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| author | Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> | 2024-05-31 07:46:44 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2024-06-21 15:40:04 +0300 |
| commit | 2fad668438d2070bbbab453b7f333ff9843c6905 (patch) | |
| tree | 997cd36034ce8d6847a518270fe81bcd63a70d23 /arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | |
| parent | ad709ff76db729da6d478cbbfd4dd4757f9b8f58 (diff) | |
| download | linux-2fad668438d2070bbbab453b7f333ff9843c6905.tar.xz | |
KVM: SEV-ES: Delegate LBR virtualization to the processor
[ Upstream commit b7e4be0a224fe5c6be30c1c8bdda8d2317ad6ba4 ]
As documented in APM[1], LBR Virtualization must be enabled for SEV-ES
guests. Although KVM currently enforces LBRV for SEV-ES guests, there
are multiple issues with it:
o MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is still intercepted. Since MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR
interception is used to dynamically toggle LBRV for performance reasons,
this can be fatal for SEV-ES guests. For ex SEV-ES guest on Zen3:
[guest ~]# wrmsr 0x1d9 0x4
KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0xffffffff
EAX=00000004 EBX=00000000 ECX=000001d9 EDX=00000000
Fix this by never intercepting MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR for SEV-ES guests.
No additional save/restore logic is required since MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR
is of swap type A.
o KVM will disable LBRV if userspace sets MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR before the
VMSA is encrypted. Fix this by moving LBRV enablement code post VMSA
encryption.
[1]: AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Pub. 40332, Rev. 4.07 - June
2023, Vol 2, 15.35.2 Enabling SEV-ES.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=304653
Fixes: 376c6d285017 ("KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading")
Co-developed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240531044644.768-4-ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 3363e5ba0fff..4650153afa46 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs { { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false }, @@ -990,7 +991,7 @@ void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb) vmcb_mark_dirty(to_vmcb, VMCB_LBR); } -static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); @@ -1000,6 +1001,9 @@ static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1); set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1); + if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) + set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, 1, 1); + /* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr); @@ -1009,6 +1013,8 @@ static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + KVM_BUG_ON(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm), vcpu->kvm); + svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 0, 0); set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 0, 0); |