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| author | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2024-03-09 19:48:35 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2024-03-09 19:48:35 +0300 |
| commit | 7d8942d8e73843de35b3737b8be50f8fef6796bb (patch) | |
| tree | 593e26864092f6829b25a1847cb5e2172ae7de53 /arch/riscv/kvm | |
| parent | 0cbca1bf44a0b8666c91ce3438f235c6fe70fbf1 (diff) | |
| parent | 2dfd2383034421101300a3b7325cf339a182d218 (diff) | |
| download | linux-7d8942d8e73843de35b3737b8be50f8fef6796bb.tar.xz | |
Merge tag 'kvm-x86-guest_memfd_fixes-6.8' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD
KVM GUEST_MEMFD fixes for 6.8:
- Make KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD mutually exclusive with KVM_MEM_READONLY to
avoid creating ABI that KVM can't sanely support.
- Update documentation for KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM to make it abundantly
clear that such VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle, and
come with zero guarantees.
- Limit KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM guests to the TDP MMU, as the long term plan
is to support confidential VMs with deterministic private memory (SNP
and TDX) only in the TDP MMU.
- Fix a bug in a GUEST_MEMFD negative test that resulted in false passes
when verifying that KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD memslots can't be dirty logged.
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/riscv/kvm')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c | 20 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c index 01f09fe8c3b0..d8cf9ca28c61 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c @@ -26,8 +26,12 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { gpa_t shmem = vcpu->arch.sta.shmem; u64 last_steal = vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal; - u32 *sequence_ptr, sequence; - u64 *steal_ptr, steal; + __le32 __user *sequence_ptr; + __le64 __user *steal_ptr; + __le32 sequence_le; + __le64 steal_le; + u32 sequence; + u64 steal; unsigned long hva; gfn_t gfn; @@ -47,22 +51,22 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return; } - sequence_ptr = (u32 *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) + + sequence_ptr = (__le32 __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) + offsetof(struct sbi_sta_struct, sequence)); - steal_ptr = (u64 *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) + + steal_ptr = (__le64 __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) + offsetof(struct sbi_sta_struct, steal)); - if (WARN_ON(get_user(sequence, sequence_ptr))) + if (WARN_ON(get_user(sequence_le, sequence_ptr))) return; - sequence = le32_to_cpu(sequence); + sequence = le32_to_cpu(sequence_le); sequence += 1; if (WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), sequence_ptr))) return; - if (!WARN_ON(get_user(steal, steal_ptr))) { - steal = le64_to_cpu(steal); + if (!WARN_ON(get_user(steal_le, steal_ptr))) { + steal = le64_to_cpu(steal_le); vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal = READ_ONCE(current->sched_info.run_delay); steal += vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal - last_steal; WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le64(steal), steal_ptr)); |