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author | Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> | 2020-08-06 14:15:47 +0300 |
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committer | Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> | 2020-08-06 14:15:47 +0300 |
commit | 94fb1afb14c4f0ceb8c5508ddddac6819f662e95 (patch) | |
tree | 4988e5769dc7482caa7f441475ae31f50bbd37ef /Documentation/staging/speculation.rst | |
parent | c4735d990268399da9133b0ad445e488ece009ad (diff) | |
parent | 47ec5303d73ea344e84f46660fff693c57641386 (diff) | |
download | linux-94fb1afb14c4f0ceb8c5508ddddac6819f662e95.tar.xz |
Mgerge remote-tracking branch 'torvalds/master' into perf/core
To sync headers, for instance, in this case tools/perf was ahead of
upstream till Linus merged tip/perf/core to get the
PERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKE changes:
Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h'
diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/staging/speculation.rst')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/staging/speculation.rst | 92 |
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/staging/speculation.rst b/Documentation/staging/speculation.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8045d99bcf12 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/staging/speculation.rst @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +=========== +Speculation +=========== + +This document explains potential effects of speculation, and how undesirable +effects can be mitigated portably using common APIs. + +------------------------------------------------------------------------------ + +To improve performance and minimize average latencies, many contemporary CPUs +employ speculative execution techniques such as branch prediction, performing +work which may be discarded at a later stage. + +Typically speculative execution cannot be observed from architectural state, +such as the contents of registers. However, in some cases it is possible to +observe its impact on microarchitectural state, such as the presence or +absence of data in caches. Such state may form side-channels which can be +observed to extract secret information. + +For example, in the presence of branch prediction, it is possible for bounds +checks to be ignored by code which is speculatively executed. Consider the +following code:: + + int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) + { + if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) + return 0; + else + return array[index]; + } + +Which, on arm64, may be compiled to an assembly sequence such as:: + + CMP <index>, #MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS + B.LT less + MOV <returnval>, #0 + RET + less: + LDR <returnval>, [<array>, <index>] + RET + +It is possible that a CPU mis-predicts the conditional branch, and +speculatively loads array[index], even if index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS. This +value will subsequently be discarded, but the speculated load may affect +microarchitectural state which can be subsequently measured. + +More complex sequences involving multiple dependent memory accesses may +result in sensitive information being leaked. Consider the following +code, building on the prior example:: + + int load_dependent_arrays(int *arr1, int *arr2, int index) + { + int val1, val2, + + val1 = load_array(arr1, index); + val2 = load_array(arr2, val1); + + return val2; + } + +Under speculation, the first call to load_array() may return the value +of an out-of-bounds address, while the second call will influence +microarchitectural state dependent on this value. This may provide an +arbitrary read primitive. + +==================================== +Mitigating speculation side-channels +==================================== + +The kernel provides a generic API to ensure that bounds checks are +respected even under speculation. Architectures which are affected by +speculation-based side-channels are expected to implement these +primitives. + +The array_index_nospec() helper in <linux/nospec.h> can be used to +prevent information from being leaked via side-channels. + +A call to array_index_nospec(index, size) returns a sanitized index +value that is bounded to [0, size) even under cpu speculation +conditions. + +This can be used to protect the earlier load_array() example:: + + int load_array(int *array, unsigned int index) + { + if (index >= MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS) + return 0; + else { + index = array_index_nospec(index, MAX_ARRAY_ELEMS); + return array[index]; + } + } |