diff options
author | Joseph Reynolds <joseph-reynolds@charter.net> | 2021-03-17 00:30:40 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Patrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz> | 2023-05-04 19:03:42 +0300 |
commit | fa324837ff64e44df7ee4a498ad4d298c81f1300 (patch) | |
tree | da12d4f9acb277c6c43b57372d8a47b734c0c892 /poky | |
parent | 8559bff5767c3670701432e543d3ece379e8d99d (diff) | |
download | openbmc-fa324837ff64e44df7ee4a498ad4d298c81f1300.tar.xz |
Update to libpam 1.5.2
This updates to libpam 1.5.2. This version removes support for
pam_cracklib and pam_tally2. They are replaced by pam_pwquality and
pam_faillock respectively.
Since parameters of pam_cracklb and pam_tally2 are configurable through
Redfish, it's possible that they will remain in the overlay of
/etc/pam.d with the old module names preventing PAM from working
correctly. To avoid this, this commit includes a script that will detect
if the old modules are in the overlay and update the overlay with the
new modules and configuration.
The script will allow updates from libpam 1.3.1 to libpam 1.5.2, but if there
are configured parameters during a downgrade from libpam 1.5.2 to libpam
1.3.1, it will require a factory reset before the downgrade.
pam_pwquality was selected over pam_passwdqc because of better security
and compatibility with pam_cracklib.
Note pam_faillock is necessarily configured into the pam module stack
differently than pam_tally2.
This patchset causes a BMC operational change:
- The pam_tally2 command (invoked from the BMC's command line) is no
longer present. If you used the "pam_tally2 -u USER -r" command
to unlock a user after repeated authentication failures, change to
use: faillock --user USER --reset
Compatibility note / migration issue. If your BMC cannot authenticate
users after installing this change, the cause might be an overlayfs file
hiding the new /etc/pam.d/common-auth file. To find out, use
`grep deny= /etc/pam.d/common-auth` on your BMC. If it shows "tally2"
then your BMC is affected. The recovery is to delete the overlay file,
to factory reset the BMC, or manually-install the changed files.
The convert-pam-configs service is intended to handle this problem.
Tested: as follows, for local users only (not tested with LDAP)
Note OpenBMC configuration defaults to an AccountLockoutThreshold
value of 0 which does not lock account passwords no matter how many
consecutive failed authentication attempts. To configure this on
the BMC, for example, use:
curl -X PATCH https://${bmc}/redfish/v1/AccountService
-d '{"AccountLockoutThreshold": 3, "AccountLockoutDuration": 60}'
Tested update scenarios:
1. Install from scratch. Success.
2. Install over firmware which had old PAM configs. Success.
Tested update scenarios for the convert-pam-configs service.
Tested changing the password via various interfaces:
- the passwd command
- the PATCH Refish AccountService {Password: NEW}
- SSH (accessible only when the password is expired)
- IPMI user set password (accessible for unexpired password)
Tested both good and bad (unacceptable) passwords.
Tested account lockout after N bad passwords
Tested unlock via Redfish.
Also, because its implementation changed, ensure reading and writing the
D-Bus User AccountPolicy RememberOldPasswordTimes property continues to
work. There is no Redfish API for this.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Reynolds <joseph-reynolds@charter.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason M. Bills <jason.m.bills@linux.intel.com>
Change-Id: I7b712cf7cfbf7b0bc79da42f822540baee66ca4f
Diffstat (limited to 'poky')
-rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch | 40 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch | 203 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch | 195 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.2.bb (renamed from poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.1.bb) | 39 |
4 files changed, 15 insertions, 462 deletions
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 917a8af64d..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/crypt_configure.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,40 +0,0 @@ -From b86575ab4a0df07da160283459da270e1c0372a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Maxin B. John" <maxin.john@intel.com> -Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 14:11:09 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] crypt_configure - -This patch fixes a case where it find crypt defined in libc (musl) but -not in specified libraries then it ends up assigning -LIBCRYPT="-l" which then goes into makefile cause all sort of problems -e.g. - -ld: cannot find -l-m32 -| collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status -The reason is that -l appears on commandline with -out any library and compiler treats the next argument as library name -whatever it is. - -Upstream-Status: Pending - -Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> -Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@intel.com> ---- - configure.ac | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index df39d07..e68d856 100644 ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ AS_IF([test "x$ac_cv_header_xcrypt_h" = "xyes"], - [crypt_libs="crypt"]) - - BACKUP_LIBS=$LIBS --AC_SEARCH_LIBS([crypt],[$crypt_libs], LIBCRYPT="${ac_lib:+-l$ac_lib}", LIBCRYPT="") -+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([crypt],[$crypt_libs], [test "$ac_cv_search_crypt" = "none required" || LIBCRYPT="$ac_cv_search_crypt"]) - AC_CHECK_FUNCS(crypt_r crypt_gensalt_r) - LIBS=$BACKUP_LIBS - AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT) --- -2.4.0 - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9b8d4c2975..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,203 +0,0 @@ -Description: extract the securetty logic for use with the "nullok_secure" option - introduced in the "055_pam_unix_nullok_secure" patch. - -Upstream-Status: Pending - -Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com> -=================================================================== -Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am -=================================================================== ---- Linux-PAM-1.3.0.orig/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am -+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am -@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ endif - securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_securetty.la - pam_securetty_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la - -+pam_securetty_la_SOURCES = \ -+ pam_securetty.c \ -+ tty_secure.c -+ - if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN - noinst_DATA = README - README: pam_securetty.8.xml -Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c -=================================================================== ---- Linux-PAM-1.3.0.orig/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c -+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c -@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ - /* pam_securetty module */ - --#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty" --#define TTY_PREFIX "/dev/" - #define CMDLINE_FILE "/proc/cmdline" - #define CONSOLEACTIVE_FILE "/sys/class/tty/console/active" - -@@ -40,6 +38,9 @@ - #include <security/pam_modutil.h> - #include <security/pam_ext.h> - -+extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, -+ const char *uttyname); -+ - #define PAM_DEBUG_ARG 0x0001 - #define PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG 0x0002 - -@@ -73,11 +74,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p - const char *username; - const char *uttyname; - const void *void_uttyname; -- char ttyfileline[256]; -- char ptname[256]; -- struct stat ttyfileinfo; - struct passwd *user_pwd; -- FILE *ttyfile; - - /* log a trail for debugging */ - if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) { -@@ -105,50 +102,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p - return PAM_SERVICE_ERR; - } - -- /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */ -- if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0) { -- uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1; -- } -- -- if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) { -- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE); -- return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling, -- this needs to succeed. But we still log the -- error. */ -- } -- -- if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) { -- /* If the file is world writable or is not a -- normal file, return error */ -- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, -- "%s is either world writable or not a normal file", -- SECURETTY_FILE); -- return PAM_AUTH_ERR; -- } -- -- ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r"); -- if (ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */ -- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE); -- return PAM_SERVICE_ERR; -- } -- -- if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) { -- snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname); -- } else { -- ptname[0] = '\0'; -- } -- -- retval = 1; -- -- while ((fgets(ttyfileline, sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL) -- && retval) { -- if (ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n') -- ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0'; -- -- retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline, uttyname) -- && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) ); -- } -- fclose(ttyfile); -+ retval = _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, uttyname); - - if (retval && !(ctrl & PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG)) { - FILE *cmdlinefile; -Index: Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c -=================================================================== ---- /dev/null -+++ Linux-PAM-1.3.0/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c -@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ -+/* -+ * A function to determine if a particular line is in /etc/securetty -+ */ -+ -+ -+#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty" -+#define TTY_PREFIX "/dev/" -+ -+/* This function taken out of pam_securetty by Sam Hartman -+ * <hartmans@debian.org>*/ -+/* -+ * by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software. -+ * July 25, 1996. -+ * Slight modifications AGM. 1996/12/3 -+ */ -+ -+#include <unistd.h> -+#include <sys/types.h> -+#include <sys/stat.h> -+#include <security/pam_modules.h> -+#include <stdarg.h> -+#include <syslog.h> -+#include <sys/syslog.h> -+#include <stdio.h> -+#include <string.h> -+#include <stdlib.h> -+#include <ctype.h> -+#include <security/pam_modutil.h> -+#include <security/pam_ext.h> -+ -+extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, -+ const char *uttyname); -+ -+int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *uttyname) -+{ -+ int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; -+ char ttyfileline[256]; -+ char ptname[256]; -+ struct stat ttyfileinfo; -+ FILE *ttyfile; -+ /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */ -+ if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0) -+ uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1; -+ -+ if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) { -+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m", -+ SECURETTY_FILE); -+ return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling, -+ this needs to succeed. But we still log the -+ error. */ -+ } -+ -+ if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) { -+ /* If the file is world writable or is not a -+ normal file, return error */ -+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, -+ "%s is either world writable or not a normal file", -+ SECURETTY_FILE); -+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR; -+ } -+ -+ ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r"); -+ if(ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */ -+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE); -+ return PAM_SERVICE_ERR; -+ } -+ -+ if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) { -+ snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname); -+ } else { -+ ptname[0] = '\0'; -+ } -+ -+ retval = 1; -+ -+ while ((fgets(ttyfileline,sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL) -+ && retval) { -+ if(ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n') -+ ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0'; -+ retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline,uttyname) -+ && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) ); -+ } -+ fclose(ttyfile); -+ -+ if(retval) { -+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; -+ } -+ -+ return retval; -+} diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d2cc66882e..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,195 +0,0 @@ -From b6545b83f94c5fb7aec1478b8d458a1393f479c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: "Maxin B. John" <maxin.john@intel.com> -Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 14:12:25 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] pam_unix: support 'nullok_secure' option - -Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, -which accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is -connected from a tty listed in /etc/securetty. - -Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>, - Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org> - -Upstream-Status: Pending - -Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com> -Signed-off-by: Amarnath Valluri <amarnath.valluri@intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@intel.com> ---- - modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am | 3 ++- - modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- - modules/pam_unix/support.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- - modules/pam_unix/support.h | 8 ++++++-- - 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am -index 56df178..2bba460 100644 ---- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am -@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING - pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map - endif - pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \ -- @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @TIRPC_LIBS@ @NSL_LIBS@ -+ @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @TIRPC_LIBS@ @NSL_LIBS@ \ -+ ../pam_securetty/tty_secure.lo - - securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la - -diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml -index 1b318f1..be0330e 100644 ---- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml -@@ -159,7 +159,24 @@ - <para> - The default action of this module is to not permit the - user access to a service if their official password is blank. -- The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default. -+ The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default -+ and allows any user with a blank password to access the -+ service. -+ </para> -+ </listitem> -+ </varlistentry> -+ <varlistentry> -+ <term> -+ <option>nullok_secure</option> -+ </term> -+ <listitem> -+ <para> -+ The default action of this module is to not permit the -+ user access to a service if their official password is blank. -+ The <option>nullok_secure</option> argument overrides this -+ default and allows any user with a blank password to access -+ the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of -+ the values found in /etc/securetty. - </para> - </listitem> - </varlistentry> -diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c -index fc8595e..29e3341 100644 ---- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c -@@ -183,13 +183,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember, int *rounds, - /* now parse the arguments to this module */ - - for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) { -+ int sl; - - D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv)); - - for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) { -- if (unix_args[j].token -- && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) { -- break; -+ if (unix_args[j].token) { -+ sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token); -+ if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') { -+ /* exclude argument from comparison */ -+ if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl)) -+ break; -+ } else { -+ /* compare full strings */ -+ if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token)) -+ break; -+ } - } - } - -@@ -560,6 +569,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd, - if (child == 0) { - static char *envp[] = { NULL }; - const char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; -+ int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl); - - /* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */ - -@@ -587,7 +597,16 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd, - /* exec binary helper */ - args[0] = CHKPWD_HELPER; - args[1] = user; -- if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) { /* this means we've succeeded */ -+ if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) { -+ const void *uttyname; -+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname); -+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL -+ || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS) { -+ nullok = 0; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ if (nullok) { - args[2]="nullok"; - } else { - args[2]="nonull"; -@@ -672,6 +691,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *name) - if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) - return 0; /* will fail but don't let on yet */ - -+ if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) { -+ int retval2; -+ const void *uttyname; -+ retval2 = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname); -+ if (retval2 != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (_pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS) -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - /* UNIX passwords area */ - - retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt); -@@ -758,7 +788,7 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name - } - } - } else { -- retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)); -+ retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name)); - } - - if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) { -diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h -index b4c279c..8da4a8e 100644 ---- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h -+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h -@@ -98,8 +98,9 @@ typedef struct { - #define UNIX_QUIET 28 /* Don't print informational messages */ - #define UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY 29 /* Don't check for password expiration if not used for authentication */ - #define UNIX_DES 30 /* DES, default */ -+#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE 31 /* NULL passwords allowed only on secure ttys */ - /* -------------- */ --#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 31 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */ -+#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 32 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */ - - #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl) (off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl)) - -@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] = - /* UNIX_AUTHTOK_TYPE */ {"authtok_type=", _ALL_ON_, 0100, 0}, - /* UNIX__PRELIM */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0200, 0}, - /* UNIX__UPDATE */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0400, 0}, --/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01000, 0}, -+/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(02000000000), 01000, 0}, - /* UNIX__QUIET */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02000, 0}, - /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */ {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_, 04000, 0}, - /* UNIX_SHADOW */ {"shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000, 0}, -@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] = - /* UNIX_QUIET */ {"quiet", _ALL_ON_, 01000000000, 0}, - /* UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY */ {"no_pass_expiry", _ALL_ON_, 02000000000, 0}, - /* UNIX_DES */ {"des", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0, 1}, -+/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */ {"nullok_secure", _ALL_ON_^(01000), 02000000000, 0}, - }; - - #define UNIX_DEFAULTS (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag) -@@ -172,6 +174,8 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handle_t * pamh - ,const char *data_name - ,const void **pass); - -+extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *uttyname); -+ - extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, - unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft); - #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */ --- -2.4.0 - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.1.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.2.bb index 59ed1749ec..bec47ab836 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.3.1.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.2.bb @@ -21,21 +21,23 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/v${PV}/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://pam.d/common-session-noninteractive \ file://pam.d/other \ file://libpam-xtests.patch \ - file://pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch \ - file://pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch \ - file://crypt_configure.patch \ + file://0001-run-xtests.sh-check-whether-files-exist.patch \ + file://run-ptest \ file://pam-volatiles.conf \ + file://CVE-2022-28321-0002.patch \ + file://0001-pam_motd-do-not-rely-on-all-filesystems-providing-a-.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "558ff53b0fc0563ca97f79e911822165" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "eff47a4ecd833fbf18de9686632a70ee8d0794b79aecb217ebd0ce11db4cd0db" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "e4ec7131a91da44512574268f493c6d8ca105c87091691b8e9b56ca685d4f94d" DEPENDS = "bison-native flex-native cracklib libxml2-native virtual/crypt" EXTRA_OECONF = "--includedir=${includedir}/security \ --libdir=${base_libdir} \ + --with-systemdunitdir=${systemd_system_unitdir} \ --disable-nis \ --disable-regenerate-docu \ + --disable-doc \ --disable-prelude" CFLAGS:append = " -fPIC " @@ -51,7 +53,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[userdb] = "--enable-db=db,--enable-db=no,db," PACKAGES += "${PN}-runtime ${PN}-xtests" FILES:${PN} = "${base_libdir}/lib*${SOLIBS}" FILES:${PN}-dev += "${base_libdir}/security/*.la ${base_libdir}/*.la ${base_libdir}/lib*${SOLIBSDEV}" -FILES:${PN}-runtime = "${sysconfdir}" +FILES:${PN}-runtime = "${sysconfdir} ${sbindir} ${systemd_system_unitdir}" FILES:${PN}-xtests = "${datadir}/Linux-PAM/xtests" PACKAGES_DYNAMIC += "^${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-.*" @@ -74,24 +76,16 @@ RDEPENDS:${PN}-runtime = "${PN}-${libpam_suffix} \ RDEPENDS:${PN}-xtests = "${PN}-${libpam_suffix} \ ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-access-${libpam_suffix} \ ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-debug-${libpam_suffix} \ - ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-cracklib-${libpam_suffix} \ ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-pwhistory-${libpam_suffix} \ ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-succeed-if-${libpam_suffix} \ ${MLPREFIX}pam-plugin-time-${libpam_suffix} \ - coreutils" + bash coreutils" # FIXME: Native suffix breaks here, disable it for now RRECOMMENDS:${PN} = "${PN}-runtime-${libpam_suffix}" -RRECOMMENDS:${PN}_class-native = "" +RRECOMMENDS:${PN}:class-native = "" python populate_packages:prepend () { - def pam_plugin_append_file(pn, dir, file): - nf = os.path.join(dir, file) - of = d.getVar('FILES:' + pn) - if of: - nf = of + " " + nf - d.setVar('FILES:' + pn, nf) - def pam_plugin_hook(file, pkg, pattern, format, basename): pn = d.getVar('PN') libpam_suffix = d.getVar('libpam_suffix') @@ -119,13 +113,6 @@ python populate_packages:prepend () { do_split_packages(d, pam_libdir, r'^pam(.*)\.so$', pam_pkgname, 'PAM plugin for %s', hook=pam_plugin_hook, extra_depends='') - pam_plugin_append_file('%spam-plugin-unix' % mlprefix, pam_sbindir, 'unix_chkpwd') - pam_plugin_append_file('%spam-plugin-unix' % mlprefix, pam_sbindir, 'unix_update') - pam_plugin_append_file('%spam-plugin-tally' % mlprefix, pam_sbindir, 'pam_tally') - pam_plugin_append_file('%spam-plugin-tally2' % mlprefix, pam_sbindir, 'pam_tally2') - pam_plugin_append_file('%spam-plugin-timestamp' % mlprefix, pam_sbindir, 'pam_timestamp_check') - pam_plugin_append_file('%spam-plugin-mkhomedir' % mlprefix, pam_sbindir, 'mkhomedir_helper') - pam_plugin_append_file('%spam-plugin-console' % mlprefix, pam_sbindir, 'pam_console_apply') do_split_packages(d, pam_filterdir, r'^(.*)$', 'pam-filter-%s', 'PAM filter for %s', extra_depends='') } @@ -163,6 +150,10 @@ do_install() { if ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES','systemd','true','false',d)}; then echo "session optional pam_systemd.so" >> ${D}${sysconfdir}/pam.d/common-session fi + if ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES','usrmerge','false','true',d)}; then + install -d ${D}/${libdir}/ + mv ${D}/${base_libdir}/pkgconfig ${D}/${libdir}/ + fi } do_install_ptest() { @@ -173,7 +164,7 @@ do_install_ptest() { fi } -pkg_postinst_${PN}() { +pkg_postinst:${PN}() { if [ -z "$D" ] && [ -e /etc/init.d/populate-volatile.sh ] ; then /etc/init.d/populate-volatile.sh update fi |