diff options
author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2018-12-17 10:23:23 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2019-01-10 16:37:31 +0300 |
commit | ab57b33525c3221afaebd391458fa0cbcd56903d (patch) | |
tree | 46705ef8eb4a9574def091929841c7a75ec4360f | |
parent | 8f9c469348487844328e162db57112f7d347c49f (diff) | |
download | linux-ab57b33525c3221afaebd391458fa0cbcd56903d.tar.xz |
crypto: bcm - convert to use crypto_authenc_extractkeys()
Convert the bcm crypto driver to use crypto_authenc_extractkeys() so
that it picks up the fix for broken validation of rtattr::rta_len.
This also fixes the DES weak key check to actually be done on the right
key. (It was checking the authentication key, not the encryption key...)
Fixes: 9d12ba86f818 ("crypto: brcm - Add Broadcom SPU driver")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/crypto/Kconfig | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c | 44 |
2 files changed, 14 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig index 5a90075f719d..0be55fcc19ba 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig @@ -692,6 +692,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_BCM_SPU depends on ARCH_BCM_IPROC depends on MAILBOX default m + select CRYPTO_AUTHENC select CRYPTO_DES select CRYPTO_MD5 select CRYPTO_SHA1 diff --git a/drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c index c9393ffb70ed..5567cbda2798 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c @@ -2845,44 +2845,28 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct crypto_aead *cipher, struct spu_hw *spu = &iproc_priv.spu; struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(cipher); struct crypto_tfm *tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(cipher); - struct rtattr *rta = (void *)key; - struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param; - const u8 *origkey = key; - const unsigned int origkeylen = keylen; - - int ret = 0; + struct crypto_authenc_keys keys; + int ret; flow_log("%s() aead:%p key:%p keylen:%u\n", __func__, cipher, key, keylen); flow_dump(" key: ", key, keylen); - if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen)) - goto badkey; - if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM) - goto badkey; - if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param)) + ret = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen); + if (ret) goto badkey; - param = RTA_DATA(rta); - ctx->enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen); - - key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len); - keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len); - - if (keylen < ctx->enckeylen) - goto badkey; - if (ctx->enckeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) + if (keys.enckeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE || + keys.authkeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) goto badkey; - ctx->authkeylen = keylen - ctx->enckeylen; - - if (ctx->authkeylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) - goto badkey; + ctx->enckeylen = keys.enckeylen; + ctx->authkeylen = keys.authkeylen; - memcpy(ctx->enckey, key + ctx->authkeylen, ctx->enckeylen); + memcpy(ctx->enckey, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen); /* May end up padding auth key. So make sure it's zeroed. */ memset(ctx->authkey, 0, sizeof(ctx->authkey)); - memcpy(ctx->authkey, key, ctx->authkeylen); + memcpy(ctx->authkey, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen); switch (ctx->alg->cipher_info.alg) { case CIPHER_ALG_DES: @@ -2890,7 +2874,7 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct crypto_aead *cipher, u32 tmp[DES_EXPKEY_WORDS]; u32 flags = CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY; - if (des_ekey(tmp, key) == 0) { + if (des_ekey(tmp, keys.enckey) == 0) { if (crypto_aead_get_flags(cipher) & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY) { crypto_aead_set_flags(cipher, flags); @@ -2905,7 +2889,7 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct crypto_aead *cipher, break; case CIPHER_ALG_3DES: if (ctx->enckeylen == (DES_KEY_SIZE * 3)) { - const u32 *K = (const u32 *)key; + const u32 *K = (const u32 *)keys.enckey; u32 flags = CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED; if (!((K[0] ^ K[2]) | (K[1] ^ K[3])) || @@ -2956,9 +2940,7 @@ static int aead_authenc_setkey(struct crypto_aead *cipher, ctx->fallback_cipher->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK; ctx->fallback_cipher->base.crt_flags |= tfm->crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK; - ret = - crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback_cipher, origkey, - origkeylen); + ret = crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback_cipher, key, keylen); if (ret) { flow_log(" fallback setkey() returned:%d\n", ret); tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK; |