb
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ SRC_URI += "\
file://0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch \
file://0001-Improve-reproducibility.patch \
file://remove_duplicate.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-1552.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-2625.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-41862.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "89fda2de33ed04a98548e43f3ee5f15b882be17505d631fe0dd1a540a2b56dce"
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/capnproto/capnproto_0.7.0.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/capnproto/capnproto_0.7.0.bb
index cb748d3cb6..fa1751e566 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/capnproto/capnproto_0.7.0.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/capnproto/capnproto_0.7.0.bb
@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ SECTION = "console/tools"
LICENSE = "MIT"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://../LICENSE;md5=a05663ae6cca874123bf667a60dca8c9"
-SRC_URI = "git://github.com/sandstorm-io/capnproto.git;branch=release-${PV};protocol=https"
+SRC_URI = "git://github.com/sandstorm-io/capnproto.git;branch=release-${PV};protocol=https \
+ file://CVE-2022-46149.patch \
+"
SRCREV = "3f44c6db0f0f6c0cab0633f15f15d0a2acd01d19"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git/c++"
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/capnproto/files/CVE-2022-46149.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/capnproto/files/CVE-2022-46149.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b6b1fa6514
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/capnproto/files/CVE-2022-46149.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 25d34c67863fd960af34fc4f82a7ca3362ee74b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kenton Varda <kenton@cloudflare.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2022 12:02:29 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] Apply data offset for list-of-pointers at access time rather
+ than ListReader creation time.
+
+Baking this offset into `ptr` reduced ops needed at access time but made the interpretation of `ptr` inconsistent depending on what type of list was expected.
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-46149
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/capnproto/capnproto/commit/25d34c67863fd960af34fc4f82a7ca3362ee74b9]
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendrak@kpit.com>
+---
+ c++/src/capnp/layout.c++ | 4 ----
+ c++/src/capnp/layout.h | 6 +++++-
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+Index: c++/src/capnp/layout.c++
+===================================================================
+--- c++.orig/src/capnp/layout.c++
++++ c++/src/capnp/layout.c++
+@@ -2322,10 +2322,6 @@ struct WireHelpers {
+ break;
+
+ case ElementSize::POINTER:
+- // We expected a list of pointers but got a list of structs. Assuming the first field
+- // in the struct is the pointer we were looking for, we want to munge the pointer to
+- // point at the first element's pointer section.
+- ptr += tag->structRef.dataSize.get();
+ KJ_REQUIRE(tag->structRef.ptrCount.get() > ZERO * POINTERS,
+ "Expected a pointer list, but got a list of data-only structs.") {
+ goto useDefault;
+Index: c++/src/capnp/layout.h
+===================================================================
+--- c++.orig/src/capnp/layout.h
++++ c++/src/capnp/layout.h
+@@ -1235,8 +1235,12 @@ inline Void ListReader::getDataElement<V
+ }
+
+ inline PointerReader ListReader::getPointerElement(ElementCount index) const {
++ // If the list elements have data sections we need to skip those. Note that for pointers to be
++ // present at all (which already must be true if we get here), then `structDataSize` must be a
++ // whole number of words, so we don't have to worry about unaligned reads here.
++ auto offset = structDataSize / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ return PointerReader(segment, capTable, reinterpret_cast<const WirePointer*>(
+- ptr + upgradeBound<uint64_t>(index) * step / BITS_PER_BYTE), nestingLimit);
++ ptr + offset + upgradeBound<uint64_t>(index) * step / BITS_PER_BYTE), nestingLimit);
+ }
+
+ // -------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/flatbuffers/flatbuffers_1.12.0.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/flatbuffers/flatbuffers_1.12.0.bb
index 859d6a0b05..c4f3594f36 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/flatbuffers/flatbuffers_1.12.0.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/flatbuffers/flatbuffers_1.12.0.bb
@@ -24,12 +24,17 @@ BUILD_CXXFLAGS += "-std=c++11 -fPIC"
# BUILD_TYPE=Release is required, otherwise flatc is not installed
EXTRA_OECMAKE += "\
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
- -DFLATBUFFERS_BUILD_TESTS=OFF \
+ -DFLATBUFFERS_BUILD_TESTS=OFF \
-DFLATBUFFERS_BUILD_SHAREDLIB=ON \
"
inherit cmake
+rm_flatc_cmaketarget_for_target() {
+ rm -f "${SYSROOT_DESTDIR}/${libdir}/cmake/flatbuffers/FlatcTargets.cmake"
+}
+SYSROOT_PREPROCESS_FUNCS:class-target += "rm_flatc_cmaketarget_for_target"
+
S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
FILES_${PN}-compiler = "${bindir}"
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-32212.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-32212.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f7b4b61f47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-32212.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+commit 48c5aa5cab718d04473fa2761d532657c84b8131
+Author: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
+Date: Fri May 27 21:18:49 2022 +0000
+
+ src: fix IPv4 validation in inspector_socket
+
+ Co-authored-by: RafaelGSS <rafael.nunu@hotmail.com>
+ PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/320
+ Backport-PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/325
+ Reviewed-By: Matteo Collina <matteo.collina@gmail.com>
+ Reviewed-By: RafaelGSS <rafael.nunu@hotmail.com>
+ CVE-ID: CVE-2022-32212
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-32212
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sources.debian.org/src/nodejs/12.22.12~dfsg-1~deb11u3/debian/patches/cve-2022-32212.patch]
+Comment: No hunks refreshed
+Signed-off-by: Poonam Jadhav <Poonam.Jadhav@kpit.com>
+
+Index: nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/inspector_socket.cc
+===================================================================
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg.orig/src/inspector_socket.cc
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/inspector_socket.cc
+@@ -168,14 +168,22 @@ static std::string TrimPort(const std::s
+ static bool IsIPAddress(const std::string& host) {
+ if (host.length() >= 4 && host.front() == '[' && host.back() == ']')
+ return true;
+- int quads = 0;
++ uint_fast16_t accum = 0;
++ uint_fast8_t quads = 0;
++ bool empty = true;
++ auto endOctet = [&accum, &quads, &empty](bool final = false) {
++ return !empty && accum <= 0xff && ++quads <= 4 && final == (quads == 4) &&
++ (empty = true) && !(accum = 0);
++ };
+ for (char c : host) {
+- if (c == '.')
+- quads++;
+- else if (!isdigit(c))
++ if (isdigit(c)) {
++ if ((accum = (accum * 10) + (c - '0')) > 0xff) return false;
++ empty = false;
++ } else if (c != '.' || !endOctet()) {
+ return false;
++ }
+ }
+- return quads == 3;
++ return endOctet(true);
+ }
+
+ // Constants for hybi-10 frame format.
+Index: nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc
+===================================================================
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg.orig/test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc
+@@ -851,4 +851,78 @@ TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostCheckedF
+ expect_failure_no_delegate(UPGRADE_REQUEST);
+ }
+
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIPChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 10.0.2.555:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostNegativeIPChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 10.0.-23.255:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpOctetOutOfIntRangeChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST =
++ "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 127.0.0.4294967296:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpOctetFarOutOfIntRangeChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST =
++ "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 127.0.0.18446744073709552000:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpEmptyOctetStartChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: .0.0.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpEmptyOctetMidChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 127..0.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpEmptyOctetEndChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 127.0.0.:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpTooFewOctetsChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 127.0.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpTooManyOctetsChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 127.0.0.0.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
+ } // anonymous namespace
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-35255.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-35255.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e9c2e7404a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-35255.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+Origin: https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/0c2a5723beff39d1f62daec96b5389da3d427e79
+Reviewed-by: Aron Xu <aron@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2022-01-05
+Comment:
+ Although WebCrypto is not implemented in 12.x series, this fix is introducing
+ enhancment to the crypto setup of V8:EntropySource().
+
+commit 0c2a5723beff39d1f62daec96b5389da3d427e79
+Author: Ben Noordhuis <info@bnoordhuis.nl>
+Date: Sun Sep 11 10:48:34 2022 +0200
+
+ crypto: fix weak randomness in WebCrypto keygen
+
+ Commit dae283d96f from August 2020 introduced a call to EntropySource()
+ in SecretKeyGenTraits::DoKeyGen() in src/crypto/crypto_keygen.cc. There
+ are two problems with that:
+
+ 1. It does not check the return value, it assumes EntropySource() always
+ succeeds, but it can (and sometimes will) fail.
+
+ 2. The random data returned byEntropySource() may not be
+ cryptographically strong and therefore not suitable as keying
+ material.
+
+ An example is a freshly booted system or a system without /dev/random or
+ getrandom(2).
+
+ EntropySource() calls out to openssl's RAND_poll() and RAND_bytes() in a
+ best-effort attempt to obtain random data. OpenSSL has a built-in CSPRNG
+ but that can fail to initialize, in which case it's possible either:
+
+ 1. No random data gets written to the output buffer, i.e., the output is
+ unmodified, or
+
+ 2. Weak random data is written. It's theoretically possible for the
+ output to be fully predictable because the CSPRNG starts from a
+ predictable state.
+
+ Replace EntropySource() and CheckEntropy() with new function CSPRNG()
+ that enforces checking of the return value. Abort on startup when the
+ entropy pool fails to initialize because that makes it too easy to
+ compromise the security of the process.
+
+ Refs: https://hackerone.com/bugs?report_id=1690000
+ Refs: https://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/35093
+
+ Reviewed-By: Rafael Gonzaga <rafael.nunu@hotmail.com>
+ Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
+ PR-URL: #346
+ Backport-PR-URL: #351
+ CVE-ID: CVE-2022-35255
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-35255
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sources.debian.org/src/nodejs/12.22.12~dfsg-1~deb11u3/debian/patches/cve-2022-35255.patch]
+Comment: No hunks refreshed
+Signed-off-by: Poonam Jadhav <Poonam.Jadhav@kpit.com>
+
+Index: nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/node.gyp
+===================================================================
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg.orig/node.gyp
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/node.gyp
+@@ -743,6 +743,8 @@
+ 'openssl_default_cipher_list%': '',
+ },
+
++ 'cflags': ['-Werror=unused-result'],
++
+ 'defines': [
+ 'NODE_ARCH="<(target_arch)"',
+ 'NODE_PLATFORM="<(OS)"',
+Index: nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/node_crypto.cc
+===================================================================
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg.orig/src/node_crypto.cc
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/node_crypto.cc
+@@ -386,48 +386,14 @@ void ThrowCryptoError(Environment* env,
+ env->isolate()->ThrowException(exception);
+ }
+
++MUST_USE_RESULT CSPRNGResult CSPRNG(void* buffer, size_t length) {
++ do {
++ if (1 == RAND_status())
++ if (1 == RAND_bytes(static_cast<unsigned char*>(buffer), length))
++ return {true};
++ } while (1 == RAND_poll());
+
+-// Ensure that OpenSSL has enough entropy (at least 256 bits) for its PRNG.
+-// The entropy pool starts out empty and needs to fill up before the PRNG
+-// can be used securely. Once the pool is filled, it never dries up again;
+-// its contents is stirred and reused when necessary.
+-//
+-// OpenSSL normally fills the pool automatically but not when someone starts
+-// generating random numbers before the pool is full: in that case OpenSSL
+-// keeps lowering the entropy estimate to thwart attackers trying to guess
+-// the initial state of the PRNG.
+-//
+-// When that happens, we will have to wait until enough entropy is available.
+-// That should normally never take longer than a few milliseconds.
+-//
+-// OpenSSL draws from /dev/random and /dev/urandom. While /dev/random may
+-// block pending "true" randomness, /dev/urandom is a CSPRNG that doesn't
+-// block under normal circumstances.
+-//
+-// The only time when /dev/urandom may conceivably block is right after boot,
+-// when the whole system is still low on entropy. That's not something we can
+-// do anything about.
+-inline void CheckEntropy() {
+- for (;;) {
+- int status = RAND_status();
+- CHECK_GE(status, 0); // Cannot fail.
+- if (status != 0)
+- break;
+-
+- // Give up, RAND_poll() not supported.
+- if (RAND_poll() == 0)
+- break;
+- }
+-}
+-
+-
+-bool EntropySource(unsigned char* buffer, size_t length) {
+- // Ensure that OpenSSL's PRNG is properly seeded.
+- CheckEntropy();
+- // RAND_bytes() can return 0 to indicate that the entropy data is not truly
+- // random. That's okay, it's still better than V8's stock source of entropy,
+- // which is /dev/urandom on UNIX platforms and the current time on Windows.
+- return RAND_bytes(buffer, length) != -1;
++ return {false};
+ }
+
+ void SecureContext::Initialize(Environment* env, Local<Object> target) {
+@@ -649,9 +615,9 @@ void SecureContext::Init(const FunctionC
+ // OpenSSL 1.1.0 changed the ticket key size, but the OpenSSL 1.0.x size was
+ // exposed in the public API. To retain compatibility, install a callback
+ // which restores the old algorithm.
+- if (RAND_bytes(sc->ticket_key_name_, sizeof(sc->ticket_key_name_)) <= 0 ||
+- RAND_bytes(sc->ticket_key_hmac_, sizeof(sc->ticket_key_hmac_)) <= 0 ||
+- RAND_bytes(sc->ticket_key_aes_, sizeof(sc->ticket_key_aes_)) <= 0) {
++ if (CSPRNG(sc->ticket_key_name_, sizeof(sc->ticket_key_name_)).is_err() ||
++ CSPRNG(sc->ticket_key_hmac_, sizeof(sc->ticket_key_hmac_)).is_err() ||
++ CSPRNG(sc->ticket_key_aes_, sizeof(sc->ticket_key_aes_)).is_err()) {
+ return env->ThrowError("Error generating ticket keys");
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(sc->ctx_.get(), TicketCompatibilityCallback);
+@@ -1643,7 +1609,7 @@ int SecureContext::TicketCompatibilityCa
+
+ if (enc) {
+ memcpy(name, sc->ticket_key_name_, sizeof(sc->ticket_key_name_));
+- if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0 ||
++ if (CSPRNG(iv, 16).is_err() ||
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ectx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), nullptr,
+ sc->ticket_key_aes_, iv) <= 0 ||
+ HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, sc->ticket_key_hmac_, sizeof(sc->ticket_key_hmac_),
+@@ -5867,8 +5833,7 @@ struct RandomBytesJob : public CryptoJob
+ : CryptoJob(env), rc(Nothing<int>()) {}
+
+ inline void DoThreadPoolWork() override {
+- CheckEntropy(); // Ensure that OpenSSL's PRNG is properly seeded.
+- rc = Just(RAND_bytes(data, size));
++ rc = Just(int(CSPRNG(data, size).is_ok()));
+ if (0 == rc.FromJust()) errors.Capture();
+ }
+
+@@ -6318,8 +6283,8 @@ class GenerateKeyPairJob : public Crypto
+ }
+
+ inline bool GenerateKey() {
+- // Make sure that the CSPRNG is properly seeded so the results are secure.
+- CheckEntropy();
++ // Make sure that the CSPRNG is properly seeded.
++ CHECK(CSPRNG(nullptr, 0).is_ok());
+
+ // Create the key generation context.
+ EVPKeyCtxPointer ctx = config_->Setup();
+Index: nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/node_crypto.h
+===================================================================
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg.orig/src/node_crypto.h
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/node_crypto.h
+@@ -840,7 +840,19 @@ class ECDH final : public BaseObject {
+ const EC_GROUP* group_;
+ };
+
+-bool EntropySource(unsigned char* buffer, size_t length);
++struct CSPRNGResult {
++ const bool ok;
++ MUST_USE_RESULT bool is_ok() const { return ok; }
++ MUST_USE_RESULT bool is_err() const { return !ok; }
++};
++
++// Either succeeds with exactly |length| bytes of cryptographically
++// strong pseudo-random data, or fails. This function may block.
++// Don't assume anything about the contents of |buffer| on error.
++// As a special case, |length == 0| can be used to check if the CSPRNG
++// is properly seeded without consuming entropy.
++MUST_USE_RESULT CSPRNGResult CSPRNG(void* buffer, size_t length);
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ void SetEngine(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args);
+ #endif // !OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+Index: nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/inspector_io.cc
+===================================================================
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg.orig/src/inspector_io.cc
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/inspector_io.cc
+@@ -46,8 +46,7 @@ std::string ScriptPath(uv_loop_t* loop,
+ // Used ver 4 - with numbers
+ std::string GenerateID() {
+ uint16_t buffer[8];
+- CHECK(crypto::EntropySource(reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(buffer),
+- sizeof(buffer)));
++ CHECK(crypto::CSPRNG(buffer, sizeof(buffer)).is_ok());
+
+ char uuid[256];
+ snprintf(uuid, sizeof(uuid), "%04x%04x-%04x-%04x-%04x-%04x%04x%04x",
+Index: nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/node.cc
+===================================================================
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg.orig/src/node.cc
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/node.cc
+@@ -969,9 +969,17 @@ InitializationResult InitializeOncePerPr
+ // the random source is properly initialized first.
+ OPENSSL_init();
+ #endif // NODE_FIPS_MODE
+- // V8 on Windows doesn't have a good source of entropy. Seed it from
+- // OpenSSL's pool.
+- V8::SetEntropySource(crypto::EntropySource);
++ // Ensure CSPRNG is properly seeded.
++ CHECK(crypto::CSPRNG(nullptr, 0).is_ok());
++
++ V8::SetEntropySource([](unsigned char* buffer, size_t length) {
++ // V8 falls back to very weak entropy when this function fails
++ // and /dev/urandom isn't available. That wouldn't be so bad if
++ // the entropy was only used for Math.random() but it's also used for
++ // hash table and address space layout randomization. Better to abort.
++ CHECK(crypto::CSPRNG(buffer, length).is_ok());
++ return true;
++ });
+ #endif // HAVE_OPENSSL
+
+ per_process::v8_platform.Initialize(
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-43548.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-43548.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..54da1fba99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-2022-43548.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+commit 2b433af094fb79cf80f086038b7f36342cb6826f
+Author: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
+Date: Sun Sep 25 12:34:05 2022 +0000
+
+ inspector: harden IP address validation again
+
+ Use inet_pton() to parse IP addresses, which restricts IP addresses
+ to a small number of well-defined formats. In particular, octal and
+ hexadecimal number formats are not allowed, and neither are leading
+ zeros. Also explicitly reject 0.0.0.0/8 and ::/128 as non-routable.
+
+ Refs: https://hackerone.com/reports/1710652
+ CVE-ID: CVE-2022-43548
+ PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/354
+ Reviewed-by: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
+ Reviewed-by: Rafael Gonzaga <rafael.nunu@hotmail.com>
+ Reviewed-by: Rich Trott <rtrott@gmail.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-43548
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sources.debian.org/src/nodejs/12.22.12~dfsg-1~deb11u3/debian/patches/cve-2022-43548.patch]
+Comment: No hunks refreshed
+Signed-off-by: Poonam Jadhav <Poonam.Jadhav@kpit.com>
+
+Index: nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/inspector_socket.cc
+===================================================================
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg.orig/src/inspector_socket.cc
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/src/inspector_socket.cc
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+
+ #include "openssl/sha.h" // Sha-1 hash
+
++#include <algorithm>
+ #include <cstring>
+ #include <map>
+
+@@ -166,25 +167,71 @@ static std::string TrimPort(const std::s
+ }
+
+ static bool IsIPAddress(const std::string& host) {
+- if (host.length() >= 4 && host.front() == '[' && host.back() == ']')
++ // TODO(tniessen): add CVEs to the following bullet points
++ // To avoid DNS rebinding attacks, we are aware of the following requirements:
++ // * the host name must be an IP address,
++ // * the IP address must be routable, and
++ // * the IP address must be formatted unambiguously.
++
++ // The logic below assumes that the string is null-terminated, so ensure that
++ // we did not somehow end up with null characters within the string.
++ if (host.find('\0') != std::string::npos) return false;
++
++ // All IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets, and anything
++ // enclosed in square brackets must be an IPv6 address.
++ if (host.length() >= 4 && host.front() == '[' && host.back() == ']') {
++ // INET6_ADDRSTRLEN is the maximum length of the dual format (including the
++ // terminating null character), which is the longest possible representation
++ // of an IPv6 address: xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:ddd.ddd.ddd.ddd
++ if (host.length() - 2 >= INET6_ADDRSTRLEN) return false;
++
++ // Annoyingly, libuv's implementation of inet_pton() deviates from other
++ // implementations of the function in that it allows '%' in IPv6 addresses.
++ if (host.find('%') != std::string::npos) return false;
++
++ // Parse the IPv6 address to ensure it is syntactically valid.
++ char ipv6_str[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
++ std::copy(host.begin() + 1, host.end() - 1, ipv6_str);
++ ipv6_str[host.length()] = '\0';
++ unsigned char ipv6[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
++ if (uv_inet_pton(AF_INET6, ipv6_str, ipv6) != 0) return false;
++
++ // The only non-routable IPv6 address is ::/128. It should not be necessary
++ // to explicitly reject it because it will still be enclosed in square
++ // brackets and not even macOS should make DNS requests in that case, but
++ // history has taught us that we cannot be careful enough.
++ // Note that RFC 4291 defines both "IPv4-Compatible IPv6 Addresses" and
++ // "IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses", which means that there are IPv6 addresses
++ // (other than ::/128) that represent non-routable IPv4 addresses. However,
++ // this translation assumes that the host is interpreted as an IPv6 address
++ // in the first place, at which point DNS rebinding should not be an issue.
++ if (std::all_of(ipv6, ipv6 + sizeof(ipv6), [](auto b) { return b == 0; })) {
++ return false;
++ }
++
++ // It is a syntactically valid and routable IPv6 address enclosed in square
++ // brackets. No client should be able to misinterpret this.
+ return true;
+- uint_fast16_t accum = 0;
+- uint_fast8_t quads = 0;
+- bool empty = true;
+- auto endOctet = [&accum, &quads, &empty](bool final = false) {
+- return !empty && accum <= 0xff && ++quads <= 4 && final == (quads == 4) &&
+- (empty = true) && !(accum = 0);
+- };
+- for (char c : host) {
+- if (isdigit(c)) {
+- if ((accum = (accum * 10) + (c - '0')) > 0xff) return false;
+- empty = false;
+- } else if (c != '.' || !endOctet()) {
+- return false;
+- }
+- }
+- return endOctet(true);
+-}
++ }
++
++ // Anything not enclosed in square brackets must be an IPv4 address. It is
++ // important here that inet_pton() accepts only the so-called dotted-decimal
++ // notation, which is a strict subset of the so-called numbers-and-dots
++ // notation that is allowed by inet_aton() and inet_addr(). This subset does
++ // not allow hexadecimal or octal number formats.
++ unsigned char ipv4[sizeof(struct in_addr)];
++ if (uv_inet_pton(AF_INET, host.c_str(), ipv4) != 0) return false;
++
++ // The only strictly non-routable IPv4 address is 0.0.0.0, and macOS will make
++ // DNS requests for this IP address, so we need to explicitly reject it. In
++ // fact, we can safely reject all of 0.0.0.0/8 (see Section 3.2 of RFC 791 and
++ // Section 3.2.1.3 of RFC 1122).
++ // Note that inet_pton() stores the IPv4 address in network byte order.
++ if (ipv4[0] == 0) return false;
++
++ // It is a routable IPv4 address in dotted-decimal notation.
++ return true;
++ }
+
+ // Constants for hybi-10 frame format.
+
+Index: nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc
+===================================================================
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg.orig/test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/cctest/test_inspector_socket.cc
+@@ -925,4 +925,84 @@ TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpTooMan
+ expect_handshake_failure();
+ }
+
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpInvalidOctalOctetStartChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 08.1.1.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpInvalidOctalOctetMidChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 1.09.1.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpInvalidOctalOctetEndChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 1.1.1.009:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpLeadingZeroStartChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 01.1.1.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpLeadingZeroMidChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 1.1.001.1:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIpLeadingZeroEndChecked) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: 1.1.1.01:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIPv6NonRoutable) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: [::]:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIPv6NonRoutableDual) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: [::0.0.0.0]:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIPv4InSquareBrackets) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: [127.0.0.1]:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
++TEST_F(InspectorSocketTest, HostIPv6InvalidAbbreviation) {
++ const std::string INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST = "GET /json HTTP/1.1\r\n"
++ "Host: [:::1]:9229\r\n\r\n";
++ send_in_chunks(INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.c_str(),
++ INVALID_HOST_IP_REQUEST.length());
++ expect_handshake_failure();
++}
++
+ } // anonymous namespace
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-llhttp.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-llhttp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..790cf92d2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs/CVE-llhttp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,4348 @@
+Reviewed-by: Aron Xu <aron@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2023-01-05
+Comment:
+ This patch updates the embeded copy of llhttp from version 2.1.4 to 2.1.6,
+ which is upstream's actual fix for CVE-2022-32213, CVE-2022-32214, CVE-2022-32215,
+ CVE-2022-35256.
+ Test cases are ported to use mustCall() to replace the later introduced
+ mustSucceed(), to avoid pulling in too many dependent new test codes.
+References:
+ * https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/da0fda0fe81d372e24c0cb11aec37534985708dd
+ * https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/a9f1146b8827855e342834458a71f2367346ace0
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-32213 CVE-2022-32214 CVE-2022-32215 CVE-2022-35256
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sources.debian.org/src/nodejs/12.22.12~dfsg-1~deb11u3/debian/patches/cve-llhttp.patch]
+Comment: No hunks refreshed
+Signed-off-by: Poonam Jadhav <Poonam.Jadhav@kpit.com>
+
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
+
+ #define LLHTTP_VERSION_MAJOR 2
+ #define LLHTTP_VERSION_MINOR 1
+-#define LLHTTP_VERSION_PATCH 4
++#define LLHTTP_VERSION_PATCH 6
+
+ #ifndef LLHTTP_STRICT_MODE
+ # define LLHTTP_STRICT_MODE 0
+@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
+ HPE_OK = 0,
+ HPE_INTERNAL = 1,
+ HPE_STRICT = 2,
++ HPE_CR_EXPECTED = 25,
+ HPE_LF_EXPECTED = 3,
+ HPE_UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH = 4,
+ HPE_CLOSED_CONNECTION = 5,
+@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@
+ HPE_CB_CHUNK_COMPLETE = 20,
+ HPE_PAUSED = 21,
+ HPE_PAUSED_UPGRADE = 22,
+- HPE_USER = 23
++ HPE_USER = 24
+ };
+ typedef enum llhttp_errno llhttp_errno_t;
+
+@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@
+ XX(0, OK, OK) \
+ XX(1, INTERNAL, INTERNAL) \
+ XX(2, STRICT, STRICT) \
++ XX(25, CR_EXPECTED, CR_EXPECTED) \
+ XX(3, LF_EXPECTED, LF_EXPECTED) \
+ XX(4, UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH, UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH) \
+ XX(5, CLOSED_CONNECTION, CLOSED_CONNECTION) \
+@@ -173,7 +175,7 @@
+ XX(20, CB_CHUNK_COMPLETE, CB_CHUNK_COMPLETE) \
+ XX(21, PAUSED, PAUSED) \
+ XX(22, PAUSED_UPGRADE, PAUSED_UPGRADE) \
+- XX(23, USER, USER) \
++ XX(24, USER, USER) \
+
+
+ #define HTTP_METHOD_MAP(XX) \
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
+@@ -325,6 +325,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_lws,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_lenient,
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_otherwise,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_token,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_ws,
+@@ -332,14 +333,16 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_2,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_3,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection,
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27,
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_content_length_ws,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_content_length,
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last,
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30,
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_token_ows,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_token,
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_header_value_1,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_discard_ws,
+@@ -734,7 +737,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_2(
++int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_3(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -742,7 +745,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_4(
++int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -750,7 +753,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_5(
++int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_6(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -758,7 +761,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_6(
++int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_7(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -766,7 +769,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_6(
++int llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_7(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -807,6 +810,13 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++int llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_8(
++ llhttp__internal_t* state,
++ const unsigned char* p,
++ const unsigned char* endp) {
++ return (state->flags & 8) == 8;
++}
++
+ int llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_16(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+@@ -823,7 +833,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_7(
++int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_8(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -831,7 +841,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_17(
++int llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_18(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -1554,7 +1564,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_discard_lws;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -1567,13 +1577,13 @@
+ }
+ switch (*p) {
+ case 9: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_3;
+ }
+ case ' ': {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_3;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_3;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_4;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -1590,7 +1600,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_lws;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -1603,10 +1613,10 @@
+ }
+ switch (*p) {
+ case 10: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_3;
+ }
+ case 13: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_3;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_4;
+ }
+ default: {
+ p++;
+@@ -1616,20 +1626,27 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25: {
++ state->error = 0xa;
++ state->reason = "Invalid header value char";
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_error;
++ return s_error;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
+ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_otherwise:
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_otherwise: {
+ if (p == endp) {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_otherwise;
+ }
+ switch (*p) {
+- case 10: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
+- }
+ case 13: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_2;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_5;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_6;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -1692,10 +1709,10 @@
+ }
+ case ',': {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_4;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_5;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_5;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -1713,7 +1730,7 @@
+ switch (match_seq.status) {
+ case kMatchComplete: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3;
+ }
+ case kMatchPause: {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_1;
+@@ -1737,7 +1754,7 @@
+ switch (match_seq.status) {
+ case kMatchComplete: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_5;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_6;
+ }
+ case kMatchPause: {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_2;
+@@ -1761,7 +1778,7 @@
+ switch (match_seq.status) {
+ case kMatchComplete: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_6;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_7;
+ }
+ case kMatchPause: {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_3;
+@@ -1806,8 +1823,8 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26:
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26: {
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27: {
+ state->error = 0xb;
+ state->reason = "Content-Length overflow";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -1816,8 +1833,8 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27:
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27: {
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28: {
+ state->error = 0xb;
+ state->reason = "Invalid character in Content-Length";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -1843,7 +1860,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_content_length_ws;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_5;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_6;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -1912,26 +1929,23 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last:
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last: {
+- if (p == endp) {
+- return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last;
+- }
+- switch (*p) {
+- case 10: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_7;
+- }
+- case 13: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_7;
+- }
+- case ' ': {
+- p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last;
+- }
+- default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked;
+- }
+- }
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30: {
++ state->error = 0xf;
++ state->reason = "Invalid `Transfer-Encoding` header value";
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_error;
++ return s_error;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29: {
++ state->error = 0xf;
++ state->reason = "Invalid `Transfer-Encoding` header value";
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_error;
++ return s_error;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+@@ -2048,8 +2062,34 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_token_ows;
+ }
+ default: {
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_9;
++ }
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last: {
++ if (p == endp) {
++ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last;
++ }
++ switch (*p) {
++ case 10: {
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_8;
++ }
++ case 13: {
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_8;
+ }
++ case ' ': {
++ p++;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last;
++ }
++ case ',': {
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_type_1;
++ }
++ default: {
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_token;
++ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -2101,7 +2141,7 @@
+ }
+ case 10: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_discard_lws;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_5;
+ }
+ case 13: {
+ p++;
+@@ -2128,7 +2168,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_field_2;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_31;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2218,7 +2258,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_field_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_9;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2243,7 +2283,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_3;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2268,7 +2308,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_4;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2289,7 +2329,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_4;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2313,7 +2353,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_1;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2338,7 +2378,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_5;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2363,7 +2403,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_6;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2388,7 +2428,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_7;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2417,7 +2457,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_7;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2508,7 +2548,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_to_http_09;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2533,7 +2573,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_skip_lf_to_http09_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2550,7 +2590,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_start;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_33;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2571,7 +2611,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_end_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_33;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2634,7 +2674,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_http_minor;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_31;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_34;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2651,7 +2691,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_minor;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_35;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2714,7 +2754,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_http_major;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_33;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2738,7 +2778,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_start_1;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_35;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_38;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2762,7 +2802,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_start_2;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_35;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_38;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2787,7 +2827,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_start_2;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_35;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_38;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2878,7 +2918,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_fragment;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2939,7 +2979,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_stub_query_3;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_37;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_40;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -2977,7 +3017,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_query;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_38;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_41;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3102,10 +3142,10 @@
+ }
+ case 8: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_40;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_43;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3164,7 +3204,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_server_with_at;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_41;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_44;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3181,7 +3221,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_server;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_43;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_46;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3199,7 +3239,7 @@
+ }
+ case 10: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45;
+ }
+ case 12: {
+ p++;
+@@ -3207,18 +3247,18 @@
+ }
+ case 13: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45;
+ }
+ case ' ': {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45;
+ }
+ case '/': {
+ p++;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_schema_delim_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_43;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_46;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3264,7 +3304,7 @@
+ }
+ case 2: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45;
+ }
+ case 3: {
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_stub_schema;
+@@ -3274,7 +3314,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_schema;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_44;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3310,7 +3350,7 @@
+ }
+ case 2: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45;
+ }
+ case 3: {
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_stub_path_2;
+@@ -3319,7 +3359,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_schema;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3417,7 +3457,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_spaces_before_url;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_46;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_49;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3442,7 +3482,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_1;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3467,7 +3507,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_2;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3492,7 +3532,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_4;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3517,7 +3557,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_6;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3535,7 +3575,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_method_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3556,7 +3596,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_7;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3577,7 +3617,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_5;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3602,7 +3642,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_8;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3627,7 +3667,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_9;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3652,7 +3692,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_10;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3677,7 +3717,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_12;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3702,7 +3742,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_13;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3723,7 +3763,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_13;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3748,7 +3788,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_15;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3773,7 +3813,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_16;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3798,7 +3838,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_18;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3823,7 +3863,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_20;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3841,7 +3881,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_method_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3862,7 +3902,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_21;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3883,7 +3923,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_19;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3908,7 +3948,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_22;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3937,7 +3977,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_22;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3962,7 +4002,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_23;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -3987,7 +4027,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_24;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4012,7 +4052,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_26;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4037,7 +4077,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_27;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4062,7 +4102,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_31;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4087,7 +4127,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_32;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4108,7 +4148,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_32;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4125,7 +4165,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_30;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4147,7 +4187,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_29;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4172,7 +4212,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_34;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4194,7 +4234,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_method_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4223,7 +4263,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_33;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4248,7 +4288,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_37;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4273,7 +4313,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_38;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4294,7 +4334,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_38;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4311,7 +4351,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_36;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4336,7 +4376,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_40;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4361,7 +4401,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_41;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4386,7 +4426,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_42;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4411,7 +4451,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_42;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4436,7 +4476,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_43;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4461,7 +4501,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_46;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4486,7 +4526,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_48;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4511,7 +4551,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_49;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4532,7 +4572,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_49;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4557,7 +4597,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_50;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4582,7 +4622,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_50;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4599,7 +4639,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_45;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4672,7 +4712,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_44;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4689,7 +4729,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_start;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4764,7 +4804,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_res_status_start;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_49;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_52;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4844,7 +4884,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_status_code;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_50;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_53;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4907,7 +4947,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_http_minor_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_54;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4924,7 +4964,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_res_http_minor;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_52;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -4987,7 +5027,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_http_major_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_53;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_56;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -5011,7 +5051,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_res;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_56;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_59;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -5036,7 +5076,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_or_res_method_2;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_54;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_57;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -5060,7 +5100,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_or_res_method_3;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_54;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_57;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -5081,7 +5121,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_or_res_method_3;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_54;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_57;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -5098,7 +5138,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_or_res_method_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_54;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_57;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -5167,7 +5207,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Invalid characters in url";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -5655,7 +5695,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22: {
+ state->error = 0xb;
+ state->reason = "Empty Content-Length";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -5740,14 +5780,33 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 2:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22;
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_1;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21: {
++ state->error = 0xa;
++ state->reason = "Invalid header value char";
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_error;
++ return s_error;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_5: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_2(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 1:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_discard_lws;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23: {
+ state->error = 0x2;
+ state->reason = "Expected LF after CR";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -5757,6 +5816,24 @@
+ abort();
+ }
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_1: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(state, p, endp)) {
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_3: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 8:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_1;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_start;
+@@ -5767,7 +5844,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_7: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_3(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -5775,7 +5852,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_8: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_4(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -5783,7 +5860,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_9: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_5(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -5796,7 +5873,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_3: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_4: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 5:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_7;
+@@ -5812,7 +5889,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24: {
+ state->error = 0x3;
+ state->reason = "Missing expected LF after header value";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -5830,6 +5907,24 @@
+ err = llhttp__on_header_value(state, start, p);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done;
++ return s_error;
++ }
++ p++;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_3: {
++ const unsigned char* start;
++ int err;
++
++ start = state->_span_pos0;
++ state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
++ err = llhttp__on_header_value(state, start, p);
