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| author | Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> | 2022-06-15 00:16:02 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2022-06-27 11:34:00 +0300 |
| commit | 3ebc170068885b6fc7bedda6c667bb2c4d533159 (patch) | |
| tree | 1e91294a6b76f0d2fe842e035bbd588fd63d75cd /arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | |
| parent | d147553b64bad34d2f92cb7d8ba454ae95c3baac (diff) | |
| download | linux-3ebc170068885b6fc7bedda6c667bb2c4d533159.tar.xz | |
x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb
jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead.
It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but
it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary
instruction boundaries.
On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates
"arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries".
But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block
boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker
predictions.
On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP
or no-SMT):
1) Nothing System wide open
2) jmp2ret May stop a script kiddy
3) jmp2ret+chickenbit Raises the bar rather further
4) IBPB Only thing which can count as "safe".
Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit
on Zen1 according to lmbench.
[ bp: Fixup feature bit comments, document option, 32-bit build fix. ]
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 8 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 455d79c6c2f3..05dd75478d7b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -123,14 +123,17 @@ * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD * typically has NO_MELTDOWN). * - * Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack. + * While zen_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack, + * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX. * * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. */ .macro UNTRAIN_RET #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET + ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ + "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \ + "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB #endif .endm @@ -147,6 +150,7 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[]; extern void __x86_return_thunk(void); extern void zen_untrain_ret(void); +extern void entry_ibpb(void); #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE |