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authorDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>2016-05-13 20:08:32 +0300
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2016-05-16 20:49:32 +0300
commit4f3446bb809f20ad56cadf712e6006815ae7a8f9 (patch)
tree1c0e44904ab6b252342e1f024cf7dcbf83c94672
parentd1c55ab5e41fcd72cb0a8bef86d3f652ad9ad9f5 (diff)
downloadlinux-4f3446bb809f20ad56cadf712e6006815ae7a8f9.tar.xz
bpf: add generic constant blinding for use in jits
This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers. Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86, arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore, we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and first implementation since around netconf 2016. We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this, additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump (and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default. For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons, the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended, rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one. This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390 without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(), and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter. Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning, interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture. The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32 and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND, and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction. 64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other() pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register. Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax 43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax 48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax 4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax 52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax 57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax 5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax [...] echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>: [...] 39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d 3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d 46: mov %r10d,%eax 49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d 4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d 56: mov %r10d,%eax 59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d 5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d 66: mov %r10d,%eax 69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d 6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d 76: mov %r10d,%eax 79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d 7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d 86: mov %r10d,%eax 89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d 8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d 96: mov %r10d,%eax [...] As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective. Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded. Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case, f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT), 35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter). BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests pass. [1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html [2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/ [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5 Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r--Documentation/sysctl/net.txt11
-rw-r--r--include/linux/filter.h42
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/core.c203
-rw-r--r--net/Kconfig7
-rw-r--r--net/core/sysctl_net_core.c9
5 files changed, 270 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt
index 809ab6efcc74..f0480f7ea740 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/net.txt
@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@ Values :
1 - enable the JIT
2 - enable the JIT and ask the compiler to emit traces on kernel log.
+bpf_jit_harden
+--------------
+
+This enables hardening for the Berkeley Packet Filter Just in Time compiler.
+Supported are eBPF JIT backends. Enabling hardening trades off performance,
+but can mitigate JIT spraying.
+Values :
+ 0 - disable JIT hardening (default value)
+ 1 - enable JIT hardening for unprivileged users only
+ 2 - enable JIT hardening for all users
+
dev_weight
--------------
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 891852cf7716..6fc31ef1da2d 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+
#include <net/sch_generic.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -42,6 +44,15 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux;
#define BPF_REG_X BPF_REG_7
#define BPF_REG_TMP BPF_REG_8
+/* Kernel hidden auxiliary/helper register for hardening step.
+ * Only used by eBPF JITs. It's nothing more than a temporary
+ * register that JITs use internally, only that here it's part
+ * of eBPF instructions that have been rewritten for blinding
+ * constants. See JIT pre-step in bpf_jit_blind_constants().
+ */
+#define BPF_REG_AX MAX_BPF_REG
+#define MAX_BPF_JIT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 1)
+
/* BPF program can access up to 512 bytes of stack space. */
#define MAX_BPF_STACK 512
@@ -501,6 +512,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off,
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT
extern int bpf_jit_enable;
+extern int bpf_jit_harden;
typedef void (*bpf_jit_fill_hole_t)(void *area, unsigned int size);
@@ -513,6 +525,9 @@ void bpf_jit_binary_free(struct bpf_binary_header *hdr);
void bpf_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp);
void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *fp);
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *fp);
+void bpf_jit_prog_release_other(struct bpf_prog *fp, struct bpf_prog *fp_other);
+
static inline void bpf_jit_dump(unsigned int flen, unsigned int proglen,
u32 pass, void *image)
{
@@ -523,6 +538,33 @@ static inline void bpf_jit_dump(unsigned int flen, unsigned int proglen,
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "JIT code: ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
16, 1, image, proglen, false);
}
+
+static inline bool bpf_jit_is_ebpf(void)
+{
+# ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT
+ return true;
+# else
+ return false;
+# endif
+}
+
+static inline bool bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(void)
+{
+ /* These are the prerequisites, should someone ever have the
+ * idea to call blinding outside of them, we make sure to
+ * bail out.
