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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-05-19 19:21:36 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-05-19 19:21:36 +0300
commitf4f27d0028aabce57e44c16c2fdefccd6310d2f3 (patch)
tree09f25601316d22b64165c19042da51c101bde3c4
parent2600a46ee0ed57c0e0a382c2a37ebac64d374d20 (diff)
parentb937190c40de0f6f07f592042e3097b16c6b0130 (diff)
downloadlinux-f4f27d0028aabce57e44c16c2fdefccd6310d2f3.tar.xz
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified cryptographically via dm-verity). This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing). - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key. Lots of general fixes and updates. - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits) LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting seccomp: Fix comment typo ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory fs: fix over-zealous use of "const" selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration Yama: consolidate error reporting string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it selinux: Change bool variable name to index. KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command ...
-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/LoadPin.txt17
-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/keys.txt52
-rw-r--r--MAINTAINERS6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c18
-rw-r--r--certs/Kconfig9
-rw-r--r--certs/system_keyring.c139
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig6
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile5
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c96
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c21
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c72
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c58
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h11
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c43
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c107
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c20
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c108
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c18
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c40
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h5
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c52
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h12
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c297
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/cifsacl.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c29
-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c2
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/pkcs7.h6
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/public_key.h33
-rw-r--r--include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h2
-rw-r--r--include/keys/asymmetric-type.h13
-rw-r--r--include/keys/system_keyring.h41
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fs.h31
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ima.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key-type.h1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key.h44
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_hooks.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/string_helpers.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/verification.h49
-rw-r--r--include/linux/verify_pefile.h22
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h10
-rw-r--r--kernel/module_signing.c7
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/string_helpers.c92
-rw-r--r--net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c2
-rw-r--r--net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c2
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/ar-key.c4
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--security/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c15
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig36
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c7
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c25
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c23
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/Kconfig15
-rw-r--r--security/keys/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c198
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/dh.c160
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h12
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c42
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c5
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c46
-rw-r--r--security/keys/persistent.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c16
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c42
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/Kconfig19
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/loadpin.c190
-rw-r--r--security/security.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c144
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h30
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/conditional.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c6
-rw-r--r--security/yama/yama_lsm.c31
82 files changed, 1915 insertions, 807 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/LoadPin.txt b/Documentation/security/LoadPin.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e11877f5d3d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/LoadPin.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+LoadPin is a Linux Security Module that ensures all kernel-loaded files
+(modules, firmware, etc) all originate from the same filesystem, with
+the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device
+such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified
+and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading
+restrictions without needing to sign the files individually.
+
+The LSM is selectable at build-time with CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN, and
+can be controlled at boot-time with the kernel command line option
+"loadpin.enabled". By default, it is enabled, but can be disabled at
+boot ("loadpin.enabled=0").
+
+LoadPin starts pinning when it sees the first file loaded. If the
+block device backing the filesystem is not read-only, a sysctl is
+created to toggle pinning: /proc/sys/kernel/loadpin/enabled. (Having
+a mutable filesystem means pinning is mutable too, but having the
+sysctl allows for easy testing on systems with a mutable filesystem.)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
index 8c183873b2b7..20d05719bceb 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
@@ -823,6 +823,36 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
A process must have search permission on the key for this function to be
successful.
+ (*) Compute a Diffie-Hellman shared secret or public key
+
+ long keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, struct keyctl_dh_params *params,
+ char *buffer, size_t buflen);
+
+ The params struct contains serial numbers for three keys:
+
+ - The prime, p, known to both parties
+ - The local private key
+ - The base integer, which is either a shared generator or the
+ remote public key
+
+ The value computed is:
+
+ result = base ^ private (mod prime)
+
+ If the base is the shared generator, the result is the local
+ public key. If the base is the remote public key, the result is
+ the shared secret.
+
+ The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero.
+
+ If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is
+ returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the
+ buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required
+ buffer length is returned.
+
+ This function will return error EOPNOTSUPP if the key type is not
+ supported, error ENOKEY if the key could not be found, or error
+ EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller.
===============
KERNEL SERVICES
@@ -999,6 +1029,10 @@ payload contents" for more information.
struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm,
+ int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
+ const struct key_type *,
+ unsigned long,
+ const union key_payload *),
unsigned long flags,
struct key *dest);
@@ -1010,6 +1044,24 @@ payload contents" for more information.
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA in flags if the keyring shouldn't be accounted
towards the user's quota). Error ENOMEM can also be returned.
+ If restrict_link not NULL, it should point to a function that will be
+ called each time an attempt is made to link a key into the new keyring.
+ This function is called to check whether a key may be added into the keying
+ or not. Callers of key_create_or_update() within the kernel can pass
+ KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to suppress the check. An example of using
+ this is to manage rings of cryptographic keys that are set up when the
+ kernel boots where userspace is also permitted to add keys - provided they
+ can be verified by a key the kernel already has.
+
+ When called, the restriction function will be passed the keyring being
+ added to, the key flags value and the type and payload of the key being
+ added. Note that when a new key is being created, this is called between
+ payload preparsing and actual key creation. The function should return 0
+ to allow the link or an error to reject it.
+
+ A convenience function, restrict_link_reject, exists to always return
+ -EPERM to in this case.
+
(*) To check the validity of a key, this function can be called:
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index add406a46231..71bcef4a161c 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -10025,6 +10025,12 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git
S: Supported
F: security/apparmor/
+LOADPIN SECURITY MODULE
+M: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git lsm/loadpin
+S: Supported
+F: security/loadpin/
+
YAMA SECURITY MODULE
M: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git yama/tip
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 2af478e3fd4e..f2356bda2b05 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
-#include <linux/verify_pefile.h>
-#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -529,18 +528,9 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
{
- bool trusted;
- int ret;
-
- ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- system_trusted_keyring,
- VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
- &trusted);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- if (!trusted)
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
- return 0;
+ return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+ NULL,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
}
#endif
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
index f0f8a4433685..fc5955f5fc8a 100644
--- a/certs/Kconfig
+++ b/certs/Kconfig
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ config MODULE_SIG_KEY
config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys"
depends on KEYS
+ depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
help
Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added. Keys in
the keyring are considered to be trusted. Keys may be added at will
@@ -55,4 +56,12 @@ config SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE_SIZE
This is the number of bytes reserved in the kernel image for a
certificate to be inserted.
+config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ bool "Provide a keyring to which extra trustable keys may be added"
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ help
+ If set, provide a keyring to which extra keys may be added, provided
+ those keys are not blacklisted and are vouched for by a key built
+ into the kernel or already in the secondary trusted keyring.
+
endmenu
diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
index f4180326c2e1..50979d6dcecd 100644
--- a/certs/system_keyring.c
+++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
@@ -18,29 +18,88 @@
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
-struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
+static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;
+#endif
extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
+/**
+ * restrict_link_to_builtin_trusted - Restrict keyring addition by built in CA
+ *
+ * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
+ * being vouched for by a key in the built in system keyring.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload)
+{
+ return restrict_link_by_signature(builtin_trusted_keys, type, payload);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted - Restrict keyring
+ * addition by both builtin and secondary keyrings
+ *
+ * Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
+ * being vouched for by a key in either the built-in or the secondary system
+ * keyrings.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
+ struct key *keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload)
+{
+ /* If we have a secondary trusted keyring, then that contains a link
+ * through to the builtin keyring and the search will follow that link.
+ */
+ if (type == &key_type_keyring &&
+ keyring == secondary_trusted_keys &&
+ payload == &builtin_trusted_keys->payload)
+ /* Allow the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary */
+ return 0;
+
+ return restrict_link_by_signature(secondary_trusted_keys, type, payload);
+}
+#endif
+
/*
- * Load the compiled-in keys
+ * Create the trusted keyrings
*/
static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
{
- pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n");
+ pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyrings\n");
- system_trusted_keyring =
- keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
+ builtin_trusted_keys =
+ keyring_alloc(".builtin_trusted_keys",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
- panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(builtin_trusted_keys))
+ panic("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n");
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ secondary_trusted_keys =
+ keyring_alloc(".secondary_trusted_keys",
+ KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
+ ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
+ KEY_USR_WRITE),
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted,
+ NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys))
+ panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n");
+
+ if (key_link(secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) < 0)
+ panic("Can't link trusted keyrings\n");
+#endif
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &system_trusted_keyring->flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -76,7 +135,7 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
if (plen > end - p)
goto dodgy_cert;
- key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
+ key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(builtin_trusted_keys, 1),
"asymmetric",
NULL,
p,
@@ -84,8 +143,8 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
- KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED |
- KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
+ KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN |
+ KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
PTR_ERR(key));
@@ -108,19 +167,27 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
/**
- * Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
- * @data: The data to be verified.
+ * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
* @len: Size of @data.
* @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
* @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
+ * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
* @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
+ * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
+ * @ctx: Context for callback.
*/
-int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
- const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
- enum key_being_used_for usage)
+int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx)
{
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
- bool trusted;
int ret;
pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
@@ -128,7 +195,7 @@ int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
- if (pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
+ if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error;
@@ -138,13 +205,33 @@ int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (!trusted_keys) {
+ trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
+ } else if (trusted_keys == (void *)1UL) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys;
+#else
+ trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
+#endif
+ }
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret == -ENOKEY)
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (view_content) {
+ size_t asn1hdrlen;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &len, &asn1hdrlen);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret == -ENODATA)
+ pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
+ goto error;
+ }
- if (!trusted) {
- pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
- ret = -ENOKEY;
+ ret = view_content(ctx, data, len, asn1hdrlen);
}
error:
@@ -152,6 +239,6 @@ error:
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_verify_data);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index 91a7e047a765..e28e912000a7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
menuconfig ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
- tristate "Asymmetric (public-key cryptographic) key type"
+ bool "Asymmetric (public-key cryptographic) key type"
depends on KEYS
help
This option provides support for a key type that holds the data for
@@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
config PKCS7_TEST_KEY
tristate "PKCS#7 testing key type"
- depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
- select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
help
This option provides a type of key that can be loaded up from a
PKCS#7 message - provided the message is signed by a trusted key. If
@@ -54,6 +53,7 @@ config PKCS7_TEST_KEY
config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
bool "Support for PE file signature verification"
depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
+ depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
select ASN1
select OID_REGISTRY
help
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index f90486256f01..6516855bec18 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys.o
-asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o
+asymmetric_keys-y := \
+ asymmetric_type.o \
+ restrict.o \
+ signature.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
index 1d450b580245..ca8e9ac34ce6 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+
extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index 9f2165b27d52..6600181d5d01 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -35,6 +35,95 @@ static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
/**
+ * find_asymmetric_key - Find a key by ID.
