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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-05-21 20:04:02 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-05-21 20:04:02 +0300 |
| commit | fa8151cabfaa4166feeb6e8a4df428d7c3d9fecd (patch) | |
| tree | 24703a13d6e95e89bfbe43aa6f227ab5239013ef | |
| parent | 38da32ee70b876f5b8bea7c4135eff46339c18f2 (diff) | |
| parent | 050bf3c793a07f96bd1e2fd62e1447f731ed733b (diff) | |
| download | linux-fa8151cabfaa4166feeb6e8a4df428d7c3d9fecd.tar.xz | |
Merge tag 'keys-trusted-next-6.10-rc1-part2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull trusted keys fixes from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"These are two bugs I found from trusted keys while working on a new
RSA key type for TPM2. Both originate form v5.13.
The memory leak is more crucial but I don't think it is either good
idea if kernel throws WARN when ASN.1 parser fails, even if it is
related to programming error, as it is not that mature code yet.
There's at least two WARN's in that code but I picked just the one
more likely to trigger. Planning to fix the other one too over time"
* tag 'keys-trusted-next-6.10-rc1-part2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: Do not use WARN when encode fails
KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_key_encode()
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index dfeec06301ce..8b7dd73d94c1 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE; u8 *priv, *pub; u16 priv_len, pub_len; + int ret; priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; priv = src; @@ -57,8 +58,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); - if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) - return PTR_ERR(w); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) { + ret = PTR_ERR(w); + goto err; + } work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool); } @@ -69,8 +72,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on */ if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE, - "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) - return -EINVAL; + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); @@ -79,10 +84,18 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, work1 = payload->blob; work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob), scratch, work - scratch); - if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) - return PTR_ERR(work1); + if (IS_ERR(work1)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(work1); + pr_err("BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed with %d\n", ret); + goto err; + } + kfree(scratch); return work1 - payload->blob; + +err: + kfree(scratch); + return ret; } struct tpm2_key_context { |