+ */
+ if (!bpf_jit_is_ebpf())
+ return false;
+ if (!bpf_jit_enable)
+ return false;
+ if (!bpf_jit_harden)
+ return false;
+ if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
#else
static inline void bpf_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
{
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 70f0821aca47..f1e8a0def99b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -243,6 +243,209 @@ void bpf_jit_binary_free(struct bpf_binary_header *hdr)
{
module_memfree(hdr);
}
+
+int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly;
+
+static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from,
+ const struct bpf_insn *aux,
+ struct bpf_insn *to_buff)
+{
+ struct bpf_insn *to = to_buff;
+ u32 imm_rnd = prandom_u32();
+ s16 off;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_AX + 1 != MAX_BPF_JIT_REG);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(MAX_BPF_REG + 1 != MAX_BPF_JIT_REG);
+
+ if (from->imm == 0 &&
+ (from->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_K) ||
+ from->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K))) {
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_XOR, from->dst_reg, from->dst_reg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (from->code) {
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_MOD | BPF_K:
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU32_REG(from->code, from->dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX);
+ break;
+
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_AND | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_OR | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_XOR | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MUL | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_DIV | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_K:
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(from->code, from->dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX);
+ break;
+
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JNE | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSGT | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSGE | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K:
+ /* Accommodate for extra offset in case of a backjump. */
+ off = from->off;
+ if (off < 0)
+ off -= 2;
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
+ *to++ = BPF_JMP_REG(from->code, from->dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX, off);
+ break;
+
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_W:
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_H:
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_B:
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
+ *to++ = BPF_LD_IND(from->code, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_W:
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_H:
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_B:
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, from->src_reg);
+ *to++ = BPF_LD_IND(from->code, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW:
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ aux[1].imm);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, aux[0].dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX);
+ break;
+ case 0: /* Part 2 of BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW. */
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ aux[0].imm);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, aux[0].dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX);
+ break;
+
+ case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW:
+ case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W:
+ case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
+ case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ from->imm);
+ *to++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
+ *to++ = BPF_STX_MEM(from->code, from->dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX, from->off);
+ break;
+ }
+out:
+ return to - to_buff;
+}
+
+static struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_clone_create(struct bpf_prog *fp_other,
+ gfp_t gfp_extra_flags)
+{
+ gfp_t gfp_flags = GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_HIGHMEM | __GFP_ZERO |
+ gfp_extra_flags;
+ struct bpf_prog *fp;
+
+ fp = __vmalloc(fp_other->pages * PAGE_SIZE, gfp_flags, PAGE_KERNEL);
+ if (fp != NULL) {
+ kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield(fp, meta);
+
+ /* aux->prog still points to the fp_other one, so
+ * when promoting the clone to the real program,
+ * this still needs to be adapted.
+ */
+ memcpy(fp, fp_other, fp_other->pages * PAGE_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ return fp;
+}
+
+static void bpf_prog_clone_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)
+{
+ /* aux was stolen by the other clone, so we cannot free
+ * it from this path! It will be freed eventually by the
+ * other program on release.
+ *
+ * At this point, we don't need a deferred release since
+ * clone is guaranteed to not be locked.
+ */
+ fp->aux = NULL;
+ __bpf_prog_free(fp);
+}
+
+void bpf_jit_prog_release_other(struct bpf_prog *fp, struct bpf_prog *fp_other)
+{
+ /* We have to repoint aux->prog to self, as we don't
+ * know whether fp here is the clone or the original.
+ */
+ fp->aux->prog = fp;
+ bpf_prog_clone_free(fp_other);
+}
+
+struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ struct bpf_insn insn_buff[16], aux[2];
+ struct bpf_prog *clone, *tmp;
+ int insn_delta, insn_cnt;
+ struct bpf_insn *insn;
+ int i, rewritten;
+
+ if (!bpf_jit_blinding_enabled())
+ return prog;
+
+ clone = bpf_prog_clone_create(prog, GFP_USER);
+ if (!clone)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ insn_cnt = clone->len;
+ insn = clone->insnsi;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
+ /* We temporarily need to hold the original ld64 insn
+ * so that we can still access the first part in the
+ * second blinding run.
+ */
+ if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW) &&
+ insn[1].code == 0)
+ memcpy(aux, insn, sizeof(aux));
+
+ rewritten = bpf_jit_blind_insn(insn, aux, insn_buff);
+ if (!rewritten)
+ continue;
+
+ tmp = bpf_patch_insn_single(clone, i, insn_buff, rewritten);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ /* Patching may have repointed aux->prog during
+ * realloc from the original one, so we need to
+ * fix it up here on error.
+ */
+ bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, clone);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ clone = tmp;
+ insn_delta = rewritten - 1;
+
+ /* Walk new program and skip insns we just inserted. */
+ insn = clone->insnsi + i + insn_delta;
+ insn_cnt += insn_delta;
+ i += insn_delta;
+ }
+
+ return clone;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_JIT */
/* Base function for offset calculation. Needs to go into .text section,
diff --git a/net/Kconfig b/net/Kconfig
index f7148f24f114..ff40562a782c 100644
--- a/net/Kconfig
+++ b/net/Kconfig
@@ -295,8 +295,11 @@ config BPF_JIT
Berkeley Packet Filter filtering capabilities are normally handled
by an interpreter. This option allows kernel to generate a native
code when filter is loaded in memory. This should speedup
- packet sniffing (libpcap/tcpdump). Note : Admin should enable
- this feature changing /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
+ packet sniffing (libpcap/tcpdump).
+
+ Note, admin should enable this feature changing:
+ /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable
+ /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden (optional)
config NET_FLOW_LIMIT
bool
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index a6beb7b6ae55..0df2aa652530 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -294,6 +294,15 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = {
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
+# ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT
+ {
+ .procname = "bpf_jit_harden",
+ .data = &bpf_jit_harden,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0600,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ },
+# endif
#endif
{
.procname = "netdev_tstamp_prequeue",