+ * @keyring: The keys to search.
+ * @id_0: The first ID to look for or NULL.
+ * @id_1: The second ID to look for or NULL.
+ * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
+ *
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is
+ * the id_0 and the fallback identifier is the id_1. If both are given, the
+ * lookup is by the former, but the latter must also match.
+ */
+struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_0,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_1,
+ bool partial)
+{
+ struct key *key;
+ key_ref_t ref;
+ const char *lookup;
+ char *req, *p;
+ int len;
+
+ if (id_0) {
+ lookup = id_0->data;
+ len = id_0->len;
+ } else {
+ lookup = id_1->data;
+ len = id_1->len;
+ }
+
+ /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
+ p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (partial) {
+ *p++ = 'i';
+ *p++ = 'd';
+ } else {
+ *p++ = 'e';
+ *p++ = 'x';
+ }
+ *p++ = ':';
+ p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len);
+ *p = 0;
+
+ pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
+
+ ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+ &key_type_asymmetric, req);
+ if (IS_ERR(ref))
+ pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
+ kfree(req);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
+ switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) {
+ /* Hide some search errors */
+ case -EACCES:
+ case -ENOTDIR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ default:
+ return ERR_CAST(ref);
+ }
+ }
+
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
+ if (id_0 && id_1) {
+ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+
+ if (!kids->id[0]) {
+ pr_debug("First ID matches, but second is missing\n");
+ goto reject;
+ }
+ if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(id_1, kids->id[1])) {
+ pr_debug("First ID matches, but second does not\n");
+ goto reject;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
+ return key;
+
+reject:
+ key_put(key);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_asymmetric_key);
+
+/**
* asymmetric_key_generate_id: Construct an asymmetric key ID
* @val_1: First binary blob
* @len_1: Length of first binary blob
@@ -331,7 +420,8 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
if (subtype) {
- subtype->destroy(prep->payload.data[asym_crypto]);
+ subtype->destroy(prep->payload.data[asym_crypto],
+ prep->payload.data[asym_auth]);
module_put(subtype->owner);
}
asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids);
@@ -346,13 +436,15 @@ static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
void *data = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+ void *auth = key->payload.data[asym_auth];
key->payload.data[asym_crypto] = NULL;
key->payload.data[asym_subtype] = NULL;
key->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL;
+ key->payload.data[asym_auth] = NULL;
if (subtype) {
- subtype->destroy(data);
+ subtype->destroy(data, auth);
module_put(subtype->owner);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
index 3242cbfaeaa2..6a76d5c70ef6 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
@@ -21,19 +21,13 @@
/*
* Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob
*/
-int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx)
+int mscode_parse(void *_ctx, const void *content_data, size_t data_len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen)
{
- const void *content_data;
- size_t data_len;
- int ret;
-
- ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx->pkcs7, &content_data, &data_len, 1);
-
- if (ret) {
- pr_debug("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
- return ret;
- }
+ struct pefile_context *ctx = _ctx;
+ content_data -= asn1hdrlen;
+ data_len += asn1hdrlen;
pr_devel("Data: %zu [%*ph]\n", data_len, (unsigned)(data_len),
content_data);
@@ -129,7 +123,6 @@ int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
{
struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
- ctx->digest = value;
- ctx->digest_len = vlen;
- return 0;
+ ctx->digest = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ return ctx->digest ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
index e2d0edbbc71a..3b92523882e5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -13,12 +13,9 @@
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
-#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
-#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 testing key type");
@@ -29,60 +26,47 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(pkcs7_usage,
"Usage to specify when verifying the PKCS#7 message");
/*
- * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
+ * Retrieve the PKCS#7 message content.
*/
-static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int pkcs7_view_content(void *ctx, const void *data, size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen)
{
- enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage;
- struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
- const void *data, *saved_prep_data;
- size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen;
- bool trusted;
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep = ctx;
+ const void *saved_prep_data;
+ size_t saved_prep_datalen;
int ret;
- kenter("");
-
- if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) {
- pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
saved_prep_data = prep->data;
saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
- pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen);
- if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
- goto error;
- }
-
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free;
-
- ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free;
- if (!trusted)
- pr_warn("PKCS#7 message doesn't chain back to a trusted key\n");
-
- ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free;
-
prep->data = data;
- prep->datalen = datalen;
+ prep->datalen = len;
+
ret = user_preparse(prep);
+
prep->data = saved_prep_data;
prep->datalen = saved_prep_datalen;
-
-error_free:
- pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
-error:
- kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
/*
+ * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage;
+
+ if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) {
+ pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0,
+ prep->data, prep->datalen,
+ NULL, usage,
+ pkcs7_view_content, prep);
+}
+
+/*
* user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
* arbitrary blob of data as the payload
*/
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index bdd0d753ce5d..af4cd8649117 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -44,9 +44,7 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
{
if (sinfo) {
- kfree(sinfo->sig.s);
- kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
- kfree(sinfo->signing_cert_id);
+ public_key_signature_free(sinfo->sig);
kfree(sinfo);
}
}
@@ -125,6 +123,10 @@ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->sinfo)
goto out_no_sinfo;
+ ctx->sinfo->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->sinfo->sig)
+ goto out_no_sig;
ctx->data = (unsigned long)data;
ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs;
@@ -150,6 +152,7 @@ out:
ctx->certs = cert->next;
x509_free_certificate(cert);
}
+out_no_sig:
pkcs7_free_signed_info(ctx->sinfo);
out_no_sinfo:
pkcs7_free_message(ctx->msg);
@@ -165,24 +168,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message);
* @pkcs7: The preparsed PKCS#7 message to access
* @_data: Place to return a pointer to the data
* @_data_len: Place to return the data length
- * @want_wrapper: True if the ASN.1 object header should be included in the data
+ * @_headerlen: Size of ASN.1 header not included in _data
*
- * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message, including, optionally,
- * the header of the ASN.1 object that contains it. Returns -ENODATA if the
- * data object was missing from the message.
+ * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message. The size of the
+ * header of the ASN.1 object that contains it is also provided and can be used
+ * to adjust *_data and *_data_len to get the entire object.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENODATA if the data object was missing from the message.
*/
int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
const void **_data, size_t *_data_len,
- bool want_wrapper)
+ size_t *_headerlen)
{
- size_t wrapper;
-
if (!pkcs7->data)
return -ENODATA;
- wrapper = want_wrapper ? pkcs7->data_hdrlen : 0;
- *_data = pkcs7->data - wrapper;
- *_data_len = pkcs7->data_len + wrapper;
+ *_data = pkcs7->data;
+ *_data_len = pkcs7->data_len;
+ if (_headerlen)
+ *_headerlen = pkcs7->data_hdrlen;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_get_content_data);
@@ -218,25 +222,25 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
case OID_md4:
- ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "md4";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "md4";
break;
case OID_md5:
- ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "md5";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "md5";
break;
case OID_sha1:
- ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha1";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
break;
case OID_sha256:
- ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha256";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
break;
case OID_sha384:
- ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha384";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
break;
case OID_sha512:
- ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha512";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
break;
case OID_sha224:
- ctx->sinfo->sig.hash_algo = "sha224";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
break;
default:
printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
@@ -256,7 +260,7 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
case OID_rsaEncryption:
- ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
default:
printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
@@ -616,11 +620,11 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
- ctx->sinfo->sig.s = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ctx->sinfo->sig.s)
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->s = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->sinfo->sig->s)
return -ENOMEM;
- ctx->sinfo->sig.s_size = vlen;
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->s_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
@@ -656,12 +660,16 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
pr_devel("SINFO KID: %u [%*phN]\n", kid->len, kid->len, kid->data);
- sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
+ sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;
sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
*ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next;
ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->sinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
+ ctx->sinfo->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->sinfo->sig)
+ return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
index a66b19ebcf47..f4e81074f5e0 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
unsigned index;
- bool trusted;
bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
@@ -41,19 +40,17 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
#define sinfo_has_ms_statement_type 5
time64_t signing_time;
- /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1]
- * or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3].
- */
- struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
-
/* Message signature.
*
* This contains the generated digest of _either_ the Content Data or
* the Authenticated Attributes [RFC2315 9.3]. If the latter, one of
* the attributes contains the digest of the the Content Data within
* it.
+ *
+ * THis also contains the issuing cert serial number and issuer's name
+ * [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1] or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3].
*/
- struct public_key_signature sig;
+ struct public_key_signature *sig;
};
struct pkcs7_message {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
index 7d7a39b47c62..f6a009d88a33 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -27,10 +27,9 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
struct key *trust_keyring)
{
- struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig;
+ struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
struct key *key;
- bool trusted;
int ret;
kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index);
@@ -42,10 +41,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {
if (x509->seen) {
- if (x509->verified) {
- trusted = x509->trusted;
+ if (x509->verified)
goto verified;
- }
kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]");
return -ENOKEY;
}
@@ -54,9 +51,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
* keys.
*/
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
- x509->id, x509->skid,
- false);
+ key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ x509->id, x509->skid, false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
* is apparently the same as one we already trust.
@@ -80,17 +76,17 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
might_sleep();
last = x509;
- sig = &last->sig;
+ sig = last->sig;
}
/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
* trusted keys.
*/
- if (last && (last->akid_id || last->akid_skid)) {
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
- last->akid_id,
- last->akid_skid,
- false);
+ if (last && (last->sig->auth_ids[0] || last->sig->auth_ids[1])) {
+ key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ last->sig->auth_ids[0],
+ last->sig->auth_ids[1],
+ false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
x509 = last;
pr_devel("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n",
@@ -104,10 +100,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* As a last resort, see if we have a trusted public key that matches
* the signed info directly.
*/
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
- sinfo->signing_cert_id,
- NULL,
- false);
+ key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0], NULL, false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n",
sinfo->index, key_serial(key));
@@ -122,7 +116,6 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
matched:
ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
- trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags);
key_put(key);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOMEM)
@@ -134,12 +127,9 @@ matched:
verified:
if (x509) {
x509->verified = true;
- for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) {
+ for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer)
p->verified = true;
- p->trusted = trusted;
- }
}
- sinfo->trusted = trusted;
kleave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
@@ -148,7 +138,6 @@ verified:
* pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
* @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
- * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
*
* Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
* keys we already know and trust.
@@ -170,16 +159,13 @@ verified:
* May also return -ENOMEM.
