diff options
author | Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> | 2022-02-16 22:57:01 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2022-02-21 12:21:35 +0300 |
commit | 1e19da8522c81bf46b335f84137165741e0d82b7 (patch) | |
tree | 406c56c0f671da6a45aa02a4694f60dd993db13d /arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | |
parent | d45476d9832409371537013ebdd8dc1a7781f97a (diff) | |
download | linux-1e19da8522c81bf46b335f84137165741e0d82b7.tar.xz |
x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options
Thanks to the chaps at VUsec it is now clear that eIBRS is not
sufficient, therefore allow enabling of retpolines along with eIBRS.
Add spectre_v2=eibrs, spectre_v2=eibrs,lfence and
spectre_v2=eibrs,retpoline options to explicitly pick your preferred
means of mitigation.
Since there's new mitigations there's also user visible changes in
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 to reflect these
new mitigations.
[ bp: Massage commit message, trim error messages,
do more precise eIBRS mode checking. ]
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Colp <patrick.colp@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index c91d97bee237..acbaeaf83b61 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -190,7 +190,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_NONE, SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE, SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE, - SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, + SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS, + SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, + SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE, }; /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ |