diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd')
4 files changed, 223 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-0326.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-0326.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..54c405b539 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-0326.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 947272febe24a8f0ea828b5b2f35f13c3821901e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 11:43:12 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Fix copying of secondary device types for P2P group + client + +Parsing and copying of WPS secondary device types list was verifying +that the contents is not too long for the internal maximum in the case +of WPS messages, but similar validation was missing from the case of P2P +group information which encodes this information in a different +attribute. This could result in writing beyond the memory area assigned +for these entries and corrupting memory within an instance of struct +p2p_device. This could result in invalid operations and unexpected +behavior when trying to free pointers from that corrupted memory. + +CVE: CVE-2021-0326 + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Credit to OSS-Fuzz: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=27269 +Fixes: e57ae6e19edf ("P2P: Keep track of secondary device types for peers") +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <mingli.yu@windriver.com> +--- + src/p2p/p2p.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c +index 74b7b52ae..5cbfc217f 100644 +--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c ++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c +@@ -453,6 +453,8 @@ static void p2p_copy_client_info(struct p2p_device *dev, + dev->info.config_methods = cli->config_methods; + os_memcpy(dev->info.pri_dev_type, cli->pri_dev_type, 8); + dev->info.wps_sec_dev_type_list_len = 8 * cli->num_sec_dev_types; ++ if (dev->info.wps_sec_dev_type_list_len > WPS_SEC_DEV_TYPE_MAX_LEN) ++ dev->info.wps_sec_dev_type_list_len = WPS_SEC_DEV_TYPE_MAX_LEN; + os_memcpy(dev->info.wps_sec_dev_type_list, cli->sec_dev_types, + dev->info.wps_sec_dev_type_list_len); + } +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-27803.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-27803.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fedff76b18 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-27803.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From 8460e3230988ef2ec13ce6b69b687e941f6cdb32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 23:52:50 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Fix a corner case in peer addition based on PD Request + +p2p_add_device() may remove the oldest entry if there is no room in the +peer table for a new peer. This would result in any pointer to that +removed entry becoming stale. A corner case with an invalid PD Request +frame could result in such a case ending up using (read+write) freed +memory. This could only by triggered when the peer table has reached its +maximum size and the PD Request frame is received from the P2P Device +Address of the oldest remaining entry and the frame has incorrect P2P +Device Address in the payload. + +Fix this by fetching the dev pointer again after having called +p2p_add_device() so that the stale pointer cannot be used. + +CVE: CVE-2021-27803 + +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Fixes: 17bef1e97a50 ("P2P: Add peer entry based on Provision Discovery Request") +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> +--- + src/p2p/p2p_pd.c | 12 +++++------- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p_pd.c b/src/p2p/p2p_pd.c +index 3994ec03f..05fd59349 100644 +--- a/src/p2p/p2p_pd.c ++++ b/src/p2p/p2p_pd.c +@@ -595,14 +595,12 @@ void p2p_process_prov_disc_req(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *sa, + goto out; + } + ++ dev = p2p_get_device(p2p, sa); + if (!dev) { +- dev = p2p_get_device(p2p, sa); +- if (!dev) { +- p2p_dbg(p2p, +- "Provision Discovery device not found " +- MACSTR, MAC2STR(sa)); +- goto out; +- } ++ p2p_dbg(p2p, ++ "Provision Discovery device not found " ++ MACSTR, MAC2STR(sa)); ++ goto out; + } + } else if (msg.wfd_subelems) { + wpabuf_free(dev->info.wfd_subelems); +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-30004.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-30004.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e2540fc26b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2021-30004.patch @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +From a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 18:19:31 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ASN.1: Validate DigestAlgorithmIdentifier parameters + +The supported hash algorithms do not use AlgorithmIdentifier parameters. +However, there are implementations that include NULL parameters in +addition to ones that omit the parameters. Previous implementation did +not check the parameters value at all which supported both these cases, +but did not reject any other unexpected information. + +Use strict validation of digest algorithm parameters and reject any +unexpected value when validating a signature. This is needed to prevent +potential forging attacks. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> + +Upstream-Status: Backport +CVE: CVE-2021-30004 + +Reference to upstream patch: +[https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15] + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Ghinea <stefan.ghinea@windriver.com> +--- + src/tls/pkcs1.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ + src/tls/x509v3.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c +index 141ac50..e09db07 100644 +--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c ++++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c +@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, + os_free(decrypted); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestInfo", ++ hdr.payload, hdr.length); + + pos = hdr.payload; + end = pos + hdr.length; +@@ -261,6 +263,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, + os_free(decrypted); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", ++ hdr.payload, hdr.length); + da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length; + + if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) { +@@ -269,6 +273,23 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk, + os_free(decrypted); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: Digest algorithm parameters", ++ next, da_end - next); ++ ++ /* ++ * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to ++ * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these ++ * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else. ++ */ ++ if (da_end > next && ++ (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 || ++ !asn1_is_null(&hdr) || ++ hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "PKCS #1: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters"); ++ os_free(decrypted); ++ return -1; ++ } + + if (!asn1_oid_equal(&oid, hash_alg)) { + char txt[100], txt2[100]; +diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c +index 1bd5aa0..bf2289f 100644 +--- a/src/tls/x509v3.c ++++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c +@@ -1834,6 +1834,7 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, + os_free(data); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestInfo", hdr.payload, hdr.length); + + pos = hdr.payload; + end = pos + hdr.length; +@@ -1855,6 +1856,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, + os_free(data); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", ++ hdr.payload, hdr.length); + da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length; + + if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) { +@@ -1862,6 +1865,23 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer, + os_free(data); + return -1; + } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: Digest algorithm parameters", ++ next, da_end - next); ++ ++ /* ++ * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to ++ * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these ++ * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else. ++ */ ++ if (da_end > next && ++ (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 || ++ !asn1_is_null(&hdr) || ++ hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "X509: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters"); ++ os_free(data); ++ return -1; ++ } + + if (x509_sha1_oid(&oid)) { + if (signature->oid.oid[6] != 5 /* sha-1WithRSAEncryption */) { +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.9.bb b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.9.bb index 1f38eee0ff..e586018685 100644 --- a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.9.bb +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.9.bb @@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ SRC_URI = " \ file://hostapd.service \ file://CVE-2019-16275.patch \ file://CVE-2019-5061.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-0326.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-27803.patch \ + file://CVE-2021-30004.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f188fc53a495fe7af3b6d77d3c31dee8" |