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authorJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2017-02-10 02:28:49 +0300
committerJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2017-02-10 02:28:49 +0300
commita2a15479d617ebbab67c60b4eed02524536af780 (patch)
tree64c4a5bbf434b003f02f56edda845e89fd539a7a
parente2241be62deabe09d7c681326fcb0bc707082147 (diff)
parent1ea0ce40690dff38935538e8dab7b12683ded0d3 (diff)
downloadlinux-a2a15479d617ebbab67c60b4eed02524536af780.tar.xz
Merge branch 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c13
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_hooks.h10
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h10
-rw-r--r--kernel/exit.c19
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c7
-rw-r--r--security/security.c10
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c379
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h62
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h10
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c98
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c3
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c31
13 files changed, 341 insertions, 314 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 8e7e61b28f31..988c5a77e888 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2488,6 +2488,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
length = -ESRCH;
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
+
+ /* A task may only write its own attributes. */
+ length = -EACCES;
+ if (current != task)
+ goto out;
+
if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
count = PAGE_SIZE;
@@ -2503,14 +2509,13 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
}
/* Guard against adverse ptrace interaction */
- length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (length < 0)
goto out_free;
- length = security_setprocattr(task,
- (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
+ length = security_setprocattr(file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
page, count);
- mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
out_free:
kfree(page);
out:
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 0f3c309065d7..e29d4c62a3c8 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -665,11 +665,6 @@
* @sig contains the signal value.
* @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_wait:
- * Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p
- * and collect its status information.
- * @p contains the task_struct for process.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_prctl:
* Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
* current process.
@@ -1506,7 +1501,6 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid);
- int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
@@ -1546,8 +1540,7 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*d_instantiate)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
- int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
- size_t size);
+ int (*setprocattr)(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
@@ -1767,7 +1760,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct list_head task_getscheduler;
struct list_head task_movememory;
struct list_head task_kill;
- struct list_head task_wait;
struct list_head task_prctl;
struct list_head task_to_inode;
struct list_head ipc_permission;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c2125e9093e8..d3868f2ebada 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid);
-int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
@@ -361,7 +360,7 @@ int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
unsigned nsops, int alter);
void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
-int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
@@ -980,11 +979,6 @@ static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4,
@@ -1106,7 +1100,7 @@ static inline int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char *
return -EINVAL;
}
-static inline int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+static inline int security_setprocattr(char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 8f14b866f9f6..60f245190571 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/iocontext.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/acct.h>
#include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
@@ -1360,7 +1359,7 @@ static int wait_task_continued(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p)
* Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock.
* Returns zero if the search for a child should continue;
* then ->notask_error is 0 if @p is an eligible child,
- * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD.
+ * or still -ECHILD.
*/
static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
struct task_struct *p)
@@ -1380,20 +1379,6 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
if (!ret)
return ret;
- ret = security_task_wait(p);
- if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
- /*
- * If we have not yet seen any eligible child,
- * then let this error code replace -ECHILD.
- * A permission error will give the user a clue
- * to look for security policy problems, rather
- * than for mysterious wait bugs.
- */
- if (wo->notask_error)
- wo->notask_error = ret;
- return 0;
- }
-
if (unlikely(exit_state == EXIT_TRACE)) {
/*
* ptrace == 0 means we are the natural parent. In this case
@@ -1486,7 +1471,7 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
* Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock.
* Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; then
* ->notask_error is 0 if there were any eligible children,
- * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD.
+ * or still -ECHILD.
*/
static int do_wait_thread(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b63d39ca6278..709eacd23909 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -505,8 +505,8 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
return error;
}
-static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
- void *value, size_t size)
+static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
+ size_t size)
{
char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
@@ -515,9 +515,6 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
- /* task can only write its own attributes */
- if (current != task)
- return -EACCES;
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f0a802ee29b6..d0e07f269b2d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1063,11 +1063,6 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid);
}
-int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p);
-}
-
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
@@ -1208,9 +1203,9 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value);
}
-int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+int security_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
- return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value, size);
+ return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, name, value, size);
}
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1807,7 +1802,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
.task_movememory =
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory),
.task_kill = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill),
- .task_wait = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait),
.task_prctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl),
.task_to_inode =
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode),
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 424573029c5c..9bc12bcddc2c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -210,16 +210,6 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
return sid;
}
-/*
- * get the subjective security ID of the current task
- */
-static inline u32 current_sid(void)
-{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
-
- return tsec->sid;
-}
-
/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
@@ -490,8 +480,11 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
/* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
}
@@ -833,10 +826,14 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
}
/*
- * If this is a user namespace mount, no contexts are allowed
- * on the command line and security labels must be ignored.
+ * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
+ * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
+ * line and security labels must be ignored.
*/
- if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns) {
+ if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
+ strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
+ strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
+ strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
defcontext_sid) {
rc = -EACCES;
@@ -1268,6 +1265,8 @@ static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
{
+ int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
+
switch (family) {
case PF_UNIX:
switch (type) {
@@ -1282,13 +1281,19 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
case PF_INET6:
switch (type) {
case SOCK_STREAM:
+ case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
+ else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
+ return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
else
return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
case SOCK_DGRAM:
if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
+ else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
+ protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
+ return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
else
return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
case SOCK_DCCP:
@@ -1342,6 +1347,66 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
}
+ if (extsockclass) {
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_AX25:
+ return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
+ case PF_IPX:
+ return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
+ case PF_NETROM:
+ return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
+ case PF_ATMPVC:
+ return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_X25:
+ return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
+ case PF_ROSE:
+ return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
+ case PF_DECnet:
+ return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
+ case PF_ATMSVC:
+ return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_RDS:
+ return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
+ case PF_IRDA:
+ return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
+ case PF_PPPOX:
+ return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
+ case PF_LLC:
+ return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_CAN:
+ return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
+ case PF_TIPC:
+ return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_BLUETOOTH:
+ return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
+ case PF_IUCV:
+ return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
+ case PF_RXRPC:
+ return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_ISDN:
+ return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
+ case PF_PHONET:
+ return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
+ case PF_IEEE802154:
+ return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
+ case PF_CAIF:
+ return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
+ case PF_ALG:
+ return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
+ case PF_NFC:
+ return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
+ case PF_VSOCK:
+ return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
+ case PF_KCM:
+ return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
+ case PF_QIPCRTR:
+ return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
+#if PF_MAX > 43
+#error New address family defined, please update this function.
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
}
@@ -1608,55 +1673,6 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
return perm;
}
-/*
- * Check permission between a pair of credentials
- * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
- */
-static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
- const struct cred *target,
- u32 perms)
-{
- u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
-
- return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
- * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
- * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
- * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
- */
-static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
- const struct task_struct *tsk2,
- u32 perms)
-{
- const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
- u32 sid1, sid2;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
- __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
- * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
- * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
- * - this uses current's subjective creds
- */
-static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
- u32 perms)
-{
- u32 sid, tsid;
-
- sid = current_sid();
- tsid = task_sid(tsk);
- return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
-}
-
#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
#endif
@@ -1698,16 +1714,6 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
return rc;
}
-/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
-static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
- u32 perms)
-{
- u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
-
- return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
- SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
-}
-
/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
@@ -1879,15 +1885,6 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
}
-/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
-static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
- struct task_struct *ctx)
-{
- u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
-
- return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
-}
-
#define MAY_LINK 0
#define MAY_UNLINK 1
#define MAY_RMDIR 2
@@ -2143,24 +2140,26 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
- if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
- u32 sid = current_sid();
- u32 csid = task_sid(child);
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ u32 csid = task_sid(child);
+
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
- }
- return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
}
static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
- return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
+ return avc_has_perm(task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
}
static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
}
static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -2168,7 +2167,8 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
+ return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
}
/*
@@ -2224,29 +2224,22 @@ static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
static int selinux_syslog(int type)
{
- int rc;
-
switch (type) {
case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
- rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
- break;
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
/* Set level of messages printed to console */
case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
- rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
- break;
- case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
- case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
- case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
- case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
- case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
- default:
- rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
- break;
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
+ NULL);
}
- return rc;
+ /* All other syslog types */
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
}
/*
@@ -2271,13 +2264,13 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
/* binprm security operations */
-static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(struct task_struct *task)
+static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
{
u32 sid = 0;
struct task_struct *tracer;
rcu_read_lock();
- tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
+ tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
if (tracer)
sid = task_sid(tracer);
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -2406,7 +2399,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
if (bprm->unsafe &
(LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
- u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(current);
+ u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
if (ptsid != 0) {
rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS,
@@ -3503,6 +3496,7 @@ static int default_noexec;
static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
int rc = 0;
if (default_noexec &&
@@ -3513,7 +3507,8 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
* private file mapping that will also be writable.
* This has an additional check.
*/
- rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
if (rc)
goto error;
}
@@ -3564,6 +3559,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long prot)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
if (selinux_checkreqprot)
prot = reqprot;
@@ -3573,12 +3569,14 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
int rc = 0;
if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
- rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
- rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
/*
* We are making executable a file mapping that has
@@ -3711,7 +3709,9 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
}
/*
@@ -3821,15 +3821,12 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
- u32 sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
- sid = task_sid(current);
-
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
- return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
}
@@ -3881,17 +3878,20 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
- return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
}
static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
@@ -3901,17 +3901,20 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
- return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
- return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
@@ -3924,47 +3927,42 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
- return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p),
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
return 0;
}
static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
}
static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid)
{
u32 perm;
- int rc;
if (!sig)
perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
else
perm = signal_to_av(sig);
- if (secid)
- rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
- SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
- else
- rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
- return rc;
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
+ if (!secid)
+ secid = current_sid();
+ return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
}
static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -4254,12 +4252,11 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
socksid);
}
-static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
+static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
- u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
return 0;
@@ -4268,7 +4265,8 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sk = sk;
- return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
+ &ad);
}
static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
@@ -4330,7 +4328,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
u16 family;
int err;
- err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
+ err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
if (err)
goto out;
@@ -4429,7 +4427,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
int err;
- err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+ err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -4481,7 +4479,7 @@ out:
static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
- return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
}
static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
@@ -4492,7 +4490,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
u16 sclass;
u32 sid;
- err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
+ err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -4513,30 +4511,30 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size)
{
- return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
}
static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size, int flags)
{
- return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
}
static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
{
- return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
}
static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
{
- return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
}
static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
{
int err;
- err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
+ err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -4546,12 +4544,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname
static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
int optname)
{
- return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
}
static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
- return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
+ return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
}
static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
@@ -5039,7 +5037,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
goto out;
}
- err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
+ err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
out:
return err;
}
@@ -5370,20 +5368,17 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
}
-static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
- struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
+static int ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
u16 sclass)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
- u32 sid;
isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!isec)
return -ENOMEM;
- sid = task_sid(task);
isec->sclass = sclass;
- isec->sid = sid;
+ isec->sid = current_sid();
perm->security = isec;
return 0;
@@ -5451,7 +5446,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
+ rc = ipc_alloc_security(&msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -5498,7 +5493,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
case IPC_INFO:
case MSG_INFO:
/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
- return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
case IPC_STAT:
case MSG_STAT:
perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
@@ -5592,7 +5588,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
+ rc = ipc_alloc_security(&shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -5640,7 +5636,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
case IPC_INFO:
case SHM_INFO:
/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
- return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
case IPC_STAT:
case SHM_STAT:
perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
@@ -5684,7 +5681,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
- rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
+ rc = ipc_alloc_security(&sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -5732,7 +5729,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
case IPC_INFO:
case SEM_INFO:
/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
- return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+ return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
case GETPID:
case GETNCNT:
case GETZCNT:
@@ -5813,15 +5811,16 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
int error;
unsigned len;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
+
if (current != p) {
- error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
+ error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
if (error)
- return error;
+ goto bad;
}
- rcu_read_lock();
- __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
-
if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
sid = __tsec->sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
@@ -5834,8 +5833,10 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
- else
- goto invalid;
+ else {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!sid)
@@ -5846,41 +5847,37 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
return error;
return len;
-invalid:
+bad:
rcu_read_unlock();
- return -EINVAL;
+ return error;
}
-static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
- char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct cred *new;
- u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
+ u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
int error;
char *str = value;
- if (current != p) {
- /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
- security attributes. */
- return -EACCES;
- }
-
/*
* Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
- * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
- * above restriction is ever removed.
*/
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
- error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
- error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
- error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
- error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
- error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
else
error = -EINVAL;
if (error)
@@ -5934,7 +5931,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
} else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
tsec->create_sid = sid;
} else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
- error = may_create_key(sid, p);
+ error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
+ NULL);
if (error)
goto abort_change;
tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
@@ -5961,7 +5959,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
- ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(p);
+ ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
if (ptsid != 0) {
error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
@@ -6209,7 +6207,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 13ae49b0baa0..7898ffa6d3e6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -171,5 +171,67 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "cap2_userns",
{ COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "sctp_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "node_bind", NULL } },
+ { "icmp_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
+ "node_bind", NULL } },
+ { "ax25_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "ipx_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netrom_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "atmpvc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "x25_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "rose_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "decnet_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "atmsvc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "rds_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "irda_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "pppox_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "llc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "can_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "tipc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "bluetooth_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "iucv_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "rxrpc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "isdn_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "phonet_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "ieee802154_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "caif_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "alg_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "nfc_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "vsock_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "kcm_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "qipcrtr_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
+
+#if PF_MAX > 43
+#error New address family defined, please update secclass_map.
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index e8dab0f02c72..c03cdcd12a3b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ struct task_security_struct {
u32 sockcreate_sid; /* fscreate SID */
};
+/*
+ * get the subjective security ID of the current task
+ */
+static inline u32 current_sid(void)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+
+ return tsec->sid;
+}
+
enum label_initialized {
LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */
LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* initialized */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 308a286c6cbe..beaa14b8b6cf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ extern int selinux_enabled;
enum {
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM,
- POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_REDHAT1,
+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK,
__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
};
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ enum {
extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+extern int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
/*
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index cf9293e01fc1..c354807381c1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
static char *policycap_names[] = {
"network_peer_controls",
"open_perms",
- "redhat1",
+ "extended_socket_class",
"always_check_network"
};
@@ -77,25 +77,6 @@ static char policy_opened;
/* global data for policy capabilities */
static struct dentry *policycap_dir;
-/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a security operation. */
-static int task_has_security(struct task_struct *tsk,
- u32 perms)
-{
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- u32 sid = 0;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- tsec = __task_cred(tsk)->security;
- if (tsec)
- sid = tsec->sid;
- rcu_read_unlock();
- if (!tsec)
- return -EACCES;
-
- return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_SECURITY,
- SECCLASS_SECURITY, perms, NULL);
-}
-
enum sel_inos {
SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
SEL_LOAD, /* load policy */
@@ -166,7 +147,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
new_value = !!new_value;
if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) {
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE,
+ NULL);
if (length)
goto out;
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
@@ -368,7 +351,8 @@ static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
- rc = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
if (rc)
goto err;
@@ -429,7 +413,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
- ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
+ ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
if (ret)
goto out;
@@ -499,7 +484,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, NULL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -522,20 +508,28 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out;
length = security_load_policy(data, count);
- if (length)
+ if (length) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n");
goto out;
+ }
length = sel_make_bools();
- if (length)
+ if (length) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy booleans\n");
goto out1;
+ }
length = sel_make_classes();
- if (length)
+ if (length) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy classes\n");
goto out1;
+ }
length = sel_make_policycap();
- if (length)
+ if (length) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n");
goto out1;
+ }
length = count;
@@ -561,7 +555,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
u32 sid, len;
ssize_t length;
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT, NULL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -604,7 +599,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
ssize_t length;
unsigned int new_value;
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT,
+ NULL);
if (length)
return length;
@@ -645,7 +642,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
u16 tclass;
int rc;
- rc = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -772,7 +770,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
struct av_decision avd;
ssize_t length;
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, NULL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -822,7 +821,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
u32 len;
int nargs;
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE,
+ NULL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -919,7 +920,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
char *newcon = NULL;
u32 len;
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL,
+ NULL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -975,7 +978,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
int i, rc;
u32 len, nsids;
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER,
+ NULL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -1035,7 +1040,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
char *newcon = NULL;
u32 len;
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER,
+ NULL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -1142,7 +1149,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
+ NULL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -1198,7 +1207,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
- length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
+ length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
+ NULL);
if (length)
goto out;
@@ -1299,8 +1310,11 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n",
+ page);
+ sid = SECINITSID_SECURITY;
+ }
isec->sid = sid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
@@ -1351,7 +1365,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
ssize_t ret;
unsigned int new_value;
- ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM);
+ ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM,
+ NULL);
if (ret)
return ret;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 082b20c78363..a70fcee9824b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
@@ -1988,6 +1989,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
+ selinux_policycap_extsockclass = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS);
selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 1723bd370e3a..60b4217b9b68 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2302,25 +2302,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
}
/**
- * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
- * @p: task to wait for
- *
- * Returns 0
- */
-static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- /*
- * Allow the operation to succeed.
- * Zombies are bad.
- * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
- * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
- * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
- * may expect to know when the child exits.
- */
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
* smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
* @p: task to copy from
* @inode: inode to copy to
@@ -3680,7 +3661,6 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
/**
* smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
- * @p: the object task
* @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
* @value: the value to set
* @size: the size of the value
@@ -3690,8 +3670,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
*
* Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
*/
-static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
- void *value, size_t size)
+static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
struct cred *new;
@@ -3699,13 +3678,6 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
int rc;
- /*
- * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
- * and supports no sane use case.
- */
- if (p != current)
- return -EPERM;
-
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
return -EPERM;
@@ -4727,7 +4699,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),