*/
int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
- struct key *trust_keyring,
- bool *_trusted)
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *p;
int cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
int ret;
- *_trusted = false;
-
for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
p->seen = false;
@@ -193,7 +179,6 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
cached_ret = -ENOPKG;
continue;
case 0:
- *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted;
cached_ret = 0;
continue;
default:
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 50be2a15e531..44b746e9df1b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -25,34 +25,36 @@
static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
{
+ struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
- size_t digest_size, desc_size;
- void *digest;
+ size_t desc_size;
int ret;
- kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig.hash_algo);
+ kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
- if (!sinfo->sig.hash_algo)
+ if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
return -ENOPKG;
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sinfo->sig.hash_algo, 0, 0);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
- sinfo->sig.digest_size = digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+ sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
ret = -ENOMEM;
- digest = kzalloc(ALIGN(digest_size, __alignof__(*desc)) + desc_size,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!digest)
+ sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sig->digest)
+ goto error_no_desc;
+
+ desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc)
goto error_no_desc;
- desc = PTR_ALIGN(digest + digest_size, __alignof__(*desc));
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
@@ -60,10 +62,11 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, digest);
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len,
+ sig->digest);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+ pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
@@ -78,14 +81,15 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
goto error;
}
- if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
+ if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error;
}
- if (memcmp(digest, sinfo->msgdigest, sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
+ if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
+ sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
sinfo->index);
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -97,7 +101,7 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
* hash it.
*/
- memset(digest, 0, sinfo->sig.digest_size);
+ memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -107,17 +111,14 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
- sinfo->authattrs_len, digest);
+ sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest);
+ pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
}
- sinfo->sig.digest = digest;
- digest = NULL;
-
error:
- kfree(digest);
+ kfree(desc);
error_no_desc:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
@@ -144,12 +145,12 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's
* possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
*/
- if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->signing_cert_id))
+ if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]))
continue;
pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
sinfo->index, certix);
- if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
+ if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) {
pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
sinfo->index);
continue;
@@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
*/
pr_debug("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*phN)\n",
sinfo->index,
- sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data);
+ sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
return 0;
}
@@ -174,6 +175,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
{
+ struct public_key_signature *sig;
struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
struct asymmetric_key_id *auth;
int ret;
@@ -188,34 +190,26 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
x509->subject,
x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
x509->seen = true;
- ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
+ if (x509->unsupported_key)
+ goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
- if (x509->akid_id)
+ sig = x509->sig;
+ if (sig->auth_ids[0])
pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n",
- x509->akid_id->len, x509->akid_id->data);
- if (x509->akid_skid)
+ sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
+ if (sig->auth_ids[1])
pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n",
- x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data);
+ sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data);
- if ((!x509->akid_id && !x509->akid_skid) ||
- strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
+ if (x509->self_signed) {
/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
* the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
* of the chain. Likewise if the cert is its own
* authority.
*/
- pr_debug("- no auth?\n");
- if (x509->raw_subject_size != x509->raw_issuer_size ||
- memcmp(x509->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
- x509->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
- return 0;
-
- ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
+ if (x509->unsupported_sig)
+ goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
x509->signer = x509;
pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
return 0;
@@ -224,7 +218,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
* list to see if the next one is there.
*/
- auth = x509->akid_id;
+ auth = sig->auth_ids[0];
if (auth) {
pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
@@ -234,7 +228,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
goto found_issuer_check_skid;
}
} else {
- auth = x509->akid_skid;
+ auth = sig->auth_ids[1];
pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
if (!p->skid)
@@ -254,8 +248,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an
* authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also.
*/
- if (x509->akid_skid &&
- !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->akid_skid)) {
+ if (sig->auth_ids[1] &&
+ !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, sig->auth_ids[1])) {
pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n",
sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index);
return -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -267,7 +261,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
sinfo->index);
return 0;
}
- ret = x509_check_signature(p->pub, x509);
+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, p->sig);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
x509->signer = p;
@@ -279,16 +273,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
might_sleep();
}
-maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509:
+unsupported_crypto_in_x509:
/* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some
* crypto module to go further. Note, however, we don't want to set
- * sinfo->missing_crypto as the signed info block may still be
+ * sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be
* validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a
* trusted copy of.
*/
- if (ret == -ENOPKG)
- return 0;
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -332,7 +324,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
}
/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
- ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig);
+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, sinfo->sig);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -375,9 +367,8 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
- struct x509_certificate *x509;
int enopkg = -ENOPKG;
- int ret, n;
+ int ret;
kenter("");
@@ -419,12 +410,6 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
return -EINVAL;
}
- for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
- ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- }
-
for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
if (ret < 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 0f8b264b3961..fd76b5fc3b3a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -39,15 +39,23 @@ static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
/*
* Destroy a public key algorithm key.
*/
-void public_key_destroy(void *payload)
+void public_key_free(struct public_key *key)
{
- struct public_key *key = payload;
-
- if (key)
+ if (key) {
kfree(key->key);
- kfree(key);
+ kfree(key);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_free);
+
+/*
+ * Destroy a public key algorithm key.
+ */
+static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3)
+{
+ public_key_free(payload0);
+ public_key_signature_free(payload3);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_destroy);
struct public_key_completion {
struct completion completion;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ac4bddf669de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012, 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ASYM: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
+
+static bool use_builtin_keys;
+static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+static struct {
+ struct asymmetric_key_id id;
+ unsigned char data[10];
+} cakey;
+
+static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str) /* default system keyring */
+ return 1;
+
+ if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
+ size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
+ pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
+ else
+ ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
+ } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
+ use_builtin_keys = true;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * restrict_link_by_signature - Restrict additions to a ring of public keys
+ * @trust_keyring: A ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the new key.
+ *
+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of
+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
+ * new certificate as being trusted.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a
+ * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the
+ * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if
+ * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed.
+ */
+int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload)
+{
+ const struct public_key_signature *sig;
+ struct key *key;
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+ if (!trust_keyring)
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ if (type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
+ if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /* See if we have a key that signed this one. */
+ key = find_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1],
+ false);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ return -ENOKEY;
+
+ if (use_builtin_keys && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
+ ret = -ENOKEY;
+ else
+ ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
+ key_put(key);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
index 004d5fc8e56b..11b7ba170904 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
@@ -15,9 +15,27 @@
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
+/*
+ * Destroy a public key signature.
+ */
+void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (sig) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sig->auth_ids); i++)
+ kfree(sig->auth_ids[i]);
+ kfree(sig->s);
+ kfree(sig->digest);
+ kfree(sig);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_signature_free);
+
/**
* verify_signature - Initiate the use of an asymmetric key to verify a signature
* @key: The asymmetric key to verify against
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 7e8c2338ae25..672a94c2c3ff 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/pe.h>
#include <linux/asn1.h>
-#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include "verify_pefile.h"
@@ -392,9 +392,8 @@ error_no_desc:
* verify_pefile_signature - Verify the signature on a PE binary image
* @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
* @pelen: Length of the binary image
- * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @trust_keys: Signing certificate(s) to use as starting points
* @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
- * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
*
* Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE
* binary image intersects keys we already know and trust.
@@ -418,14 +417,10 @@ error_no_desc:
* May also return -ENOMEM.
*/
int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
- struct key *trusted_keyring,
- enum key_being_used_for usage,
- bool *_trusted)
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
- struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
struct pefile_context ctx;
- const void *data;
- size_t datalen;
int ret;
kenter("");
@@ -439,19 +434,10 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len);
- if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
- return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
- ctx.pkcs7 = pkcs7;
-
- ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx.pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false);
- if (ret < 0 || datalen == 0) {
- pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
- ret = -EBADMSG;
- goto error;
- }
-
- ret = mscode_parse(&ctx);
+ ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0,
+ pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len,
+ trusted_keys, usage,
+ mscode_parse, &ctx);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
@@ -462,16 +448,8 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
* contents.
*/
ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keyring, _trusted);
error:
- pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7);
+ kfree(ctx.digest);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
index a133eb81a492..cd4d20930728 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
-#include <linux/verify_pefile.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
@@ -23,7 +22,6 @@ struct pefile_context {
unsigned sig_offset;
unsigned sig_len;
const struct section_header *secs;
- struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
/* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */
const void *digest; /* Digest */
@@ -39,4 +37,5 @@ struct pefile_context {
/*
* mscode_parser.c
*/
-extern int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx);
+extern int mscode_parse(void *_ctx, const void *content_data, size_t data_len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 4a29bac70060..865f46ea724f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -47,15 +47,12 @@ struct x509_parse_context {
void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
if (cert) {
- public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
+ public_key_free(cert->pub);
+ public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
kfree(cert->issuer);
kfree(cert->subject);
kfree(cert->id);
kfree(cert->skid);
- kfree(cert->akid_id);
- kfree(cert->akid_skid);
- kfree(cert->sig.digest);
- kfree(cert->sig.s);
kfree(cert);
}
}
@@ -78,6 +75,9 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->pub)
goto error_no_ctx;
+ cert->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cert->sig)
+ goto error_no_ctx;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
goto error_no_ctx;
@@ -108,6 +108,11 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
cert->pub->keylen = ctx->key_size;
+ /* Grab the signature bits */
+ ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_decode;
+
/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
cert->raw_serial_size,
@@ -119,6 +124,11 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
}
cert->id = kid;
+ /* Detect self-signed certificates */
+ ret = x509_check_for_self_signed(cert);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_decode;
+
kfree(ctx);
return cert;
@@ -188,33 +198,33 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */
case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "md4";
- ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "md4";
+ ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha1";
- ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
+ ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha256";
- ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
+ ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha384";
- ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
+ ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha512";
- ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
+ ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption:
- ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha224";
- ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
+ ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
}
@@ -572,14 +582,14 @@ int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
- if (ctx->cert->akid_skid)
+ if (ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
return 0;
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
- ctx->cert->akid_skid = kid;
+ ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1] = kid;
return 0;
}
@@ -611,7 +621,7 @@ int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
- if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->akid_id)
+ if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0])
return 0;
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value,
@@ -622,6 +632,6 @@ int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return PTR_ERR(kid);
pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
- ctx->cert->akid_id = kid;
+ ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index dbeed6018e63..05eef1c68881 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -17,13 +17,11 @@ struct x509_certificate {
struct x509_certificate *next;
struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */
struct public_key *pub; /* Public key details */
- struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
+ struct public_key_signature *sig; /* Signature parameters */
char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + Serial number */
struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */
- struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_id; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->id (optional) */
- struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_skid; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->skid (optional) */
time64_t valid_from;
time64_t valid_to;
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
@@ -41,8 +39,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {
unsigned index;
bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */
bool verified;
- bool trusted;
- bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if can't be verified due to missing crypto */
+ bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
+ bool unsupported_key; /* T if key uses unsupported crypto */
+ bool unsupported_sig; /* T if signature uses unsupported crypto */
};
/*
@@ -58,5 +57,4 @@ extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
* x509_public_key.c
*/
extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
-extern int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
- struct x509_certificate *cert);
+extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 733c046aacc6..fb732296cd36 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -20,256 +20,133 @@
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
-static bool use_builtin_keys;
-static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
-
-#ifndef MODULE
-static struct {
- struct asymmetric_key_id id;
- unsigned char data[10];
-} cakey;
-
-static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
-{
- if (!str) /* default system keyring */
- return 1;
-
- if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
- struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
- size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
- int ret;
-
- if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
- pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
- return 1;
- }
-
- ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
- if (ret < 0)
- pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
- else
- ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
- } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
- use_builtin_keys = true;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
-#endif
-
-/**
- * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
- * @keyring: The keys to search.
- * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL.
- * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL.
- * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
- *
- * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is
- * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the
- * subjectKeyIdentifier. If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but
- * the latter must also match.
- */
-struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
- const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
- const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
- bool partial)
-{
- struct key *key;
- key_ref_t ref;
- const char *lookup;
- char *req, *p;
- int len;
-
- if (id) {
- lookup = id->data;
- len = id->len;
- } else {
- lookup = skid->data;
- len = skid->len;
- }
-
- /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
- p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
- if (partial) {
- *p++ = 'i';
- *p++ = 'd';
- } else {
- *p++ = 'e';
- *p++ = 'x';
- }
- *p++ = ':';
- p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len);
- *p = 0;
-
- pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
-
- ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
- &key_type_asymmetric, req);
- if (IS_ERR(ref))
- pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
- kfree(req);
-
- if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
- switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) {
- /* Hide some search errors */
- case -EACCES:
- case -ENOTDIR:
- case -EAGAIN:
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
- default:
- return ERR_CAST(ref);
- }
- }
-
- key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
- if (id && skid) {
- const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
- if (!kids->id[1]) {
- pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n");
- goto reject;
- }
- if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) {
- pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n");
- goto reject;
- }
- }
-
- pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
- return key;
-
-reject:
- key_put(key);
- return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key);
-
/*
* Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
* digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
*/
int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
+ struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
- size_t digest_size, desc_size;
- void *digest;
+ size_t desc_size;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
- if (cert->unsupported_crypto)
- return -ENOPKG;
- if (cert->sig.s)
+ if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo)
+ cert->unsupported_key = true;
+
+ if (!sig->pkey_algo)
+ cert->unsupported_sig = true;
+
+ /* We check the hash if we can - even if we can't then verify it */
+ if (!sig->hash_algo) {
+ cert->unsupported_sig = true;
return 0;
+ }
- cert->sig.s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!cert->sig.s)
+ sig->s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sig->s)
return -ENOMEM;
- cert->sig.s_size = cert->raw_sig_size;
+ sig->s_size = cert->raw_sig_size;
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(cert->sig.hash_algo, 0, 0);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
- cert->unsupported_crypto = true;
- return -ENOPKG;
+ cert->unsupported_sig = true;
+ return 0;
}
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
- digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+ sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
- /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of the
- * digest storage space.
- */
ret = -ENOMEM;
- digest = kzalloc(ALIGN(digest_size, __alignof__(*desc)) + desc_size,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!digest)
+ sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sig->digest)
goto error;
- cert->sig.digest = digest;
- cert->sig.digest_size = digest_size;
+ desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc)
+ goto error;
- desc = PTR_ALIGN(digest + digest_size, __alignof__(*desc));
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
+ goto error_2;
might_sleep();
- ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, digest);
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest);
+
+error_2:
+ kfree(desc);
error:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_get_sig_params);
/*
- * Check the signature on a certificate using the provided public key
+ * Check for self-signedness in an X.509 cert and if found, check the signature
+ * immediately if we can.
*/
-int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
- struct x509_certificate *cert)
+int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret = 0;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
- ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ if (cert->raw_subject_size != cert->raw_issuer_size ||
+ memcmp(cert->raw_subject, cert->raw_issuer,
+ cert->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
+ goto not_self_signed;
+
+ if (cert->sig->auth_ids[0] || cert->sig->auth_ids[1]) {
+ /* If the AKID is present it may have one or two parts. If
+ * both are supplied, both must match.
+ */
+ bool a = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->sig->auth_ids[1]);
+ bool b = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->sig->auth_ids[0]);
+
+ if (!a && !b)
+ goto not_self_signed;
+
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ if (((a && !b) || (b && !a)) &&
+ cert->sig->auth_ids[0] && cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
+ goto out;
+ }
- ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, &cert->sig);
- if (ret == -ENOPKG)
- cert->unsupported_crypto = true;
- pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ if (cert->pub->pkey_algo != cert->sig->pkey_algo)
+ goto out;
-/*
- * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of
- * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
- * new certificate as being trusted.
- *
- * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
- * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
- * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
- */
-static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
- struct key *trust_keyring)
-{
- struct key *key;
- int ret = 1;
-
- if (!trust_keyring)
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
- if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->akid_skid, ca_keyid))
- return -EPERM;
-
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
- cert->akid_id, cert->akid_skid,
- false);
- if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
- if (!use_builtin_keys
- || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
- ret = x509_check_signature(key->payload.data[asym_crypto],
- cert);
- key_put(key);
+ ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
+ cert->unsupported_sig = true;
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ goto out;
}
+
+ pr_devel("Cert Self-signature verified");
+ cert->self_signed = true;
+
+out:
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
+
+not_self_signed:
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [not]\n", __func__);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -291,34 +168,22 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
- if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo ||
- !cert->sig.pkey_algo ||
- !cert->sig.hash_algo) {
+ if (cert->unsupported_key) {
ret = -ENOPKG;
goto error_free_cert;
}
pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo);
pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);
- pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
- cert->sig.pkey_algo,
- cert->sig.hash_algo);
cert->pub->id_type = "X509";
- /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
- if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id) ||
- asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) ||
- asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->akid_id)) {
- ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free_cert;
- } else if (!prep->trusted) {
- ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
- if (ret)
- ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring());
- if (!ret)
- prep->trusted = 1;
+ if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
+ public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
+ cert->sig = NULL;
+ } else {
+ pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
+ cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo);
}
/* Propose a description */
@@ -353,6 +218,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype;
prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = kids;
prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = cert->pub;
+ prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = cert->sig;
prep->description = desc;
prep->quotalen = 100;
@@ -360,6 +226,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
cert->pub = NULL;
cert->id = NULL;
cert->skid = NULL;
+ cert->sig = NULL;
desc = NULL;
ret = 0;
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
index 3f93125916bf..71e8a56e9479 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ init_cifs_idmap(void)
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto failed_put_cred;
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a98b21d47385..e92419fd78b3 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -850,15 +850,25 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
if (ret)
return ret;
+ ret = deny_write_access(file);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
- if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)
- return -EFBIG;
- if (i_size <= 0)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size) {
+ ret = -EFBIG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (i_size <= 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
*buf = vmalloc(i_size);
- if (!*buf)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!*buf) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
pos = 0;
while (pos < i_size) {
@@ -876,18 +886,21 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
if (pos != i_size) {
ret = -EIO;
- goto out;
+ goto out_free;
}
ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
if (!ret)
*size = pos;
-out:
+out_free:
if (ret < 0) {
vfree(*buf);
*buf = NULL;
}
+
+out:
+ allow_write_access(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 9d193d336c9f..5375571cf6e1 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -3627,6 +3627,8 @@ retry:
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
case 0: case S_IFREG:
error = vfs_create(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,true);
+ if (!error)
+ ima_post_path_mknod(dentry);
break;
case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK:
error = vfs_mknod(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
index 5ba22c6b0ffa..c444285bb1b1 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ int nfs_idmap_init(void)
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto failed_put_cred;
diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
index 441aff9b5aa7..583f199400a3 100644
--- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#ifndef _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
#define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
+#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
struct key;
@@ -26,14 +27,13 @@ extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
const void **_data, size_t *_datalen,
- bool want_wrapper);
+ size_t *_headerlen);
/*
* pkcs7_trust.c
*/
extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
- struct key *trust_keyring,
- bool *_trusted);
+ struct key *trust_keyring);
/*
* pkcs7_verify.c
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index aa730ea7faf8..882ca0e1e7a5 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -15,20 +15,6 @@
#define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
/*
- * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
- */
-enum key_being_used_for {
- VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
- VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE,
- VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
- VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
- VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
- VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
- NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
-};
-extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
-
-/*
* Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type.
*
* Note that this may include private part of the key as well as the public
@@ -41,12 +27,13 @@ struct public_key {
const char *pkey_algo;
};
-extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload);
+extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
/*
* Public key cryptography signature data
*/
struct public_key_signature {
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[2];
u8 *s; /* Signature */
u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
u8 *digest;
@@ -55,17 +42,21 @@ struct public_key_signature {
const char *hash_algo;
};
+extern void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig);
+
extern struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype;
+
struct key;
+struct key_type;
+union key_payload;
+
+extern int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload);
+
extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
const struct public_key_signature *sig);
-struct asymmetric_key_id;
-extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
- const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
- const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
- bool partial);
-
int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
const struct public_key_signature *sig);
diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h
index 4915d40d3c3c..2480469ce8fb 100644
--- a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h
+++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype {
void (*describe)(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m);
/* Destroy a key of this subtype */
- void (*destroy)(void *payload);
+ void (*destroy)(void *payload_crypto, void *payload_auth);
/* Verify the signature on a key of this subtype (optional) */
int (*verify_signature)(const struct key *key,
diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h
index 59c1df9cf922..b38240716d41 100644
--- a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#define _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_TYPE_H
#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
extern struct key_type key_type_asymmetric;
@@ -23,9 +24,10 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_asymmetric;
* follows:
*/
enum asymmetric_payload_bits {
- asym_crypto,
- asym_subtype,
- asym_key_ids,
+ asym_crypto, /* The data representing the key */
+ asym_subtype, /* Pointer to an asymmetric_key_subtype struct */
+ asym_key_ids, /* Pointer to an asymmetric_key_ids struct */
+ asym_auth /* The key's authorisation (signature, parent key ID) */
};
/*
@@ -74,6 +76,11 @@ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
return key->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
}
+extern struct key *find_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_0,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id_1,
+ bool partial);
+
/*
* The payload is at the discretion of the subtype.
*/
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 39fd38cfa8c9..fbd4647767e9 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -12,51 +12,40 @@
#ifndef _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
#define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
+#include <linux/key.h>
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-#include <linux/key.h>
-#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload);
-extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
-static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
-{
- return system_trusted_keyring;
-}
#else
-static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
+#define restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted restrict_link_reject
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
-extern int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
- const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
- enum key_being_used_for usage);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
+ struct key *keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload);
+#else
+#define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING
-extern struct key *ima_mok_keyring;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
extern struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring;
-static inline struct key *get_ima_mok_keyring(void)
-{
- return ima_mok_keyring;
-}
static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void)
{
return ima_blacklist_keyring;
}
#else
-static inline struct key *get_ima_mok_keyring(void)
-{
- return NULL;
-}
static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void)
{
return NULL;
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING */
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING */
#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 851390c8d75b..10d3d8f8a65b 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2634,15 +2634,34 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
#endif
extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
+#define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \
+ id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \
+ id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \
+ id(MODULE, kernel-module) \
+ id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \
+ id(KEXEC_INITRAMFS, kexec-initramfs) \
+ id(POLICY, security-policy) \
+ id(MAX_ID, )
+
+#define __fid_enumify(ENUM, dummy) READING_ ## ENUM,
+#define __fid_stringify(dummy, str) #str,
+
enum kernel_read_file_id {
- READING_FIRMWARE = 1,
- READING_MODULE,
- READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
- READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
- READING_POLICY,
- READING_MAX_ID
+ __kernel_read_file_id(__fid_enumify)
+};
+
+static const char * const kernel_read_file_str[] = {
+ __kernel_read_file_id(__fid_stringify)
};
+static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ if (id < 0 || id >= READING_MAX_ID)
+ return kernel_read_file_str[READING_UNKNOWN];
+
+ return kernel_read_file_str[id];
+}
+
extern int kernel_read(struct file *, loff_t, char *, unsigned long);
extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
enum kernel_read_file_id);
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index e6516cbbe9bf..0eb7c2e7f0d6 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
#else
static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -54,6 +55,11 @@ static inline int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
return 0;
}
+static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
index 7463355a198b..eaee981c5558 100644
--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload {
size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */
size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */
time_t expiry; /* Expiry time of key */
- bool trusted; /* True if key is trusted */
};
typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key,
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 5f5b1129dc92..722914798f37 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -173,11 +173,9 @@ struct key {
#define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE 5 /* set if key is negative */
#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR 6 /* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
#define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 7 /* set if key has been invalidated */
-#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED 8 /* set if key is trusted */
-#define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY 9 /* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */
-#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 10 /* set if key is builtin */
-#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 11 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
-#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 12 /* set if key should not be removed */
+#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 8 /* set if key is built in to the kernel */
+#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 9 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
+#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP 10 /* set if key should not be removed */
/* the key type and key description string
* - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria
@@ -205,6 +203,20 @@ struct key {
};
int reject_error;
};
+
+ /* This is set on a keyring to restrict the addition of a link to a key
+ * to it. If this method isn't provided then it is assumed that the
+ * keyring is open to any addition. It is ignored for non-keyring
+ * keys.
+ *
+ * This is intended for use with rings of trusted keys whereby addition
+ * to the keyring needs to be controlled. KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION
+ * overrides this, allowing the kernel to add extra keys without
+ * restriction.
+ */
+ int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload);
};
extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
@@ -212,14 +224,17 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm,
- unsigned long flags);
+ unsigned long flags,
+ int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
+ const struct key_type *,
+ const union key_payload *));
-#define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA 0x0000 /* add to quota, reject if would overrun */
-#define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN 0x0001 /* add to quota, permit even if overrun */
-#define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002 /* not in quota */
-#define KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED 0x0004 /* Key should be flagged as trusted */
-#define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN 0x0008 /* Key is built into kernel */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA 0x0000 /* add to quota, reject if would overrun */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN 0x0001 /* add to quota, permit even if overrun */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA 0x0002 /* not in quota */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN 0x0004 /* Key is built into kernel */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION 0x0008 /* Override the check on restricted keyrings */
extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
@@ -288,8 +303,15 @@ extern struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid
const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags,
+ int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
+ const struct key_type *,
+ const union key_payload *),
struct key *dest);
+extern int restrict_link_reject(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload);
+
extern int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring);
extern key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 512fd000562b..7ae397669d8b 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1805,7 +1805,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct list_head tun_dev_attach_queue;
struct list_head tun_dev_attach;
struct list_head tun_dev_open;
- struct list_head skb_owned_by;
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
struct list_head xfrm_policy_alloc_security;
@@ -1894,5 +1893,10 @@ extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
#else
static inline void __init yama_add_hooks(void) { }
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN
+void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void);
+#else
+static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
+#endif
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/string_helpers.h b/include/linux/string_helpers.h
index dabe643eb5fa..5ce9538f290e 100644
--- a/include/linux/string_helpers.h
+++ b/include/linux/string_helpers.h
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
+struct file;
+
/* Descriptions of the types of units to
* print in */
enum string_size_units {
@@ -68,4 +70,8 @@ static inline int string_escape_str_any_np(const char *src, char *dst,
return string_escape_str(src, dst, sz, ESCAPE_ANY_NP, only);
}
+char *kstrdup_quotable(const char *src, gfp_t gfp);
+char *kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(struct task_struct *task, gfp_t gfp);
+char *kstrdup_quotable_file(struct file *file, gfp_t gfp);
+
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a10549a6c7cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* Signature verification
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H
+#define _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H
+
+/*
+ * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
+ */
+enum key_being_used_for {
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
+ NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
+};
+extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
+struct key;
+
+extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len,
+ size_t asn1hdrlen),
+ void *ctx);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
+extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
+ struct key *trusted_keys,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
+#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
deleted file mode 100644
index da2049b5161c..000000000000
--- a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-/* Signed PE file verification
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
- * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
- * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
- */
-
-#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
-#define _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
-
-#include <crypto/public_key.h>
-
-extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
- struct key *trusted_keyring,
- enum key_being_used_for usage,
- bool *_trusted);
-
-#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
index 840cb990abe2..86eddd6241f3 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_KEYCTL_H
#define _LINUX_KEYCTL_H
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
/* special process keyring shortcut IDs */
#define KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING -1 /* - key ID for thread-specific keyring */
#define KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING -2 /* - key ID for process-specific keyring */
@@ -57,5 +59,13 @@
#define KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV 20 /* instantiate a partially constructed key */
#define KEYCTL_INVALIDATE 21 /* invalidate a key */
#define KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT 22 /* get a user's persistent keyring */
+#define KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE 23 /* Compute Diffie-Hellman values */
+
+/* keyctl structures */
+struct keyctl_dh_params {
+ __s32 private;
+ __s32 prime;
+ __s32 base;
+};
#endif /* _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 64b9dead4a07..937c844bee4a 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
return -EBADMSG;
}
- return system_verify_data(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
- VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
+ return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ NULL, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ NULL, NULL);
}
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index e1e5a354854e..6c9bb62ed046 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off,
fprog = filter->prog->orig_prog;
if (!fprog) {
- /* This must be a new non-cBPF filter, since we save every
+ /* This must be a new non-cBPF filter, since we save
* every cBPF filter's orig_prog above when
* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is enabled.
*/
diff --git a/lib/string_helpers.c b/lib/string_helpers.c
index 5c88204b6f1f..ecaac2c0526f 100644
--- a/lib/string_helpers.c
+++ b/lib/string_helpers.c
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
@@ -534,3 +538,91 @@ int string_escape_mem(const char *src, size_t isz, char *dst, size_t osz,
return p - dst;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(string_escape_mem);
+
+/*
+ * Return an allocated string that has been escaped of special characters
+ * and double quotes, making it safe to log in quotes.
+ */
+char *kstrdup_quotable(const char *src, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ size_t slen, dlen;
+ char *dst;
+ const int flags = ESCAPE_HEX;
+ const char esc[] = "\f\n\r\t\v\a\e\\\"";
+
+ if (!src)
+ return NULL;
+ slen = strlen(src);
+
+ dlen = string_escape_mem(src, slen, NULL, 0, flags, esc);
+ dst = kmalloc(dlen + 1, gfp);
+ if (!dst)
+ return NULL;
+
+ WARN_ON(string_escape_mem(src, slen, dst, dlen, flags, esc) != dlen);
+ dst[dlen] = '\0';
+
+ return dst;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kstrdup_quotable);
+
+/*
+ * Returns allocated NULL-terminated string containing process
+ * command line, with inter-argument NULLs replaced with spaces,
+ * and other special characters escaped.
+ */
+char *kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(struct task_struct *task, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ char *buffer, *quoted;
+ int i, res;
+
+ buffer = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_TEMPORARY);
+ if (!buffer)
+ return NULL;
+
+ res = get_cmdline(task, buffer, PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+ buffer[res] = '\0';
+
+ /* Collapse trailing NULLs, leave res pointing to last non-NULL. */
+ while (--res >= 0 && buffer[res] == '\0')
+ ;
+
+ /* Replace inter-argument NULLs. */
+ for (i = 0; i <= res; i++)
+ if (buffer[i] == '\0')
+ buffer[i] = ' ';
+
+ /* Make sure result is printable. */
+ quoted = kstrdup_quotable(buffer, gfp);
+ kfree(buffer);
+ return quoted;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kstrdup_quotable_cmdline);
+
+/*
+ * Returns allocated NULL-terminated string containing pathname,
+ * with special characters escaped, able to be safely logged. If
+ * there is an error, the leading character will be "<".
+ */
+char *kstrdup_quotable_file(struct file *file, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ char *temp, *pathname;
+
+ if (!file)
+ return kstrdup("<unknown>", gfp);
+
+ /* We add 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
+ temp = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_TEMPORARY);
+ if (!temp)
+ return kstrdup("<no_memory>", gfp);
+
+ pathname = file_path(file, temp, PATH_MAX + 11);
+ if (IS_ERR(pathname))
+ pathname = kstrdup("<too_long>", gfp);
+ else
+ pathname = kstrdup_quotable(pathname, gfp);
+
+ kfree(temp);
+ return pathname;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kstrdup_quotable_file);
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
index c79b85eb4d4c..8737412c7b27 100644
--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int __init init_dns_resolver(void)
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto failed_put_cred;
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 28cddc85b700..1325776daa27 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ int netlbl_catmap_setrng(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
u32 spot = start;
while (rc == 0 && spot <= end) {
- if (((spot & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1)) != 0) &&
+ if (((spot & (BITS_PER_LONG - 1)) == 0) &&
((end - spot) > BITS_PER_LONG)) {
rc = netlbl_catmap_setlong(catmap,
spot,
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
index 3fb492eedeb9..1021b4c0bdd2 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
@@ -965,7 +965,7 @@ int rxrpc_get_server_data_key(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, "x",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, 0,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
_leave(" = -ENOMEM [alloc %ld]", PTR_ERR(key));
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ struct key *rxrpc_get_null_key(const char *keyname)
key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, keyname,
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
- KEY_POS_SEARCH, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ KEY_POS_SEARCH, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key))
return key;
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index e45237897b43..176758cdfa57 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
source security/apparmor/Kconfig
+source security/loadpin/Kconfig
source security/yama/Kconfig
source security/integrity/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index c9bfbc84ff50..f2d71cdb8e19 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
# Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 979be65d22c4..da9565891738 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
default n
select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
- select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
select CRYPTO_RSA
select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
help
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 8ef15118cc78..4304372b323f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "integrity.h"
@@ -40,6 +42,12 @@ static bool init_keyring __initdata = true;
static bool init_keyring __initdata;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
+#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted
+#else
+#define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
+#endif
+
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *digest, int digestlen)
{
@@ -83,10 +91,9 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
- if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id]))
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags);
- else {
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ restrict_link_to_ima, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) {
err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]);
pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n",
keyring_name[id], err);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index e54a8a8dae94..5487827fa86c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -155,23 +155,33 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-config IMA_MOK_KEYRING
- bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings"
+config IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
+ bool "Permit keys validly signed by a built-in or secondary CA cert (EXPERIMENTAL)"
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ default n
+ help
+ Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the
+ key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or
+ secondary trusted keyrings.
+
+ Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the
+ IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring,
+ provided they are validly signed by a key already resident in the
+ built-in or secondary trusted keyrings.
+
+config IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ bool "Create IMA machine owner blacklist keyrings (EXPERIMENTAL)"
depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
default n
help
- This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an
- intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
- effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a
- key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system
- keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be
- signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty
- at kernel boot.
-
- IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted
- before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested
- operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.
+ This option creates an IMA blacklist keyring, which contains all
+ revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If
+ the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and
+ an error is returned to the caller.
config IMA_LOAD_X509
bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index a8539f9e060f..9aeaedad1e2b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -8,4 +8,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 6b4694aedae8..1bcbc12e03d9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -275,6 +275,11 @@ out:
xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint))
status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ } else if ((inode->i_size == 0) &&
+ (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) &&
+ (xattr_value &&
+ xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
+ status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
op, cause, rc, 0);
@@ -328,7 +333,7 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
if (iint) {
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
- IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
+ IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS);
if (must_appraise)
iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 391f41751021..68b26c340acd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
out_digsig:
- if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG))
+ if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) &&
+ !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
rc = -EACCES;
kfree(xattr_value);
out_free:
@@ -316,6 +317,28 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
/**
+ * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode
+ * @dentry: newly created dentry
+ *
+ * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
+ * file data can be written later.
+ */
+void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ int must_appraise;
+
+ must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK);
+ if (!must_appraise)
+ return;
+
+ iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+ if (iint)
+ iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
+}
+
+/**
* ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
* @read_id: caller identifier
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
index 676885e4320e..74a279957464 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
@@ -17,38 +17,29 @@
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-struct key *ima_mok_keyring;
struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring;
/*
- * Allocate the IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings
+ * Allocate the IMA blacklist keyring
*/
__init int ima_mok_init(void)
{
- pr_notice("Allocating IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings.\n");
-
- ima_mok_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_mok",
- KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
- KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ pr_notice("Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n");
ima_blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_blacklist",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted, NULL);
- if (IS_ERR(ima_mok_keyring) || IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring))
- panic("Can't allocate IMA MOK or blacklist keyrings.");
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &ima_mok_keyring->flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring))
+ panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring.");
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags);
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index e08935cf343f..90bc57d796ec 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
/* iint cache flags */
#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
+#define IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS 0x06000000
#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000
#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000
#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index fe4d74e126a7..f826e8739023 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ config BIG_KEYS
bool "Large payload keys"
depends on KEYS
depends on TMPFS
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_AES
+ select CRYPTO_ECB
+ select CRYPTO_RNG
help
This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel
(for example Kerberos ticket caches). The data may be stored out to
@@ -81,3 +85,14 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
+ bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
+ depends on KEYS
+ select MPILIB
+ help
+ This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
+ public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys
+ in the kernel.
+
+ If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index dfb3a7bededf..1fd4a16e6daf 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += dh.o
#
# Key types
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index c721e398893a..9e443fccad4c 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
+#include <crypto/rng.h>
/*
* Layout of key payload words.
@@ -28,6 +30,14 @@ enum {
};
/*
+ * Crypto operation with big_key data
+ */
+enum big_key_op {
+ BIG_KEY_ENC,
+ BIG_KEY_DEC,
+};
+
+/*
* If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
* hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
* least as large as the data.
@@ -35,6 +45,11 @@ enum {
#define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
/*
+ * Key size for big_key data encryption
+ */
+#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 16
+
+/*
* big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
* arbitrary blob of data as the payload
*/
@@ -50,12 +65,62 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
};
/*
+ * Crypto names for big_key data encryption
+ */
+static const char big_key_rng_name[] = "stdrng";
+static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "ecb(aes)";
+
+/*
+ * Crypto algorithms for big_key data encryption
+ */
+static struct crypto_rng *big_key_rng;
+static struct crypto_blkcipher *big_key_blkcipher;
+
+/*
+ * Generate random key to encrypt big_key data
+ */
+static inline int big_key_gen_enckey(u8 *key)
+{
+ return crypto_rng_get_bytes(big_key_rng, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt/decrypt big_key data
+ */
+static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, u8 *data, size_t datalen, u8 *key)
+{
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+ struct scatterlist sgio;
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+
+ if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(big_key_blkcipher, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) {
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ desc.flags = 0;
+ desc.tfm = big_key_blkcipher;
+
+ sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen);
+
+ if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC)
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sgio, &sgio, datalen);
+ else
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, &sgio, &sgio, datalen);
+
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
* Preparse a big key
*/
int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
+ u8 *enckey;
+ u8 *data = NULL;
ssize_t written;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
@@ -73,16 +138,43 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
/* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data
* to be swapped out if needed.
*
- * TODO: Encrypt the stored data with a temporary key.
+ * File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
*/
- file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
+ size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(big_key_blkcipher));
+
+ /* prepare aligned data to encrypt */
+ data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen);
+ memset(data + datalen, 0x00, enclen - datalen);
+
+ /* generate random key */
+ enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!enckey) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = big_key_gen_enckey(enckey);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_enckey;
+
+ /* encrypt aligned data */
+ ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, enclen, enckey);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_enckey;
+
+ /* save aligned data to file */
+ file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(file);
- goto error;
+ goto err_enckey;
}
- written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0);
- if (written != datalen) {
+ written = kernel_write(file, data, enclen, 0);
+ if (written != enclen) {
ret = written;
if (written >= 0)
ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -92,12 +184,15 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
* later
*/
+ prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = enckey;
*path = file->f_path;
path_get(path);
fput(file);
+ kfree(data);
} else {
/* Just store the data in a buffer */
void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -108,7 +203,10 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
err_fput:
fput(file);
+err_enckey:
+ kfree(enckey);
error:
+ kfree(data);
return ret;
}
@@ -119,10 +217,10 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
+
path_put(path);
- } else {
- kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
}
+ kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
}
/*
@@ -147,15 +245,15 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
- if (datalen) {
+ if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
+
path_put(path);
path->mnt = NULL;
path->dentry = NULL;
- } else {
- kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
- key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
}
+ kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
+ key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
}
/*
@@ -188,17 +286,41 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
- loff_t pos;
+ u8 *data;
+ u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
+ size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(big_key_blkcipher));
+
+ data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
- if (IS_ERR(file))
- return PTR_ERR(file);
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(file);
+ goto error;
+ }
- pos = 0;
- ret = vfs_read(file, buffer, datalen, &pos);
- fput(file);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret != datalen)
+ /* read file to kernel and decrypt */
+ ret = kernel_read(file, 0, data, enclen);
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret != enclen) {
ret = -EIO;
+ goto err_fput;
+ }
+
+ ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_DEC, data, enclen, enckey);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_fput;
+
+ ret = datalen;
+
+ /* copy decrypted data to user */
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, data, datalen) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+err_fput:
+ fput(file);
+error:
+ kfree(data);
} else {
ret = datalen;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data],
@@ -209,8 +331,48 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Register key type
+ */
static int __init big_key_init(void)
{
return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize big_key crypto and RNG algorithms
+ */
+static int __init big_key_crypto_init(void)
+{
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* init RNG */
+ big_key_rng = crypto_alloc_rng(big_key_rng_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(big_key_rng)) {
+ big_key_rng = NULL;
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /* seed RNG */
+ ret = crypto_rng_reset(big_key_rng, NULL, crypto_rng_seedsize(big_key_rng));
+ if (ret)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* init block cipher */
+ big_key_blkcipher = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(big_key_alg_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(big_key_blkcipher)) {
+ big_key_blkcipher = NULL;
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ crypto_free_rng(big_key_rng);
+ big_key_rng = NULL;
+ return ret;
+}
+
device_initcall(big_key_init);
+late_initcall(big_key_crypto_init);
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 25430a3aa7f7..c8783b3b628c 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3);
+ case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
+ return keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
+ arg4);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..880505a4b9f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/* Crypto operations using stored keys
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mpi.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Public key or shared secret generation function [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1]
+ *
+ * ya = g^xa mod p;
+ * or
+ * ZZ = yb^xa mod p;
+ *
+ * where xa is the local private key, ya is the local public key, g is
+ * the generator, p is the prime, yb is the remote public key, and ZZ
+ * is the shared secret.
+ *
+ * Both are the same calculation, so g or yb are the "base" and ya or
+ * ZZ are the "result".
