1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/dlt-daemon/dlt-daemon/275.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/dlt-daemon/dlt-daemon/275.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..75065eb054
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-oe/recipes-extended/dlt-daemon/dlt-daemon/275.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+Upstream-status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2020-29394
+From 7f5cd5404a03fa330e192084f6bdafb2dc9bdcb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: GwanYeong Kim <gy741.kim@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2020 12:24:46 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] dlt_common: Fix buffer overflow in dlt_filter_load
+
+A buffer overflow in the dlt_filter_load function in dlt_common.c in dlt-daemon allows arbitrary code execution via an unsafe usage of fscanf, because it does not limit the number of characters to be read in a format argument.
+
+Fixed: #274
+
+Signed-off-by: GwanYeong Kim <gy741.kim@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/shared/dlt_common.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/shared/dlt_common.c b/src/shared/dlt_common.c
+index 254f4ce4..d15b1cec 100644
+--- a/src/shared/dlt_common.c
++++ b/src/shared/dlt_common.c
+@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ DltReturnValue dlt_filter_load(DltFilter *filter, const char *filename, int verb
+     while (!feof(handle)) {
+         str1[0] = 0;
+ 
+-        if (fscanf(handle, "%s", str1) != 1)
++        if (fscanf(handle, "%254s", str1) != 1)
+             break;
+ 
+         if (str1[0] == 0)
+@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ DltReturnValue dlt_filter_load(DltFilter *filter, const char *filename, int verb
+ 
+         str1[0] = 0;
+ 
+-        if (fscanf(handle, "%s", str1) != 1)
++        if (fscanf(handle, "%254s", str1) != 1)
+             break;
+ 
+         if (str1[0] == 0)