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author | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2018-11-25 21:33:55 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-12-05 21:41:22 +0300 |
commit | ca97dd0009e688a67f6e22ce3fce0b4523741243 (patch) | |
tree | 9f65b98f89fcdf24395d4945ea9992a5af201a6e /arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | |
parent | 605b2828ff55471d8b2ab0b405991895a2216e06 (diff) | |
download | linux-ca97dd0009e688a67f6e22ce3fce0b4523741243.tar.xz |
x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode
commit 6b3e64c237c072797a9ec918654a60e3a46488e2 upstream
If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected
on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which
restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl.
SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it
makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as
well.
The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works:
Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor
prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical
processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes
(or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core.
Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task
running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on
different hyper-threads from being attacked.
While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between
the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that
STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of
course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no
requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that
direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel
clarifies the whole mechanism.
IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot
mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same
logical processor.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 35ef92c5cc66..a633767419f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE, SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT, SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP, }; /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ |