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authorJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2022-03-11 04:16:56 +0300
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2022-03-11 04:16:56 +0300
commit1e8a3f0d2a1ef544611a7ea4a7c1512c732e0e43 (patch)
tree89b9a31da1a19af868424f4dac2178536cf30781 /Documentation/admin-guide
parent3e18bcb778e636045e091ddc09c2b69594bc844c (diff)
parent186d32bbf034417b40e2b4e773eeb8ef106c16c1 (diff)
downloadlinux-1e8a3f0d2a1ef544611a7ea4a7c1512c732e0e43.tar.xz
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
net/dsa/dsa2.c commit afb3cc1a397d ("net: dsa: unlock the rtnl_mutex when dsa_master_setup() fails") commit e83d56537859 ("net: dsa: replay master state events in dsa_tree_{setup,teardown}_master") https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220307101436.7ae87da0@canb.auug.org.au/ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice.h commit 97b0129146b1 ("ice: Fix error with handling of bonding MTU") commit 43113ff73453 ("ice: add TTY for GNSS module for E810T device") https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220310112843.3233bcf1@canb.auug.org.au/ drivers/staging/gdm724x/gdm_lte.c commit fc7f750dc9d1 ("staging: gdm724x: fix use after free in gdm_lte_rx()") commit 4bcc4249b4cf ("staging: Use netif_rx().") https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220308111043.1018a59d@canb.auug.org.au/ Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst50
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt8
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/mm/pagemap.rst2
3 files changed, 40 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index a2b22d5640ec..9e9556826450 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
---------------------------------------
@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
victim's data.
+Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
+Branch History Buffer (BHB) to speculatively steer an indirect branch
+to a specific Branch Target Buffer (BTB) entry, even if the entry isn't
+associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
+the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
+Enhanced IBRS.
+
+Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
+unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
+unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
+retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+
Attack scenarios
----------------
@@ -364,13 +377,15 @@ The possible values in this file are:
- Kernel status:
- ==================================== =================================
- 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
- 'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation
- 'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation
- 'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation
- 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation
- ==================================== =================================
+ ======================================== =================================
+ 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
+ 'Mitigation: None' Vulnerable, no mitigation
+ 'Mitigation: Retpolines' Use Retpoline thunks
+ 'Mitigation: LFENCE' Use LFENCE instructions
+ 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation
+ 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines' Hardware-focused + Retpolines
+ 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE' Hardware-focused + LFENCE
+ ======================================== =================================
- Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
@@ -583,12 +598,13 @@ kernel command line.
Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
- retpoline
- replace indirect branches
- retpoline,generic
- google's original retpoline
- retpoline,amd
- AMD-specific minimal thunk
+ retpoline auto pick between generic,lfence
+ retpoline,generic Retpolines
+ retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch
+ retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence
+ eibrs enhanced IBRS
+ eibrs,retpoline enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
+ eibrs,lfence enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
@@ -599,7 +615,7 @@ kernel command line.
spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
cannot be disabled.
-For spectre_v2_user see :doc:`/admin-guide/kernel-parameters`.
+For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------
@@ -681,7 +697,7 @@ AMD white papers:
.. _spec_ref6:
-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
ARM white papers:
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index f5a27f067db9..7123524a86b8 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5361,8 +5361,12 @@
Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
retpoline - replace indirect branches
- retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
- retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk
+ retpoline,generic - Retpolines
+ retpoline,lfence - LFENCE; indirect branch
+ retpoline,amd - alias for retpoline,lfence
+ eibrs - enhanced IBRS
+ eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
+ eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/pagemap.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/pagemap.rst
index bfc28704856c..6e2e416af783 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/pagemap.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/pagemap.rst
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ There are four components to pagemap:
* Bit 56 page exclusively mapped (since 4.2)
* Bit 57 pte is uffd-wp write-protected (since 5.13) (see
:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst <userfaultfd>`)
- * Bits 57-60 zero
+ * Bits 58-60 zero
* Bit 61 page is file-page or shared-anon (since 3.5)
* Bit 62 page swapped
* Bit 63 page present