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-rw-r--r--poky/meta/recipes-extended/sysstat/sysstat/CVE-2022-39377.patch93
1 files changed, 93 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/sysstat/sysstat/CVE-2022-39377.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/sysstat/sysstat/CVE-2022-39377.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dce7b0d61f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/sysstat/sysstat/CVE-2022-39377.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From 9c4eaf150662ad40607923389d4519bc83b93540 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastien <seb@fedora-2.home>
+Date: Sat, 15 Oct 2022 14:24:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix size_t overflow in sa_common.c (GHSL-2022-074)
+
+allocate_structures function located in sa_common.c insufficiently
+checks bounds before arithmetic multiplication allowing for an
+overflow in the size allocated for the buffer representing system
+activities.
+
+This patch checks that the post-multiplied value is not greater than
+UINT_MAX.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sebastien <seb@fedora-2.home>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport from
+[https://github.com/sysstat/sysstat/commit/a953ee3307d51255cc96e1f211882e97f795eed9]
+
+Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com>
+---
+ common.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ common.h | 2 ++
+ sa_common.c | 6 ++++++
+ 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/common.c b/common.c
+index 81c7762..1a84b05 100644
+--- a/common.c
++++ b/common.c
+@@ -1655,4 +1655,29 @@ int parse_values(char *strargv, unsigned char bitmap[], int max_val, const char
+
+ return 0;
+ }
++
++/*
++ ***************************************************************************
++ * Check if the multiplication of the 3 values may be greater than UINT_MAX.
++ *
++ * IN:
++ * @val1 First value.
++ * @val2 Second value.
++ * @val3 Third value.
++ ***************************************************************************
++ */
++void check_overflow(size_t val1, size_t val2, size_t val3)
++{
++ if ((unsigned long long) val1 *
++ (unsigned long long) val2 *
++ (unsigned long long) val3 > UINT_MAX) {
++#ifdef DEBUG
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: Overflow detected (%llu). Aborting...\n",
++ __FUNCTION__,
++ (unsigned long long) val1 * (unsigned long long) val2 * (unsigned long long) val3);
++#endif
++ exit(4);
++ }
++}
++
+ #endif /* SOURCE_SADC undefined */
+diff --git a/common.h b/common.h
+index 55b6657..e8ab98a 100644
+--- a/common.h
++++ b/common.h
+@@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ int check_dir
+ (char *);
+
+ #ifndef SOURCE_SADC
++void check_overflow
++ (size_t, size_t, size_t);
+ int count_bits
+ (void *, int);
+ int count_csvalues
+diff --git a/sa_common.c b/sa_common.c
+index 3699a84..b2cec4a 100644
+--- a/sa_common.c
++++ b/sa_common.c
+@@ -459,7 +459,13 @@ void allocate_structures(struct activity *act[])
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NR_ACT; i++) {
++
+ if (act[i]->nr_ini > 0) {
++
++ /* Look for a possible overflow */
++ check_overflow((size_t) act[i]->msize, (size_t) act[i]->nr_ini,
++ (size_t) act[i]->nr2);
++
+ for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
+ SREALLOC(act[i]->buf[j], void,
+ (size_t) act[i]->msize * (size_t) act[i]->nr_ini * (size_t) act[i]->nr2);
+--
+2.34.1
+