+ */
+static int do_dh(MPI result, MPI base, MPI xa, MPI p)
+{
+ return mpi_powm(result, base, xa, p);
+}
+
+static ssize_t mpi_from_key(key_serial_t keyid, size_t maxlen, MPI *mpi)
+{
+ struct key *key;
+ key_ref_t key_ref;
+ long status;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, KEY_NEED_READ);
+ if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+ ret = -ENOKEY;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (key->type == &key_type_user) {
+ down_read(&key->sem);
+ status = key_validate(key);
+ if (status == 0) {
+ const struct user_key_payload *payload;
+
+ payload = user_key_payload(key);
+
+ if (maxlen == 0) {
+ *mpi = NULL;
+ ret = payload->datalen;
+ } else if (payload->datalen <= maxlen) {
+ *mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(payload->data,
+ payload->datalen);
+ if (*mpi)
+ ret = payload->datalen;
+ } else {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&key->sem);
+ }
+
+ key_put(key);
+error:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+ long ret;
+ MPI base, private, prime, result;
+ unsigned nbytes;
+ struct keyctl_dh_params pcopy;
+ uint8_t *kbuf;
+ ssize_t keylen;
+ size_t resultlen;
+
+ if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (copy_from_user(&pcopy, params, sizeof(pcopy)) != 0) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, buflen, &prime);
+ if (keylen < 0 || !prime) {
+ /* buflen == 0 may be used to query the required buffer size,
+ * which is the prime key length.
+ */
+ ret = keylen;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* The result is never longer than the prime */
+ resultlen = keylen;
+
+ keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.base, SIZE_MAX, &base);
+ if (keylen < 0 || !base) {
+ ret = keylen;
+ goto error1;
+ }
+
+ keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.private, SIZE_MAX, &private);
+ if (keylen < 0 || !private) {
+ ret = keylen;
+ goto error2;
+ }
+
+ result = mpi_alloc(0);
+ if (!result) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto error3;
+ }
+
+ kbuf = kmalloc(resultlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kbuf) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto error4;
+ }
+
+ ret = do_dh(result, base, private, prime);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error5;
+
+ ret = mpi_read_buffer(result, kbuf, resultlen, &nbytes, NULL);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto error5;
+
+ ret = nbytes;
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+error5:
+ kfree(kbuf);
+error4:
+ mpi_free(result);
+error3:
+ mpi_free(private);
+error2:
+ mpi_free(base);
+error1:
+ mpi_free(prime);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 5105c2c2da75..8ec7a528365d 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/task_work.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
struct iovec;
@@ -257,6 +258,17 @@ static inline long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t destring)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
+extern long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
+ size_t);
+#else
+static inline long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* Debugging key validation
*/
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index b28755131687..bd5a272f28a6 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ serial_exists:
* @cred: The credentials specifying UID namespace.
* @perm: The permissions mask of the new key.
* @flags: Flags specifying quota properties.
+ * @restrict_link: Optional link restriction method for new keyrings.
*
* Allocate a key of the specified type with the attributes given. The key is
* returned in an uninstantiated state and the caller needs to instantiate the
@@ -223,7 +224,10 @@ serial_exists:
*/
struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
- key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags)
+ key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags,
+ int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
+ const struct key_type *,
+ const union key_payload *))
{
struct key_user *user = NULL;
struct key *key;
@@ -291,11 +295,10 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
key->uid = uid;
key->gid = gid;
key->perm = perm;
+ key->restrict_link = restrict_link;
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
- if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED)
- key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
@@ -496,6 +499,12 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
}
if (keyring) {
+ if (keyring->restrict_link) {
+ ret = keyring->restrict_link(keyring, key->type,
+ &prep.payload);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
@@ -551,8 +560,12 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
awaken = 0;
ret = -EBUSY;
- if (keyring)
+ if (keyring) {
+ if (keyring->restrict_link)
+ return -EPERM;
+
link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
+ }
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
@@ -793,6 +806,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
+ int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
+ const struct key_type *,
+ const union key_payload *) = NULL;
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
* types */
@@ -811,6 +827,10 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
key_check(keyring);
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION))
+ restrict_link = keyring->restrict_link;
+
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
goto error_put_type;
@@ -819,7 +839,6 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
- prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (index_key.type->preparse) {
ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
@@ -835,10 +854,13 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
}
index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
- key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- if (!prep.trusted && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags))
- goto error_free_prep;
- flags |= prep.trusted ? KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED : 0;
+ if (restrict_link) {
+ ret = restrict_link(keyring, index_key.type, &prep.payload);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ goto error_free_prep;
+ }
+ }
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &index_key, &edit);
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -879,7 +901,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
/* allocate a new key */
key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description,
- cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags);
+ cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error_link_end;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index ed73c6c1c326..3b135a0af344 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1686,6 +1686,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT:
return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t)arg2, (key_serial_t)arg3);
+ case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
+ return keyctl_dh_compute((struct keyctl_dh_params __user *) arg2,
+ (char __user *) arg3,
+ (size_t) arg4);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index f931ccfeefb0..c91e4e0cea08 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -491,13 +491,17 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
*/
struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm,
- unsigned long flags, struct key *dest)
+ unsigned long flags,
+ int (*restrict_link)(struct key *,
+ const struct key_type *,
+ const union key_payload *),
+ struct key *dest)
{
struct key *keyring;
int ret;
keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, description,
- uid, gid, cred, perm, flags);
+ uid, gid, cred, perm, flags, restrict_link);
if (!IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -510,6 +514,26 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_alloc);
+/**
+ * restrict_link_reject - Give -EPERM to restrict link
+ * @keyring: The keyring being added to.
+ * @type: The type of key being added.
+ * @payload: The payload of the key intended to be added.
+ *
+ * Reject the addition of any links to a keyring. It can be overridden by
+ * passing KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to key_instantiate_and_link() when
+ * adding a key to a keyring.
+ *
+ * This is meant to be passed as the restrict_link parameter to
+ * keyring_alloc().
+ */
+int restrict_link_reject(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload)
+{
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
/*
* By default, we keys found by getting an exact match on their descriptions.
*/
@@ -1191,6 +1215,16 @@ void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
up_write(&keyring->sem);
}
+/*
+ * Check addition of keys to restricted keyrings.
+ */
+static int __key_link_check_restriction(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
+{
+ if (!keyring->restrict_link)
+ return 0;
+ return keyring->restrict_link(keyring, key->type, &key->payload);
+}
+
/**
* key_link - Link a key to a keyring
* @keyring: The keyring to make the link in.
@@ -1221,14 +1255,12 @@ int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
key_check(keyring);
key_check(key);
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring->flags) &&
- !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags))
- return -EPERM;
-
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
if (ret == 0) {
kdebug("begun {%d,%d}", keyring->serial, atomic_read(&keyring->usage));
- ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
+ ret = __key_link_check_restriction(keyring, key);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
if (ret == 0)
__key_link(key, &edit);
__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c
index c9fae5ea89fe..2ef45b319dd9 100644
--- a/security/keys/persistent.c
+++ b/security/keys/persistent.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static int key_create_persistent_register(struct user_namespace *ns)
current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(reg))
return PTR_ERR(reg);
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static key_ref_t key_create_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
uid, INVALID_GID, current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL,
ns->persistent_keyring_register);
if (IS_ERR(persistent))
return ERR_CAST(persistent);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index e6d50172872f..40a885239782 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
- KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+ NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
goto error;
@@ -92,7 +93,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
session_keyring =
keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
- KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
+ NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
goto error_release;
@@ -134,7 +136,8 @@ int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
- KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
+ NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -180,7 +183,8 @@ int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
- KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
+ NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -231,7 +235,7 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- flags, NULL);
+ flags, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
} else {
@@ -785,7 +789,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
keyring = keyring_alloc(
name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,
- KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error2;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index c7a117c9a8f3..a29e3554751e 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
cred = get_current_cred();
keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
- KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
+ KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL, NULL);
put_cred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
key = key_alloc(ctx->index_key.type, ctx->index_key.description,
ctx->cred->fsuid, ctx->cred->fsgid, ctx->cred,
- perm, flags);
+ perm, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key))
goto alloc_failed;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 4f0f112fe276..9db8b4a82787 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
- KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
goto error_alloc;
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 8705d79b2c6f..66b1840b4110 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -96,45 +96,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
*/
int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- struct user_key_payload *upayload, *zap;
- size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+ struct user_key_payload *zap = NULL;
int ret;
- ret = -EINVAL;
- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
- goto error;
-
- /* construct a replacement payload */
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!upayload)
- goto error;
-
- upayload->datalen = datalen;
- memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
-
/* check the quota and attach the new data */
- zap = upayload;
-
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen);
-
- if (ret == 0) {
- /* attach the new data, displacing the old */
- if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
- zap = key->payload.data[0];
- else
- zap = NULL;
- rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload);
- key->expiry = 0;
- }
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* attach the new data, displacing the old */
+ key->expiry = prep->expiry;
+ if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
+ zap = rcu_dereference_key(key);
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]);
+ prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
if (zap)
kfree_rcu(zap, rcu);
-
-error:
return ret;
}
-
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update);
/*
diff --git a/security/loadpin/Kconfig b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dd01aa91e521
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/loadpin/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+config SECURITY_LOADPIN
+ bool "Pin load of kernel files (modules, fw, etc) to one filesystem"
+ depends on SECURITY && BLOCK
+ help
+ Any files read through the kernel file reading interface
+ (kernel modules, firmware, kexec images, security policy)
+ can be pinned to the first filesystem used for loading. When
+ enabled, any files that come from other filesystems will be
+ rejected. This is best used on systems without an initrd that
+ have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as
+ dm-verity or a CDROM.
+
+config SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED
+ bool "Enforce LoadPin at boot"
+ depends on SECURITY_LOADPIN
+ help
+ If selected, LoadPin will enforce pinning at boot. If not
+ selected, it can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter
+ "loadpin.enabled=1".
diff --git a/security/loadpin/Makefile b/security/loadpin/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c2d77f83037b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/loadpin/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin.o
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..89a46f10b8a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/*
+ * Module and Firmware Pinning Security Module
+ *
+ * Copyright 2011-2016 Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
+ * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and
+ * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LoadPin: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h> /* current */
+#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
+
+static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation)
+{
+ char *cmdline, *pathname;
+
+ pathname = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL);
+ cmdline = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(current, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ pr_notice("%s %s obj=%s%s%s pid=%d cmdline=%s%s%s\n",
+ origin, operation,
+ (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "",
+ pathname,
+ (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "",
+ task_pid_nr(current),
+ cmdline ? "\"" : "", cmdline, cmdline ? "\"" : "");
+
+ kfree(cmdline);
+ kfree(pathname);
+}
+
+static int enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENABLED);
+static struct super_block *pinned_root;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static int zero;
+static int one = 1;
+
+static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = {
+ { .procname = "kernel", },
+ { .procname = "loadpin", },
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "enabled",
+ .data = &enabled,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra2 = &one,
+ },
+ { }
+};
+
+/*
+ * This must be called after early kernel init, since then the rootdev
+ * is available.