++ if (err != 0) {
++ state->error = err;
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done;
+ return s_error;
+@@ -5838,7 +5933,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_2: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_4: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+@@ -5856,7 +5951,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_3: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_2: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+@@ -5865,35 +5960,25 @@
+ err = llhttp__on_header_value(state, start, p);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
+- state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
+- state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done;
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25;
+ return s_error;
+ }
+- p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done;
+- /* UNREACHABLE */;
+- abort();
+- }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24: {
+- state->error = 0xa;
+- state->reason = "Invalid header value char";
+- state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+- state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_error;
+- return s_error;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_5: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_6: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_2(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 1:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_lenient;
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_2;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection;
+@@ -5904,7 +5989,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_11: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_3(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -5912,7 +5997,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_12: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_4(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -5920,7 +6005,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_13: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_5(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -5933,7 +6018,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_4: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_5: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 5:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_11;
+@@ -5949,39 +6034,39 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_4(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_5: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_token;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_2(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_3(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_ws;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_5: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_5(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_6: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_6(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_ws;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_6: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_6(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_7: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_7(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_ws;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_4: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_5: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+@@ -5991,17 +6076,17 @@
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+- state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27;
+ return s_error;
+ }
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_mul_add_content_length_1: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_mul_add_content_length_1(state, p, endp, match)) {
+ case 1:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_4;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_5;
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_content_length;
+ }
+@@ -6016,7 +6101,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_5: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_6: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+@@ -6026,14 +6111,14 @@
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+- state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28;
+ return s_error;
+ }
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26: {
+ state->error = 0x4;
+ state->reason = "Duplicate Content-Length";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6042,26 +6127,82 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_6: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_6(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_7: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_7(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 0:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_content_length;
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_7: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_7(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_8: {
++ const unsigned char* start;
++ int err;
++
++ start = state->_span_pos0;
++ state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
++ err = llhttp__on_header_value(state, start, p);
++ if (err != 0) {
++ state->error = err;
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30;
++ return s_error;
++ }
++ p++;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_8: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_8(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_otherwise;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_8: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_4(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_7: {
++ const unsigned char* start;
++ int err;
++
++ start = state->_span_pos0;
++ state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
++ err = llhttp__on_header_value(state, start, p);
++ if (err != 0) {
++ state->error = err;
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29;
++ return s_error;
++ }
++ p++;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_9: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_2(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 0:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_7;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_type_1: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_type(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 1:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_9;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_9: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value;
+ }
+@@ -6076,6 +6217,34 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_17: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_16(state, p, endp)) {
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_and_flags;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_10: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_2(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 0:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_8;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_17;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_type_2: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_type(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 1:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_10;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_17;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_16: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_16(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+@@ -6084,10 +6253,20 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_17: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_17(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_8: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_8(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 1:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_type_2;
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_8;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_16;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_18: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_18(state, p, endp)) {
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_9;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -6097,11 +6276,11 @@
+ case 1:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection;
+ case 2:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_6;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_7;
+ case 3:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_16;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_8;
+ case 4:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_17;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_18;
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value;
+ }
+@@ -6144,7 +6323,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_31: {
+ state->error = 0xa;
+ state->reason = "Invalid header token";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6153,8 +6332,8 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_9: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_4(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_general;
+ }
+@@ -6169,8 +6348,8 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_4(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_general;
+ }
+@@ -6210,7 +6389,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Expected CRLF";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6236,7 +6415,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_33: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Expected CRLF after version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6253,7 +6432,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_31: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_34: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Invalid minor version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6262,7 +6441,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_35: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Expected dot";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6279,7 +6458,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_33: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Invalid major version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6288,7 +6467,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_35: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_38: {
+ state->error = 0x8;
+ state->reason = "Expected HTTP/";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6297,7 +6476,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_34: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_37: {
+ state->error = 0x8;
+ state->reason = "Expected SOURCE method for ICE/x.x request";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6309,7 +6488,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_is_equal_method_1: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_is_equal_method_1(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 0:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_34;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_37;
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_major;
+ }
+@@ -6384,7 +6563,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Invalid char in url fragment start";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6444,7 +6623,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_37: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_40: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Invalid char in url query";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6453,7 +6632,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_38: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_41: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Invalid char in url path";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6564,7 +6743,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Double @ in url";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6573,7 +6752,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_40: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_43: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Unexpected char in url server";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6582,7 +6761,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_41: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_44: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Unexpected char in url server";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6591,7 +6770,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_43: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_46: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Unexpected char in url schema";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6600,7 +6779,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_44: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Unexpected char in url schema";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6609,7 +6788,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Unexpected start char in url";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6628,7 +6807,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_46: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_49: {
+ state->error = 0x6;
+ state->reason = "Expected space after method";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6645,7 +6824,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_58: {
+ state->error = 0x6;
+ state->reason = "Invalid method encountered";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6654,7 +6833,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_50: {
+ state->error = 0xd;
+ state->reason = "Response overflow";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6666,14 +6845,14 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_mul_add_status_code: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_mul_add_status_code(state, p, endp, match)) {
+ case 1:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_50;
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_res_status_code;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51: {
+ state->error = 0x2;
+ state->reason = "Expected LF after CR";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6718,7 +6897,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_49: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_52: {
+ state->error = 0xd;
+ state->reason = "Invalid response status";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6735,7 +6914,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_50: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_53: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Expected space after version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6752,7 +6931,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_54: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Invalid minor version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6761,7 +6940,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_52: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_55: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Expected dot";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6778,7 +6957,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_53: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_56: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Invalid major version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6787,7 +6966,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_56: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_59: {
+ state->error = 0x8;
+ state->reason = "Expected HTTP/";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -6812,7 +6991,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_54: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_57: {
+ state->error = 0x8;
+ state->reason = "Invalid word encountered";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -7244,6 +7423,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_lws,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_lenient,
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_19,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_otherwise,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_token,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_ws,
+@@ -7251,14 +7431,16 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_2,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_3,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection,
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_20,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21,
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_content_length_ws,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_content_length,
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last,
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24,
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_token_ows,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_token,
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_header_value_1,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_discard_ws,
+@@ -7648,7 +7830,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_2(
++int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_3(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -7656,7 +7838,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_4(
++int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -7664,7 +7846,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_5(
++int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_6(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -7672,7 +7854,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_6(
++int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_7(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -7680,7 +7862,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_6(
++int llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_7(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -7721,6 +7903,13 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++int llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_8(
++ llhttp__internal_t* state,
++ const unsigned char* p,
++ const unsigned char* endp) {
++ return (state->flags & 8) == 8;
++}
++
+ int llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_16(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+@@ -7737,7 +7926,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_7(
++int llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_8(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -7745,7 +7934,7 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-int llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_17(
++int llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_18(
+ llhttp__internal_t* state,
+ const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp) {
+@@ -8432,13 +8621,13 @@
+ }
+ switch (*p) {
+ case 9: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_3;
+ }
+ case ' ': {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_3;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_3;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_4;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -8455,7 +8644,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_lws;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_17;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_18;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -8468,10 +8657,10 @@
+ }
+ switch (*p) {
+ case 10: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_3;
+ }
+ case 13: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_3;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_4;
+ }
+ default: {
+ p++;
+@@ -8481,20 +8670,27 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_19:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_19: {
++ state->error = 0xa;
++ state->reason = "Invalid header value char";
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_error;
++ return s_error;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
+ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_otherwise:
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_otherwise: {
+ if (p == endp) {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_otherwise;
+ }
+ switch (*p) {
+- case 10: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
+- }
+ case 13: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_2;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_5;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_6;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -8557,10 +8753,10 @@
+ }
+ case ',': {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_4;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_5;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_5;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -8578,7 +8774,7 @@
+ switch (match_seq.status) {
+ case kMatchComplete: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3;
+ }
+ case kMatchPause: {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_1;
+@@ -8602,7 +8798,7 @@
+ switch (match_seq.status) {
+ case kMatchComplete: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_5;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_6;
+ }
+ case kMatchPause: {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_2;
+@@ -8626,7 +8822,7 @@
+ switch (match_seq.status) {
+ case kMatchComplete: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_6;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_7;
+ }
+ case kMatchPause: {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_3;
+@@ -8671,8 +8867,8 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_20:
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_20: {
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21: {
+ state->error = 0xb;
+ state->reason = "Content-Length overflow";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -8681,8 +8877,8 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21:
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21: {
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22: {
+ state->error = 0xb;
+ state->reason = "Invalid character in Content-Length";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -8708,7 +8904,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_content_length_ws;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_5;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_6;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -8777,26 +8973,23 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last:
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last: {
+- if (p == endp) {
+- return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last;
+- }
+- switch (*p) {
+- case 10: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_7;
+- }
+- case 13: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_7;
+- }
+- case ' ': {
+- p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last;
+- }
+- default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked;
+- }
+- }
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24: {
++ state->error = 0xf;
++ state->reason = "Invalid `Transfer-Encoding` header value";
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_error;
++ return s_error;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23: {
++ state->error = 0xf;
++ state->reason = "Invalid `Transfer-Encoding` header value";
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_error;
++ return s_error;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+@@ -8913,8 +9106,34 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_token_ows;
+ }
+ default: {
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_9;
++ }
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last:
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last: {
++ if (p == endp) {
++ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last;
++ }
++ switch (*p) {
++ case 10: {
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_8;
+ }
++ case 13: {
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_8;
++ }
++ case ' ': {
++ p++;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked_last;
++ }
++ case ',': {
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_type_1;
++ }
++ default: {
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_token;
++ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -8966,7 +9185,7 @@
+ }
+ case 10: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_discard_lws;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_5;
+ }
+ case 13: {
+ p++;
+@@ -8993,7 +9212,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_field_2;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9083,7 +9302,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_field_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_9;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9108,7 +9327,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_3;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9133,7 +9352,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_4;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9154,7 +9373,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_4;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9178,7 +9397,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_1;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9203,7 +9422,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_5;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9228,7 +9447,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_6;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9253,7 +9472,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_7;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9282,7 +9501,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_7;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9347,7 +9566,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_skip_lf_to_http09;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9364,7 +9583,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_start;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9385,7 +9604,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_end_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9448,7 +9667,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_http_minor;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9465,7 +9684,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_minor;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9528,7 +9747,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_http_major;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9552,7 +9771,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_start_1;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9576,7 +9795,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_start_2;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9601,7 +9820,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_start_2;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9655,7 +9874,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_url_8;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_33;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9712,7 +9931,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_stub_query_3;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_31;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_34;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9742,7 +9961,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_query;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_35;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9883,10 +10102,10 @@
+ }
+ case 7: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_33;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_34;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_37;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9941,7 +10160,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_server_with_at;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_35;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_38;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9958,7 +10177,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_server;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_37;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_40;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -9972,22 +10191,22 @@
+ switch (*p) {
+ case 10: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39;
+ }
+ case 13: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39;
+ }
+ case ' ': {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39;
+ }
+ case '/': {
+ p++;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_schema_delim_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_37;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_40;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10029,7 +10248,7 @@
+ switch (lookup_table[(uint8_t) *p]) {
+ case 1: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39;
+ }
+ case 2: {
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_stub_schema;
+@@ -10039,7 +10258,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_schema;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_38;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_41;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10071,7 +10290,7 @@
+ switch (lookup_table[(uint8_t) *p]) {
+ case 1: {
+ p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39;
+ }
+ case 2: {
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_stub_path_2;
+@@ -10080,7 +10299,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_url_schema;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10136,7 +10355,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_spaces_before_url;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_40;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_43;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10161,7 +10380,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_1;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10186,7 +10405,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_2;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10211,7 +10430,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_4;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10236,7 +10455,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_6;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10254,7 +10473,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_method_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10275,7 +10494,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_7;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10296,7 +10515,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_5;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10321,7 +10540,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_8;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10346,7 +10565,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_9;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10371,7 +10590,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_10;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10396,7 +10615,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_12;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10421,7 +10640,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_13;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10442,7 +10661,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_13;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10467,7 +10686,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_15;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10492,7 +10711,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_16;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10517,7 +10736,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_18;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10542,7 +10761,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_20;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10560,7 +10779,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_method_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10581,7 +10800,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_21;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10602,7 +10821,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_19;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10627,7 +10846,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_22;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10656,7 +10875,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_22;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10681,7 +10900,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_23;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10706,7 +10925,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_24;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10731,7 +10950,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_26;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10756,7 +10975,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_27;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10781,7 +11000,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_31;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10806,7 +11025,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_32;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10827,7 +11046,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_32;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10844,7 +11063,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_30;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10866,7 +11085,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_29;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10891,7 +11110,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_34;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10913,7 +11132,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_method_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10942,7 +11161,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_33;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10967,7 +11186,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_37;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -10992,7 +11211,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_38;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11013,7 +11232,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_38;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11030,7 +11249,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_36;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11055,7 +11274,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_40;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11080,7 +11299,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_41;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11105,7 +11324,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_42;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11130,7 +11349,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_42;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11155,7 +11374,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_43;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11180,7 +11399,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_46;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11205,7 +11424,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_48;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11230,7 +11449,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_49;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11251,7 +11470,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_49;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11276,7 +11495,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_50;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11301,7 +11520,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_50;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11318,7 +11537,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_45;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11391,7 +11610,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_req_44;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11476,7 +11695,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_res_status_start;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11556,7 +11775,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_status_code;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_43;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_46;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11619,7 +11838,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_http_minor_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_44;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11636,7 +11855,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_res_http_minor;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11699,7 +11918,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_store_http_major_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_46;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_49;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11723,7 +11942,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_start_res;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_49;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_52;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11748,7 +11967,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_or_res_method_2;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_50;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11772,7 +11991,7 @@
