Merge tag 'v5.4-rc8' into WIP.x86/mm, to pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 69 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index d4bbebe1d72f..887bf86c447a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ config X86
 	select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV			if X86_64
+	select ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
 	select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API		if X86_64
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_DEVMAP		if X86_64
@@ -147,6 +148,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK		if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
+	select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS
 	select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
 	select HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL
 	select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING		if X86_64
@@ -794,6 +796,7 @@ config KVM_GUEST
 	bool "KVM Guest support (including kvmclock)"
 	depends on PARAVIRT
 	select PARAVIRT_CLOCK
+	select ARCH_CPUIDLE_HALTPOLL
 	default y
 	---help---
 	  This option enables various optimizations for running under the KVM
@@ -802,6 +805,12 @@ config KVM_GUEST
 	  underlying device model, the host provides the guest with
 	  timing infrastructure such as time of day, and system time
 
+config ARCH_CPUIDLE_HALTPOLL
+        def_bool n
+        prompt "Disable host haltpoll when loading haltpoll driver"
+        help
+	  If virtualized under KVM, disable host haltpoll.
+
 config PVH
 	bool "Support for running PVH guests"
 	---help---
@@ -1519,9 +1528,6 @@ config X86_CPA_STATISTICS
 	  helps to determine the effectiveness of preserving large and huge
 	  page mappings when mapping protections are changed.
 
-config ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT
-	def_bool y
-
 config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support"
 	depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD
@@ -1935,6 +1941,51 @@ config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 
 	  If unsure, say y.
 
+choice
+	prompt "TSX enable mode"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF
+	help
+	  Intel's TSX (Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature
+	  allows to optimize locking protocols through lock elision which
+	  can lead to a noticeable performance boost.
+
+	  On the other hand it has been shown that TSX can be exploited
+	  to form side channel attacks (e.g. TAA) and chances are there
+	  will be more of those attacks discovered in the future.
+
+	  Therefore TSX is not enabled by default (aka tsx=off). An admin
+	  might override this decision by tsx=on the command line parameter.
+	  Even with TSX enabled, the kernel will attempt to enable the best
+	  possible TAA mitigation setting depending on the microcode available
+	  for the particular machine.
+
+	  This option allows to set the default tsx mode between tsx=on, =off
+	  and =auto. See Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt for more
+	  details.
+
+	  Say off if not sure, auto if TSX is in use but it should be used on safe
+	  platforms or on if TSX is in use and the security aspect of tsx is not
+	  relevant.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF
+	bool "off"
+	help
+	  TSX is disabled if possible - equals to tsx=off command line parameter.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON
+	bool "on"
+	help
+	  TSX is always enabled on TSX capable HW - equals the tsx=on command
+	  line parameter.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO
+	bool "auto"
+	help
+	  TSX is enabled on TSX capable HW that is believed to be safe against
+	  side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter.
+endchoice
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
@@ -2026,20 +2077,30 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
 config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
 
-config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
 	depends on KEXEC_FILE
 	---help---
-	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
-	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
 
-	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
+	  This option makes the kexec_file_load() syscall check for a valid
+	  signature of the kernel image.  The image can still be loaded without
+	  a valid signature unless you also enable KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, though if
+	  there's a signature that we can check, then it must be valid.
+
+	  In addition to this option, you need to enable signature
 	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
 	  loaded in order for this to work.
 
+config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
+	bool "Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall"
+	depends on KEXEC_SIG
+	---help---
+	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
+	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
+
 config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
 	bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support"
-	depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+	depends on KEXEC_SIG
 	depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION
 	select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	---help---