+ */
+static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+ bool ro = false;
+
+ /*
+ * If load pinning is not enforced via a read-only block
+ * device, allow sysctl to change modes for testing.
+ */
+ if (mnt_sb->s_bdev) {
+ ro = bdev_read_only(mnt_sb->s_bdev);
+ pr_info("dev(%u,%u): %s\n",
+ MAJOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
+ MINOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev),
+ ro ? "read-only" : "writable");
+ } else
+ pr_info("mnt_sb lacks block device, treating as: writable\n");
+
+ if (!ro) {
+ if (!register_sysctl_paths(loadpin_sysctl_path,
+ loadpin_sysctl_table))
+ pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("load pinning can be disabled.\n");
+ } else
+ pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
+}
+#else
+static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+ pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
+{
+ /*
+ * When unmounting the filesystem we were using for load
+ * pinning, we acknowledge the superblock release, but make sure
+ * no other modules or firmware can be loaded.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) && mnt_sb == pinned_root) {
+ pinned_root = ERR_PTR(-EIO);
+ pr_info("umount pinned fs: refusing further loads\n");
+ }
+}
+
+static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ struct super_block *load_root;
+ const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
+
+ /* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */
+ if (!file) {
+ if (!enabled) {
+ report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-denied");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ load_root = file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb;
+
+ /* First loaded module/firmware defines the root for all others. */
+ spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+ /*
+ * pinned_root is only NULL at startup. Otherwise, it is either
+ * a valid reference, or an ERR_PTR.
+ */
+ if (!pinned_root) {
+ pinned_root = load_root;
+ /*
+ * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about.
+ * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning
+ * failures before we have announced that pinning is
+ * enabled. This would be purely cosmetic.
+ */
+ spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+ check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root);
+ report_load(origin, file, "pinned");
+ } else {
+ spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
+ }
+
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) || load_root != pinned_root) {
+ if (unlikely(!enabled)) {
+ report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ report_load(origin, file, "denied");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
+};
+
+void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
+{
+ pr_info("ready to pin (currently %sabled)", enabled ? "en" : "dis");
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks));
+}
+
+/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
+module_param(enabled, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(enabled, "Pin module/firmware loading (default: true)");
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d17e4a6d269c..709569305d32 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
*/
capability_add_hooks();
yama_add_hooks();
+ loadpin_add_hooks();
/*
* Load all the remaining security modules.
@@ -1848,7 +1849,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
.tun_dev_attach =
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_attach),
.tun_dev_open = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_open),
- .skb_owned_by = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.skb_owned_by),
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3140efa76a75..a86d537eb79b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
- if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INVALID) {
+ if (ss_initialized && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
if (!may_sleep)
return -ECHILD;
@@ -297,6 +297,13 @@ static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
return inode->i_security;
}
+static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+ return inode->i_security;
+}
+
/*
* Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
*/
@@ -687,7 +694,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
- struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = backing_inode_security(root);
+ struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
@@ -730,6 +737,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
&& (num_opts == 0))
goto out;
+ root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
+
/*
* parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
* also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
@@ -1623,7 +1632,7 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
- int cap, int audit)
+ int cap, int audit, bool initns)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct av_decision avd;
@@ -1637,10 +1646,10 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
case 0:
- sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
+ sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
break;
case 1:
- sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
+ sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
break;
default:
printk(KERN_ERR
@@ -1782,7 +1791,6 @@ static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
u32 *_new_isid)
{
const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
- const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
@@ -1792,6 +1800,7 @@ static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
tsec->create_sid) {
*_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
} else {
+ const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
name, _new_isid);
}
@@ -2076,7 +2085,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
u32 sid = task_sid(to);
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
int rc;
@@ -2095,6 +2104,7 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
+ isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
&ad);
}
@@ -2143,7 +2153,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, int audit)
{
- return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
+ return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
}
static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -2221,7 +2231,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2230,6 +2240,20 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
/* binprm security operations */
+static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ u32 sid = 0;
+ struct task_struct *tracer;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
+ if (tracer)
+ sid = task_sid(tracer);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return sid;
+}
+
static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
@@ -2351,18 +2375,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
if (bprm->unsafe &
(LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
- struct task_struct *tracer;
- struct task_security_struct *sec;
- u32 ptsid = 0;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
- if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
- sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
- ptsid = sec->sid;
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
+ u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(current);
if (ptsid != 0) {
rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS,
@@ -3046,7 +3059,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
@@ -3065,6 +3078,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+ isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
if (rc)
@@ -3123,7 +3137,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
int flags)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
u32 newsid;
int rc;
@@ -3140,6 +3154,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
return;
}
+ isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
isec->sid = newsid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
@@ -3181,7 +3196,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void
u32 size;
int error;
char *context = NULL;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -3199,7 +3214,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
+ isec = inode_security(inode);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);
@@ -3220,7 +3236,7 @@ out_nofree:
static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
u32 newsid;
int rc;
@@ -3309,7 +3325,7 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
int rc;
@@ -3333,6 +3349,7 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
+ isec = inode_security(inode);
rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
out:
@@ -3374,7 +3391,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case KDSKBENT:
case KDSKBSENT:
error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
break;
/* default case assumes that the command will go
@@ -3463,8 +3480,9 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
- vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
- vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
+ ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
+ vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
+ vma_is_stack_for_task(vma, current))) {
rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
/*
@@ -3720,6 +3738,52 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
}
+static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int rc;
+
+ /* init_module */
+ if (file == NULL)
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+ SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
+
+ /* finit_module */
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+ ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+
+ fsec = file->f_security;
+ if (sid != fsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+ SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ switch (id) {
+ case READING_MODULE:
+ rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -4599,6 +4663,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
{
u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
u16 family;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
family = PF_INET;
@@ -4609,9 +4674,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
else
goto out;
- if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
- selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
- else if (skb)
+ if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
+ isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
+ peer_secid = isec->sid;
+ } else if (skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
out:
@@ -5676,7 +5742,6 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct task_struct *tracer;
struct cred *new;
u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
int error;
@@ -5783,14 +5848,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
- ptsid = 0;
- rcu_read_lock();
- tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
- if (tracer)
- ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
- if (tracer) {
+ ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(p);
+ if (ptsid != 0) {
error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
if (error)
@@ -6021,6 +6080,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index ef83c4b85a33..1f1f4b2f6018 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -12,6 +12,18 @@
#define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
"write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
+#define COMMON_CAP_PERMS "chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search", \
+ "fowner", "fsetid", "kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap", \
+ "linux_immutable", "net_bind_service", "net_broadcast", \
+ "net_admin", "net_raw", "ipc_lock", "ipc_owner", "sys_module", \
+ "sys_rawio", "sys_chroot", "sys_ptrace", "sys_pacct", "sys_admin", \
+ "sys_boot", "sys_nice", "sys_resource", "sys_time", \
+ "sys_tty_config", "mknod", "lease", "audit_write", \
+ "audit_control", "setfcap"
+
+#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+
/*
* Note: The name for any socket class should be suffixed by "socket",
* and doesn't contain more than one substr of "socket".
@@ -32,16 +44,9 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"setsockcreate", NULL } },
{ "system",
{ "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
- "syslog_console", "module_request", NULL } },
+ "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
{ "capability",
- { "chown", "dac_override", "dac_read_search",
- "fowner", "fsetid", "kill", "setgid", "setuid", "setpcap",
- "linux_immutable", "net_bind_service", "net_broadcast",
- "net_admin", "net_raw", "ipc_lock", "ipc_owner", "sys_module",
- "sys_rawio", "sys_chroot", "sys_ptrace", "sys_pacct", "sys_admin",
- "sys_boot", "sys_nice", "sys_resource", "sys_time",
- "sys_tty_config", "mknod", "lease", "audit_write",
- "audit_control", "setfcap", NULL } },
+ { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "filesystem",
{ "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr",
"relabelfrom", "relabelto", "associate", "quotamod",
@@ -150,12 +155,15 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
{ "capability2",
- { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", "wake_alarm", "block_suspend",
- "audit_read", NULL } },
+ { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
{ "tun_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
{ "binder", { "impersonate", "call", "set_context_mgr", "transfer",
NULL } },
+ { "cap_userns",
+ { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "cap2_userns",
+ { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
index 67ce7a8d8301..ff4fddca9050 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
@@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values);
int security_set_bools(int len, int *values);
-int security_get_bool_value(int bool);
+int security_get_bool_value(int index);
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index a2ae05414ba1..c21e135460a5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -38,9 +38,8 @@ struct task_security_struct {
};
enum label_initialized {
- LABEL_MISSING, /* not initialized */
- LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* inizialized */
- LABEL_INVALID /* invalid */
+ LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */
+ LABEL_INITIALIZED /* initialized */
};
struct inode_security_struct {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ebda97333f1b..89df64672b89 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2696,7 +2696,7 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
+int security_get_bool_value(int index)
{
int rc;
int len;
@@ -2705,10 +2705,10 @@ int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
rc = -EFAULT;
len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
- if (bool >= len)
+ if (index >= len)
goto out;
- rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
+ rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index cb6ed10816d4..9b756b1f3dc5 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
#define YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED 0
#define YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL 1
@@ -41,6 +42,22 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock);
static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work);
static DECLARE_WORK(yama_relation_work, yama_relation_cleanup);
+static void report_access(const char *access, struct task_struct *target,
+ struct task_struct *agent)
+{
+ char *target_cmd, *agent_cmd;
+
+ target_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(target, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ agent_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(agent, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+ pr_notice_ratelimited(
+ "ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n",
+ access, target_cmd, target->pid, agent_cmd, agent->pid);
+
+ kfree(agent_cmd);
+ kfree(target_cmd);
+}
+
/**
* yama_relation_cleanup - remove invalid entries from the relation list
*
@@ -307,11 +324,8 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
}
}
- if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
- printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
- "ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
- child->pid, current->comm, current->pid);
- }
+ if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0)
+ report_access("attach", child, current);
return rc;
}
@@ -337,11 +351,8 @@ int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
break;
}
- if (rc) {
- printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
- "ptraceme of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
- current->pid, parent->comm, parent->pid);
- }
+ if (rc)
+ report_access("traceme", current, parent);
return rc;
}