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_or_res_method_3;
+ }
+ case kMatchMismatch: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_50;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11793,7 +12012,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_or_res_method_3;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_50;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11810,7 +12029,7 @@
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_or_res_method_1;
+ }
+ default: {
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_50;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+@@ -11870,7 +12089,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Invalid characters in url";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12314,7 +12533,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_16: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_17: {
+ state->error = 0xb;
+ state->reason = "Empty Content-Length";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12399,14 +12618,51 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 2:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_16;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_17;
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_1;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_16: {
++ state->error = 0xa;
++ state->reason = "Invalid header value char";
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_error;
++ return s_error;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_5: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_2(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 1:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_discard_lws;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_16;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_1: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(state, p, endp)) {
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_3: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 8:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_1;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_header_value_1;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_start;
+@@ -12417,7 +12673,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_7: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_3(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -12425,7 +12681,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_8: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_4(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -12433,7 +12689,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_9: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_5(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_1;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -12446,7 +12702,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_3: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_4: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 5:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_7;
+@@ -12462,7 +12718,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_17: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_18: {
+ state->error = 0x3;
+ state->reason = "Missing expected LF after header value";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12480,6 +12736,24 @@
+ err = llhttp__on_header_value(state, start, p);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done;
++ return s_error;
++ }
++ p++;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_3: {
++ const unsigned char* start;
++ int err;
++
++ start = state->_span_pos0;
++ state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
++ err = llhttp__on_header_value(state, start, p);
++ if (err != 0) {
++ state->error = err;
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done;
+ return s_error;
+@@ -12488,7 +12762,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_2: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_4: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+@@ -12506,7 +12780,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_3: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_2: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+@@ -12515,35 +12789,25 @@
+ err = llhttp__on_header_value(state, start, p);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
+- state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
+- state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done;
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_19;
+ return s_error;
+ }
+- p++;
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_almost_done;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_19;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_18: {
+- state->error = 0xa;
+- state->reason = "Invalid header value char";
+- state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+- state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_error;
+- return s_error;
+- /* UNREACHABLE */;
+- abort();
+- }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_5: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_6: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_2(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 1:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_lenient;
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_18;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_2;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection;
+@@ -12554,7 +12818,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_11: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_3(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -12562,7 +12826,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_12: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_4(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -12570,7 +12834,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_13: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_5(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -12583,7 +12847,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_4: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_header_state_5: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_header_state(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 5:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_11;
+@@ -12599,39 +12863,39 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_4: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_4(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_5: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_token;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_2: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_2(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_3: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_3(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_ws;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_5: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_5(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_6: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_6(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_ws;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_6: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_6(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_7: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_7(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection_ws;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_4: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_5: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+@@ -12641,17 +12905,17 @@
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+- state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_20;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21;
+ return s_error;
+ }
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_20;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_mul_add_content_length_1: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_mul_add_content_length_1(state, p, endp, match)) {
+ case 1:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_4;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_5;
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_content_length;
+ }
+@@ -12666,7 +12930,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_5: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_6: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+@@ -12676,14 +12940,14 @@
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+- state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21;
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22;
+ return s_error;
+ }
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_21;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_19: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_20: {
+ state->error = 0x4;
+ state->reason = "Duplicate Content-Length";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12692,26 +12956,82 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_6: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_6(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_7: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_7(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 0:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_content_length;
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_19;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_20;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_7: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_7(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_8: {
++ const unsigned char* start;
++ int err;
++
++ start = state->_span_pos0;
++ state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
++ err = llhttp__on_header_value(state, start, p);
++ if (err != 0) {
++ state->error = err;
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24;
++ return s_error;
++ }
++ p++;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_8: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_8(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_otherwise;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_8: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_4(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_7: {
++ const unsigned char* start;
++ int err;
++
++ start = state->_span_pos0;
++ state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
++ err = llhttp__on_header_value(state, start, p);
++ if (err != 0) {
++ state->error = err;
++ state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
++ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23;
++ return s_error;
++ }
++ p++;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23;
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_9: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_2(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 0:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_7;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_type_1: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_type(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 1:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_9;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_te_chunked;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_9: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value;
+ }
+@@ -12726,6 +13046,34 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_17: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_16(state, p, endp)) {
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_and_flags;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_10: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_2(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 0:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_header_value_8;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_17;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_type_2: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_load_type(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 1:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_10;
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_17;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_16: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_16(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+@@ -12734,10 +13082,20 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_17: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_17(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_8: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_test_flags_8(state, p, endp)) {
++ case 1:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_load_type_2;
+ default:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_8;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_16;
++ }
++ /* UNREACHABLE */;
++ abort();
++ }
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_18: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_or_flags_18(state, p, endp)) {
++ default:
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_9;
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+@@ -12747,11 +13105,11 @@
+ case 1:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value_connection;
+ case 2:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_6;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_7;
+ case 3:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_16;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_test_flags_8;
+ case 4:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_17;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_or_flags_18;
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_value;
+ }
+@@ -12794,7 +13152,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_22: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25: {
+ state->error = 0xa;
+ state->reason = "Invalid header token";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12803,8 +13161,8 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_9: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_4(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_general;
+ }
+@@ -12819,8 +13177,8 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_10: {
+- switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_4(state, p, endp)) {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_update_header_state_11: {
++ switch (llhttp__internal__c_update_header_state_1(state, p, endp)) {
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_header_field_general;
+ }
+@@ -12860,7 +13218,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_23: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Expected CRLF";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12886,7 +13244,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_24: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Expected CRLF after version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12903,7 +13261,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_25: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Invalid minor version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12912,7 +13270,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_26: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Expected dot";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12929,7 +13287,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_27: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Invalid major version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12938,7 +13296,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_29: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32: {
+ state->error = 0x8;
+ state->reason = "Expected HTTP/";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12947,7 +13305,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_31: {
+ state->error = 0x8;
+ state->reason = "Expected SOURCE method for ICE/x.x request";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -12959,7 +13317,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_is_equal_method_1: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_is_equal_method_1(state, p, endp)) {
+ case 0:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_28;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_31;
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_req_http_major;
+ }
+@@ -13034,7 +13392,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_30: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_33: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Invalid char in url fragment start";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13094,7 +13452,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_31: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_34: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Invalid char in url query";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13103,7 +13461,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_32: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_35: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Invalid char in url path";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13214,7 +13572,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_33: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_36: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Double @ in url";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13223,7 +13581,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_34: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_37: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Unexpected char in url server";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13232,7 +13590,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_35: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_38: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Unexpected char in url server";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13241,7 +13599,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_37: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_40: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Unexpected char in url schema";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13250,7 +13608,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_38: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_41: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Unexpected char in url schema";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13259,7 +13617,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_39: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42: {
+ state->error = 0x7;
+ state->reason = "Unexpected start char in url";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13278,7 +13636,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_40: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_43: {
+ state->error = 0x6;
+ state->reason = "Expected space after method";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13295,7 +13653,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_51: {
+ state->error = 0x6;
+ state->reason = "Invalid method encountered";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13304,7 +13662,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_41: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_44: {
+ state->error = 0xd;
+ state->reason = "Response overflow";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13316,7 +13674,7 @@
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_mul_add_status_code: {
+ switch (llhttp__internal__c_mul_add_status_code(state, p, endp, match)) {
+ case 1:
+- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_41;
++ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_44;
+ default:
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_res_status_code;
+ }
+@@ -13359,7 +13717,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_42: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45: {
+ state->error = 0xd;
+ state->reason = "Invalid response status";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13376,7 +13734,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_43: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_46: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Expected space after version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13393,7 +13751,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_44: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Invalid minor version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13402,7 +13760,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_45: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_48: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Expected dot";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13419,7 +13777,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_46: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_49: {
+ state->error = 0x9;
+ state->reason = "Invalid major version";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13428,7 +13786,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_49: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_52: {
+ state->error = 0x8;
+ state->reason = "Expected HTTP/";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+@@ -13453,7 +13811,7 @@
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+- s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_47: {
++ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_50: {
+ state->error = 0x8;
+ state->reason = "Invalid word encountered";
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) p;
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/parallel/test-http-invalid-te.js
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/parallel/test-http-invalid-te.js
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
+ Host: hacker.exploit.com
+ Connection: keep-alive
+ Content-Length: 10
+-Transfer-Encoding: chunked, eee
++Transfer-Encoding: eee, chunked
+
+ HELLOWORLDPOST / HTTP/1.1
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/parallel/test-http-missing-header-separator-cr.js
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/parallel/test-http-missing-header-separator-cr.js
+@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
++'use strict';
++
++const common = require('../common');
++const assert = require('assert');
++
++const http = require('http');
++const net = require('net');
++
++function serverHandler(server, msg) {
++ const client = net.connect(server.address().port, 'localhost');
++
++ let response = '';
++
++ client.on('data', common.mustCall((chunk) => {
++ response += chunk.toString('utf-8');
++ }));
++
++ client.setEncoding('utf8');
++ client.on('error', common.mustNotCall());
++ client.on('end', common.mustCall(() => {
++ assert.strictEqual(
++ response,
++ 'HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n'
++ );
++ server.close();
++ }));
++ client.write(msg);
++ client.resume();
++}
++
++{
++ const msg = [
++ 'GET / HTTP/1.1',
++ 'Host: localhost',
++ 'Dummy: x\nContent-Length: 23',
++ '',
++ 'GET / HTTP/1.1',
++ 'Dummy: GET /admin HTTP/1.1',
++ 'Host: localhost',
++ '',
++ '',
++ ].join('\r\n');
++
++ const server = http.createServer(common.mustNotCall());
++
++ server.listen(0, common.mustCall(serverHandler.bind(null, server, msg)));
++}
++
++{
++ const msg = [
++ 'POST / HTTP/1.1',
++ 'Host: localhost',
++ 'x:x\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked',
++ '',
++ '1',
++ 'A',
++ '0',
++ '',
++ '',
++ ].join('\r\n');
++
++ const server = http.createServer(common.mustNotCall());
++
++ server.listen(0, common.mustCall(serverHandler.bind(null, server, msg)));
++}
++
++{
++ const msg = [
++ 'POST / HTTP/1.1',
++ 'Host: localhost',
++ 'x:\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked',
++ '',
++ '1',
++ 'A',
++ '0',
++ '',
++ '',
++ ].join('\r\n');
++
++ const server = http.createServer(common.mustNotCall());
++
++ server.listen(0, common.mustCall(serverHandler.bind(null, server, msg)));
++}
+--- /dev/null
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/parallel/test-http-transfer-encoding-repeated-chunked.js
+@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
++'use strict';
++
++const common = require('../common');
++const assert = require('assert');
++
++const http = require('http');
++const net = require('net');
++
++const msg = [
++ 'POST / HTTP/1.1',
++ 'Host: 127.0.0.1',
++ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunkedchunked',
++ '',
++ '1',
++ 'A',
++ '0',
++ '',
++].join('\r\n');
++
++const server = http.createServer(common.mustCall((req, res) => {
++ // Verify that no data is received
++
++ req.on('data', common.mustNotCall());
++
++ req.on('end', common.mustNotCall(() => {
++ res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
++ res.end();
++ }));
++}, 1));
++
++server.listen(0, common.mustCall(() => {
++ const client = net.connect(server.address().port, 'localhost');
++
++ let response = '';
++
++ client.on('data', common.mustCall((chunk) => {
++ response += chunk.toString('utf-8');
++ }));
++
++ client.setEncoding('utf8');
++ client.on('error', common.mustNotCall());
++ client.on('end', common.mustCall(() => {
++ assert.strictEqual(
++ response,
++ 'HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n'
++ );
++ server.close();
++ }));
++ client.write(msg);
++ client.resume();
++}));
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/parallel/test-http-transfer-encoding-smuggling.js
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/parallel/test-http-transfer-encoding-smuggling.js
+@@ -1,46 +1,89 @@
+ 'use strict';
+
+ const common = require('../common');
+-
+ const assert = require('assert');
++
+ const http = require('http');
+ const net = require('net');
+
+-const msg = [
+- 'POST / HTTP/1.1',
+- 'Host: 127.0.0.1',
+- 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked',
+- 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked-false',
+- 'Connection: upgrade',
+- '',
+- '1',
+- 'A',
+- '0',
+- '',
+- 'GET /flag HTTP/1.1',
+- 'Host: 127.0.0.1',
+- '',
+- '',
+-].join('\r\n');
+-
+-// Verify that the server is called only once even with a smuggled request.
+-
+-const server = http.createServer(common.mustCall((req, res) => {
+- res.end();
+-}, 1));
+-
+-function send(next) {
+- const client = net.connect(server.address().port, 'localhost');
+- client.setEncoding('utf8');
+- client.on('error', common.mustNotCall());
+- client.on('end', next);
+- client.write(msg);
+- client.resume();
++{
++ const msg = [
++ 'POST / HTTP/1.1',
++ 'Host: 127.0.0.1',
++ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked',
++ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked-false',
++ 'Connection: upgrade',
++ '',
++ '1',
++ 'A',
++ '0',
++ '',
++ 'GET /flag HTTP/1.1',
++ 'Host: 127.0.0.1',
++ '',
++ '',
++ ].join('\r\n');
++
++ const server = http.createServer(common.mustNotCall((req, res) => {
++ res.end();
++ }, 1));
++
++ server.listen(0, common.mustCall(() => {
++ const client = net.connect(server.address().port, 'localhost');
++
++ let response = '';
++
++ // Verify that the server listener is never called
++
++ client.on('data', common.mustCall((chunk) => {
++ response += chunk.toString('utf-8');
++ }));
++
++ client.setEncoding('utf8');
++ client.on('error', common.mustNotCall());
++ client.on('end', common.mustCall(() => {
++ assert.strictEqual(
++ response,
++ 'HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n'
++ );
++ server.close();
++ }));
++ client.write(msg);
++ client.resume();
++ }));
+ }
+
+-server.listen(0, common.mustCall((err) => {
+- assert.ifError(err);
+- send(common.mustCall(() => {
+- server.close();
++{
++ const msg = [
++ 'POST / HTTP/1.1',
++ 'Host: 127.0.0.1',
++ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked',
++ ' , chunked-false',
++ 'Connection: upgrade',
++ '',
++ '1',
++ 'A',
++ '0',
++ '',
++ 'GET /flag HTTP/1.1',
++ 'Host: 127.0.0.1',
++ '',
++ '',
++ ].join('\r\n');
++
++ const server = http.createServer(common.mustCall((request, response) => {
++ assert.notStrictEqual(request.url, '/admin');
++ response.end('hello world');
++ }), 1);
++
++ server.listen(0, common.mustCall(() => {
++ const client = net.connect(server.address().port, 'localhost');
++
++ client.on('end', common.mustCall(function() {
++ server.close();
++ }));
++
++ client.write(msg);
++ client.resume();
+ }));
+-}));
++}
+--- nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/parallel/test-http-header-overflow.js
++++ nodejs-12.22.12~dfsg/test/parallel/test-http-header-overflow.js
+@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
++// Flags: --expose-internals
++
+ 'use strict';
+ const { expectsError, mustCall } = require('../common');
+ const assert = require('assert');
+@@ -8,7 +10,7 @@ const CRLF = '\r\n';
+ const DUMMY_HEADER_NAME = 'Cookie: ';
+ const DUMMY_HEADER_VALUE = 'a'.repeat(
+ // Plus one is to make it 1 byte too big
+- maxHeaderSize - DUMMY_HEADER_NAME.length - (2 * CRLF.length) + 1
++ maxHeaderSize - DUMMY_HEADER_NAME.length + 2
+ );
+ const PAYLOAD_GET = 'GET /blah HTTP/1.1';
+ const PAYLOAD = PAYLOAD_GET + CRLF +
+@@ -21,7 +23,7 @@ server.on('connection', mustCall((socket
+ name: 'Error',
+ message: 'Parse Error: Header overflow',
+ code: 'HPE_HEADER_OVERFLOW',
+- bytesParsed: maxHeaderSize + PAYLOAD_GET.length,
++ bytesParsed: maxHeaderSize + PAYLOAD_GET.length + (CRLF.length * 2) + 1,
+ rawPacket: Buffer.from(PAYLOAD)
+ }));
+ }));
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_12.22.12.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_12.22.12.bb
index 8dbdd088e9..3ededae562 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_12.22.12.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/nodejs/nodejs_12.22.12.bb
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ SRC_URI = "http://nodejs.org/dist/v${PV}/node-v${PV}.tar.xz \
file://big-endian.patch \
file://mips-warnings.patch \
file://0001-Remove-use-of-register-r7-because-llvm-now-issues-an.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-32212.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-35255.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-43548.patch \
+ file://CVE-llhttp.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_class-target = " \
file://0002-Using-native-binaries.patch \
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/php/php_7.4.28.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/php/php_7.4.33.bb
index 3970ce097a..caaaa23426 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/php/php_7.4.28.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-devtools/php/php_7.4.33.bb
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI_append_class-target = " \
"
S = "${WORKDIR}/php-${PV}"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2085086a863444b0e39547de1a4969fd1c40a0c188eb58fab2938b649b0c4b58"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e8117458fe5a475bf203128726b71bcbba61c42ad463dffadee5667a198a98a"
inherit autotools pkgconfig python3native gettext
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/xorg-app/xterm/CVE-2022-45063.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/xorg-app/xterm/CVE-2022-45063.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e63169a209
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/xorg-app/xterm/CVE-2022-45063.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,776 @@
+From 787636674918873a091e7a4ef5977263ba982322 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Thomas E. Dickey" <dickey@invisible-island.net>
+Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2022 22:59:52 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] snapshot of project "xterm", label xterm-374c
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ThomasDickey/xterm-snapshots/commit/787636674918873a091e7a4ef5977263ba982322]
+CVE: CVE-2022-45063
+
+Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <sdoshi@mvista.com>
+---
+ button.c | 16 +--
+ charproc.c | 9 +-
+ doublechr.c | 4 +-
+ fontutils.c | 266 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ fontutils.h | 4 +-
+ misc.c | 7 +-
+ screen.c | 2 +-
+ xterm.h | 2 +-
+ xterm.log.html | 6 ++
+ 9 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 152 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/button.c b/button.c
+index 66a6181..e05ca50 100644
+--- a/button.c
++++ b/button.c
+@@ -1619,14 +1619,9 @@ static void
+ UnmapSelections(XtermWidget xw)
+ {
+ TScreen *screen = TScreenOf(xw);
+- Cardinal n;
+
+- if (screen->mappedSelect) {
+- for (n = 0; screen->mappedSelect[n] != 0; ++n)
+- free((void *) screen->mappedSelect[n]);
+- free(screen->mappedSelect);
+- screen->mappedSelect = 0;
+- }
++ free(screen->mappedSelect);
++ screen->mappedSelect = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -1662,14 +1657,11 @@ MapSelections(XtermWidget xw, String *params, Cardinal num_params)
+ if ((result = TypeMallocN(String, num_params + 1)) != 0) {
+ result[num_params] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < num_params; ++j) {
+- result[j] = x_strdup((isSELECT(params[j])
++ result[j] = (String) (isSELECT(params[j])
+ ? mapTo
+- : params[j]));
++ : params[j]);
+ if (result[j] == 0) {
+ UnmapSelections(xw);
+- while (j != 0) {
+- free((void *) result[--j]);
+- }
+ free(result);
+ result = 0;
+ break;
+diff --git a/charproc.c b/charproc.c
+index 55f0108..b07de4c 100644
+--- a/charproc.c
++++ b/charproc.c
+@@ -12548,7 +12548,6 @@ DoSetSelectedFont(Widget w,
+ Bell(xw, XkbBI_MinorError, 0);
+ } else {
+ Boolean failed = False;
+- int oldFont = TScreenOf(xw)->menu_font_number;
+ char *save = TScreenOf(xw)->SelectFontName();
+ char *val;
+ char *test;
+@@ -12593,10 +12592,6 @@ DoSetSelectedFont(Widget w,
+ failed = True;
+ }
+ if (failed) {
+- (void) xtermLoadFont(xw,
+- xtermFontName(TScreenOf(xw)->MenuFontName(oldFont)),
+- True,
+- oldFont);
+ Bell(xw, XkbBI_MinorError, 0);
+ }
+ free(used);
+@@ -12605,7 +12600,7 @@ DoSetSelectedFont(Widget w,
+ }
+ }
+
+-void
++Bool
+ FindFontSelection(XtermWidget xw, const char *atom_name, Bool justprobe)
+ {
+ TScreen *screen = TScreenOf(xw);
+@@ -12645,7 +12640,7 @@ FindFontSelection(XtermWidget xw, const char *atom_name, Bool justprobe)
+ DoSetSelectedFont, NULL,
+ XtLastTimestampProcessed(XtDisplay(xw)));
+ }
+- return;
++ return (screen->SelectFontName() != NULL) ? True : False;
+ }
+
+ Bool
+diff --git a/doublechr.c b/doublechr.c
+index a60f5bd..f7b6bae 100644
+--- a/doublechr.c
++++ b/doublechr.c
+@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ xterm_DoubleGC(XTermDraw * params, GC old_gc, int *inxp)
+ temp.flags = (params->attr_flags & BOLD);
+ temp.warn = fwResource;
+
+- if (!xtermOpenFont(params->xw, name, &temp, False)) {
++ if (!xtermOpenFont(params->xw, name, &temp, NULL, False)) {
+ XTermDraw local = *params;
+ char *nname;
+
+@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ xterm_DoubleGC(XTermDraw * params, GC old_gc, int *inxp)
+ nname = xtermSpecialFont(&local);
+ if (nname != 0) {
+ found = (Boolean) xtermOpenFont(params->xw, nname, &temp,
+- False);
++ NULL, False);
+ free(nname);
+ }
+ } else {
+diff --git a/fontutils.c b/fontutils.c
+index 4b0ef85..d9bfaf8 100644
+--- a/fontutils.c
++++ b/fontutils.c
+@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@
+ }
+
+ #define FREE_FNAME(field) \
+- if (fonts == 0 || myfonts.field != fonts->field) { \
+- FREE_STRING(myfonts.field); \
+- myfonts.field = 0; \
++ if (fonts == 0 || new_fnames.field != fonts->field) { \
++ FREE_STRING(new_fnames.field); \
++ new_fnames.field = 0; \
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ open_italic_font(XtermWidget xw, int n, FontNameProperties *fp, XTermFonts * dat
+ if ((name = italic_font_name(fp, slant[pass])) != 0) {
+ TRACE(("open_italic_font %s %s\n",
+ whichFontEnum((VTFontEnum) n), name));
+- if (xtermOpenFont(xw, name, data, False)) {
++ if (xtermOpenFont(xw, name, data, NULL, False)) {
+ result = (data->fs != 0);
+ #if OPT_REPORT_FONTS
+ if (resource.reportFonts) {
+@@ -1006,13 +1006,14 @@ cannotFont(XtermWidget xw, const char *who, const char *tag, const char *name)
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * Open the given font and verify that it is non-empty. Return a null on
++ * Open the given font and verify that it is non-empty. Return false on
+ * failure.
+ */
+ Bool
+ xtermOpenFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ const char *name,
+ XTermFonts * result,
++ XTermFonts * current,
+ Bool force)
+ {
+ Bool code = False;
+@@ -1020,7 +1021,12 @@ xtermOpenFont(XtermWidget xw,
+
+ TRACE(("xtermOpenFont %d:%d '%s'\n",
+ result->warn, xw->misc.fontWarnings, NonNull(name)));
++
+ if (!IsEmpty(name)) {
++ Bool existing = (current != NULL
++ && current->fs != NULL
++ && current->fn != NULL);
++
+ if ((result->fs = XLoadQueryFont(screen->display, name)) != 0) {
+ code = True;
+ if (EmptyFont(result->fs)) {
+@@ -1039,9 +1045,13 @@ xtermOpenFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ } else {
+ TRACE(("xtermOpenFont: cannot load font '%s'\n", name));
+ }
+- if (force) {
++ if (existing) {
++ TRACE(("...continue using font '%s'\n", current->fn));
++ result->fn = x_strdup(current->fn);
++ result->fs = current->fs;
++ } else if (force) {
+ NoFontWarning(result);
+- code = xtermOpenFont(xw, DEFFONT, result, True);
++ code = xtermOpenFont(xw, DEFFONT, result, NULL, True);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+@@ -1289,6 +1299,7 @@ static Bool
+ loadNormFP(XtermWidget xw,
+ char **nameOutP,
+ XTermFonts * infoOut,
++ XTermFonts * current,
+ int fontnum)
+ {
+ Bool status = True;
+@@ -1298,7 +1309,7 @@ loadNormFP(XtermWidget xw,
+ if (!xtermOpenFont(xw,
+ *nameOutP,
+ infoOut,
+- (fontnum == fontMenu_default))) {
++ current, (fontnum == fontMenu_default))) {
+ /*
+ * If we are opening the default font, and it happens to be missing,
+ * force that to the compiled-in default font, e.g., "fixed". If we
+@@ -1333,10 +1344,10 @@ loadBoldFP(XtermWidget xw,
+ if (fp != 0) {
+ NoFontWarning(infoOut);
+ *nameOutP = bold_font_name(fp, fp->average_width);
+- if (!xtermOpenFont(xw, *nameOutP, infoOut, False)) {
++ if (!xtermOpenFont(xw, *nameOutP, infoOut, NULL, False)) {
+ free(*nameOutP);
+ *nameOutP = bold_font_name(fp, -1);
+- xtermOpenFont(xw, *nameOutP, infoOut, False);
++ xtermOpenFont(xw, *nameOutP, infoOut, NULL, False);
+ }
+ TRACE(("...derived bold '%s'\n", NonNull(*nameOutP)));
+ }
+@@ -1354,7 +1365,7 @@ loadBoldFP(XtermWidget xw,
+ TRACE(("...did not get a matching bold font\n"));
+ }
+ free(normal);
+- } else if (!xtermOpenFont(xw, *nameOutP, infoOut, False)) {
++ } else if (!xtermOpenFont(xw, *nameOutP, infoOut, NULL, False)) {
+ xtermCopyFontInfo(infoOut, infoRef);
+ TRACE(("...cannot load bold font '%s'\n", NonNull(*nameOutP)));
+ } else {
+@@ -1408,7 +1419,7 @@ loadWideFP(XtermWidget xw,
+ }
+
+ if (check_fontname(*nameOutP)) {
+- if (xtermOpenFont(xw, *nameOutP, infoOut, False)
++ if (xtermOpenFont(xw, *nameOutP, infoOut, NULL, False)
+ && is_derived_font_name(*nameOutP)
+ && EmptyFont(infoOut->fs)) {
+ xtermCloseFont2(xw, infoOut - fWide, fWide);
+@@ -1452,7 +1463,7 @@ loadWBoldFP(XtermWidget xw,
+
+ if (check_fontname(*nameOutP)) {
+
+- if (xtermOpenFont(xw, *nameOutP, infoOut, False)
++ if (xtermOpenFont(xw, *nameOutP, infoOut, NULL, False)
+ && is_derived_font_name(*nameOutP)
+ && !compatibleWideCounts(wideInfoRef->fs, infoOut->fs)) {
+ xtermCloseFont2(xw, infoOut - fWBold, fWBold);
+@@ -1505,6 +1516,10 @@ loadWBoldFP(XtermWidget xw,
+ }
+ #endif
+
++/*
++ * Load a given bitmap font, along with the bold/wide variants.
++ * Returns nonzero on success.
++ */
+ int
+ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ const VTFontNames * fonts,
+@@ -1514,33 +1529,37 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ TScreen *screen = TScreenOf(xw);
+ VTwin *win = WhichVWin(screen);
+
+- VTFontNames myfonts;
+- XTermFonts fnts[fMAX];
++ VTFontNames new_fnames;
++ XTermFonts new_fonts[fMAX];
++ XTermFonts old_fonts[fMAX];
+ char *tmpname = NULL;
+ Boolean proportional = False;
++ Boolean recovered;
++ int code = 0;
+
+- memset(&myfonts, 0, sizeof(myfonts));
+- memset(fnts, 0, sizeof(fnts));
++ memset(&new_fnames, 0, sizeof(new_fnames));
++ memset(new_fonts, 0, sizeof(new_fonts));
++ memcpy(&old_fonts, screen->fnts, sizeof(old_fonts));
+
+ if (fonts != 0)
+- myfonts = *fonts;
+- if (!check_fontname(myfonts.f_n))
+- return 0;
++ new_fnames = *fonts;
++ if (!check_fontname(new_fnames.f_n))
++ return code;
+
+ if (fontnum == fontMenu_fontescape
+- && myfonts.f_n != screen->MenuFontName(fontnum)) {
+- if ((tmpname = x_strdup(myfonts.f_n)) == 0)
+- return 0;
++ && new_fnames.f_n != screen->MenuFontName(fontnum)) {
++ if ((tmpname = x_strdup(new_fnames.f_n)) == 0)
++ return code;
+ }
+
+- TRACE(("Begin Cgs - xtermLoadFont(%s)\n", myfonts.f_n));
++ TRACE(("Begin Cgs - xtermLoadFont(%s)\n", new_fnames.f_n));
+ releaseWindowGCs(xw, win);
+
+ #define DbgResource(name, field, index) \
+ TRACE(("xtermLoadFont #%d "name" %s%s\n", \
+ fontnum, \
+- (fnts[index].warn == fwResource) ? "*" : " ", \
+- NonNull(myfonts.field)))
++ (new_fonts[index].warn == fwResource) ? "*" : " ", \
++ NonNull(new_fnames.field)))
+ DbgResource("normal", f_n, fNorm);
+ DbgResource("bold ", f_b, fBold);
+ #if OPT_WIDE_CHARS
+@@ -1549,16 +1568,17 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ #endif
+
+ if (!loadNormFP(xw,
+- &myfonts.f_n,
+- &fnts[fNorm],
++ &new_fnames.f_n,
++ &new_fonts[fNorm],
++ &old_fonts[fNorm],
+ fontnum))
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (!loadBoldFP(xw,
+- &myfonts.f_b,
+- &fnts[fBold],
+- myfonts.f_n,
+- &fnts[fNorm],
++ &new_fnames.f_b,
++ &new_fonts[fBold],
++ new_fnames.f_n,
++ &new_fonts[fNorm],
+ fontnum))
+ goto bad;
+
+@@ -1570,20 +1590,20 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ if_OPT_WIDE_CHARS(screen, {
+
+ if (!loadWideFP(xw,
+- &myfonts.f_w,
+- &fnts[fWide],
+- myfonts.f_n,
+- &fnts[fNorm],
++ &new_fnames.f_w,
++ &new_fonts[fWide],
++ new_fnames.f_n,
++ &new_fonts[fNorm],
+ fontnum))
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (!loadWBoldFP(xw,
+- &myfonts.f_wb,
+- &fnts[fWBold],
+- myfonts.f_w,
+- &fnts[fWide],
+- myfonts.f_b,
+- &fnts[fBold],
++ &new_fnames.f_wb,
++ &new_fonts[fWBold],
++ new_fnames.f_w,
++ &new_fonts[fWide],
++ new_fnames.f_b,
++ &new_fonts[fBold],
+ fontnum))
+ goto bad;
+
+@@ -1593,30 +1613,30 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ * Normal/bold fonts should be the same width. Also, the min/max
+ * values should be the same.
+ */
+- if (fnts[fNorm].fs != 0
+- && fnts[fBold].fs != 0
+- && (!is_fixed_font(fnts[fNorm].fs)
+- || !is_fixed_font(fnts[fBold].fs)
+- || differing_widths(fnts[fNorm].fs, fnts[fBold].fs))) {
++ if (new_fonts[fNorm].fs != 0
++ && new_fonts[fBold].fs != 0
++ && (!is_fixed_font(new_fonts[fNorm].fs)
++ || !is_fixed_font(new_fonts[fBold].fs)
++ || differing_widths(new_fonts[fNorm].fs, new_fonts[fBold].fs))) {
+ TRACE(("Proportional font! normal %d/%d, bold %d/%d\n",
+- fnts[fNorm].fs->min_bounds.width,
+- fnts[fNorm].fs->max_bounds.width,
+- fnts[fBold].fs->min_bounds.width,
+- fnts[fBold].fs->max_bounds.width));
++ new_fonts[fNorm].fs->min_bounds.width,
++ new_fonts[fNorm].fs->max_bounds.width,
++ new_fonts[fBold].fs->min_bounds.width,
++ new_fonts[fBold].fs->max_bounds.width));
+ proportional = True;
+ }
+
+ if_OPT_WIDE_CHARS(screen, {
+- if (fnts[fWide].fs != 0
+- && fnts[fWBold].fs != 0
+- && (!is_fixed_font(fnts[fWide].fs)
+- || !is_fixed_font(fnts[fWBold].fs)
+- || differing_widths(fnts[fWide].fs, fnts[fWBold].fs))) {
++ if (new_fonts[fWide].fs != 0
++ && new_fonts[fWBold].fs != 0
++ && (!is_fixed_font(new_fonts[fWide].fs)
++ || !is_fixed_font(new_fonts[fWBold].fs)
++ || differing_widths(new_fonts[fWide].fs, new_fonts[fWBold].fs))) {
+ TRACE(("Proportional font! wide %d/%d, wide bold %d/%d\n",
+- fnts[fWide].fs->min_bounds.width,
+- fnts[fWide].fs->max_bounds.width,
+- fnts[fWBold].fs->min_bounds.width,
+- fnts[fWBold].fs->max_bounds.width));
++ new_fonts[fWide].fs->min_bounds.width,
++ new_fonts[fWide].fs->max_bounds.width,
++ new_fonts[fWBold].fs->min_bounds.width,
++ new_fonts[fWBold].fs->max_bounds.width));
+ proportional = True;
+ }
+ });
+@@ -1635,13 +1655,13 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ screen->ifnts_ok = False;
+ #endif
+
+- xtermCopyFontInfo(GetNormalFont(screen, fNorm), &fnts[fNorm]);
+- xtermCopyFontInfo(GetNormalFont(screen, fBold), &fnts[fBold]);
++ xtermCopyFontInfo(GetNormalFont(screen, fNorm), &new_fonts[fNorm]);
++ xtermCopyFontInfo(GetNormalFont(screen, fBold), &new_fonts[fBold]);
+ #if OPT_WIDE_CHARS
+- xtermCopyFontInfo(GetNormalFont(screen, fWide), &fnts[fWide]);
+- if (fnts[fWBold].fs == NULL)
+- xtermCopyFontInfo(GetNormalFont(screen, fWide), &fnts[fWide]);
+- xtermCopyFontInfo(GetNormalFont(screen, fWBold), &fnts[fWBold]);
++ xtermCopyFontInfo(GetNormalFont(screen, fWide), &new_fonts[fWide]);
++ if (new_fonts[fWBold].fs == NULL)
++ xtermCopyFontInfo(GetNormalFont(screen, fWide), &new_fonts[fWide]);
++ xtermCopyFontInfo(GetNormalFont(screen, fWBold), &new_fonts[fWBold]);
+ #endif
+
+ xtermUpdateFontGCs(xw, getNormalFont);
+@@ -1672,7 +1692,7 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ unsigned ch;
+
+ #if OPT_TRACE
+-#define TRACE_MISS(index) show_font_misses(#index, &fnts[index])
++#define TRACE_MISS(index) show_font_misses(#index, &new_fonts[index])
+ TRACE_MISS(fNorm);
+ TRACE_MISS(fBold);
+ #if OPT_WIDE_CHARS
+@@ -1689,8 +1709,8 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ if ((n != UCS_REPL)
+ && (n != ch)
+ && (screen->fnt_boxes & 2)) {
+- if (xtermMissingChar(n, &fnts[fNorm]) ||
+- xtermMissingChar(n, &fnts[fBold])) {
++ if (xtermMissingChar(n, &new_fonts[fNorm]) ||
++ xtermMissingChar(n, &new_fonts[fBold])) {
+ UIntClr(screen->fnt_boxes, 2);
+ TRACE(("missing graphics character #%d, U+%04X\n",
+ ch, n));
+@@ -1702,12 +1722,12 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ #endif
+
+ for (ch = 1; ch < 32; ch++) {
+- if (xtermMissingChar(ch, &fnts[fNorm])) {
++ if (xtermMissingChar(ch, &new_fonts[fNorm])) {
+ TRACE(("missing normal char #%d\n", ch));
+ UIntClr(screen->fnt_boxes, 1);
+ break;
+ }
+- if (xtermMissingChar(ch, &fnts[fBold])) {
++ if (xtermMissingChar(ch, &new_fonts[fBold])) {
+ TRACE(("missing bold char #%d\n", ch));
+ UIntClr(screen->fnt_boxes, 1);
+ break;
+@@ -1724,8 +1744,8 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ screen->enbolden = screen->bold_mode;
+ } else {
+ screen->enbolden = screen->bold_mode
+- && ((fnts[fNorm].fs == fnts[fBold].fs)
+- || same_font_name(myfonts.f_n, myfonts.f_b));
++ && ((new_fonts[fNorm].fs == new_fonts[fBold].fs)
++ || same_font_name(new_fnames.f_n, new_fnames.f_b));
+ }
+ TRACE(("Will %suse 1-pixel offset/overstrike to simulate bold\n",
+ screen->enbolden ? "" : "not "));
+@@ -1741,7 +1761,7 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ update_font_escape();
+ }
+ #if OPT_SHIFT_FONTS
+- screen->menu_font_sizes[fontnum] = FontSize(fnts[fNorm].fs);
++ screen->menu_font_sizes[fontnum] = FontSize(new_fonts[fNorm].fs);
+ #endif
+ }
+ set_cursor_gcs(xw);
+@@ -1756,20 +1776,21 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ FREE_FNAME(f_w);
+ FREE_FNAME(f_wb);
+ #endif
+- if (fnts[fNorm].fn == fnts[fBold].fn) {
+- free(fnts[fNorm].fn);
++ if (new_fonts[fNorm].fn == new_fonts[fBold].fn) {
++ free(new_fonts[fNorm].fn);
+ } else {
+- free(fnts[fNorm].fn);
+- free(fnts[fBold].fn);
++ free(new_fonts[fNorm].fn);
++ free(new_fonts[fBold].fn);
+ }
+ #if OPT_WIDE_CHARS
+- free(fnts[fWide].fn);
+- free(fnts[fWBold].fn);
++ free(new_fonts[fWide].fn);
++ free(new_fonts[fWBold].fn);
+ #endif
+ xtermSetWinSize(xw);
+ return 1;
+
+ bad:
++ recovered = False;
+ if (tmpname)
+ free(tmpname);
+
+@@ -1780,15 +1801,15 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ SetItemSensitivity(fontMenuEntries[fontnum].widget, True);
+ #endif
+ Bell(xw, XkbBI_MinorError, 0);
+- myfonts.f_n = screen->MenuFontName(old_fontnum);
+- return xtermLoadFont(xw, &myfonts, doresize, old_fontnum);
+- } else if (x_strcasecmp(myfonts.f_n, DEFFONT)) {
+- int code;
+-
+- myfonts.f_n = x_strdup(DEFFONT);
+- TRACE(("...recovering for TrueType fonts\n"));
+- code = xtermLoadFont(xw, &myfonts, doresize, fontnum);
+- if (code) {
++ new_fnames.f_n = screen->MenuFontName(old_fontnum);
++ if (xtermLoadFont(xw, &new_fnames, doresize, old_fontnum))
++ recovered = True;
++ } else if (x_strcasecmp(new_fnames.f_n, DEFFONT)
++ && x_strcasecmp(new_fnames.f_n, old_fonts[fNorm].fn)) {
++ new_fnames.f_n = x_strdup(old_fonts[fNorm].fn);
++ TRACE(("...recovering from failed font-load\n"));
++ if (xtermLoadFont(xw, &new_fnames, doresize, fontnum)) {
++ recovered = True;
+ if (fontnum != fontMenu_fontsel) {
+ SetItemSensitivity(fontMenuEntries[fontnum].widget,
+ UsingRenderFont(xw));
+@@ -1797,15 +1818,15 @@ xtermLoadFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ FontHeight(screen),
+ FontWidth(screen)));
+ }
+- return code;
+ }
+ #endif
+-
+- releaseWindowGCs(xw, win);
+-
+- xtermCloseFonts(xw, fnts);
+- TRACE(("Fail Cgs - xtermLoadFont\n"));
+- return 0;
++ if (!recovered) {
++ releaseWindowGCs(xw, win);
++ xtermCloseFonts(xw, new_fonts);
++ TRACE(("Fail Cgs - xtermLoadFont\n"));
++ code = 0;
++ }
++ return code;
+ }
+
+ #if OPT_WIDE_ATTRS
+@@ -1853,7 +1874,7 @@ xtermLoadItalics(XtermWidget xw)
+ } else {
+ xtermOpenFont(xw,
+ getNormalFont(screen, n)->fn,
+- data, False);
++ data, NULL, False);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+@@ -4317,7 +4338,7 @@ lookupOneFontSize(XtermWidget xw, int fontnum)
+
+ memset(&fnt, 0, sizeof(fnt));
+ screen->menu_font_sizes[fontnum] = -1;
