diff options
author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2022-12-11 00:20:53 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2022-12-11 00:36:22 +0300 |
commit | 99523094de48df65477cbbb9d8027f4bc4701794 (patch) | |
tree | de4c47b1ac47deceb055aef7fbab79f30dabebc0 | |
parent | f3212ad5b7e93c002bd2dbe552c2b0b0033317ff (diff) | |
parent | efd6286ff74a2fa2b45ed070d344cc0822b8ea6e (diff) | |
download | linux-99523094de48df65477cbbb9d8027f4bc4701794.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'stricter register ID checking in regsafe()'
Eduard Zingerman says:
====================
This patch-set consists of a series of bug fixes for register ID
tracking in verifier.c:states_equal()/regsafe() functions:
- for registers of type PTR_TO_MAP_{KEY,VALUE}, PTR_TO_PACKET[_META]
the regsafe() should call check_ids() even if registers are
byte-to-byte equal;
- states_equal() must maintain idmap that covers all function frames
in the state because functions like mark_ptr_or_null_regs() operate
on all registers in the state;
- regsafe() must compare spin lock ids for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE registers.
The last point covers issue reported by Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi in [1],
I borrowed the test commit from there.
Note, that there is also an issue with register id tracking for
scalars described here [2], it would be addressed separately.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221111202719.982118-1-memxor@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221128163442.280187-2-eddyz87@gmail.com/
Eduard Zingerman (6):
bpf: regsafe() must not skip check_ids()
selftests/bpf: test cases for regsafe() bug skipping check_id()
bpf: states_equal() must build idmap for all function frames
selftests/bpf: verify states_equal() maintains idmap across all frames
bpf: use check_ids() for active_lock comparison
selftests/bpf: test case for relaxed prunning of active_lock.id
====================
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 48 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 82 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/direct_packet_access.c | 54 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spin_lock.c | 114 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_or_null.c | 49 |
6 files changed, 324 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index df0cb825e0e3..53d175cbaa02 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ struct bpf_id_pair { u32 cur; }; -/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */ -#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) #define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8 +/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */ +#define BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE ((MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) * MAX_CALL_FRAMES) struct bpf_verifier_state { /* call stack tracking */ struct bpf_func_state *frame[MAX_CALL_FRAMES]; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 9791788071d5..a5255a0dcbb6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -13064,15 +13064,6 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0; - if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK) - /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to - * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar - */ - return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; - - if (equal) - return true; - if (rold->type == NOT_INIT) /* explored state can't have used this */ return true; @@ -13080,6 +13071,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, return false; switch (base_type(rold->type)) { case SCALAR_VALUE: + if (equal) + return true; if (env->explore_alu_limits) return false; if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { @@ -13126,7 +13119,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, */ return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && range_within(rold, rcur) && - tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); + tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && + check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); case PTR_TO_PACKET_META: case PTR_TO_PACKET: if (rcur->type != rold->type) @@ -13150,20 +13144,14 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ return range_within(rold, rcur) && tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); - case PTR_TO_CTX: - case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: - case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: - case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: - case PTR_TO_SOCKET: - case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: - case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: - case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK: - /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above - * would have accepted + case PTR_TO_STACK: + /* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to + * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar */ + return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno; default: - /* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */ - return false; + /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() */ + return equal; } /* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */ @@ -13273,7 +13261,6 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat { int i; - memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch)); for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], env->idmap_scratch)) @@ -13297,14 +13284,25 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) return false; + memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch)); + /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. */ if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative) return false; - if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr || - old->active_lock.id != cur->active_lock.id) + if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr) + return false; + + /* Old and cur active_lock's have to be either both present + * or both absent. + */ + if (!!old->active_lock.id != !!cur->active_lock.id) + return false; + + if (old->active_lock.id && + !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, env->idmap_scratch)) return false; if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c index babcec123251..9d993926bf0e 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c @@ -2305,3 +2305,85 @@ .errstr = "!read_ok", .result = REJECT, }, +/* Make sure that verifier.c:states_equal() considers IDs from all + * frames when building 'idmap' for check_ids(). + */ +{ + "calls: check_ids() across call boundary", + .insns = { + /* Function main() */ + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), + /* fp[-24] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; get a MAP_VALUE_PTR_OR_NULL with some ID */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, + 0), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_0, -24), + /* fp[-32] = map_lookup_elem(...) ; get a MAP_VALUE_PTR_OR_NULL with some ID */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, + 0), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_0, -32), + /* call foo(&fp[-24], &fp[-32]) ; both arguments have IDs in the current + * ; stack frame + */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_FP), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -24), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_FP), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -32), + BPF_CALL_REL(2), + /* exit 0 */ + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + /* Function foo() + * + * r9 = &frame[0].fp[-24] ; save arguments in the callee saved registers, + * r8 = &frame[0].fp[-32] ; arguments are pointers to pointers to map value + */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_1), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_2), + /* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0), + /* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0), + /* if r6 > r7 goto +1 ; no new information about the state is derived from + * ; this check, thus produced verifier states differ + * ; only in 'insn_idx' + * r9 = r8 + */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7, 1), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_8), + /* r9 = *r9 ; verifier get's to this point via two paths: + * ; (I) one including r9 = r8, verified first; + * ; (II) one excluding r9 = r8, verified next. + * ; After load of *r9 to r9 the frame[0].fp[-24].id == r9.id. + * ; Suppose that checkpoint is created here via path (I). + * ; When verifying via (II) the r9.id must be compared against + * ; frame[0].fp[-24].id, otherwise (I) and (II) would be + * ; incorrectly deemed equivalent. + * if r9 == 0 goto <exit> + */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_9, 0), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_9, 0, 1), + /* r8 = *r8 ; read map value via r8, this is not safe + * r0 = *r8 ; because r8 might be not equal to r9. + */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_8, 0), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8, 0), + /* exit 0 */ + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ, + .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3, 9 }, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "R8 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + .errstr_unpriv = "", + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, +}, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/direct_packet_access.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/direct_packet_access.c index 11acd1855acf..dce2e28aeb43 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/direct_packet_access.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/direct_packet_access.c @@ -654,3 +654,57 @@ .result = ACCEPT, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, }, +{ + "direct packet access: test30 (check_id() in regsafe(), bad access)", + .insns = { + /* r9 = ctx */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_1), + /* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0), + /* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0), + /* r2 = ctx->data + * r3 = ctx->data + * r4 = ctx->data_end + */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_9, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_9, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_9, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + /* if r6 > 100 goto exit + * if r7 > 100 goto exit + */ + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_6, 100, 9), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_7, 100, 8), + /* r2 += r6 ; this forces assignment of ID to r2 + * r2 += 1 ; get some fixed off for r2 + * r3 += r7 ; this forces assignment of ID to r3 + * r3 += 1 ; get some fixed off for r3 + */ + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_6), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 1), + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_7), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, 1), + /* if r6 > r7 goto +1 ; no new information about the state is derived from + * ; this check, thus produced verifier states differ + * ; only in 'insn_idx' + * r2 = r3 ; optionally share ID between r2 and r3 + */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7, 1), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3), + /* if r3 > ctx->data_end goto exit */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, 1), + /* r5 = *(u8 *) (r2 - 1) ; access packet memory using r2, + * ; this is not always safe + */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_2, -1), + /* exit(0) */ + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "invalid access to packet, off=0 size=1, R2", + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, +}, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spin_lock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spin_lock.c index 781621facae4..eaf114f07e2e 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spin_lock.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spin_lock.c @@ -331,3 +331,117 @@ .errstr = "inside bpf_spin_lock", .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, }, +{ + "spin_lock: regsafe compare reg->id for map value", + .insns = { + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_6, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_1), + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -4, 0), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), + BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_9), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), + BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_0), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 4), + BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_spin_lock), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_6, 0, 1), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_7), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 4), + BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .fixup_map_spin_lock = { 2 }, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "bpf_spin_unlock of different lock", + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, + .flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ, +}, +/* Make sure that regsafe() compares ids for spin lock records using + * check_ids(): + * 1: r9 = map_lookup_elem(...) ; r9.id == 1 + * 2: r8 = map_lookup_elem(...) ; r8.id == 2 + * 3: r7 = ktime_get_ns() + * 4: r6 = ktime_get_ns() + * 5: if r6 > r7 goto <9> + * 6: spin_lock(r8) + * 7: r9 = r8 + * 8: goto <10> + * 9: spin_lock(r9) + * 10: spin_unlock(r9) ; r9.id == 1 || r9.id == 2 and lock is active, + * ; second visit to (10) should be considered safe + * ; if check_ids() is used. + * 11: exit(0) + */ +{ + "spin_lock: regsafe() check_ids() similar id mappings", + .insns = { + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -4, 0), + /* r9 = map_lookup_elem(...) */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, + 0), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 24), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_0), + /* r8 = map_lookup_elem(...) */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, + 0), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 18), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_0), + /* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0), + /* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0), + /* if r6 > r7 goto +5 ; no new information about the state is derived from + * ; this check, thus produced verifier states differ + * ; only in 'insn_idx' + * spin_lock(r8) + * r9 = r8 + * goto unlock + */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7, 5), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_8), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 4), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_spin_lock), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_8), + BPF_JMP_A(3), + /* spin_lock(r9) */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_9), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 4), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_spin_lock), + /* spin_unlock(r9) */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_9), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 4), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock), + /* exit(0) */ + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .fixup_map_spin_lock = { 3, 10 }, + .result = VERBOSE_ACCEPT, + .errstr = "28: safe", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + .errstr_unpriv = "", + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, + .flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ, +}, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_or_null.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_or_null.c index 3ecb70a3d939..52a8bca14f03 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_or_null.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_or_null.c @@ -169,3 +169,52 @@ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, .result = ACCEPT, }, +{ + "MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL check_ids() in regsafe()", + .insns = { + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), + /* r9 = map_lookup_elem(...) */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, + 0), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_0), + /* r8 = map_lookup_elem(...) */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, + 0), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_0), + /* r7 = ktime_get_ns() */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0), + /* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0), + /* if r6 > r7 goto +1 ; no new information about the state is derived from + * ; this check, thus produced verifier states differ + * ; only in 'insn_idx' + * r9 = r8 ; optionally share ID between r9 and r8 + */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_7, 1), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_9, BPF_REG_8), + /* if r9 == 0 goto <exit> */ + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_9, 0, 1), + /* read map value via r8, this is not always + * safe because r8 might be not equal to r9. + */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8, 0), + /* exit 0 */ + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ, + .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3, 9 }, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "R8 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + .errstr_unpriv = "", + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, +}, |