summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/Documentation/admin-guide
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-12-01 23:35:48 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-12-01 23:35:48 +0300
commit4b78317679c4f3782a3cff0ddb269c1fcfde7621 (patch)
treefd3d202ef58da346528625067bc139bc19b28726 /Documentation/admin-guide
parent880584176ed7875117a5ba76cf316cb60f7ad30b (diff)
parent55a974021ec952ee460dc31ca08722158639de72 (diff)
downloadlinux-4b78317679c4f3782a3cff0ddb269c1fcfde7621.tar.xz
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull STIBP fallout fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "The performance destruction department finally got it's act together and came up with a cure for the STIPB regression: - Provide a command line option to control the spectre v2 user space mitigations. Default is either seccomp or prctl (if seccomp is disabled in Kconfig). prctl allows mitigation opt-in, seccomp enables the migitation for sandboxed processes. - Rework the code to handle the conditional STIBP/IBPB control and remove the now unused ptrace_may_access_sched() optimization attempt - Disable STIBP automatically when SMT is disabled - Optimize the switch_to() logic to avoid MSR writes and invocations of __switch_to_xtra(). - Make the asynchronous speculation TIF updates synchronous to prevent stale mitigation state. As a general cleanup this also makes retpoline directly depend on compiler support and removes the 'minimal retpoline' option which just pretended to provide some form of security while providing none" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits) x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content x86/speculation: Split out TIF update ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm() x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key ...
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide')
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt56
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 5d6ba930d4f4..aefd358a5ca3 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4199,9 +4199,13 @@
spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+ The default operation protects the kernel from
+ user space attacks.
- on - unconditionally enable
- off - unconditionally disable
+ on - unconditionally enable, implies
+ spectre_v2_user=on
+ off - unconditionally disable, implies
+ spectre_v2_user=off
auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
vulnerable
@@ -4211,6 +4215,12 @@
CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
compiler with which the kernel was built.
+ Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+ against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+ Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+ the user space protections.
+
Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
retpoline - replace indirect branches
@@ -4220,6 +4230,48 @@
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
+ spectre_v2_user=
+ [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+ user space tasks
+
+ on - Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+ enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+ off - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+ enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+ prctl - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+ but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+ per thread. The mitigation control state
+ is inherited on fork.
+
+ prctl,ibpb
+ - Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different user
+ space processes.
+
+ seccomp
+ - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+ threads will enable the mitigation unless
+ they explicitly opt out.
+
+ seccomp,ibpb
+ - Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different
+ user space processes.
+
+ auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+ the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+ Default mitigation:
+ If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
spec_store_bypass_disable=
[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)