+- if (xtermOpenFont(xw, screen->MenuFontName(fontnum), &fnt, True)) {
++ if (xtermOpenFont(xw, screen->MenuFontName(fontnum), &fnt, NULL, True)) {
+ if (fontnum <= fontMenu_lastBuiltin
+ || strcmp(fnt.fn, DEFFONT)) {
+ screen->menu_font_sizes[fontnum] = FontSize(fnt.fs);
+@@ -4722,13 +4743,14 @@ HandleSetFont(Widget w GCC_UNUSED,
+ }
+ }
+
+-void
++Bool
+ SetVTFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ int which,
+ Bool doresize,
+ const VTFontNames * fonts)
+ {
+ TScreen *screen = TScreenOf(xw);
++ Bool result = False;
+
+ TRACE(("SetVTFont(which=%d, f_n=%s, f_b=%s)\n", which,
+ (fonts && fonts->f_n) ? fonts->f_n : "<null>",
+@@ -4737,34 +4759,31 @@ SetVTFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ if (IsIcon(screen)) {
+ Bell(xw, XkbBI_MinorError, 0);
+ } else if (which >= 0 && which < NMENUFONTS) {
+- VTFontNames myfonts;
++ VTFontNames new_fnames;
+
+- memset(&myfonts, 0, sizeof(myfonts));
++ memset(&new_fnames, 0, sizeof(new_fnames));
+ if (fonts != 0)
+- myfonts = *fonts;
++ new_fnames = *fonts;
+
+ if (which == fontMenu_fontsel) { /* go get the selection */
+- FindFontSelection(xw, myfonts.f_n, False);
++ result = FindFontSelection(xw, new_fnames.f_n, False);
+ } else {
+- int oldFont = screen->menu_font_number;
+-
+ #define USE_CACHED(field, name) \
+- if (myfonts.field == 0) { \
+- myfonts.field = x_strdup(screen->menu_font_names[which][name]); \
+- TRACE(("set myfonts." #field " from menu_font_names[%d][" #name "] %s\n", \
+- which, NonNull(myfonts.field))); \
++ if (new_fnames.field == NULL) { \
++ new_fnames.field = x_strdup(screen->menu_font_names[which][name]); \
++ TRACE(("set new_fnames." #field " from menu_font_names[%d][" #name "] %s\n", \
++ which, NonNull(new_fnames.field))); \
+ } else { \
+- TRACE(("set myfonts." #field " reused\n")); \
++ TRACE(("set new_fnames." #field " reused\n")); \
+ }
+ #define SAVE_FNAME(field, name) \
+- if (myfonts.field != 0) { \
+- if (screen->menu_font_names[which][name] == 0 \
+- || strcmp(screen->menu_font_names[which][name], myfonts.field)) { \
+- TRACE(("updating menu_font_names[%d][" #name "] to %s\n", \
+- which, myfonts.field)); \
+- FREE_STRING(screen->menu_font_names[which][name]); \
+- screen->menu_font_names[which][name] = x_strdup(myfonts.field); \
+- } \
++ if (new_fnames.field != NULL \
++ && (screen->menu_font_names[which][name] == NULL \
++ || strcmp(screen->menu_font_names[which][name], new_fnames.field))) { \
++ TRACE(("updating menu_font_names[%d][" #name "] to \"%s\"\n", \
++ which, new_fnames.field)); \
++ FREE_STRING(screen->menu_font_names[which][name]); \
++ screen->menu_font_names[which][name] = x_strdup(new_fnames.field); \
+ }
+
+ USE_CACHED(f_n, fNorm);
+@@ -4774,7 +4793,7 @@ SetVTFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ USE_CACHED(f_wb, fWBold);
+ #endif
+ if (xtermLoadFont(xw,
+- &myfonts,
++ &new_fnames,
+ doresize, which)) {
+ /*
+ * If successful, save the data so that a subsequent query via
+@@ -4786,10 +4805,8 @@ SetVTFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ SAVE_FNAME(f_w, fWide);
+ SAVE_FNAME(f_wb, fWBold);
+ #endif
++ result = True;
+ } else {
+- (void) xtermLoadFont(xw,
+- xtermFontName(screen->MenuFontName(oldFont)),
+- doresize, oldFont);
+ Bell(xw, XkbBI_MinorError, 0);
+ }
+ FREE_FNAME(f_n);
+@@ -4802,7 +4819,8 @@ SetVTFont(XtermWidget xw,
+ } else {
+ Bell(xw, XkbBI_MinorError, 0);
+ }
+- return;
++ TRACE(("...SetVTFont: %d\n", result));
++ return result;
+ }
+
+ #if OPT_RENDERFONT
+diff --git a/fontutils.h b/fontutils.h
+index 9d530c5..ceaf44a 100644
+--- a/fontutils.h
++++ b/fontutils.h
+@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
+ /* *INDENT-OFF* */
+
+ extern Bool xtermLoadDefaultFonts (XtermWidget /* xw */);
+-extern Bool xtermOpenFont (XtermWidget /* xw */, const char */* name */, XTermFonts * /* result */, Bool /* force */);
++extern Bool xtermOpenFont (XtermWidget /* xw */, const char */* name */, XTermFonts * /* result */, XTermFonts * /* current */, Bool /* force */);
+ extern XTermFonts * getDoubleFont (TScreen * /* screen */, int /* which */);
+ extern XTermFonts * getItalicFont (TScreen * /* screen */, int /* which */);
+ extern XTermFonts * getNormalFont (TScreen * /* screen */, int /* which */);
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ extern int lookupRelativeFontSize (XtermWidget /* xw */, int /* old */, int /* r
+ extern int xtermGetFont (const char * /* param */);
+ extern int xtermLoadFont (XtermWidget /* xw */, const VTFontNames */* fonts */, Bool /* doresize */, int /* fontnum */);
+ extern void HandleSetFont PROTO_XT_ACTIONS_ARGS;
+-extern void SetVTFont (XtermWidget /* xw */, int /* i */, Bool /* doresize */, const VTFontNames */* fonts */);
++extern Bool SetVTFont (XtermWidget /* xw */, int /* i */, Bool /* doresize */, const VTFontNames */* fonts */);
+ extern void allocFontList (XtermWidget /* xw */, const char * /* name */, XtermFontNames * /* target */, VTFontEnum /* which */, const char * /* source */, Bool /* ttf */);
+ extern void copyFontList (char *** /* targetp */, char ** /* source */);
+ extern void initFontLists (XtermWidget /* xw */);
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index cc323f8..6c5e938 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -3787,9 +3787,9 @@ ChangeFontRequest(XtermWidget xw, String buf)
+ {
+ memset(&fonts, 0, sizeof(fonts));
+ fonts.f_n = name;
+- SetVTFont(xw, num, True, &fonts);
+- if (num == screen->menu_font_number &&
+- num != fontMenu_fontescape) {
++ if (SetVTFont(xw, num, True, &fonts)
++ && num == screen->menu_font_number
++ && num != fontMenu_fontescape) {
+ screen->EscapeFontName() = x_strdup(name);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -6237,7 +6237,6 @@ xtermSetenv(const char *var, const char *value)
+
+ found = envindex;
+ environ[found + 1] = NULL;
+- environ = environ;
+ }
+
+ environ[found] = TextAlloc(1 + len + strlen(value));
+diff --git a/screen.c b/screen.c
+index 690e3e2..f84254f 100644
+--- a/screen.c
++++ b/screen.c
+@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ ScrnRefresh(XtermWidget xw,
+ screen->topline, toprow, leftcol,
+ nrows, ncols,
+ force ? " force" : ""));
+-
++ (void) recurse;
+ ++recurse;
+
+ if (screen->cursorp.col >= leftcol
+diff --git a/xterm.h b/xterm.h
+index ec70e43..aa71f96 100644
+--- a/xterm.h
++++ b/xterm.h
+@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ extern Bool CheckBufPtrs (TScreen * /* screen */);
+ extern Bool set_cursor_gcs (XtermWidget /* xw */);
+ extern char * vt100ResourceToString (XtermWidget /* xw */, const char * /* name */);
+ extern int VTInit (XtermWidget /* xw */);
+-extern void FindFontSelection (XtermWidget /* xw */, const char * /* atom_name */, Bool /* justprobe */);
++extern Bool FindFontSelection (XtermWidget /* xw */, const char * /* atom_name */, Bool /* justprobe */);
+ extern void HideCursor (void);
+ extern void RestartBlinking(XtermWidget /* xw */);
+ extern void ShowCursor (void);
+diff --git a/xterm.log.html b/xterm.log.html
+index 47d590b..e27dc31 100644
+--- a/xterm.log.html
++++ b/xterm.log.html
+@@ -991,6 +991,12 @@
+ 2020/02/01</a></h1>
+
+ <ul>
++ <li>improve error-recovery when setting a bitmap font for the
++ VT100 window, e.g., in case <em>OSC&nbsp;50</em> failed,
++ restoring the most recent valid font so that a subsequent
++ <em>OSC&nbsp;50</em> reports this correctly (report by David
++ Leadbeater).</li>
++
+ <li>amend change in <a href="#xterm_352">patch #352</a> for
+ button-events to fix a case where some followup events were not
+ processed soon enough (report/patch by Jimmy Aguilar
+--
+2.24.4
+
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/xorg-app/xterm_353.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/xorg-app/xterm_353.bb
index 1862b250ef..4e2b0c9d53 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/xorg-app/xterm_353.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-graphics/xorg-app/xterm_353.bb
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://invisible-mirror.net/archives/${BPN}/${BP}.tgz \
file://0001-Add-configure-time-check-for-setsid.patch \
file://CVE-2021-27135.patch \
file://CVE-2022-24130.patch \
+ file://CVE-2022-45063.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "247c30ebfa44623f3a2d100e0cae5c7f"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "e521d3ee9def61f5d5c911afc74dd5c3a56ce147c7071c74023ea24cac9bb768"
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2020-25648.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2020-25648.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f30d4d32cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2020-25648.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
+# Date 1602524521 0
+# Node ID 57bbefa793232586d27cee83e74411171e128361
+# Parent 6e3bc17f05086854ffd2b06f7fae9371f7a0c174
+Bug 1641480, TLS 1.3: tighten CCS handling in compatibility mode, r=mt
+
+This makes the server reject CCS when the client doesn't indicate the
+use of the middlebox compatibility mode with a non-empty
+ClientHello.legacy_session_id, or it sends multiple CCS in a row.
+
+Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D79994
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2020-25648
+Reference to upstream patch: https://hg.mozilla.org/projects/nss/rev/57bbefa793232586d27cee83e74411171e128361
+Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mbriand@witekio.com>
+
+diff --color -Naur nss-3.51.1_old/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc nss-3.51.1/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc
+--- nss-3.51.1_old/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc 2022-12-08 16:05:47.447142660 +0100
++++ nss-3.51.1/nss/gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc 2022-12-08 16:12:32.645932052 +0100
+@@ -348,6 +348,85 @@
+ client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT);
+ }
+
++// The server rejects a ChangeCipherSpec if the client advertises an
++// empty session ID.
++TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCipherSpecAfterClientHelloEmptySid) {
++ EnsureTlsSetup();
++ ConfigureVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
++
++ StartConnect();
++ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
++ client_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs))); // Send CCS
++
++ server_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
++ server_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS
++ server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
++}
++
++// The server rejects multiple ChangeCipherSpec even if the client
++// indicates compatibility mode with non-empty session ID.
++TEST_F(Tls13CompatTest, ChangeCipherSpecAfterClientHelloTwice) {
++ EnsureTlsSetup();
++ ConfigureVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
++ EnableCompatMode();
++
++ StartConnect();
++ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
++ // Send CCS twice in a row
++ client_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs)));
++ client_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs)));
++
++ server_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
++ server_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS.
++ server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
++}
++
++// The client rejects a ChangeCipherSpec if it advertises an empty
++// session ID.
++TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCipherSpecAfterServerHelloEmptySid) {
++ EnsureTlsSetup();
++ ConfigureVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
++
++ // To replace Finished with a CCS below
++ auto filter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsHandshakeDropper>(server_);
++ filter->SetHandshakeTypes({kTlsHandshakeFinished});
++ filter->EnableDecryption();
++
++ StartConnect();
++ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
++ server_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello, and
++ // send ServerHello..CertificateVerify
++ // Send CCS
++ server_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs)));
++ client_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
++ client_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS
++ client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
++}
++
++// The client rejects multiple ChangeCipherSpec in a row even if the
++// client indicates compatibility mode with non-empty session ID.
++TEST_F(Tls13CompatTest, ChangeCipherSpecAfterServerHelloTwice) {
++ EnsureTlsSetup();
++ ConfigureVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
++ EnableCompatMode();
++
++ // To replace Finished with a CCS below
++ auto filter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsHandshakeDropper>(server_);
++ filter->SetHandshakeTypes({kTlsHandshakeFinished});
++ filter->EnableDecryption();
++
++ StartConnect();
++ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
++ server_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello, and
++ // send ServerHello..CertificateVerify
++ // the ServerHello is followed by CCS
++ // Send another CCS
++ server_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs)));
++ client_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
++ client_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS
++ client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
++}
++
+ // If we negotiate 1.2, we abort.
+ TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCipherSpecBeforeClientHello12) {
+ EnsureTlsSetup();
+diff --color -Naur nss-3.51.1_old/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c nss-3.51.1/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+--- nss-3.51.1_old/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2022-12-08 16:05:47.471142833 +0100
++++ nss-3.51.1/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2022-12-08 16:12:42.037994262 +0100
+@@ -6711,7 +6711,11 @@
+
+ /* TLS 1.3: We sent a session ID. The server's should match. */
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && (sentRealSid || sentFakeSid)) {
+- return sidMatch;
++ if (sidMatch) {
++ ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_TRUE;
++ return PR_TRUE;
++ }
++ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 (no SID)/DTLS 1.3: The server shouldn't send a session ID. */
+@@ -8730,6 +8734,7 @@
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
++ ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression include only null. */
+@@ -13058,8 +13063,15 @@
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake &&
+ cText->buf->len == 1 &&
+ cText->buf->buf[0] == change_cipher_spec_choice) {
+- /* Ignore the CCS. */
+- return SECSuccess;
++ if (ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs) {
++ /* Ignore the first CCS. */
++ ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_FALSE;
++ return SECSuccess;
++ }
++
++ /* Compatibility mode is not negotiated. */
++ alert = unexpected_message;
++ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) ||
+diff --color -Naur nss-3.51.1_old/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h nss-3.51.1/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
+--- nss-3.51.1_old/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h 2022-12-08 16:05:47.471142833 +0100
++++ nss-3.51.1/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h 2022-12-08 16:12:45.106014567 +0100
+@@ -711,6 +711,10 @@
+ * or received. */
+ PRBool receivedCcs; /* A server received ChangeCipherSpec
+ * before the handshake started. */
++ PRBool allowCcs; /* A server allows ChangeCipherSpec
++ * as the middlebox compatibility mode
++ * is explicitly indicarted by
++ * legacy_session_id in TLS 1.3 ClientHello. */
+ PRBool clientCertRequested; /* True if CertificateRequest received. */
+ ssl3KEADef kea_def_mutable; /* Used to hold the writable kea_def
+ * we use for TLS 1.3 */
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2023-0767.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2023-0767.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ec3b4a092a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss/CVE-2023-0767.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User John M. Schanck <jschanck@mozilla.com>
+# Date 1675974326 0
+# Node ID 62f6b3e9024dd72ba3af9ce23848d7573b934f18
+# Parent 52b4b7d3d3ebdb25fbf2cf1c101bfad3721680f4
+Bug 1804640 - improve handling of unknown PKCS#12 safe bag types. r=rrelyea
+
+Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D167443
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-0767
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+archive/primary/+sourcefiles/nss/2:3.35-2ubuntu2.16/nss_3.35-2ubuntu2.16.debian.tar.xz]
+Signed-off-by: Virendra Thakur <virendra.thakur@kpit.com>
+
+diff --git a/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c b/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
+--- a/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
++++ b/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12d.c
+@@ -332,41 +332,48 @@ sec_pkcs12_decoder_safe_bag_update(void
+ unsigned long len, int depth,
+ SEC_ASN1EncodingPart data_kind)
+ {
+ sec_PKCS12SafeContentsContext *safeContentsCtx =
+ (sec_PKCS12SafeContentsContext *)arg;
+ SEC_PKCS12DecoderContext *p12dcx;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+- /* make sure that we are not skipping the current safeBag,
+- * and that there are no errors. If so, just return rather
+- * than continuing to process.
+- */
+- if (!safeContentsCtx || !safeContentsCtx->p12dcx ||
+- safeContentsCtx->p12dcx->error || safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag) {
++ if (!safeContentsCtx || !safeContentsCtx->p12dcx || !safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx) {
+ return;
+ }
+ p12dcx = safeContentsCtx->p12dcx;
+
++ /* make sure that there are no errors and we are not skipping the current safeBag */
++ if (p12dcx->error || safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag) {
++ goto loser;
++ }
++
+ rv = SEC_ASN1DecoderUpdate(safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx, data, len);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ p12dcx->errorValue = PORT_GetError();
++ p12dcx->error = PR_TRUE;
++ goto loser;
++ }
++
++ /* The update may have set safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag, and we
++ * may not get another opportunity to clean up the decoder context.
++ */
++ if (safeContentsCtx->skipCurrentSafeBag) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ return;
+
+ loser:
+- /* set the error, and finish the decoder context. because there
++ /* Finish the decoder context. Because there
+ * is not a way of returning an error message, it may be worth
+ * while to do a check higher up and finish any decoding contexts
+ * that are still open.
+ */
+- p12dcx->error = PR_TRUE;
+ SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish(safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx);
+ safeContentsCtx->currentSafeBagA1Dcx = NULL;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* notify function for decoding safeBags. This function is
+ * used to filter safeBag types which are not supported,
+ * initiate the decoding of nested safe contents, and decode
+diff --git a/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h b/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h
+--- a/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h
++++ b/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12t.h
+@@ -68,16 +68,17 @@ struct sec_PKCS12SafeBagStr {
+ /* Dependent upon the type of bag being used. */
+ union {
+ SECKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pkcs8KeyBag;
+ SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag;
+ sec_PKCS12CertBag *certBag;
+ sec_PKCS12CRLBag *crlBag;
+ sec_PKCS12SecretBag *secretBag;
+ sec_PKCS12SafeContents *safeContents;
++ SECItem *unknownBag;
+ } safeBagContent;
+
+ sec_PKCS12Attribute **attribs;
+
+ /* used locally */
+ SECOidData *bagTypeTag;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+ unsigned int nAttribs;
+diff --git a/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c b/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c
+--- a/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c
++++ b/nss/lib/pkcs12/p12tmpl.c
+@@ -25,22 +25,22 @@ sec_pkcs12_choose_safe_bag_type(void *sr
+ if (src_or_dest == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ safeBag = (sec_PKCS12SafeBag *)src_or_dest;
+
+ oiddata = SECOID_FindOID(&safeBag->safeBagType);
+ if (oiddata == NULL) {
+- return SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_AnyTemplate);
++ return SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_PointerToAnyTemplate);
+ }
+
+ switch (oiddata->offset) {
+ default:
+- theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_AnyTemplate);
++ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_PointerToAnyTemplate);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V1_KEY_BAG_ID:
+ theTemplate = SEC_ASN1_GET(SECKEY_PointerToPrivateKeyInfoTemplate);
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V1_CERT_BAG_ID:
+ theTemplate = sec_PKCS12PointerToCertBagTemplate;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_PKCS12_V1_CRL_BAG_ID:
+
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.51.1.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.51.1.bb
index 8b59f7ea8f..1de2a40094 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.51.1.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/nss/nss_3.51.1.bb
@@ -39,8 +39,10 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.mozilla.org/pub/mozilla.org/security/nss/releases/${VERSIO
file://CVE-2020-6829_12400.patch \
file://CVE-2020-12403_1.patch \
file://CVE-2020-12403_2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2020-25648.patch \
file://CVE-2021-43527.patch \
file://CVE-2022-22747.patch \
+ file://CVE-2023-0767.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "6acaf1ddff69306ae30a908881c6f233"
@@ -291,5 +293,11 @@ RDEPENDS_${PN}-smime = "perl"
BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
+CVE_PRODUCT += "network_security_services"
+
# CVE-2006-5201 affects only Sun Solaris
CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2006-5201"
+
+# CVES CVE-2017-11695 CVE-2017-11696 CVE-2017-11697 CVE-2017-11698 only affect
+# the legacy db (libnssdbm), only compiled with --enable-legacy-db.
+CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2017-11695 CVE-2017-11696 CVE-2017-11697 CVE-2017-11698"
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools/0001-Properly-check-authorization-on-incoming-guestOps-re.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools/0001-Properly-check-authorization-on-incoming-guestOps-re.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1c6657ae9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools/0001-Properly-check-authorization-on-incoming-guestOps-re.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From d16eda269413bdb04e85c242fa28db264697c45f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: John Wolfe <jwolfe@vmware.com>
+Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2022 07:56:49 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Properly check authorization on incoming guestOps requests.
+
+Fix public pipe request checks. Only a SessionRequest type should
+be accepted on the public pipe.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/vmware/open-vm-tools/commit/70a74758bfe0042c27f15ce590fb21a2bc54d745
+CVE: CVE-2022-31676
+Signed-off-by: Priyal Doshi <pdoshi@mvista.com>
+---
+ open-vm-tools/vgauth/serviceImpl/proto.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/open-vm-tools/vgauth/serviceImpl/proto.c b/open-vm-tools/vgauth/serviceImpl/proto.c
+index f097fb6..0ebaa7b 100644
+--- a/open-vm-tools/vgauth/serviceImpl/proto.c
++++ b/open-vm-tools/vgauth/serviceImpl/proto.c
+@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
+ /*********************************************************
+- * Copyright (C) 2011-2016,2019 VMware, Inc. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (C) 2011-2016,2019-2022 VMware, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published
+@@ -1202,6 +1202,10 @@ Proto_SecurityCheckRequest(ServiceConnection *conn,
+ VGAuthError err;
+ gboolean isSecure = ServiceNetworkIsConnectionPrivateSuperUser(conn);
+
++ if (conn->isPublic && req->reqType != PROTO_REQUEST_SESSION_REQ) {
++ return VGAUTH_E_PERMISSION_DENIED;
++ }
++
+ switch (req->reqType) {
+ /*
+ * This comes over the public connection; alwsys let it through.
+--
+2.7.4
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools_11.0.1.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools_11.0.1.bb
index 3cf0aa8292..9a1b3f4c80 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools_11.0.1.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/open-vm-tools/open-vm-tools_11.0.1.bb
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vmware/open-vm-tools.git;protocol=https;branch=maste
file://0002-hgfsServerLinux-Consider-64bit-time_t-possibility.patch;patchdir=.. \
file://0001-utilBacktrace-Ignore-Warray-bounds.patch;patchdir=.. \
file://0001-hgfsmounter-Makefile.am-support-usrmerge.patch;patchdir=.. \
+ file://0001-Properly-check-authorization-on-incoming-guestOps-re.patch;patchdir=.. \
"
SRCREV = "d3edfd142a81096f9f58aff17d84219b457f4987"
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/syslog-ng/files/CVE-2022-38725.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/syslog-ng/files/CVE-2022-38725.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a09c8c7fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/syslog-ng/files/CVE-2022-38725.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,629 @@
+From 73b5c300b8fde5e7a4824baa83a04931279abb37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?L=C3=A1szl=C3=B3=20V=C3=A1rady?=
+ <laszlo.varady@protonmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 20 Aug 2022 12:42:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2022-38725
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Signed-off-by: László Várady <laszlo.varady@protonmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Balazs Scheidler <bazsi77@gmail.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://github.com/syslog-ng/syslog-ng/commit/b5a060f2ebb8d794f508436a12e4d4163f94b1b8 && https://github.com/syslog-ng/syslog-ng/commit/81a07263f1e522a376d3a30f96f51df3f2879f8a && https://github.com/syslog-ng/syslog-ng/commit/4b8dc56ca8eaeac4c8751a305eb7eeefab8dc89d && https://github.com/syslog-ng/syslog-ng/commit/73b5c300b8fde5e7a4824baa83a04931279abb37 && https://github.com/syslog-ng/syslog-ng/commit/45f051239312e43bd4f92b9339fe67c6798a0321 && https://github.com/syslog-ng/syslog-ng/commit/09f489c89c826293ff8cbd282cfc866ab56054c4 && https://github.com/syslog-ng/syslog-ng/commit/8c6e2c1c41b0fcc5fbd464c35f4dac7102235396 && https://github.com/syslog-ng/syslog-ng/commit/56f881c5eaa3d8c02c96607c4b9e4eaf959a044d]
+CVE: CVE-2022-38725
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/timeutils/scan-timestamp.c | 68 +++++----
+ lib/timeutils/tests/test_scan-timestamp.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++--
+ modules/syslogformat/CMakeLists.txt | 2 +
+ modules/syslogformat/Makefile.am | 2 +
+ modules/syslogformat/syslog-format.c | 12 +-
+ modules/syslogformat/tests/CMakeLists.txt | 1 +
+ modules/syslogformat/tests/Makefile.am | 9 ++
+ .../syslogformat/tests/test_syslog_format.c | 104 ++++++++++++++
+ 8 files changed, 284 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 modules/syslogformat/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+ create mode 100644 modules/syslogformat/tests/Makefile.am
+ create mode 100644 modules/syslogformat/tests/test_syslog_format.c
+
+diff --git a/lib/timeutils/scan-timestamp.c b/lib/timeutils/scan-timestamp.c
+index 41ead1a..ec9746b 100644
+--- a/lib/timeutils/scan-timestamp.c
++++ b/lib/timeutils/scan-timestamp.c
+@@ -34,41 +34,43 @@ scan_day_abbrev(const gchar **buf, gint *left, gint *wday)
+ {
+ *wday = -1;
+
+- if (*left < 3)
++ const gsize abbrev_length = 3;
++
++ if (*left < abbrev_length)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ switch (**buf)
+ {
+ case 'S':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Sun", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Sun", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *wday = 0;
+- else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Sat", 3) == 0)
++ else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Sat", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *wday = 6;
+ break;
+ case 'M':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Mon", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Mon", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *wday = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Tue", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Tue", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *wday = 2;
+- else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Thu", 3) == 0)
++ else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Thu", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *wday = 4;
+ break;
+ case 'W':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Wed", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Wed", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *wday = 3;
+ break;
+ case 'F':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Fri", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Fri", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *wday = 5;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+- (*buf) += 3;
+- (*left) -= 3;
++ (*buf) += abbrev_length;
++ (*left) -= abbrev_length;
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+@@ -77,57 +79,59 @@ scan_month_abbrev(const gchar **buf, gint *left, gint *mon)
+ {
+ *mon = -1;
+
+- if (*left < 3)
++ const gsize abbrev_length = 3;
++
++ if (*left < abbrev_length)
+ return FALSE;
+
+ switch (**buf)
+ {
+ case 'J':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Jan", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Jan", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 0;
+- else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Jun", 3) == 0)
++ else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Jun", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 5;
+- else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Jul", 3) == 0)
++ else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Jul", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 6;
+ break;
+ case 'F':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Feb", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Feb", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 1;
+ break;
+ case 'M':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Mar", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Mar", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 2;
+- else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "May", 3) == 0)
++ else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "May", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 4;
+ break;
+ case 'A':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Apr", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Apr", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 3;
+- else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Aug", 3) == 0)
++ else if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Aug", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 7;
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Sep", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Sep", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 8;
+ break;
+ case 'O':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Oct", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Oct", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 9;
+ break;
+ case 'N':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Nov", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Nov", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 10;
+ break;
+ case 'D':
+- if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Dec", 3) == 0)
++ if (strncasecmp(*buf, "Dec", abbrev_length) == 0)
+ *mon = 11;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+- (*buf) += 3;
+- (*left) -= 3;
++ (*buf) += abbrev_length;
++ (*left) -= abbrev_length;
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+@@ -302,7 +306,7 @@ __parse_usec(const guchar **data, gint *length)
+ src++;
+ (*length)--;
+ }
+- while (isdigit(*src))
++ while (*length > 0 && isdigit(*src))
+ {
+ src++;
+ (*length)--;
+@@ -316,19 +320,21 @@ __parse_usec(const guchar **data, gint *length)
+ static gboolean
+ __has_iso_timezone(const guchar *src, gint length)
+ {
+- return (length >= 5) &&
++ return (length >= 6) &&
+ (*src == '+' || *src == '-') &&
+ isdigit(*(src+1)) &&
+ isdigit(*(src+2)) &&
+ *(src+3) == ':' &&
+ isdigit(*(src+4)) &&
+ isdigit(*(src+5)) &&
+- !isdigit(*(src+6));
++ (length < 7 || !isdigit(*(src+6)));
+ }
+
+ static guint32
+ __parse_iso_timezone(const guchar **data, gint *length)
+ {
++ g_assert(*length >= 6);
++
+ gint hours, mins;
+ const guchar *src = *data;
+ guint32 tz = 0;
+@@ -338,8 +344,10 @@ __parse_iso_timezone(const guchar **data, gint *length)
+ hours = (*(src + 1) - '0') * 10 + *(src + 2) - '0';
+ mins = (*(src + 4) - '0') * 10 + *(src + 5) - '0';
+ tz = sign * (hours * 3600 + mins * 60);
++
+ src += 6;
+ (*length) -= 6;
++
+ *data = src;
+ return tz;
+ }
+@@ -393,7 +401,7 @@ __parse_bsd_timestamp(const guchar **data, gint *length, WallClockTime *wct)
+ if (!scan_pix_timestamp((const gchar **) &src, &left, wct))
+ return FALSE;
+
+- if (*src == ':')
++ if (left && *src == ':')
+ {
+ src++;
+ left--;
+@@ -444,7 +452,7 @@ scan_rfc3164_timestamp(const guchar **data, gint *length, WallClockTime *wct)
+ * looking at you, skip that as well, so we can reliably detect IPv6
+ * addresses as hostnames, which would be using ":" as well. */
+
+- if (*src == ':')
++ if (left && *src == ':')
+ {
+ ++src;
+ --left;
+diff --git a/lib/timeutils/tests/test_scan-timestamp.c b/lib/timeutils/tests/test_scan-timestamp.c
+index 4508139..ad657c6 100644
+--- a/lib/timeutils/tests/test_scan-timestamp.c
++++ b/lib/timeutils/tests/test_scan-timestamp.c
+@@ -49,17 +49,21 @@ fake_time_add(time_t diff)
+ }
+
+ static gboolean
+-_parse_rfc3164(const gchar *ts, gchar isotimestamp[32])
++_parse_rfc3164(const gchar *ts, gint len, gchar isotimestamp[32])
+ {
+ UnixTime stamp;
+- const guchar *data = (const guchar *) ts;
+- gint length = strlen(ts);
++ const guchar *tsu = (const guchar *) ts;
++ gint tsu_len = len < 0 ? strlen(ts) : len;
+ GString *result = g_string_new("");
+ WallClockTime wct = WALL_CLOCK_TIME_INIT;
+
+-
++ const guchar *data = tsu;
++ gint length = tsu_len;
+ gboolean success = scan_rfc3164_timestamp(&data, &length, &wct);
+
++ cr_assert(length >= 0);
++ cr_assert(data == &tsu[tsu_len - length]);
++
+ unix_time_unset(&stamp);
+ convert_wall_clock_time_to_unix_time(&wct, &stamp);
+
+@@ -70,16 +74,21 @@ _parse_rfc3164(const gchar *ts, gchar isotimestamp[32])
+ }
+
+ static gboolean
+-_parse_rfc5424(const gchar *ts, gchar isotimestamp[32])
++_parse_rfc5424(const gchar *ts, gint len, gchar isotimestamp[32])
+ {
+ UnixTime stamp;
+- const guchar *data = (const guchar *) ts;
+- gint length = strlen(ts);
++ const guchar *tsu = (const guchar *) ts;
++ gint tsu_len = len < 0 ? strlen(ts) : len;
+ GString *result = g_string_new("");
+ WallClockTime wct = WALL_CLOCK_TIME_INIT;
+
++ const guchar *data = tsu;
++ gint length = tsu_len;
+ gboolean success = scan_rfc5424_timestamp(&data, &length, &wct);
+
++ cr_assert(length >= 0);
++ cr_assert(data == &tsu[tsu_len - length]);
++
+ unix_time_unset(&stamp);
+ convert_wall_clock_time_to_unix_time(&wct, &stamp);
+
+@@ -90,31 +99,60 @@ _parse_rfc5424(const gchar *ts, gchar isotimestamp[32])
+ }
+
+ static gboolean
+-_rfc3164_timestamp_eq(const gchar *ts, const gchar *expected, gchar converted[32])
++_rfc3164_timestamp_eq(const gchar *ts, gint len, const gchar *expected, gchar converted[32])
+ {
+- cr_assert(_parse_rfc3164(ts, converted));
++ cr_assert(_parse_rfc3164(ts, len, converted));
+ return strcmp(converted, expected) == 0;
+ }
+
+ static gboolean
+-_rfc5424_timestamp_eq(const gchar *ts, const gchar *expected, gchar converted[32])
++_rfc5424_timestamp_eq(const gchar *ts, gint len, const gchar *expected, gchar converted[32])
+ {
+- cr_assert(_parse_rfc5424(ts, converted));
++ cr_assert(_parse_rfc5424(ts, len, converted));
+ return strcmp(converted, expected) == 0;
+ }
+
+ #define _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_eq(ts, expected) \
+ ({ \
+ gchar converted[32]; \
+- cr_expect(_rfc3164_timestamp_eq(ts, expected, converted), "Parsed RFC3164 timestamp does not equal expected, ts=%s, converted=%s, expected=%s", ts, converted, expected); \
++ cr_expect(_rfc3164_timestamp_eq(ts, -1, expected, converted), "Parsed RFC3164 timestamp does not equal expected, ts=%s, converted=%s, expected=%s", ts, converted, expected); \
++ })
++
++#define _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, len, expected) \
++ ({ \
++ gchar converted[32]; \
++ cr_expect(_rfc3164_timestamp_eq(ts, len, expected, converted), "Parsed RFC3164 timestamp does not equal expected, ts=%s, converted=%s, expected=%s", ts, converted, expected); \
++ })
++
++#define _expect_rfc3164_fails(ts, len) \
++ ({ \
++ WallClockTime wct = WALL_CLOCK_TIME_INIT; \
++ const guchar *data = (guchar *) ts; \
++ gint length = len < 0 ? strlen(ts) : len; \
++ cr_assert_not(scan_rfc3164_timestamp(&data, &length, &wct)); \
+ })
+
+ #define _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_eq(ts, expected) \
+ ({ \
+ gchar converted[32]; \
+- cr_expect(_rfc5424_timestamp_eq(ts, expected, converted), "Parsed RFC5424 timestamp does not equal expected, ts=%s, converted=%s, expected=%s", ts, converted, expected); \
++ cr_expect(_rfc5424_timestamp_eq(ts, -1, expected, converted), "Parsed RFC5424 timestamp does not equal expected, ts=%s, converted=%s, expected=%s", ts, converted, expected); \
++ })
++
++#define _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_len_eq(ts, len, expected) \
++ ({ \
++ gchar converted[32]; \
++ cr_expect(_rfc5424_timestamp_eq(ts, len, expected, converted), "Parsed RFC5424 timestamp does not equal expected, ts=%s, converted=%s, expected=%s", ts, converted, expected); \
+ })
+
++#define _expect_rfc5424_fails(ts, len) \
++ ({ \
++ WallClockTime wct = WALL_CLOCK_TIME_INIT; \
++ const guchar *data = (guchar *) ts; \
++ gint length = len < 0 ? strlen(ts) : len; \
++ cr_assert_not(scan_rfc5424_timestamp(&data, &length, &wct)); \
++ })
++
++
+ Test(parse_timestamp, standard_bsd_format)
+ {
+ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_eq("Oct 1 17:46:12", "2017-10-01T17:46:12.000+02:00");
+@@ -148,6 +186,75 @@ Test(parse_timestamp, standard_bsd_format_year_in_the_past)
+ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_eq("Dec 31 17:46:12", "2017-12-31T17:46:12.000+01:00");
+ }
+
++Test(parse_timestamp, non_zero_terminated_rfc3164_iso_input_is_handled_properly)
++{
++ gchar *ts = "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417Z whatever";
++ gint ts_len = 24;
++
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, strlen(ts), "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417+00:00");
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len + 5, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417+00:00");
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417+00:00");
++
++ /* no "Z" parsed, timezone defaults to local, forced CET */
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len - 1, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417+02:00");
++
++ /* msec is partially parsed as we trim the string from the right */
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len - 2, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.410+02:00");
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len - 3, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.400+02:00");
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len - 4, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.000+02:00");
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len - 5, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.000+02:00");
++
++ for (gint i = 6; i < ts_len; i++)
++ _expect_rfc3164_fails(ts, ts_len - i);
++
++}
++
++Test(parse_timestamp, non_zero_terminated_rfc3164_bsd_pix_or_asa_input_is_handled_properly)
++{
++ gchar *ts = "Aug 17 2022 05:02:28: whatever";
++ gint ts_len = 21;
++
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, strlen(ts), "2022-08-17T05:02:28.000+02:00");
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len + 5, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.000+02:00");
++ _expect_rfc3164_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.000+02:00");
++
++ /* no ":" at the end, that's a problem, unrecognized */
++ _expect_rfc3164_fails(ts, ts_len - 1);
++
++ for (gint i = 1; i < ts_len; i++)
++ _expect_rfc3164_fails(ts, ts_len - i);
++}
++
++Test(parse_timestamp, non_zero_terminated_rfc5424_input_is_handled_properly)
++{
++ gchar *ts = "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417Z whatever";
++ gint ts_len = 24;
++
++ _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_len_eq(ts, strlen(ts), "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417+00:00");
++ _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len + 5, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417+00:00");
++ _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417+00:00");
++
++ /* no "Z" parsed, timezone defaults to local, forced CET */
++ _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len - 1, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417+02:00");
++
++ /* msec is partially parsed as we trim the string from the right */
++ _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len - 2, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.410+02:00");
++ _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len - 3, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.400+02:00");
++ _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len - 4, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.000+02:00");
++ _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len - 5, "2022-08-17T05:02:28.000+02:00");
++
++ for (gint i = 6; i < ts_len; i++)
++ _expect_rfc5424_fails(ts, ts_len - i);
++
++}
++
++Test(parse_timestamp, non_zero_terminated_rfc5424_timestamp_only)
++{
++ const gchar *ts = "2022-08-17T05:02:28.417+03:00";
++ gint ts_len = strlen(ts);
++ _expect_rfc5424_timestamp_len_eq(ts, ts_len, ts);
++}
++
+
+ Test(parse_timestamp, daylight_saving_behavior_at_spring_with_explicit_timezones)
+ {
+diff --git a/modules/syslogformat/CMakeLists.txt b/modules/syslogformat/CMakeLists.txt
+index fb55ea4..a2a92bb 100644
+--- a/modules/syslogformat/CMakeLists.txt
++++ b/modules/syslogformat/CMakeLists.txt
+@@ -24,4 +24,6 @@ target_include_directories(syslogformat
+ )
+ target_link_libraries(syslogformat PRIVATE syslog-ng)
+
++add_test_subdirectory(tests)
++
+ install(TARGETS syslogformat LIBRARY DESTINATION lib/syslog-ng/)
+diff --git a/modules/syslogformat/Makefile.am b/modules/syslogformat/Makefile.am
+index f13f88c..14cdf58 100644
+--- a/modules/syslogformat/Makefile.am
++++ b/modules/syslogformat/Makefile.am
+@@ -31,3 +31,5 @@ modules_syslogformat_libsyslogformat_la_DEPENDENCIES = \
+ modules/syslogformat modules/syslogformat/ mod-syslogformat: \
+ modules/syslogformat/libsyslogformat.la
+ .PHONY: modules/syslogformat/ mod-syslogformat
++
++include modules/syslogformat/tests/Makefile.am
+diff --git a/modules/syslogformat/syslog-format.c b/modules/syslogformat/syslog-format.c
+index 6d53a32..a69f39f 100644
+--- a/modules/syslogformat/syslog-format.c
++++ b/modules/syslogformat/syslog-format.c
+@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ log_msg_parse_cisco_sequence_id(LogMessage *self, const guchar **data, gint *len
+
+ /* if the next char is not space, then we may try to read a date */
+
+- if (*src != ' ')
++ if (!left || *src != ' ')
+ return;
+
+ log_msg_set_value(self, handles.cisco_seqid, (gchar *) *data, *length - left - 1);
+@@ -216,6 +216,9 @@ log_msg_parse_cisco_timestamp_attributes(LogMessage *self, const guchar **data,
+ const guchar *src = *data;
+ gint left = *length;
+
++ if (!left)
++ return;
++
+ /* Cisco timestamp extensions, the first '*' indicates that the clock is
+ * unsynced, '.' if it is known to be synced */
+ if (G_UNLIKELY(src[0] == '*'))
+@@ -564,7 +567,7 @@ log_msg_parse_sd(LogMessage *self, const guchar **data, gint *length, const MsgF
+ open_sd++;
+ do
+ {
+- if (!isascii(*src) || *src == '=' || *src == ' ' || *src == ']' || *src == '"')
++ if (!left || !isascii(*src) || *src == '=' || *src == ' ' || *src == ']' || *src == '"')
+ goto error;
+ /* read sd_id */
+ pos = 0;
+@@ -598,7 +601,8 @@ log_msg_parse_sd(LogMessage *self, const guchar **data, gint *length, const MsgF
+ strcpy(sd_value_name, logmsg_sd_prefix);
+ /* this strcat is safe, as sd_id_name is at most 32 chars */
+ strncpy(sd_value_name + logmsg_sd_prefix_len, sd_id_name, sizeof(sd_value_name) - logmsg_sd_prefix_len);
+- if (*src == ']')
++
++ if (left && *src == ']')
+ {
+ log_msg_set_value_by_name(self, sd_value_name, "", 0);
+ }
+@@ -615,7 +619,7 @@ log_msg_parse_sd(LogMessage *self, const guchar **data, gint *length, const MsgF
+ else
+ goto error;
+
+- if (!isascii(*src) || *src == '=' || *src == ' ' || *src == ']' || *src == '"')
++ if (!left || !isascii(*src) || *src == '=' || *src == ' ' || *src == ']' || *src == '"')
+ goto error;
+
+ /* read sd-param */
+diff --git a/modules/syslogformat/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/modules/syslogformat/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2e45b71
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/modules/syslogformat/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++add_unit_test(CRITERION TARGET test_syslog_format DEPENDS syslogformat)
+diff --git a/modules/syslogformat/tests/Makefile.am b/modules/syslogformat/tests/Makefile.am
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7ee66a5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/modules/syslogformat/tests/Makefile.am
+@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
++modules_syslogformat_tests_TESTS = \
++ modules/syslogformat/tests/test_syslog_format
++
++check_PROGRAMS += ${modules_syslogformat_tests_TESTS}
++
++EXTRA_DIST += modules/syslogformat/tests/CMakeLists.txt
++
++modules_syslogformat_tests_test_syslog_format_CFLAGS = $(TEST_CFLAGS) -I$(top_srcdir)/modules/syslogformat
++modules_syslogformat_tests_test_syslog_format_LDADD = $(TEST_LDADD) $(PREOPEN_SYSLOGFORMAT)
+diff --git a/modules/syslogformat/tests/test_syslog_format.c b/modules/syslogformat/tests/test_syslog_format.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..d0f5b40
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/modules/syslogformat/tests/test_syslog_format.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2022 One Identity
++ * Copyright (c) 2022 László Várady
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
++ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as published
++ * by the Free Software Foundation, or (at your option) any later version.
++ *
++ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
++ * GNU General Public License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
++ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
++ *
++ * As an additional exemption you are allowed to compile & link against the
++ * OpenSSL libraries as published by the OpenSSL project. See the file
++ * COPYING for details.
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <criterion/criterion.h>
++
++#include "apphook.h"
++#include "cfg.h"
++#include "syslog-format.h"
++#include "logmsg/logmsg.h"
++#include "msg-format.h"
++#include "scratch-buffers.h"
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++GlobalConfig *cfg;
++MsgFormatOptions parse_options;
++
++static void
++setup(void)
++{
++ app_startup();
++ syslog_format_init();
++
++ cfg = cfg_new_snippet();
++ msg_format_options_defaults(&parse_options);
++}
++
++static void
++teardown(void)
++{
++ scratch_buffers_explicit_gc();
++ app_shutdown();
++ cfg_free(cfg);
++}
++
++TestSuite(syslog_format, .init = setup, .fini = teardown);
++
++Test(syslog_format, parser_should_not_spin_on_non_zero_terminated_input, .timeout = 10)
++{
++ const gchar *data = "<182>2022-08-17T05:02:28.217 mymachine su: 'su root' failed for lonvick on /dev/pts/8";
++ /* chosen carefully to reproduce a bug */
++ gsize data_length = 27;
++
++ msg_format_options_init(&parse_options, cfg);
++ LogMessage *msg = msg_format_construct_message(&parse_options, (const guchar *) data, data_length);
++
++ gsize problem_position;
++ cr_assert(syslog_format_handler(&parse_options, msg, (const guchar *) data, data_length, &problem_position));
++
++ msg_format_options_destroy(&parse_options);
++ log_msg_unref(msg);
++}
++
++Test(syslog_format, cisco_sequence_id_non_zero_termination)
++{
++ const gchar *data = "<189>65536: ";
++ gsize data_length = strlen(data);
++
++ msg_format_options_init(&parse_options, cfg);
++ LogMessage *msg = msg_format_construct_message(&parse_options, (const guchar *) data, data_length);
++
++ gsize problem_position;
++ cr_assert(syslog_format_handler(&parse_options, msg, (const guchar *) data, data_length, &problem_position));
++ cr_assert_str_eq(log_msg_get_value_by_name(msg, ".SDATA.meta.sequenceId", NULL), "65536");
++
++ msg_format_options_destroy(&parse_options);
++ log_msg_unref(msg);
++}
++
++Test(syslog_format, minimal_non_zero_terminated_numeric_message_is_parsed_as_program_name)
++{
++ const gchar *data = "<189>65536";
++ gsize data_length = strlen(data);
++
++ msg_format_options_init(&parse_options, cfg);
++ LogMessage *msg = msg_format_construct_message(&parse_options, (const guchar *) data, data_length);
++
++ gsize problem_position;
++ cr_assert(syslog_format_handler(&parse_options, msg, (const guchar *) data, data_length, &problem_position));
++ cr_assert_str_eq(log_msg_get_value_by_name(msg, "PROGRAM", NULL), "65536");
++
++ msg_format_options_destroy(&parse_options);
++ log_msg_unref(msg);
++}
+--
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/syslog-ng/syslog-ng_3.24.1.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/syslog-ng/syslog-ng_3.24.1.bb
index 10bf00fdce..6e90dabd14 100644
--- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/syslog-ng/syslog-ng_3.24.1.bb
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-support/syslog-ng/syslog-ng_3.24.1.bb
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ SRC_URI += " \
file://0001-syslog-ng-fix-segment-fault-during-service-start.patch \
file://shebang.patch \
file://syslog-ng-tmp.conf \
+ file://CVE-2022-38725.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ef9de066793f7358af7312b964ac0450"